Information Model for Large-Scale Measurement Platforms (LMAPs)
draft-ietf-lmap-information-model-18
Yes
(Alissa Cooper)
No Objection
(Alia Atlas)
(Alvaro Retana)
(Benoît Claise)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Joel Jaeggli)
(Suresh Krishnan)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 17 and is now closed.
Alissa Cooper Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
(for -17)
Unknown
Alexey Melnikov Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2017-03-16 for -17)
Unknown
I only skimmed the document. ma-log-description: A human readable description of the event. As per Section 4 of BCP 18 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp18>, human readable text should be associated with language tags. You should consider adding this functionality to the information model.
Alia Atlas Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -17)
Unknown
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -17)
Unknown
Ben Campbell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2017-03-14 for -17)
Unknown
I concur with Russ's comment in his GenArt review that the credentials/certificates described in section 3.1 warrant discussion in the security considerations section.
Benoît Claise Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -17)
Unknown
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -17)
Unknown
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2017-03-15 for -17)
Unknown
Russ's comment/question about the credentials is a good one. It is fine to have different arrangements for different situations, but Russ’s question was really not about that but whether the CA information mentioned earlier is a part of a specific part of the information model (ma-credentials). I think that deserves clarification.
Joel Jaeggli Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -17)
Unknown
Kathleen Moriarty Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2017-03-14 for -17)
Unknown
In the security considerations section, I see the following text: These mechanisms are important to ensure that the MA cannot be hijacked, for example to participate in a distributed denial of service attack. Wouldn't using the systems or the collected data for network recon (or other attacks) be a more important consideration to be listed than DDoS?
Mirja Kühlewind Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2017-03-10 for -17)
Unknown
Why is this document Standards Track? I think it should be informational! Minor comments/questions: - It's not really explained what tags are (see ma-report-result-tags) ? And what's the differents to options (ma-report-result-options)? - Is it correct that an ma-report-table-obj can cover multiple ma-report-table-functions? Examples would be good here! - Sec 3.7.: "There is no mechanism to prioritise one schedule over another or to mutex scheduled tasks." Why is that? Was this discussed? I would guess that would be important to have! - Wouldn't it makes sense to discuss the common objects first? - The regristry concept is rather unclear to me as it suddently shows up in section 3.10. Especially what's a role in this context (ma-registry-role)? Example?
Stephen Farrell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2017-03-16 for -17)
Unknown
I suspect Leif and Russ are right that credential handling needs a bit more work. (IOW, I agree with Jari's comment.)
Suresh Krishnan Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -17)
Unknown