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Clarification of RFC7030 CSR Attributes definition
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs-00

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Authors Michael Richardson , Owen Friel , David von Oheimb , Dan Harkins
Last updated 2022-09-16 (Latest revision 2022-08-15)
Replaces draft-richardson-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs
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draft-ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs-00
LAMPS Working Group                                   M. Richardson, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Standards Track                                O. Friel
Expires: 16 February 2023                                          Cisco
                                                           D. von Oheimb
                                                                 Siemens
                                                              D. Harkins
                                                   The Industrial Lounge
                                                          15 August 2022

           Clarification of RFC7030 CSR Attributes definition
                  draft-ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs-00

Abstract

   The Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST, RFC7030) is ambiguous in
   its specification of the CSR Attributes Response.  This has resulted
   in implementation challenges and implementor confusion.

   This document updates RFC7030 (EST) and clarifies how the CSR
   Attributes Response can be used by an EST server to specify both CSR
   attribute OIDs and also CSR attribute values, in particular X.509
   extension values, that the server expects the client to include in
   subsequent CSR request.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 February 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  CSR Attributes Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Extensions to RFC 7030 section 2.6. . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Extensions to RFC 7030 section 4.5.2. . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Co-existence with existing implementations  . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  RFC8994/ACP subjectAltName with specific otherName and
           other extensions included . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  EST server requires public keys of a specific size  . . .   6
     5.3.  EST server requires a public key of a specific algorithm/
           curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.4.  EST server requires a specific extension to be present  .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Identity and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   Enrollment over Secure Transport [RFC7030] (EST) has been used in a
   wide variety of applications.  In particular, [RFC8994] and [RFC8995]
   describe a way to use it in order to build out an autonomic control
   plane (ACP) [RFC8368].

   The ACP requires that each node be given a very specific
   subjectAltName.  In the ACP specification, the solution was for the
   EST server to use section 2.6 of [RFC7030] to convey to the EST
   client the actual subjectAltName that will end up in its certificate.

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   As a result of some implementation challenges, it came to light that
   this particular way of using the CSR attributes was not universally
   agreed upon, and it was suggested that it went contrary to section
   2.6.

   Section 2.6 says that the CSR attributes "can provide additional
   descriptive information that the EST server cannot access itself".
   This is extened to mention also values that the EST server demands to
   use.

   After significant discussion, it has been determined that Section 4.5
   of [RFC7030] specification is sufficiently difficult to read and
   ambiguous to interpret that clarification is needed.

   This document motivates the different use cases, and provides
   additional worked out examples.

   Also section 4.5.2 is extended to clarify the use of the existing
   ASN.1 syntax.  This covers all uses and is fully backward compatible
   with the existing use.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  CSR Attributes Handling

3.1.  Extensions to RFC 7030 section 2.6.

   Replace the second paragraph with the following text.

   These attributes can provide additional descriptive information that
   the EST server cannot access itself, such as the Media Access Control
   (MAC) address of an interface of the EST client.  The EST server can
   also provide concrete values that it tells the client to include in
   the CSR, such as a specific X.509 Subject Alternative Name extension.
   Moreover, these attributes can indicate the kind of enrollment
   request, such as a specific elliptic curve or a specific hash
   function that the client is expected to use when generating the CSR.

3.2.  Extensions to RFC 7030 section 4.5.2.

   The ASN.1 for CSR Attributes as defined in EST section 4.5.2 is:

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      CsrAttrs ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF AttrOrOID

      AttrOrOID ::= CHOICE (oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attribute Attribute }

      Attribute { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE {
           type   ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}),
           values SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{@type}) }

   This remains unchanged, such that bits-on-the-wire compatibility is
   maintained.

   Key parts that were unclear were which OID to use in the 'type' field
   and that the 'values' field can contain an entire sequence of X.509
   extensions.

   The OID to use for such extensions in the 'type' field MUST be
   extensionRequest, which has the numerical value
   1.2.840.113549.1.9.14.  There MUST be only one such attribute.

   The 'values' field of this attribute MUST contain a set with exactly
   one element, and this element MUST by of type Extensions, as per
   Section 4.1 of [RFC5280]:

      Extensions  ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension

      Extension  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
           extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
           critical    BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
           extnValue   OCTET STRING
                       -- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
                       -- corresponding to the extension type identified
                       -- by extnID
           }

   In each such Extensions sequence, an extnID OID MUST appear at most
   once.

   An Extension comprises of the OID of the specific X.509 extension
   (extnID), optionally the 'critical' bit, and the extension value
   (extnValue).

   (TODO: Do we want to allow an empty extnValue (which is of type OCTET
   STRING), which would mean that the client is told to include an X.509
   extension of the given type and fill in the concrete value itself?)

   With this understanding, the needs of [RFC8994] and [RFC8995] are
   satisfied with no change to the bits on the wire.

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   (TODO: Do we want to give the empty list of Extensions a specific
   meaning, such as, no X.509 extensions should be included in the CSR?)

   (TODO: Note that this mechanism does not support telling the client
   to include in the CSR a specific subject DN, simply because there is
   no OID for this.  I think we should better make this clear, or we
   have to define such an OID if setting a subject name should be
   supported.)

4.  Co-existence with existing implementations

5.  Examples

5.1.  RFC8994/ACP subjectAltName with specific otherName and other
      extensions included

   This is a CSR Attributes object with two non-critical
   basicConstraints and extKeyUsage extensions and a critical X.509
   subjectAltName extension that contains both an RFC8994/ACP Subject
   Alternative Name with a specific otherName and an example Subject
   Alternative Name value of type dNSName.

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   SEQUENCE {
     SEQUENCE {
       OBJECT IDENTIFIER extensionRequest (1 2 840 113549 1 9 14)
       SET {
         SEQUENCE {
           SEQUENCE {
             OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
             OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
               SEQUENCE {}
               }
             }
           SEQUENCE {
             OBJECT IDENTIFIER extKeyUsage (2 5 29 37)
             OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
               SEQUENCE {
                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER serverAuth (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 1)
                 }
               }
             }
           SEQUENCE {
             OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17)
             BOOLEAN TRUE
             OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
               SEQUENCE {
                 [0] {
                   OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 10'
                   [0] {
                     IA5String
               'fd89b714f3db00000200000064000000+area51.research'
               '@acp.example.com'
                     }
                   }
                 [2] 'domain.example'
                 }
               }
             }
           }
         }
       }
     }

5.2.  EST server requires public keys of a specific size

   TBD

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5.3.  EST server requires a public key of a specific algorithm/curve

   TBD

5.4.  EST server requires a specific extension to be present

   TBD

6.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations from EST [RFC7030] section 6 are
   unchanged.

6.1.  Identity and Privacy Considerations

   An EST server may use this mechanism to instruct the EST client about
   the identities it should include in the CSR it sends as part of
   enrollment.  The client may only be aware of its IDevID Subject,
   which includes a manufacturer serial number.  The EST server can use
   this mechanism to tell the client to include a specific fully
   qualified domain name in the CSR in order to complete domain
   ownership proofs required by the CA.  Additionally, the EST server
   may deem the manufacturer serial number in an IDevID as personally
   identifiable information, and may want to specify a new random opaque
   identifier that the pledge should use in its CSR.  This may be
   desirable if the CA and EST server have different operators.

7.  IANA Considerations

   No requests are made to IANA.

8.  Acknowledgements

   TODO

9.  Changelog

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

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   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8994]  Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
              Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8994>.

   [RFC8995]  Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
              May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC8368]  Eckert, T., Ed. and M. Behringer, "Using an Autonomic
              Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network
              Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)",
              RFC 8368, DOI 10.17487/RFC8368, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8368>.

Authors' Addresses

   Michael Richardson (editor)
   Sandelman Software Works
   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

   Owen Friel
   Cisco
   Email: ofriel@cisco.com

   Dr. David von Oheimb
   Siemens
   Email: dev@ddvo.net

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   Dan Harkins
   The Industrial Lounge
   Email: dharkins@lounge.org

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