Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs
draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8692.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Panos Kampanakis , Quynh Dang | ||
| Last updated | 2018-11-25 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
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draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang
Expires: May 29, 2019 NIST
November 25, 2018
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs
draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04
Abstract
Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and
CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the
conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509
certificates and CRLs as one-way hash functions with the RSA
Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The
conventions for the associated subject public keys are also
described.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 29, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04:
* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
Deterministric ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
randomness of k because we are using deterministric ECDSA.
* Various ASN.1 fixes.
* Text fixes.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03:
* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
* Added ASN.1.
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o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in PKIX.
* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcode hash, salt and MGF,
according the WG consensus.
* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
* Consolidated subsection for message digest algorithms.
* Text fixes.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01:
* Changed titles and section names.
* Removed DSA after WG discussions.
* Updated shake OID names and parameters, added MGF1 section.
* Updated RSASSA-PSS section.
* Added Public key algorithm OIDs.
* Populated Introduction and IANA sections.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-00:
* Initial version
2. Introduction
This document describes cryptographic algorithm identifiers for
several cryptographic algorithms which use variable length output
SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the
Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280].
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
variable length hash function. The output length, in bits, of a
SHAKE is defined by the d parameter. The corresponding collision and
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second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128)
and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the corresponding collision
and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE256 are
min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.
A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the
message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA and as the hash in the
mask generating function in RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes
the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in X.509 and their meaning.
3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
4. Identifiers
This section defines four new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA when
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are used. The same algorithm identifiers are
used for identifying a public key in RSASSA-PSS.
The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
below.
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
TBD }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
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The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length
for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In
summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the
SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions RSASSA-PSS, their output
length is (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n is a RSA
modulus size in bits.
5. Use in PKIX
5.1. Signatures
Signatures can be placed in a number of different ASN.1 structures.
The top level structure for an X.509 certificate, to illustrate how
signatures are frequently encoded with an algorithm identifier and a
location for the signature, is
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING }
The identifiers defined in Section 4 can be used as the
AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence
Certificate and the signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate in
X.509 [RFC5280].
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS or
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Conforming
client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE
signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA
signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480]
respectively.
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
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The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of
the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes
respectively.
The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the SHAKEs MUST be
used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-
SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the
seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. The
output length is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where
n is the RSA modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is
2048, the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be
223 or 191-bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
is used respectively.
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
(specified in Section 4) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The
encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-
ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively.
Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE
signatures in certificates or CRLs MUST generate such signatures with
a deterministicly generated, non-random k in accordance with all the
requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such
signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or
[SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
these standards. These standards may have not specified SHAKE128 and
SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
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with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively are
subtitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as
SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.
5.2. Public Keys
Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm
through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier is an OID
and optionally associated parameters.
In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax:
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
}
The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings:
o algorithm is the algorithm identifier and parameters for the
public key.
o subjectPublicKey contains the byte stream of the public key. The
algorithms defined in this document always encode the public key
as an exact multiple of 8-bits.
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS or
ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs. Conforming
client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE
public key when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs. The conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public
keys algorithm identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055]
and [RFC5480] , but we include them below for convenience.
5.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys
[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}
Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifiers
for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 4 can be used as the algorithm
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field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence [RFC5280]. The identifier
parameters, as explained in section Section 4, MUST be absent.
Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA
public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,
MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of
this encoding is carried in the certificate subjectPublicKey.
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER -- e
}
5.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys
For ECDSA, the public key identifier defined in [RFC5480] is
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
Section 2.1.1 and its syntax is in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
include them here for convenience:
The id-ecPublicKey parameters MUST be absent or present and are
defined as
ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- implicitCurve NULL
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
}
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signer's
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
6. IANA Considerations
[ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ]
This document has no IANA actions.
7. Security Considerations
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
function, executing multiple times with the same input will produce
the same output. Therefore, users should not expect unrelated
outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from running a
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SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. The shorter of
any two outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same input is a prefix
of the longer one. It is a similar situation as truncating a 512-bit
output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most bits. These 256 left-
most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
the signer's private key permits masquerade attacks.
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break
a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,
cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should
be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
implementations.
8. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Sean Turner and Jim Schaad for their valuable
contributions to this document.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
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[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,
<https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-
permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 module
This appendix includes the ASN.1 module for SHAKEs in X.509. This
module does not come from any existing RFC.
PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2018 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-shake-2018(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
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BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
-- FROM [RFC5912]
PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
-- FROM [RFC5912]
RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, id-ecPublicKey,
ECPoint, ECDSA-Sig-Value
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
--
-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)
--
HashAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
...
-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5912]
mda-shake128 |
mda-shake256,
...
}
--
-- One-Way Hash Functions
-- SHAKE128
mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
}
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- SHAKE-256
mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
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}
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 }
--
-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms
--
PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
...
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 |
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
...
}
-- From [RFC5912] - Here so it compiles.
pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
-- (n - 264)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 32
-- the trailerField is 1
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
-- (n - 520)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 64
-- the trailerField is 1
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
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IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
pk-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey
KEY ECPoint
PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyAgreement,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve CURVE.&id({NamedCurve})
-- implicitCurve NULL
-- implicitCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedCurve
-- specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX
-- Details for specifiedCurve can be found in [X9.62]
-- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated
-- with ANSI X.9.
}
--
-- Signature Algorithms (sa-)
--
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
...
-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from [RFC5912]
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 |
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256,
...
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256,
...
}
--
-- SMIME Capabilities (sa-)
--
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
...
-- The expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5912]
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
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sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
...
}
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
-- (n - 264)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 32
-- the trailerField is 1
HASHES mda-shake128
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
-- (n - 520)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 64
-- the trailerField is 1
HASHES mda-shake256
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
-- Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE128
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
Kampanakis & Dang Expires May 29, 2019 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft SHAKE identifiers in X.509 November 2018
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
sigAlgs(3) TBD }
-- Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE256
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
sigAlgs(3) TBD }
END
Authors' Addresses
Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com
Quynh Dang
NIST
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
USA
Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov
Kampanakis & Dang Expires May 29, 2019 [Page 15]