Threat Models introduced by Mobile IPv6 and Requirements for Security in Mobile IPv6
draft-ietf-mobileip-mipv6-scrty-reqts-02

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (mobileip WG)
Last updated 2001-11-06
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
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Expired & archived
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Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-mobileip-mipv6-scrty-reqts-02.txt

Abstract

The IESG returned the Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) draft to the working group due to concerns about the security and scalability of binding updates (BUs) sent to correspondent nodes and the associated IPsec processing that is specified in the draft. Since that time discussions have continued to attempt to define what is really needed to make binding updates secure while taking into consideration the aspect of scalability as well as the fact that IPsec may not be the most suitable security mechanism for securing BUs between MNs and CNs.

Authors

Pekka Nikander (Pekka.Nikander@nomadiclab.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)