Security Threats for the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2)
draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats-03

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Last updated 2017-01-05 (latest revision 2016-09-01)
Replaces draft-clausen-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats
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Network Working Group                                         T. Clausen
Internet-Draft                                                U. Herberg
Intended status: Informational
Expires: March 6, 2017                                             J. Yi
                                                     Ecole Polytechnique
                                                       September 2, 2016

Security Threats for the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2
                                (OLSRv2)
                 draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats-03

Abstract

   This document analyzes common security threats of the Optimized Link
   State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2) and describes their
   potential impacts on Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) operations.  It
   then analyzes which of these security vulnerabilities can be
   mitigated when using the mandatory-to-implement security mechanisms
   for OLSRv2, and how the vulnerabilities are mitigated.

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   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Clausen, et al.           Expires March 6, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               OLSRv2 Threats               September 2016

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  OLSRv2 Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       1.1.1.  Neighborhood Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       1.1.2.  MPR Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.1.3.  Link State Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.2.  Link State Vulnerability Taxonomy  . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.3.  OLSRv2 Attack Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Topology Map Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Attack on Jittering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Hop-count and Hop-limit Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.2.1.  Modifying the Hop Limit  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.2.2.  Modifying the Hop Count  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Effective Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  Incorrect Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Wormholes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.3.  Sequence Number Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.3.1.  Message Sequence Number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.3.2.  Advertised Neighbor Sequence Number (ANSN) . . . . . . 11
     4.4.  Indirect Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Inconsistent Topology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     5.1.  Identity Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     5.2.  Link Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       5.2.1.  Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Link State
               Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.  Mitigation of Security Vulnerabilities for OLSRv2  . . . . . . 17
     6.1.  Inherent OLSRv2 Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     6.2.  Resilience by using RFC7183 with OLSRv2  . . . . . . . . . 18
       6.2.1.  Topology Map Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       6.2.2.  Effective Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       6.2.3.  Inconsistent Topology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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