Threat Models introduced by Mobile IPv6 and Requirements for Security in Mobile IPv6
draft-ietf-mobileip-mipv6-scrty-reqts-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(mobileip WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Pekka Nikander | ||
| Last updated | 2001-11-06 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The IESG returned the Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) draft to the working group due to concerns about the security and scalability of binding updates (BUs) sent to correspondent nodes and the associated IPsec processing that is specified in the draft. Since that time discussions have continued to attempt to define what is really needed to make binding updates secure while taking into consideration the aspect of scalability as well as the fact that IPsec may not be the most suitable security mechanism for securing BUs between MNs and CNs.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)