As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document
Changes are expected over time. This version is dated September 17, 2008.
(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?
Sam hartman; yes.
(1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
have been performed?
(1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
AAA, internationalization or XML?
(1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
(1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
agree with it?
When this work was originally proposed, it was out of charter for the
working group. There was strong support for the work, although for
reasons unclear to the chairs, several WG participants wanted to see
the work go forward as a WG draft even though that meant
rechartering, rather than going forward immediately as an
AD-sponsored proposed standard. The author updated the draft based
on the discussion, the WG was rechartered and the document was
adopted and last called. Two individuals expressed support in last
call; no other comments were made. This plus the strong support
expressed prior to adoption suggests a fairly strong consensus.
(1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
entered into the ID Tracker.)
(1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
document satisfies all ID nits? (See the Internet-Drafts Checklist
and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?
I've reviewed, yes. Looks good. There are some typos and usage
errors. I've asked for some editorial corrections if a new version
is required later in the process. However, this is well within the
sort of thing the rfc-editor routinely corrects and I believe the
technical content is clear now and will remain clear if the rfc
editor corrects these issues. So, if we need another version
editorial fixes before rfc-editor would be good, but they are not
(1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
informative? Are there normative references to documents that
are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
state? If such normative references exist, what is the
strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
so, list these downward references to support the Area
Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].
The references are split. There are a couple of normative references
that probably could be informative, but none of them are downward
references or references to IDs so I don't see a point in being
ultra picky about this.
(1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
of the document? If the document specifies protocol
extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
the document creates a new registry, does it define the
proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC5226]. If the
document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?
The document accurately states no IANA actions. No new message types
are introduces; this document simply describes additional semantics
for an existing message.
(1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
an automated checker?
(1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
"Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
announcement contains the following sections:
The Kerberos 5 KRB-CRED message is used to transfer Kerberos
credentials between applications. When used with a secure transport
the unencrypted form of the KRB-CRED message may be desirable. This
document describes the unencrypted form of the KRB-CRED message.
Working Group Summary
The Kerberos Working group had consensus to publish this document as a
The OASIS Security Services TC received a request for a mechanism to
transport a Kerberos ticket and associated credential information in
the Security Assertion Markup Language. This will be transported over
a confidentiality and integrity protected channel. The intent is for a
SAML IDP to be able to permit a SAML service to use Kerberos acting on
behalf of some subject. As such, the service may have no existing
Kerberos keying material but will have SAML keying material. As an
implementation accident, at least three Kerberos implementations
already had a facility for transporting Kerberos credentials without a
key. Previously this was thought to be an unneeded facility that at
best was yet another corner case to test. This document standardizes
that already widely implemented facility because it happened to meet
the needs of the WG in this area.