LISP Threats Analysis
draft-ietf-lisp-threats-15

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (lisp WG)
Last updated 2016-02-04 (latest revision 2016-01-29)
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Network Working Group                                          D. Saucez
Internet-Draft                                                     INRIA
Intended status: Informational                                L. Iannone
Expires: August 1, 2016                                Telecom ParisTech
                                                          O. Bonaventure
                                        Universite catholique de Louvain
                                                        January 29, 2016

                         LISP Threats Analysis
                     draft-ietf-lisp-threats-15.txt

Abstract

   This document provides a threat analysis of the Locator/Identifier
   Separation Protocol (LISP).

Status of this Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Saucez, et al.           Expires August 1, 2016                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                LISP Threats                  January 2016

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  Attacker's Operation Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.1.  On-path vs. Off-path Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.2.  Internal vs. External Attackers  . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.3.  Live vs. Time-shifted attackers  . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.1.4.  Control-plane vs. Data-plane attackers . . . . . . . .  5
       2.1.5.  Cross mode attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Threat categories  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.1.  Replay attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.2.  Packet manipulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.3.  Packet interception and suppression  . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.4.  Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.5.  Rogue attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.6.  Denial of Service (DoS) attack . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.7.  Performance attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.8.  Intrusion attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.9.  Amplification attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.10. Passive Monitoring Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.2.11. Multi-category attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   3.  Attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  Gleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Locator Status Bits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.3.  Map-Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.4.  Routing Locator Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.5.  Instance ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.6.  Interworking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.7.  Map-Request messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.8.  Map-Reply messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     3.9.  Map-Register messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.10. Map-Notify messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   4.  Note on Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.  Threats Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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