Guidance on End-to-End E-mail Security
draft-ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-02
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Expired & archived
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Author | Daniel Kahn Gillmor | ||
Last updated | 2022-07-29 (Latest revision 2022-01-25) | ||
Replaces | draft-dkg-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | |||
Reviews |
GENART Last Call review
(of
-14)
by Paul Kyzivat
Ready w/nits
OPSDIR Last Call Review due 2024-02-19
Incomplete
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Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
Associated WG milestones |
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Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
End-to-end cryptographic protections for e-mail messages can provide useful security. However, the standards for providing cryptographic protection are extremely flexible. That flexibility can trap users and cause surprising failures. This document offers guidance for mail user agent implementers that need to compose or interpret e-mail messages with end-to-end cryptographic protection. It provides a useful set of vocabulary as well as suggestions to avoid common failures.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)