LISP Threats Analysis
draft-ietf-lisp-threats-05

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (lisp WG)
Last updated 2013-08-29
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Network Working Group                                          D. Saucez
Internet-Draft                                                     INRIA
Intended status: Informational                                L. Iannone
Expires: March 2, 2014                                 Telecom ParisTech
                                                          O. Bonaventure
                                        Universite catholique de Louvain
                                                         August 29, 2013

                         LISP Threats Analysis
                     draft-ietf-lisp-threats-05.txt

Abstract

   This document discusses potential security concerns with the Locator/
   Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP) if deployed in the Internet and
   proposes a set of recommendations to mitigate the identified threats
   and to reach a level of security equivalent to what is observed in
   the Internet today (i.e., without LISP).  By following the
   recommendations of this draft a LISP deployment can achieve a
   security level that is comparable to the existing Internet
   architecture.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Saucez, et al.            Expires March 2, 2014                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                LISP Threats                   August 2013

   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Definition of Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  On-path Attackers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Off-Path Attackers: Reference Environment  . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Data-Plane Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.1.  EID-to-RLOC Database Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.2.  EID-to-RLOC Cache Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       5.2.1.  EID-to-RLOC Cache poisoning  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       5.2.2.  EID-to-RLOC Cache overflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.3.  Attacks not leveraging on the LISP header  . . . . . . . .  9
     5.4.  Attacks leveraging on the LISP header  . . . . . . . . . . 10
       5.4.1.  Attacks using the Locator Status Bits  . . . . . . . . 10
       5.4.2.  Attacks using the Map-Version bit  . . . . . . . . . . 11
       5.4.3.  Attacks using the Nonce-Present and the Echo-Nonce
               bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       5.4.4.  Attacks using the Instance ID bits . . . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  Control Plane Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     6.1.  Attacks with Map-Request messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     6.2.  Attacks with Map-Reply messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.3.  Gleaning Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  Threats concerning Interworking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   8.  Threats with Malicious xTRs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   9.  Security of the Proposed Mapping Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     9.1.  LISP+ALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     9.2.  LISP-DDT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   10. Threats concerning LISP-MS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     10.1. Map Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     10.2. Map Resolver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   11. Security Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   12. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   13. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   14. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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