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Connection-Oriented Media Transport over TLS in SDP

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8122.
Authors Jonathan Lennox , Christer Holmberg
Last updated 2017-02-02 (Latest revision 2017-01-26)
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Flemming Andreasen
Shepherd write-up Show Last changed 2017-01-06
IESG IESG state Became RFC 8122 (Proposed Standard)
Consensus boilerplate Yes
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD Ben Campbell
Send notices to "Flemming Andreasen" <>
IANA IANA review state IANA OK - Actions Needed
Network Working Group                                          J. Lennox
Internet-Draft                                                     Vidyo
Obsoletes: 4572 (if approved)                                C. Holmberg
Intended status: Standards Track                                Ericsson
Expires: July 30, 2017                                  January 26, 2017

          Connection-Oriented Media Transport over TLS in SDP


   This document specifies how to establish secure connection-oriented
   media transport sessions over the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   protocol using the Session Description Protocol (SDP).  It defines
   the SDP protocol identifier, 'TCP/TLS'.  It also defines the syntax
   and semantics for an SDP 'fingerprint' attribute that identifies the
   certificate that will be presented for the TLS session.  This
   mechanism allows media transport over TLS connections to be
   established securely, so long as the integrity of session
   descriptions is assured.

   This document obsoletes RFC 4572, by clarifying the usage of multiple

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 30, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Changes From RFC 4572 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  SDP Operational Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Threat Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  The Need for Self-Signed Certificates . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  Example SDP Description for TLS Connection  . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Protocol Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Fingerprint Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Multiple Fingerprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Endpoint Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Certificate Choice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Certificate Presentation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   The Session Description Protocol (SDP) [8] provides a general-purpose
   format for describing multimedia sessions in announcements or
   invitations.  For many applications, it is desirable to establish, as
   part of a multimedia session, a media stream that uses a connection-
   oriented transport.  RFC 4145, Connection-Oriented Media Transport in
   the Session Description Protocol (SDP) [7], specifies a general
   mechanism for describing and establishing such connection-oriented
   streams; however, the only transport protocol it directly supports is
   TCP.  In many cases, session participants wish to provide
   confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication for their media
   sessions.  This document therefore extends the Connection-Oriented

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   Media specification to allow session descriptions to describe media
   sessions that use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [10].

   The TLS protocol allows applications to communicate over a channel
   that provides confidentiality and data integrity.  The TLS
   specification, however, does not specify how specific protocols
   establish and use this secure channel; particularly, TLS leaves the
   question of how to interpret and validate authentication certificates
   as an issue for the protocols that run over TLS.  This document
   specifies such usage for the case of connection-oriented media

   Complicating this issue, endpoints exchanging media will often be
   unable to obtain authentication certificates signed by a well-known
   root certification authority (CA).  Most certificate authorities
   charge for signed certificates, particularly host-based certificates;
   additionally, there is a substantial administrative overhead to
   obtaining signed certificates, as certification authorities must be
   able to confirm that they are issuing the signed certificates to the
   correct party.  Furthermore, in many cases endpoints' IP addresses
   and host names are dynamic: they may be obtained from DHCP, for
   example.  It is impractical to obtain a CA-signed certificate valid
   for the duration of a DHCP lease.  For such hosts, self-signed
   certificates are usually the only option.  This specification defines
   a mechanism that allows self-signed certificates can be used
   securely, provided that the integrity of the SDP description is
   assured.  It provides for endpoints to include a secure hash of their
   certificate, known as the "certificate fingerprint", within the
   session description.  Provided that the fingerprint of the offered
   certificate matches the one in the session description, end hosts can
   trust even self-signed certificates.

   The rest of this document is laid out as follows.  An overview of the
   problem and threat model is given in Section 3.  Section 4 gives the
   basic mechanism for establishing TLS-based connected-oriented media
   in SDP.  Section 5 describes the SDP fingerprint attribute, which,
   assuming that the integrity of SDP content is assured, allows the
   secure use of self-signed certificates.  Section 6 describes which
   X.509 certificates are presented, and how they are used in TLS.
   Section 7 discusses additional security considerations.

1.1.  Changes From RFC 4572

   This document obsoletes RFC 4572 [20] but remains backwards
   compatible with older implementations.  The changes from [20] are
   that it clarifies that multiple 'fingerprint' attributes can be used
   to carry fingerprints, calculated using different hash functions,
   associated with a given certificate, and to carry fingerprints

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   associated with multiple certificates.  The fingerprint matching
   procedure, when multiple fingerprints are provided, are also
   clarified.  The document also updates the preferred hash function
   with a stronger cipher suite, and removes the requirement to use the
   same hash function for calculating a certificate fingerprint and
   certificate signature.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3].

3.  Overview

   This section discusses the threat model that motivates TLS transport
   for connection-oriented media streams.  It also discusses in more
   detail the need for end systems to use self-signed certificates.

3.1.  SDP Operational Modes

   There are two principal operational modes for multimedia sessions:
   advertised and offer-answer.  Advertised sessions are the simpler
   mode.  In this mode, a server publishes, in some manner, an SDP
   session description of a multimedia session it is making available.
   The classic example of this mode of operation is the Session
   Announcement Protocol (SAP) [15], in which SDP session descriptions
   are periodically transmitted to a well-known multicast group.
   Traditionally, these descriptions involve multicast conferences, but
   unicast sessions are also possible.  (Connection-oriented media,
   obviously, cannot use multicast.)  Recipients of a session
   description connect to the addresses published in the session
   description.  These recipients may not previously have been known to
   the advertiser of the session description.

   Alternatively, SDP conferences can operate in offer-answer mode [4].
   This mode allows two participants in a multimedia session to
   negotiate the multimedia session between them.  In this model, one
   participant offers the other a description of the desired session
   from its perspective, and the other participant answers with the
   desired session from its own perspective.  In this mode, each of the
   participants in the session has knowledge of the other one.  This is
   the mode of operation used by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)

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3.2.  Threat Model

   Participants in multimedia conferences often wish to guarantee
   confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication for their media
   sessions.  This section describes various types of attackers and the
   ways they attempt to violate these guarantees.  It then describes how
   the TLS protocol can be used to thwart the attackers.

   The simplest type of attacker is one who listens passively to the
   traffic associated with a multimedia session.  This attacker might,
   for example, be on the same local-area or wireless network as one of
   the participants in a conference.  This sort of attacker does not
   threaten a connection's data integrity or authentication, and almost
   any operational mode of TLS can provide media stream confidentiality.

   More sophisticated is an attacker who can send his own data traffic
   over the network, but who cannot modify or redirect valid traffic.
   In SDP's 'advertised' operational mode, this can barely be considered
   an attack; media sessions are expected to be initiated from anywhere
   on the network.  In SDP's offer-answer mode, however, this type of
   attack is more serious.  An attacker could initiate a connection to
   one or both of the endpoints of a session, thus impersonating an
   endpoint, or acting as a man in the middle to listen in on their
   communications.  To thwart these attacks, TLS uses endpoint
   certificates.  So long as the certificates' private keys have not
   been compromised, the endpoints have an external trusted mechanism
   (most commonly, a mutually-trusted certification authority) to
   validate certificates, and the endpoints know what certificate
   identity to expect, endpoints can be certain that such an attack has
   not taken place.

   Finally, the most serious type of attacker is one who can modify or
   redirect session descriptions: for example, a compromised or
   malicious SIP proxy server.  Neither TLS itself nor any mechanisms
   that use it can protect an SDP session against such an attacker.
   Instead, the SDP description itself must be secured through some
   mechanism; SIP, for example, defines how S/MIME [22] can be used to
   secure session descriptions.

3.3.  The Need for Self-Signed Certificates

   SDP session descriptions are created by any endpoint that needs to
   participate in a multimedia session.  In many cases, such as SIP
   phones, such endpoints have dynamically-configured IP addresses and
   host names and must be deployed with nearly zero configuration.  For
   such an endpoint, it is for practical purposes impossible to obtain a
   certificate signed by a well-known certification authority.

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   If two endpoints have no prior relationship, self-signed certificates
   cannot generally be trusted, as there is no guarantee that an
   attacker is not launching a man-in-the-middle attack.  Fortunately,
   however, if the integrity of SDP session descriptions can be assured,
   it is possible to consider those SDP descriptions themselves as a
   prior relationship: certificates can be securely described in the
   session description itself.  This is done by providing a secure hash
   of a certificate, or "certificate fingerprint", as an SDP attribute;
   this mechanism is described in Section 5.

3.4.  Example SDP Description for TLS Connection

   Figure 1 illustrates an SDP offer that signals the availability of a
   T.38 fax session over TLS.  For the purpose of brevity, the main
   portion of the session description is omitted in the example, showing
   only the 'm' line and its attributes.  (This example is the same as
   the first one in RFC 4145 [7], except for the proto parameter and the
   fingerprint attribute.)  See the subsequent sections for explanations
   of the example's TLS-specific attributes.

   (Note: due to RFC formatting conventions, this document splits SDP
   across lines whose content would exceed 72 characters.  A backslash
   character marks where this line folding has taken place.  This
   backslash and its trailing CRLF and whitespace would not appear in
   actual SDP content.)

 m=image 54111 TCP/TLS t38
 c=IN IP4
 a=fingerprint:SHA-256 \
    12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF: \
 a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \

   Figure 1: Example SDP Description Offering a TLS Media Stream

4.  Protocol Identifiers

   The 'm' line in SDP specifies, among other items, the transport
   protocol to be used for the media in the session.  See the "Media
   Descriptions" section of SDP [8] for a discussion on transport
   protocol identifiers.

   This specification defines the protocol identifier, 'TCP/TLS', which
   indicates that the media described will use the Transport Layer
   Security protocol [10] over TCP.  (Using TLS over other transport

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   protocols is not discussed in this document.)  The 'TCP/TLS' protocol
   identifier describes only the transport protocol, not the upper-layer
   protocol.  An 'm' line that specifies 'TCP/TLS' MUST further qualify
   the protocol using a fmt identifier to indicate the application being
   run over TLS.

   Media sessions described with this identifier follow the procedures
   defined in RFC 4145 [7].  They also use the SDP attributes defined in
   that specification, 'setup' and 'connection'.

5.  Fingerprint Attribute

   Parties to a TLS session indicate their identities by presenting
   authentication certificates as part of the TLS handshake procedure.
   Authentication certificates are X.509 [2] certificates, as profiled
   by RFC 3279 [5], RFC 5280 [11], and RFC 4055 [6].

   In order to associate media streams with connections and to prevent
   unauthorized barge-in attacks on the media streams, endpoints MUST
   provide a certificate fingerprint.  If the X.509 certificate
   presented for the TLS connection matches the fingerprint presented in
   the SDP, the endpoint can be confident that the author of the SDP is
   indeed the initiator of the connection.

   A certificate fingerprint is a secure one-way hash of the DER
   (distinguished encoding rules) form of the certificate.  (Certificate
   fingerprints are widely supported by tools that manipulate X.509
   certificates; for instance, the command "openssl x509 -fingerprint"
   causes the command-line tool of the openssl package to print a
   certificate fingerprint, and the certificate managers for Mozilla and
   Internet Explorer display them when viewing the details of a

   A fingerprint is represented in SDP as an attribute (an 'a' line).
   It consists of the name of the hash function used, followed by the
   hash value itself.  The hash value is represented as a sequence of
   uppercase hexadecimal bytes, separated by colons.  The number of
   bytes is defined by the hash function.  (This is the syntax used by
   openssl and by the browsers' certificate managers.  It is different
   from the syntax used to represent hash values in, e.g., HTTP digest
   authentication [24], which uses unseparated lowercase hexadecimal
   bytes.  It was felt that consistency with other applications of
   fingerprints was more important.)

   The formal syntax of the fingerprint attribute is given in Augmented
   Backus-Naur Form [9] in Figure 2.  This syntax extends the BNF syntax
   of SDP [8].

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   attribute              =/ fingerprint-attribute

   fingerprint-attribute  =  "fingerprint" ":" hash-func SP fingerprint

   hash-func              =  "sha-1" / "sha-224" / "sha-256" /
                             "sha-384" / "sha-512" /
                             "md5" / "md2" / token
                             ; Additional hash functions can only come
                             ; from updates to RFC 3279

   fingerprint            =  2UHEX *(":" 2UHEX)
                             ; Each byte in upper-case hex, separated
                             ; by colons.

   UHEX                   =  DIGIT / %x41-46 ; A-F uppercase

   Figure 2: Augmented Backus-Naur Syntax for the Fingerprint Attribute

   Following RFC 3279 [5] as updated by RFC 4055 [6], therefore, the
   defined hash functions are 'SHA-1' [1] [16], 'SHA-224' [1], 'SHA-256'
   [1], 'SHA-384'[1], 'SHA-512' [1], 'MD5' [13] and 'MD2' [23], with
   'SHA-256' preferred.  A new IANA registry of Hash Function Textual
   Names, specified in Section 8, allows for addition of future tokens,
   but they may only be added if they are included in RFCs that update
   or obsolete RFC 3279 [5].

   Implementations compliant to this specification MUST NOT use the MD2
   and MD5 hash functions to calculate fingerprints, or to verify
   received fingerprints that have been calculated using them.

   NOTE: The MD2 and MD5 hash functions are listed in this specification
   so that implementations can recognize them.  Implementations that log
   unused hash functions might log occurrences of these algorithms
   differently to unknown hash algorithms.

   The fingerprint attribute may be either a session-level or a media-
   level SDP attribute.  If it is a session-level attribute, it applies
   to all TLS sessions for which no media-level fingerprint attribute is

5.1.  Multiple Fingerprints

   Multiple SDP fingerprint attributes can be associated with an 'm'
   line.  This can occur if multiple fingerprints have been calculated
   for a certificate using different hash functions.  It can also occur
   if one or more fingerprints associated with multiple certificates
   have been calculated.  This might be needed if multiple certificates
   will be used for media associated with an 'm' line (e.g., if separate

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   certificates are used for RTP and RTCP), or where it is not known
   which certificate will be used when the fingerprints are exchanged.
   In such cases, one or more fingerprints MUST be calculated for each
   possible certificate.

   An endpoint MUST, as a minimum, calculate a fingerprint using both
   the 'SHA-256' hash function algorithm and the hash function used to
   generate the signature on the certificate for each possible
   certificate.  Including the hash from the signature algorithm ensures
   interoperability with strict implementations of RFC 4572 [20].
   Either of these fingerprints MAY be omitted if the endpoint includes
   a hash with a stronger hash algorithm that it knows that the peer
   supports, if it is known that the peer does not support the hash
   algorithm, or if local policy mandates use of stronger algorithms.

   If fingerprints associated with multiple certificates are calculated,
   the same set of hash functions MUST be used to calculate fingerprints
   for each certificate associated with the 'm' line.

   An endpoint MUST select the set of fingerprints which use its most
   preferred hash function (out of those offered by the peer) and verify
   that each certificate used matches one fingerprint out of that set.
   If a certificate does not match any such fingerprint, the endpoint
   MUST NOT establish the TLS connection

   An endpoint MAY, in addition to its more preferred hash function,
   also verify that each certificate used matches fingerprints
   calculated using other hash functions.  Unless there is a matching
   fingerprint for each tested hash function, the endpoint MUST NOT
   establish the TLS connection.

   NOTE: The SDP fingerprint attribute does not contain a reference to a
   specific certificate.  Endpoints need to compare the fingerprint with
   a certificate hash in order to look for a match.

6.  Endpoint Identification

6.1.  Certificate Choice

   An X.509 certificate binds an identity and a public key.  If SDP
   describing a TLS session is transmitted over a mechanism that
   provides integrity protection, a certificate asserting any
   syntactically valid identity MAY be used.  For example, an SDP
   description sent over HTTP/TLS [14] or secured by S/MIME [22] MAY
   assert any identity in the certificate securing the media connection.

   Security protocols that provide only hop-by-hop integrity protection
   (e.g., the sips protocol [17], SIP over TLS) are considered

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   sufficiently secure to allow the mode in which any valid identity is
   accepted.  However, see Section 7 for a discussion of some security
   implications of this fact.

   In situations where the SDP is not integrity-protected, however, the
   certificate provided for a TLS connection MUST certify an appropriate
   identity for the connection.  In these scenarios, the certificate
   presented by an endpoint MUST certify either the SDP connection
   address, or the identity of the creator of the SDP message, as

   o  If the connection address for the media description is specified
      as an IP address, the endpoint MAY use a certificate with an
      iPAddress subjectAltName that exactly matches the IP in the
      connection-address in the session description's 'c' line.
      Similarly, if the connection address for the media description is
      specified as a fully-qualified domain name, the endpoint MAY use a
      certificate with a dNSName subjectAltName matching the specified
      'c' line connection-address exactly.  (Wildcard patterns MUST NOT
      be used.)

   o  Alternately, if the SDP session description of the session was
      transmitted over a protocol (such as SIP [17]) for which the
      identities of session participants are defined by uniform resource
      identifiers (URIs), the endpoint MAY use a certificate with a
      uniformResourceIdentifier subjectAltName corresponding to the
      identity of the endpoint that generated the SDP.  The details of
      what URIs are valid are dependent on the transmitting protocol.
      (For more details on the validity of URIs, see Section 7.)

   Identity matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
   RFC 5280 [11].  If more than one identity of a given type is present
   in the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name), a match in any
   one of the set is considered acceptable.  To support the use of
   certificate caches, as described in Section 7, endpoints SHOULD
   consistently provide the same certificate for each identity they

6.2.  Certificate Presentation

   In all cases, an endpoint acting as the TLS server (i.e., one taking
   the 'setup:passive' role, in the terminology of connection-oriented
   media) MUST present a certificate during TLS initiation, following
   the rules presented in Section 6.1.  If the certificate does not
   match the original fingerprint, the client endpoint MUST terminate
   the media connection with a bad_certificate error.

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   If the SDP offer/answer model [4] is being used, the client (the
   endpoint with the 'setup:active' role) MUST also present a
   certificate following the rules of Section 6.1.  The server MUST
   request a certificate, and if the client does not provide one, or if
   the certificate does not match a provided fingerprint, the server
   endpoint MUST terminate the media connection with a bad_certificate

   Note that when the offer/answer model is being used, it is possible
   for a media connection to outrace the answer back to the offerer.
   Thus, if the offerer has offered a 'setup:passive' or 'setup:actpass'
   role, it MUST (as specified in RFC 4145 [7]) begin listening for an
   incoming connection as soon as it sends its offer.  However, it MUST
   NOT assume that the data transmitted over the TLS connection is valid
   until it has received a matching fingerprint in an SDP answer.  If
   the fingerprint, once it arrives, does not match the client's
   certificate, the server endpoint MUST terminate the media connection
   with a bad_certificate error, as stated in the previous paragraph.

   If offer/answer is not being used (e.g., if the SDP was sent over the
   Session Announcement Protocol [15]), there is no secure channel
   available for clients to communicate certificate fingerprints to
   servers.  In this case, servers MAY request client certificates,
   which SHOULD be signed by a well-known certification authority, or
   MAY allow clients to connect without a certificate.

7.  Security Considerations

   This entire document concerns itself with security.  The problem to
   be solved is addressed in Section 1, and a high-level overview is
   presented in Section 3.  See the SDP specification [8] for security
   considerations applicable to SDP in general.

   Offering a TCP/TLS connection in SDP (or agreeing to one in SDP
   offer/answer mode) does not create an obligation for an endpoint to
   accept any TLS connection with the given fingerprint.  Instead, the
   endpoint must engage in the standard TLS negotiation procedure to
   ensure that the TLS stream cipher and MAC algorithm chosen meet the
   security needs of the higher-level application.  (For example, an
   offered stream cipher of TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL SHOULD be rejected
   in almost every application scenario.)

   Like all SDP messages, SDP messages describing TLS streams are
   conveyed in an encapsulating application protocol (e.g., SIP, Media
   Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP), etc.).  It is the responsibility of
   the encapsulating protocol to ensure the integrity of the SDP
   security descriptions.  Therefore, the application protocol SHOULD
   either invoke its own security mechanisms (e.g., secure multiparts)

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   or, alternatively, utilize a lower-layer security service (e.g., TLS
   or IPsec).  This security service SHOULD provide strong message
   authentication as well as effective replay protection.

   However, such integrity protection is not always possible.  For these
   cases, end systems SHOULD maintain a cache of certificates that other
   parties have previously presented using this mechanism.  If possible,
   users SHOULD be notified when an unsecured certificate associated
   with a previously unknown end system is presented and SHOULD be
   strongly warned if a different unsecured certificate is presented by
   a party with which they have communicated in the past.  In this way,
   even in the absence of integrity protection for SDP, the security of
   this document's mechanism is equivalent to that of the Secure Shell
   (ssh) protocol [18], which is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks
   when two parties first communicate, but can detect ones that occur
   subsequently.  (Note that a precise definition of the "other party"
   depends on the application protocol carrying the SDP message.)  Users
   SHOULD NOT, however, in any circumstances be notified about
   certificates described in SDP descriptions sent over an integrity-
   protected channel.

   To aid interoperability and deployment, security protocols that
   provide only hop-by-hop integrity protection (e.g., the sips protocol
   [17], SIP over TLS) are considered sufficiently secure to allow the
   mode in which any syntactically valid identity is accepted in a
   certificate.  This decision was made because sips is currently the
   integrity mechanism most likely to be used in deployed networks in
   the short to medium term.  However, in this mode, SDP integrity is
   vulnerable to attacks by compromised or malicious middleboxes, e.g.,
   SIP proxy servers.  End systems MAY warn users about SDP sessions
   that are secured in only a hop-by-hop manner, and definitions of
   media formats running over TCP/TLS MAY specify that only end-to-end
   integrity mechanisms be used.

   Depending on how SDP messages are transmitted, it is not always
   possible to determine whether or not a subjectAltName presented in a
   remote certificate is expected for the remote party.  In particular,
   given call forwarding, third-party call control, or session
   descriptions generated by endpoints controlled by the Gateway Control
   Protocol [21], it is not always possible in SIP to determine what
   entity ought to have generated a remote SDP response.  In general,
   when not using authenticity and integrity protection of SDP
   descriptions, a certificate transmitted over SIP SHOULD assert the
   endpoint's SIP Address of Record as a uniformResourceIndicator
   subjectAltName.  When an endpoint receives a certificate over SIP
   asserting an identity (including an iPAddress or dNSName identity)
   other than the one to which it placed or received the call, it SHOULD
   alert the user and ask for confirmation.  This applies whether

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   certificates are self-signed, or signed by certification authorities;
   a certificate for "" may be legitimately signed by
   a certification authority, but may still not be acceptable for a call
   to "".  (This issue is not one specific to this
   specification; the same consideration applies for S/MIME-signed SDP
   carried over SIP.)

   This document does not define a mechanism for securely transporting
   RTP and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) packets over a connection-
   oriented channel.  Please see RFC 7850 [19] for more details.

   TLS is not always the most appropriate choice for secure connection-
   oriented media; in some cases, a higher- or lower-level security
   protocol may be appropriate.

   This document improves security from the RFC 4572 [20].  It updates
   the preferred hash function from SHA-1 to SHA-256, and deprecates the
   usage of the MD2 and MD5 hash functions.
   By clarifying the usage and handling of multiple fingerprints, the
   document also enables hash agility, and incremental deployment of
   newer, and more secure, hash functions.

8.  IANA Considerations

   Note to IANA.  No IANA considerations are changed from RFC4572 [20]
   so the only actions required are to update the registries to point at
   this specification.

   This document defines an SDP proto value: 'TCP/TLS'.  Its format is
   defined in Section 4.  This proto value has been registered by IANA
   under "Session Description Protocol (SDP) Parameters" under "proto".

   This document defines an SDP session and media-level attribute:
   'fingerprint'.  Its format is defined in Section 5.  This attribute
   has been registered by IANA under "Session Description Protocol (SDP)
   Parameters" under "att-field (both session and media level)".

   The SDP specification [8] states that specifications defining new
   proto values, like the 'TCP/TLS' proto value defined in this one,
   must define the rules by which their media format (fmt) namespace is
   managed.  For the TCP/TLS protocol, new formats SHOULD have an
   associated MIME registration.  Use of an existing MIME subtype for
   the format is encouraged.  If no MIME subtype exists, it is
   RECOMMENDED that a suitable one be registered through the IETF
   process [12] by production of, or reference to, a standards-track RFC
   that defines the transport protocol for the format.

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   This specification takes over the IANA registry named "Hash Function
   Textual Names", that was created in [20].  It will not be part of the
   SDP Parameters.

   The names of hash functions used for certificate fingerprints are
   registered by the IANA.  Hash functions MUST be defined by standards-
   track RFCs that update or obsolete RFC 3279 [5].

   When registering a new hash function textual name, the following
   information MUST be provided:

   o  The textual name of the hash function.

   o  The Object Identifier (OID) of the hash function as used in X.509

   o  A reference to the standards-track RFC, updating or obsoleting RFC
      3279 [5], defining the use of the hash function in X.509

   Table 1 contains the initial values of this registry.

        | Hash Function Name |          OID           | Reference |
        |       "md2"        |   1.2.840.113549.2.2   |  RFC 3279 |
        |       "md5"        |   1.2.840.113549.2.5   |  RFC 3279 |
        |      "sha-1"       |      |  RFC 3279 |
        |     "sha-224"      | 2.16.840. |  RFC 4055 |
        |     "sha-256"      | 2.16.840. |  RFC 4055 |
        |     "sha-384"      | 2.16.840. |  RFC 4055 |
        |     "sha-512"      | 2.16.840. |  RFC 4055 |

             Table 1: IANA Hash Function Textual Name Registry

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [1]        National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002,

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   [2]        International Telecommunications Union, "Information
              technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
              Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks",
              ITU-T Recommendation X.509, ISO Standard 9594-8, March

   [3]        Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [4]        Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
              with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002,

   [5]        Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
              2002, <>.

   [6]        Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,

   [7]        Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in
              the Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4145,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4145, September 2005,

   [8]        Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
              Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566,
              July 2006, <>.

   [9]        Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,

   [10]       Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

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   [11]       Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

   [12]       Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
              Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
              RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,

9.2.  Informative References

   [13]       Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,

   [14]       Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,

   [15]       Handley, M., Perkins, C., and E. Whelan, "Session
              Announcement Protocol", RFC 2974, DOI 10.17487/RFC2974,
              October 2000, <>.

   [16]       Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
              (SHA1)", RFC 3174, DOI 10.17487/RFC3174, September 2001,

   [17]       Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,

   [18]       Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
              January 2006, <>.

   [19]       Lazzaro, J., "Framing Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP)
              and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Packets over Connection-
              Oriented Transport", RFC 4571, DOI 10.17487/RFC4571, July
              2006, <>.

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   [20]       Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
              Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
              Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4572, July 2006,

   [21]       Taylor, T., "Reclassification of RFC 3525 to Historic",
              RFC 5125, DOI 10.17487/RFC5125, February 2008,

   [22]       Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
              Specification", RFC 5751, DOI 10.17487/RFC5751, January
              2010, <>.

   [23]       Turner, S. and L. Chen, "MD2 to Historic Status",
              RFC 6149, DOI 10.17487/RFC6149, March 2011,

   [24]       Shekh-Yusef, R., Ed., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP
              Digest Access Authentication", RFC 7616,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7616, September 2015,

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   This version of the document included significant contributions by
   Cullen Jennings, Paul Kyzivat, Roman Shpount, and Martin Thomson.
   Elwyn Davies performed the Gen-ART review of the document.

Authors' Addresses

   Jonathan Lennox


    Christer Holmberg


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