Camellia Encryption for Kerberos 5
draft-ietf-krb-wg-camellia-cts-00

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Last updated 2011-10-06
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Kerberos Working Group                                    G. Hudson, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                   MIT Kerberos Consortium
Expires: April 8, 2012                                   October 6, 2011

                   Camellia Encryption for Kerberos 5
                   draft-ietf-krb-wg-camellia-cts-00

Abstract

   This document specifies two encryption types and two corresponding
   checksum types for the Kerberos cryptosystem suite.  The new types
   use the Camellia block cipher in CBC-mode with ciphertext stealing
   and the CMAC algorithm for integrity protection.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   The Camellia block cipher, described in [RFC3713], has a 128-bit
   block size and a 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key size, similar to
   AES.  This document specifies Kerberos encryption and checksum types
   for Camellia using 128-bit or 256-bit keys.  The new types conform to
   the framework specified in [RFC3961], but do not use the simplified
   profile.

   Like the simplified profile, the new types use key derivation to
   produce keys for encryption, integrity protection, and checksum
   operations.  Instead of the [RFC3961] section 5.1 key derivation
   function, the new types use a key derivation function from the family
   specified in [SP800-108].

   The new types use the CMAC algorithm for integrity protection and
   checksum operations.  As a consequence, they do not rely on a hash
   algorithm except when generating keys from strings.

   Like the AES encryption types [RFC3962], the new encryption types use
   CBC mode with ciphertext stealing to avoid the need for padding.
   They also use the same PBKDF2 algorithm for key generation from
   strings, with a modification to the salt string to ensure that
   different keys are generated for Camellia and AES encryption types.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Protocol Key Representation

   The Camellia key space is dense, so we use random octet strings
   directly as keys.  The first bit of the Camellia bit string is the
   high bit of the first byte of the random octet string.

3.  Key Generation from Strings

   We use a variation on the key generation algorithm specified in
   [RFC3962] section 4.

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   First, to ensure that different long-term keys are used with Camellia
   and AES, we prepend the enctype name to the salt string, separated by
   a null byte.  The enctype name is "camellia128-cts-cmac" or
   "camellia256-cts-cmac" (without the quotes).

   Second, the final key derivation step uses the algorithm described in
   Section 4 instead of the key derivation algorithm used by the
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