Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6
draft-ietf-mip6-auth-protocol-07
The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 4285.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Alpesh Patel , Kent Leung , Haseeb Akhtar , Mohamed Khalil , Kuntal Chowdhury | ||
| Last updated | 2015-10-14 (Latest revision 2005-09-19) | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 4285 (Informational) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Margaret Cullen | ||
| Send notices to | mkhalil@nortelnetworks.com |
draft-ietf-mip6-auth-protocol-07
Network Working Group A. Patel
Internet-Draft K. Leung
Expires: March 23, 2006 Cisco Systems
M. Khalil
H. Akhtar
Nortel Networks
K. Chowdhury
Starent Networks
September 19, 2005
Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6
draft-ietf-mip6-auth-protocol-07.txt
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 23, 2006.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
IPsec is specified as the means of securing signaling messages
between the Mobile Node and Home agent for Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6).
MIPv6 signalling messages that are secured include the Binding
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Updates and Acknowledgement messages used for managing the bindings
between a Mobile Node and its Home Agent. This document proposes an
alternate method for securing MIPv6 signaling messages between a
Mobile Nodes and Home Agents. The alternate method defined here
conists of a MIPv6-specific authentication option that can be added
to MIPv6 signalling messages.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. General Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Operational flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Mobility message authentication option . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. MN-HA authentication mobility option . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.1. Processing Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. MN-AAA authentication mobility option . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.1. Processing Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Authentication Failure Detection at the Mobile Node . . . 12
6. Mobility message replay protection option . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Rationale for mobility message replay protection
option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
The base Mobile IPv6 specification [RFC3775] specifies the signaling
messages, Binding Update (BU) and Binding Acknowledgement (BA),
between the Mobile Node and Home agent to be secured by the IPsec
Security Associations (IPsec SAs) that are established between these
two entities.
This document proposes a solution for securing the Binding Update and
Binding Acknowledgment messages between the Mobile Node and Home
agent using an authentication option which is included in these
messages. Such a mechanism enables IPv6 mobility in a host without
having to establish an IPsec SA with its Home Agent. A Mobile Node
can implement Mobile IPv6 without having to integrate it with the
IPsec module, in which case the Binding Update and Binding
Acknowldegement messages (between MN-HA) are secured with the
authentication option.
The authentication mechanism proposed here is similar to the
authentication mechanism used in Mobile IPv4 [RFC3344].
1.1. Applicability Statement
The authentication option specified in Section 5 is applicable in
certain types of networks that have the following characteristics:
- Networks in which the authentication of the MN for network access
is done by an authentication server in the home network via the home
agent. The security association is established by the network
operator (provisioning methods) between the MN and a backend
authentication server (eg. AAA home server). MIP6 as per RFC3775/
3776 relies on the IPsec SA between the MN and an HA. In cases where
the assignment of the HA is dynamic and the only static or long term
SA is between the MN and a backend authentication server, the
authentication option is desirable.
- In certain deployment environments, the mobile node needs dynamic
assignment of a home agent and home address. The assignment of such
can be on a per session basis or on a per MN power-up basis. In such
scenarios, the MN relies on an identity such as an NAI [MN_Ident],
and a security association with a AAA server to obtain such
bootstrapping information. The security association is created via
an out-of-band mechanism or by non Mobile IPv6 signaling. The out-
of-band mechanism can be specific to the deployment environment of a
network operator. In cdma network deployments this information can
be obtained at the time of network access authentication via [3GPP2]
specific extensions to PPP or DHCPv6 on the access link and by AAA
extensions in the core. It should be noted that the out-of-band
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mechanism if not within the scope of the authentication option
Section 5 and hence not described therein.
- Network deployments in which not all mobile nodes and home agents
have IKEv2 implementations and support for the integration of IKEv2
with backend AAA infrastructures. IKEv2 as a technology has yet to
reach maturity status and widespread implementations needed for
commercial deployments on a large scale. At the time of this writing
[IKEv2-REF] is yet to be published as an RFC. Hence from a practical
perspective that operators face, IKEv2 is not yet capable of
addressing the immediate need for MIP6 deployment.
- Networks which expressly rely on the backend AAA infrastructure as
the primary means for identifying and authentication/authorizing a
mobile user for MIP6 service.
- Networks in which the establishment of the security association
between the mobile node and the authentication server (AAA Home) is
established using an out-of-band mechanism and not by any key
exchange protocol. Such networks will also rely on out-of-band
mechanisms to renew the security association (between MN and AAA
Home) when needed.
- Networks which are bandwidth constrained (such as cellular wireless
networks) and there exists a strong desire to minimize the number of
signaling messages sent over such interfaces. MIP6 signaling which
relies on IKE as the primary means for setting up an SA between the
MN and HA requires more signaling messages compared with the use of
an authentication option carried in the BU/BAck messages.
One such example of networks that have such characteristics are cdma
networks as defined in [3GPP2].
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2. Overview
This document presents a lightweight mechanism to authenticate the
Mobile Node at the Home Agent or at the Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting (AAA) server in Home network (AAAH) based on a shared-
key based mobility security association between the Mobile Node and
the respective authenticating entity. This shared-key based mobility
security association (shared-key based mobility SA) may be statically
provisioned or dynamically created. The term "mobility security
association" referred to in this document is understood to be a
"shared-key based Mobile IPv6 authentication" security association.
This document introduces new mobility options to aid in
authentication of the Mobile Node to the Home Agent or AAAH server.
The confidentiality protection of Return Routability messages and
authentication/integrity protection of Mobile Prefix Discovery (MPD)
is not provided when these options are used for authentication of the
Mobile Node to the Home Agent. Thus, unless the network can
guarantee such protection (for instance, like in 3gpp2 networks),
Route Optimization and Mobile Prefix Discovery should not be used
when using the authentication option.
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3. Terminology
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
3.1. General Terms
First (size, input)
Some formulas in this specification use a functional form "First
(size, input)" to indicate truncation of the "input" data so that
only the first "size" bits remain to be used.
Shared-key based Mobility Security Association
Security relation between Mobile Node and its Home Agent, used to
authenticate the Mobile Node for mobility service. The shared-key
based mobility security association between Mobile Node and Home
Agent consists of a mobility SPI, a shared-key, an authentication
algorithm and the replay protection mechanism in use.
Mobility SPI
A number in the range [0-4294967296] used to index into the
shared-key based mobility security associations.
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4. Operational flow
The figure below describes the sequence of messages sent and received
between the MN and HA in the registration process. Binding Update
(BU) and Binding Acknowledgement (BA) messages are used in the
registration process.
MN HA/AAAH
| BU to HA |
(a) |----------------------------------------------------->|
| (including MN-ID option, |
| Message ID option [optional], authentication option)|
| |
| |
| HA/AAAH authenticates MN
| |
| |
| BA to MN |
(b) |<-----------------------------------------------------|
| (including MN-ID option, |
| Message ID option [optional], authentication option)|
| |
Figure 1: Home Registration with Authentication Protocol
The Mobile Node MUST use the Mobile Node Identifier Option,
specifically the MN-NAI mobility option as defined in [MN_Ident] to
identify itself while authenticating with the Home Agent. The mobile
node uses the Mobile Node Identifier option as defined in [MN_Ident]
to identify itself as may be required for use with some existing AAA
infrastructure designs.
Mobile Node MAY use Message Identifier option as defined in Section 6
for additional replay protection.
The authentication option described in Section 5 may be used by the
mobile node to transfer authentication data when the mobile node and
the home agent are utilizing a mobility SPI (a number in the range
[0-4294967296] used to index into the shared-key based mobility
security associations). to index between multiple mobility security
associations.
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5. Mobility message authentication option
This section defines a message authentication mobility option that
may be used to secure Binding Update and Binding Acknowledgement
messages. This option can be used along with IPsec or preferably as
an alternate mechanism to authenticate Binding Update and Binding
Acknowledgement messages in the absence of IPsec.
This document also defines subtype numbers, which identify the mode
of authentication and the peer entity to authenticate the message.
Two subtype numbers are specified in this document. Other subtypes
may be defined for use in the future.
Only one instance of an authentication option of a particular subtype
can be present in the message. One message may contain multiple
instances of authentication options with different subtype values.
If both MN-HA and MN-AAA authentication options are present, MN-HA
authentication option must be present before the MN-AAA
authentication option (else, the HA MUST discard the message).
When a Binding Update or Binding Acknowledgement is received without
an authentication option and the entity receiving it is configured to
use authentication option or has the shared-key based mobility
security association for authentication option, the entity should
silently discard the received message.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length | Subtype |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Mobility SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Authentication Data ....
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2
Option Type:
AUTH-OPTION-TYPE to be defined by IANA. An 8-bit identifier of
the type mobility option.
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Option Length:
8-bit unsigned integer, representing the length in octets of
the Sub-type, mobility Security Parameter Index (SPI) and
Authentication Data fields.
Subtype:
A number assigned to identify the entity and/or mechanism to be
used to authenticate the message.
Mobility SPI:
Mobility Security Parameter Index
Authentication Data:
This field has the information to authenticate the relevant
mobility entity. This protects the message beginning at the
Mobility Header upto and including the mobility SPI field.
Alignment requirements :
The alignment requirement for this option is 4n + 1.
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5.1. MN-HA authentication mobility option
The format of the MN-HA authentication mobility option is as defined
in Figure 2. This option uses the subtype value of 1. The MN-HA
authentication mobility option is used to authenticate the Binding
Update and Binding Acknowledgement messages based on the shared-key
based security association between the Mobile Node and the Home
Agent.
The shared-key based mobility security association between Mobile
Node and Home Agent used within this specification consists of a
mobility SPI, a key, an authentication algorithm and the replay
protection mechanism in use. The mobility SPI is a number in range
[0-4294967296], where the range [0-255] is reserved. The key
consists of an arbitrary value and is 16 octets in length. The
authentication algorithm is HMAC_SHA1. The replay protection
mechanism may use the Sequence number as specified in [RFC3775] or
the option as defined in Section 6. If the Timestamp option is used
for replay protection as defined in Section 6, the mobility security
association includes a "close enough" field to account for clock
drift. A default value of 7 seconds SHOULD be used. This value
SHOULD be greater than 3 seconds.
This MUST be the last option in a message with mobility header if it
is the only authentication option in the message.
The authentication data is calculated on the message starting from
the mobility header upto and including the mobility SPI value of this
option.
Authentication Data = First (96, HMAC_SHA1(MN-HA Shared key, Mobility
Data))
Mobility Data = care-of address | home address | Mobility Header(MH)
Data
MH Data is the content of the Mobility Header upto and including the
mobility SPI field of this option. The Checksum field in Mobility
Header MUST be set to 0 to calculate the Mobility Data.
The first 96 bits from the MAC result are used as the Authentication
Data field.
5.1.1. Processing Considerations
The assumption is that Mobile Node has a shared-key based security
association with the Home Agent. The Mobile Node MUST include this
option in a BU if it has a shared-key based mobility security
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association with the Home Agent. The Home Agent MUST include this
option in the BA if it received this option in the corresponding BU
and Home Agent has a shared-key based mobility security association
with the Mobile Node.
The Mobile Node or Home Agent receiving this option MUST verify the
authentication data in the option. If authentication fails, the Home
Agent MUST send BA with Status Code MIPV6-AUTH-FAIL. If the Home
Agent does not have shared-key based mobility SA, Home Agent MUST
discard the BU. The Home Agent MAY log such events.
5.2. MN-AAA authentication mobility option
The format of the MN-AAA authentication mobility option is as defined
in Figure 2. This option uses the subtype value of 2. The MN-AAA
authentication mobility option is used to authenticate the Binding
Update message based on the shared mobility security association
between Mobile Node and AAA server in Home network (AAAH). It is not
used in Binding Acknowledgement messages. The corresponding Binding
Acknowledgement messages must be authenticated using the MN-HA
authentication option Section 5.1.
This must be the last option in a message with mobility header. The
corresponding response MUST include the Mobile-Home Authentication
option, and MUST NOT include the Mobile-AAA Authentication option.
The Mobile Node MAY use Mobile Node Identifier option [MN_Ident] to
enable the Home Agent to make use of available AAA infrastructure.
The authentication data is calculated on the message starting from
the mobility header upto and including the mobility SPI value of this
option.
The authentication data shall be calculated as follows:
Authentication data = hash_fn(MN-AAA Shared key, MAC_Mobility Data)
hash_fn() is decided by the value of mobility SPI field in the
authentication option.
SPI = HMAC_SHA1_SPI:
If mobility SPI has the well-known value HMAC_SHA1_SPI, then
hash_fn() is HMAC_SHA1. When HMAC_SHA1_SPI is used, the BU is
authenticated by AAA using HMAC_SHA1 authentication. In that case,
MAC_Mobility Data is calculated as follows:
MAC_Mobility Data = SHA1(care-of address | home address | MH Data)
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MH Data is the content of the Mobility Header upto and including the
mobility SPI field of this option.
5.2.1. Processing Considerations
The use of the MN-AAA authentication option assumes that AAA entities
at the home site communicate with the HA via an authenticated
channel. Specifically, a BU with the MN-AAA authentication option is
authenticated via a home AAA server. The specific details of the
interaction between the HA and the AAA server is beyond the scope of
this document.
When the Home Agent receives a Binding Update with the Mobile-AAA
authentication option, the Binding Update is authenticated by an
entity external to the Home Agent, typically a AAA server.
5.3. Authentication Failure Detection at the Mobile Node
In case of authentication failure, the Home Agent MUST send a Binding
Acknowledgement with status code MIPV6-AUTH-FAIL to the Mobile Node,
if a shared-key based mobility security association to be used
between Mobile Node and Home Agent for authentication exists. If
there is no shared-key based mobility security association, HA drops
the Binding Update. HA may log the message for administrative
action.
Upon receiving a Binding Acknowledgement with status code MIPV6-AUTH-
FAIL, the Mobile Node SHOULD stop sending new Binding Updates to the
Home Agent.
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6. Mobility message replay protection option
The Mobility message replay protection option MAY be used in Binding
Update/Binding Acknowledgement messages when authenticated using the
mobility message authentication option as described in Section 5.
The mobility message replay protection option is used to let the Home
Agent verify that a Binding Update has been freshly generated by the
Mobile Node and not replayed by an attacker from some previous
Binding Update. This is especially useful for cases where the Home
Agent does not maintain stateful information about the Mobile Node
after the binding entry has been removed. The Home Agent does the
replay protection check after the Binding Update has been
authenticated. The mobility message replay protection option when
included is used by the Mobile Node for matching BA with BU.
If this mode of replay protection is used, it needs to be part of the
shared-key based mobility security association.
If the policy at Home Agent mandates replay protection using this
option (as opposed to the sequence number in Mobility Header in
Binding Update) and the Binding Update from Mobile Node does not
include this option, Home Agent discards the BU and sets the Status
Code in BA to MIPV6-MESG-ID-REQD.
When the Home Agent receives the mobility message replay protection
option in Binding Update, it MUST include the mobility message replay
protection option in Binding Acknowledgement. Appendix A provides
details regarding why the mobility message replay protection option
MAY be used when using the authentication option.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3
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Option Type:
MESG-ID-OPTION-TYPE to be defined by IANA. An 8-bit identifier
of the type mobility option.
Option Length:
8-bit unsigned integer, representing the length in octets of
the Timestamp field.
Timestamp:
This field carries the 64 bit timestamp.
Alignment requirements :
The alignment requirement for this option is 8n + 2.
The basic principle of timestamp replay protection is that the node
generating a message inserts the current time of day, and the node
receiving the message checks that this timestamp is sufficiently
close to its own time of day. Unless specified differently in the
shared-key based mobility security association between the nodes, a
default value of 7 seconds MAY be used to limit the time difference.
This value SHOULD be greater than 3 seconds. The two nodes must have
adequately synchronized time-of-day clocks.
The Mobile Node MUST set the Timestamp field to a 64-bit value
formatted as specified by the Network Time Protocol [RFC1305]. The
low-order 32 bits of the NTP format represent fractional seconds, and
those bits which are not available from a time source SHOULD be
generated from a good source of randomness. Note, however, that when
using timestamps, the 64-bit Timestamp used in a Binding Update from
the Mobile Node MUST be greater than that used in any previous
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successful Binding Update.
After successful authentication of Binding Update (either locally at
the Home Agent or when a success indication is received from the AAA
server), the Home Agent MUST check the Timestamp field for validity.
In order to be valid, the timestamp contained in the Timestamp field
MUST be close enough to the Home Agent's time of day clock and the
timestamp MUST be greater than all previously accepted timestamps for
the requesting Mobile Node.
If the timestamp is valid, the Home Agent copies the entire Timestamp
field into the Timestamp field in the BA it returns to the Mobile
Node. If the timestamp is not valid, the Home Agent copies only the
low-order 32 bits into the BA, and supplies the high-order 32 bits
from its own time of day.
If the timestamp field is not valid but the authentication of the BU
succeeds, Home Agent MUST send a Binding Acknowledgement with status
code MIPV6-ID-MISMATCH. The Home Agent does not create a binding
cache entry if the timestamp check fails.
If the Mobile Node receives a Binding Acknowledgement with the code
MIPV6-ID-MISMATCH, the Mobile Node MUST authenticate the BA by
processing the MN-HA authentication mobility option.
If authentication succeeds, the Mobile Node MUST adjust its timestamp
and send subsequent Binding Update using the updated value.
Upon receiving a BA that does not contain the MIPV6-ID-MISMATCH
status code, the Mobile Node MUST compare the Timestamp value in the
BA to the Timestamp value it sent in the corresponding BU. If the
values match, the Mobile Node proceeds to process the MN-HA
authentication data in the BA. If the values do not match, the
Mobile Node silently discards the BA.
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7. Security Considerations
This document proposes new authentication options to authenticate the
control message between Mobile Node, Home Agent and/or home AAA (as
an alternative to IPsec). The new options provide for authentication
of Binding Update and Binding Acknowledgement messages. The MN-AAA
authentication options provides for authentication with AAA
infrastructure.
This specification also introduces an optional replay protection
mechanism in Section 6, to prevent replay attacks. The sequence
number field in the Binding Update is not used if this mechanism is
used. This memo defines the timestamp option to be used for mobility
message replay protection.
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8. IANA Considerations
IANA services are required for this specification. The values for
new mobility options and status codes must be assigned from the
Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] numbering space.
The values for Mobility Option types AUTH-OPTION-TYPE and MESG-ID-
OPTION-TYPE, as defined in Section 5 and Section 6 need to be
assigned. The suggested values are 8 for the AUTH-OPTION-TYPE and 9
for the MESG-ID-OPTION-TYPE Mobility Option.
The values for status codes MIPV6-ID-MISMATCH, MIPv6-AUTH-FAIL and
MIPV6-MESG-ID-REQD as defined in Section 6, Section 6 and Section 5.3
also need to be assigned. The suggested values are 144 for MIPV6-ID-
MISMATCH 145 for MIPV6-MESG-ID-REQD and 146 for MIPV6-AUTH-FAIL.
IANA should record values for these new Mobility Options and the new
Status Codes.
A new section for enumerating algorithms identified by specific
mobility SPIs within the range 0-255 is to be added to
http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/mobility-parameters
The currently defined values are as follows:
The value 0 should not be assigned.
The value 3 is suggested for HMAC_SHA1_SPI as defined in Section 5.2.
The value 5 is reserved for use by 3GPP2.
New values for this namespace can be allocated using IETF Consensus.
[RFC2434].
In addition, IANA needs to create a new namespace for the subtype
field of the MN-HA and MN-AAA authentication mobility options under
http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/mobility-parameters
The currently allocated values are as follows:
1 MN-HA authentication mobility option Section 5.1
2 MN-AAA authentication mobility option Section 5.2
New values for this namespace can be allocated using IETF Consensus.
[RFC2434].
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9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Basavaraj Patil, Charlie Perkins
Vijay Devarapalli, Jari Arkko and Gopal Dommety for their thorough
review and suggestions on the document. The authors would like to
acknowledge the fact that a similar authentication method was
considered in base protocol [RFC3775] at one time.
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10. References
10.1. Normative References
[MN_Ident]
Patel et. al., A., "Mobile Node Identifier Option for
Mobile IPv6", draft-ietf-mip6-mn-ident-option-03.txt (work
in progress), December 2004.
[RFC1305] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3)
Specification, Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[RFC3344] Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4", RFC 3344,
August 2002.
[RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
10.2. Informative References
[3GPP2] "cdma2000 Wireless IP Network Standard", 3GPP2 X.S0011-D,
September 2005.
[IKEv2-REF]
Kaufman, et. al, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17.txt (work in
progress).
[whyauth] Patil et. al., B., "Why Authentication Data suboption is
needed for MIP6",
draft-patil-mip6-whyauthdataoption-01.txt (work in
progress), September 2005.
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Appendix A. Rationale for mobility message replay protection option
Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] defines a Sequence Number in the mobility
header to prevent replay attacks. There are two aspects that stand
out in regards to using the Sequence Number to prevent replay
attacks.
Firstly, the specification states that Home Agent should accept a BU
with a Sequence Number greater than the Sequence Number from previous
Binding Update. This implicitly assumes that the Home Agent has some
information regarding the Sequence Number from previous BU (even when
the binding cache entry is not present). Secondly, the specification
states that if the Home Agent has no binding cache entry for the
indicated home address, it MUST accept any Sequence Number value in a
received Binding Update from this Mobile Node.
With the mechanism defined in this draft, it is possible for the
Mobile Node to register with a different Home Agent during each
mobility session. Thus, it is unreasonable to expect each Home Agent
in the network to maintain state about the Mobile Node. Also, if the
Home Agent does not cache information regarding sequence number, as
per the second point above, a replayed BU can cause a Home Agent to
create a binding cache entry for the Mobile Node. Thus, when
authentication option is used, Sequence Number does not provide
protection against replay attack.
One solution to this problem (when Home Agent does not save state
information for every Mobile Node) would be for the Home Agent to
reject the first BU and assign a (randomly generated) starting
sequence number for the session and force the Mobile Node to send a
fresh BU with the suggested sequence number. While this would work
in most cases, it would require an additional round trip and this
extra signalling and latency is not acceptable in certain deployments
[3GPP2]. Also, this rejection and using sequence number as a nonce
in rejection is a new behavior that is not specified in [RFC3775].
Thus, this specification uses the mobility message replay protection
option to prevent replay attacks. Specifically, timestamps are used
to prevent replay attacks as described in Section 6.
It is important to note that as per Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] this
problem with sequence number exists. Since the base specification
mandates the use of IPsec (and naturally that goes with IKE in most
cases), the real replay protection is provided by IPsec/IKE. In case
of BU/BA between Mobile Node and CN, the liveness proof is provided
by the use of nonces which the CN generates.
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Authors' Addresses
Alpesh Patel
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
US
Phone: +1 408-853-9580
Email: alpesh@cisco.com
Kent Leung
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
US
Phone: +1 408-526-5030
Email: kleung@cisco.com
Mohamed Khalil
Nortel Networks
2221 Lakeside Blvd.
Richardson, TX 75082
US
Phone: +1 972-685-0574
Email: mkhalil@nortel.com
Haseeb Akhtar
Nortel Networks
2221 Lakeside Blvd.
Richardson, TX 75082
US
Phone: +1 972-684-4732
Email: haseebak@nortel.com
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Kuntal Chowdhury
Starent Networks
30 International Place
Tewksbury, MA 01876
US
Phone: +1 214 550 1416
Email: kchowdury@starentnetworks.com
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