Mobility Support in IPv6
draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis-13
Yes
(Ralph Droms)
No Objection
(Adrian Farrel)
(Gonzalo Camarillo)
(Lars Eggert)
(Robert Sparks)
(Ron Bonica)
(Russ Housley)
(Tim Polk)
Recuse
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 13 and is now closed.
Ralph Droms Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Adrian Farrel Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Alexey Melnikov Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2010-12-01)
Unknown
I've scanned wdiff changes since RFC 3775 and I don't think my review can add much value to the quality of the document. So I have No Objections to its publication.
David Harrington Former IESG member
(was Discuss, No Objection)
No Objection
No Objection
(2010-12-02)
Unknown
1) There is a TBD in 6.1.8 and the IANA Consderations, in the Status Codes registry. 2) "format of the format of the"
Gonzalo Camarillo Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Lars Eggert Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Peter Saint-Andre Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2010-12-01)
Unknown
HMAC appears to be a normative reference.
Robert Sparks Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Ron Bonica Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Sean Turner Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
(2010-12-02)
Unknown
#1) Is there a reason not to point to the latest FIPS PUB 180-3?
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), FIPS
Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, October 2008.
#2) I assume we want good keys? Add the following to the first paragraph in 5.2.1:
The keys MUST be generated by using a random number generator that is known to have good randomness properties [13].
#3) Section 5.2.4: People keep telling me it's SHA-1 not SHA1 when not used with HMAC.
#3) Should the recommendations in Section 5.2.2 and 5.2.4 be made upper case? (i.e., r/recommended/RECOMMENDED).
Stewart Bryant Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2010-12-02)
Unknown
It would be useful to the reader to describe the reason for the update much earlier in the introduction.
Tim Polk Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
(2011-02-21)
Unknown
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
Recuse
Recuse
(2010-12-02)
Unknown
FWIW I have reviewed the final list of changes from RFC 3775 and I think they are all good. Thank you Charlie for doing this work so carefully. With respect to comments raised in IESG and directorate reviews: David's comment about the normative text from RFC 3775. Not sure I understand your comment. The rules on these were one of the specific changes in the bis version. What's wrong with the bis text, specifically? Tim's comments on SHA-1: It would be lovely to add more material about this. I need to look at the review to find out if there's something that we could use. However, I do not believe this should be a blocking comment given that this code and spec has been out there for years; if substantial work is needed for the analysis, I'd prefer to do that as a separate document. In any case, since the return routability mechanism that uses SHA1 is very weak (yet sufficient), I'd be really surprised if attacking SHA1 was the easiest route to disrupting communications. Sean: Yes, we should add the normative reference on HMAC.