LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)
draft-ietf-lisp-sec-19

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (lisp WG)
Last updated 2019-07-23
Replaces draft-maino-lisp-sec
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Network Working Group                                           F. Maino
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track                              V. Ermagan
Expires: January 24, 2020                                         Google
                                                             A. Cabellos
                                    Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
                                                               D. Saucez
                                                                   INRIA
                                                           July 23, 2019

                        LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)
                         draft-ietf-lisp-sec-19

Abstract

   This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that
   provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
   to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup
   process.  LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID-
   prefix claims in Map-Reply messages.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP14 [RFC2119]
   [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
   here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 24, 2020.

Maino, et al.           Expires January 24, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                  LISP-SEC                       July 2019

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  LISP-SEC Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Protocol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  LISP-SEC Control Messages Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions  . . . .   7
     5.2.  Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.3.  Map-Register LISP-SEC Extentions  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.4.  ITR Processing: Generating a Map-Request  . . . . . . . .  12
       5.4.1.  PITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.5.  Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.5.1.  Unencrypted OTK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.6.  Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.7.  Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.7.1.  Generating a LISP-SEC Protected Encapsulated Map-
               Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.7.2.  Generating a Proxy Map-Reply  . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.8.  ETR Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.9.  ITR Processing: Receiving a Map-Reply . . . . . . . . . .  18
       5.9.1.  Map-Reply Record Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.1.  Mapping System Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.2.  Random Number Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.3.  Map-Server and ETR Colocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.4.  Deploying LISP-SEC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.5.  Shared Keys Provisioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.6.  Replay Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.7.  Message Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
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