Container Authenticated by Multiple MACs
draft-ietf-krb-wg-cammac-01

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (krb-wg WG)
Last updated 2012-02-09
Replaced by rfc7751, draft-ietf-kitten-cammac
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Internet Engineering Task Force                            S. Sorce, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Red Hat
Intended status: Standards Track                              T. Yu, Ed.
Expires: August 12, 2012                                T. Hardjono, Ed.
                                                 MIT Kerberos Consortium
                                                             Feb 9, 2012

                Container Authenticated by Multiple MACs
                      draft-ietf-krb-wg-cammac-01

Abstract

   Abstract: This document proposes a Kerberos Authorization Data
   container similar to AD-KDC-ISSUED, but that allows for multiple MACs
   or signatures on the contained Authorization Data elements.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 12, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Sorce, et al.            Expires August 12, 2012                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft  Container Authenticated by Multiple MACs        Feb 2012

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   4.  Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     4.1.  AD-CAMMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   5.  Assigned numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   Appendix A.  Additional Stuff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Sorce, et al.            Expires August 12, 2012                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft  Container Authenticated by Multiple MACs        Feb 2012

1.  Introduction

   This draft proposes a Authorization Data container for Kerberos that
   identifies a base set of MAC and other elements necessary to
   authenticate the authorization data being carried in such a way that
   not only the KDC but also services can independently verify that the
   data has been authenticated by the KDC and has not been tampered
   with.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Validation

   Authorization data is highly sensitive and must be validated to
   insure no tampering has occured.

   In order to validate any information the receiving client need to be
   able to cryptographically verify the data.  This is done by
   introducing a new AuthorizationData element called AD-CAMMAC that
   contains enough information to bind the contents to a principal in a
   way that a receiving client can verify autonomusly without further
   contact with the KDC.

   The following information is needed:

   o  The KDC signature.

   o  The Service Signature.

   o  Optional Trusted Service Key Signature.

   o  Optional PUBKEY KDC Signature.

   The KDC signature is required to allow the KDC to validate the data
   withouth requiring to recompute the contents at every TGS request.

   The SVC signature is required so that the Service can verify that the
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