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Shepherd writeup
draft-ietf-krb-wg-camellia-cts

(1.a)  Who is the Document Shepherd for this document?  Has the
       Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
       document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
       version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

       >> The Document Shepherd for this document is Jeffrey Hutzelman,
       >> <jhutz@cmu.edu>.  I have reviewed this document, and I believe
       >> it is ready for IETF-wide review and publication as a
       >> Proposed Standard.

(1.b)  Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
       and from key non-WG members?  Does the Document Shepherd have
       any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
       have been performed?

       >> This document is the result of an effort which involved
       >> both individuals with extensive experience with the Kerberos
       >> cryptographic framework and those who have been involved in
       >> specifying support for Camellia in other IETF protocols.
       >> It has been extensively reviewed and discussed within the
       >> working group, and all technical issues raised have been
       >> resolved.  I have no concerns about the level of review
       >> this document has received.

(1.c)  Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
       needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
       e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
       AAA, internationalization or XML?

       >> I don't believe any particular additional outside review
       >> is required.  Of course, more review is always welcome.

(1.d)  Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
       issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
       and/or the IESG should be aware of?  For example, perhaps he
       or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
       has concerns whether there really is a need for it.  In any
       event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
       that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
       concerns here.  Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
       been filed?  If so, please include a reference to the
       disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
       this issue.

       >> I have no particular concerns about this document.  NTT
       >> and Mitsubishi Electric have filed a joint IPR statement
       >> #1304, related to use of Camellia in Kerberos.  Similar
       >> disclosures had been filed previously related to IPsec,
       >> TLS, S/MIME, and OpenPGP.  This issue has been discussed
       >> briefly within the working group, and there were no
       >> objections to proceeding with this work once the IPR
       >> disclosure was filed.

(1.e)  How solid is the WG consensus behind this document?  Does it
       represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
       others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
       agree with it?

       >> There is concensus within the working group to publish this
       >> document.  The authors have requested publication on the
       >> standards track; however, there is no consensus within the
       >> working group to do so at this time.  There is a possibility
       >> that a consensus may emerge in the future to adopt one or
       >> both of the enctypes defined in this document as mandatory
       >> to implement for Kerberos; if that happens, we will likely
       >> request that the document be reclassified as a Proposed
       >> Standard.  However, no such consensus exists at this time.

(1.f)  Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
       discontent?  If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
       separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director.  (It
       should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
       entered into the ID Tracker.)

       >> There have been no expressions of discontent.

(1.g)  Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
       document satisfies all ID nits?  (See
       http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and
       http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/).  Boilerplate checks are
       not enough; this check needs to be thorough.  Has the document
       met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
       Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?

       >> This document has been run through the idnits tool, and was
       >> reviewed manually for compliance with requirements not checked
       >> by the automatic tool.  No additional formal review criteria
       >> apply to this document.

(1.h)  Has the document split its references into normative and
       informative?  Are there normative references to documents that
       are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
       state?  If such normative references exist, what is the
       strategy for their completion?  Are there normative references
       that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]?  If
       so, list these downward references to support the Area
       Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

       >> References have been split appropriately.
       >>
       >> This document contains a normative reference to RFC3713,
       >> and informational document which describes the Camellia
       >> cipher.  We don't see a problem with this, even if the
       >> document is published on the standards track, as this is
       >> consistent with current practice within the IETF relating
       >> to descriptions of cryptographic algorithms.
       >>
       >> This document also contains normative references to two
       >> NIST special publications.  While these are not IETF
       >> documents, we feel they are suitably stable to be used as
       >> normative references by a protocol specification.
       >>
       >> There are no normative references to IETF documents that
       >> are not ready for advancement.

(1.i)  Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
       consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
       of the document?  If the document specifies protocol
       extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
       registries?  Are the IANA registries clearly identified?  If
       the document creates a new registry, does it define the
       proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
       procedure for future registrations?  Does it suggest a
       reasonable name for the new registry?  See [RFC2434].  If the
       document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
       conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
       can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

       >> This document defines new Kerberos encryption and checksum
       >> types, which require assignment of numbers in IANA-managed
       >> namespaces.  The IANA considerations section correctly
       >> identifies the required registrations.

(1.j)  Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
       document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
       code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
       an automated checker?

       >> XXX test vectors
       >> No part of this document is written in a formal language
       >> requiring such verification.

(1.k)  The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
       Announcement Write-Up.  Please provide such a Document
       Announcement Write-Up?  Recent examples can be found in the
       "Action" announcements for approved documents.  The approval
       announcement contains the following sections:


Technical Summary

   This document specifies two encryption types and two corresponding
   checksum types for the Kerberos cryptosystem framework defined in RFC
   3961.  The new types use the Camellia block cipher in CBC-mode with
   ciphertext stealing and the CMAC algorithm for integrity protection.


Working Group Summary

   This document represents the consensus of the Kerberos Working Group.


Document Quality

   XXX test vectors / other implementations
   At least one major Kerberos XXX has implemented support for the
   encryption and checksum types described in this document.


Personnel

   The Document Shepherd for this document is Jeffrey Hutzelman.
   The responsible Area Director is Stephen Farrell.

vim:fo=tcroql com=b\:>>
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