Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-01
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8702.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Quynh Dang , Panos Kampanakis | ||
| Last updated | 2018-06-30 | ||
| Replaces | draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 8702 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-01
LAMPS WG Q. Dang
Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis
Expires: December 31, 2018 Cisco Systems
June 29, 2018
Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-01
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.
* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt and
MFG, according the WG consensus.
* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:
* Various updates to title and section names.
* Content changes filling in text and references.
o draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00:
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* Initial version
2. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, it
describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature
algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.
The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128
and SHAKE256 are defined. Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this
document. A SHAKE is a variable length hash function. The output
lengths, in bits, of the SHAKE hash functions are defined by the d
parameter. The corresponding collision and preimage resistance
security levels for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits.
A SHAKE can be used in CMS as a message digest, message
authentication code or a mask generation function (in RSASSA-PSS).
In this document we define six new OIDs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
in CMS.
3. Identifiers
The object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for
convenience.
id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 }
id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 }
In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len or id-
shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent.
That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the
OID.
The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
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id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
below.
id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ]
The same RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with SHAKEs algorithm identifiers are
used for identifying public keys and signatures.
The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be
absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID.
The new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
below.
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }
EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST.
The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST
be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID.
4. Use in CMS
4.1. Message Digests
The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used
as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,
SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
fields in CMS [RFC5652]. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field
and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest
MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively.
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The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the
Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest
values are input to signature algorithms.
4.2. Signatures
In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the
SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature.
Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with
SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm in the maskGenAlgorithm used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the
same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of the
SHAKE which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
The maskGenAlgorithm is the MGF1 specified in Section B.2.1 of
[RFC8017]. A mask generation function in RSASSA-PSS takes an octet
string of variable length and a desired output length as input, and
outputs an octet string of the desired length. The output length for
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the hash function in MGF1 is (n -
264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA modulus
in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output length
for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in the maskGenAlgorithm will be 223 or 191
when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used
respectively.
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
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4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the
parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-
ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively. The ECDSA message hash function is
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively.
4.3. Public Keys
In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.
The conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm
identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] ,
but we include them below for convenience.
4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys
[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}
Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3 can be used as the algorithm
attribute in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence. The identifier
parameters, as explained in Section 3, MUST be absent. The RSASSA-
PSS algorithm functions and output lengths are the same as defined in
Section 4.2.1.
Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA
public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,
MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of
this encoding is carried in the CMS publicKey bit string.
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RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER -- e
}
4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys
When id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 are used as the
algorithm identitifier in the public key, the parameters, as
explained in Section 3, MUST be absent. The hash function and its
output-length are the same as in Section 4.2.2.
Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
include them here for convenience:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- implicitCurve NULL
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
}
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
4.4. Message Authentication Codes
KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in
the AuthenticatedData mac field.
When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm
identifier is used as the KMAC algorithm identifier, the parameters
field MUST be absent.
Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.
When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.
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5. IANA Considerations
This document uses several new registries [ EDNOTE: Update here. ]
6. Security Considerations
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions. Their
output length depends on a required length of the consuming
application.
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
the signer's private key permits masquerade.
When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
content could originate from any one of the parties.
Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
relies on random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number
generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result
in little or no security. The generation of quality random numbers
is difficult. [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
[SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs.
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break
a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,
cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should
be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
implementations.
7. Acknowledgements
This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] It replaces SHA3 hash functions by
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-
Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
August 2015.
[SP800-185]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.
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[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[shake-nist-oids]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
Security Objects Register", October 2017,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
[SP800-90A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
June 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
[EDNOTE: Update]
Authors' Addresses
Quynh Dang
NIST
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Email: quynh.Dang@nist.gov
Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com
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