Using Pre-Shared Key (PSK) in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-06

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INTERNET-DRAFT                                                R. Housley
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                    Vigil Security
Intended Status: Proposed Standard
Expires: 6 February 2020                                   6 August 2019

  Using Pre-Shared Key (PSK) in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
               <draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-06.txt>

Abstract

   The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious
   challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed
   today.  The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) supports key transport
   and key agreement algorithms that could be broken by the invention of
   such a quantum computer.  By storing communications that are
   protected with the CMS today, someone could decrypt them in the
   future when a large-scale quantum computer becomes available.  Once
   quantum-secure key management algorithms are available, the CMS will
   be extended to support the new algorithms, if the existing syntax
   does not accommodate them.  In the near-term, this document describes
   a mechanism to protect today's communication from the future
   invention of a large-scale quantum computer by mixing the output of
   key transport and key agreement algorithms with a pre-shared key.

Status of this Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Housley                                                         [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT            Using PSK in the CMS               August 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  ASN.1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.3.  Version Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   10.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     10.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     10.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Appendix A: Key Transport with PSK Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     A.1.  Originator Processing Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     A.2.  ContentInfo and AuthEnvelopedData  . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     A.3.  Recipient Processing Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   Appendix B: Key Agreement with PSK Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     B.1.  Originator Processing Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     B.2.  ContentInfo and AuthEnvelopedData  . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     B.3.  Recipient Processing Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

1.  Introduction

   The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious
   challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed
   today [S1994].  It is an open question whether or not it is feasible
   to build a large-scale quantum computer, and if so, when that might
   happen [NAS2019].  However, if such a quantum computer is invented,