Using Pre-Shared Key (PSK) in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-03
INTERNET-DRAFT R. Housley
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Vigil Security
Intended Status: Proposed Standard
Expires: 8 September 2019 8 March 2019
Using Pre-Shared Key (PSK) in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
<draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-03.txt>
Abstract
The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious
challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed
today. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) supports key transport
and key agreement algorithms that could be broken by the invention of
such a quantum computer. By storing communications that are
protected with the CMS today, someone could decrypt them in the
future when a large-scale quantum computer becomes available. Once
quantum-secure key management algorithms are available, the CMS will
be extended to support the new algorithms, if the existing syntax
does not accommodate them. In the near-term, this document describes
a mechanism to protect today's communication from the future
invention of a large-scale quantum computer by mixing the output of
key transport and key agreement algorithms with a pre-shared key.
Status of this Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Housley [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT Using PSK in the CMS March 2019
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. ASN.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Version Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A: Key Transport with PSK Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.1. Originator Processing Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. ContentInfo and AuthEnvelopedData . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.3. Recipient Processing Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix B: Key Agreement with PSK Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.1. Originator Processing Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.2. ContentInfo and AuthEnvelopedData . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.3. Recipient Processing Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction
The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious
challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed
today. It is an open question whether or not it is feasible to build
a large-scale quantum computer, and if so, when that might happen.
However, if such a quantum computer is invented, many of the
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