Network Overlay Impacts to Streaming Video
draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-impacts-02
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draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-impacts-02
Media OPerationS G. Deen
Internet-Draft Comcast-NBCUniversal
Intended status: Informational S. Mishra
Expires: 8 January 2026 Verizon
7 July 2025
Network Overlay Impacts to Streaming Video
draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-impacts-02
Abstract
This document examines the operational impacts to streaming video
applications caused by changes to network policies by network
overlays. The network policy changes include IP address assignment,
transport protocols, routing, and DNS resolvers, which in turn affect
a variety of important content delivery aspects such as latency, CDN
cache selection, delivery path choices, traffic classification and
content access controls.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-wg-
mops.github.io/draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-impacts/draft-ietf--
mops-network-overlay-impacts.html. Status information for this
document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-
mops-network-overlay-impacts/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Media OPerationS
Working Group mailing list (mailto:mops@ietf.org), which is archived
at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mops/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mops/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ietf-wg-mops/draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-
impacts.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Internet Privacy Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Network Overlays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1. Emerging Operational Issues with Network Overlay Policy
Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Policy Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1. Partitioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2. Protocol Policy Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.3. Encryption Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.4. Address Policy Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.5. DNS Policy Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.6. Log Data Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.7. Geo Location & Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.8. CDN interconnection troubleshooting . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.9. Routing Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.10. Unintended Content Blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Policy Changes Hidden from Applications . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Making It Easy (for Users) by Working Under the Covers . . . 12
5. Streaming Video . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Advances in Streaming Video Architecture . . . . . . . . 14
6. Middleboxes and learning from the past . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Appendix A: Network Overlays are different than VPNs . . . . 15
7.1. VPNs typically: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1.1. Network Overlays typically: . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
Enhancing the privacy of Internet users has a been significant focus
of the IETF since the Snowden revelations and the publication of
[RFC7258]. [RFC7264] explored in greater detail the technical
threats identified in RFC7258 along with high level descriptions of
mitigations. Since then the various working groups at the IETF have
endeavored to address the specific threats to their respective area
and have produced a long list of new RFCs with privacy enhancements
deliberately and consciously included. Protocols like QUIC [RFC9000]
are examples of the new generation of IETF protocols with privacy
enhancements such as always enabled encryption built directly into
their design.
At the same time that the IETF has been diligently enhancing Internet
privacy, Internet video streaming has become a part of daily life for
billions of viewers with streaming being for many their primary way
of watching sports, entertainment, user generated content (UGC) and
news. This has grown to become the primary data by volume traversing
the Internet with an hour of HD video consisting of roughly 1.5-2.5GB
of data and streaming is estimated to account for 80-85% of current
global Internet traffic.
The Operational Considerations for Streaming Media [RFC9317] provides
a good introduction to the various engineering aspects encountered by
streaming platforms in engineering and operating the infrastructure
used to meet the global growth in video streaming.
While early streaming efforts were satisfied with being able to
stream a video to a device successfully without consideration for
efficiency or scale, the rapid growth in viewership has pushed
platforms to develop sophisticated architectures and designs.
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For video that is prerecorded, such as Video On Demand (VOD) TV and
Movie content ans User Generated Content (UGC) distributing the
recorded and encoded content using Content Delivery Network (CDN)
caches is a common technique to meet demand at scale. The IETF CDNi
working group has done significant work on this and SVTA OpenCaching
(svta.org) extends upon CDNi to create a robust implementation of CDN
architecture for VOD scaling. VOD and UCG streaming typically place
a focus on selecting the best CDN cache with the best responsiveness,
the shortest network path and fewest hops to avoid congestion and
bandwidth limitations that might limit the quality of the video being
delivered.
The newest frontier in streaming is live streaming, primarily around
sports events. Live streaming, like VOD has significant capacity
demands with events that can have viewership levels ranging from tens
of thousands to 10-50 million live viewers. The day of hundreds of
millions of live viewers for a single event such as a major global
sporting event is on the near horizon as a normal occurence, with no
limit in sight on how far growth can go. Perhaps, one day a
significant portion of the global population will live view an event
over the Internet.
Even today, the current viewer levels for large events are pushing
the boundaries of video streaming techniques. Live also comes with
new challenges; CDN caching is still used to meet scaling challenges
for live events, but unlike VOD it can't be prerecorded and
prepositioned on CDN caches ahead of the event. Live sports
streaming also has important low latency requirements - viewers don't
want a big goal spoiled by alerts on their phones, or cheering the
street before they see it on their own screen. The video pipeline
used to deliver live streamed events with low latency and at high
quality is highly optimized and as a result is very sensitive to
interference from unexpected network behaviors and conditions.
The delivery pipelines of VOD, UGC and Live have each been enginered
and optimized to deliver the highest quality, in the most efficient
manner over the Internet from platform to viewers. However,
increasingly as consumer products have added responses to [RFC7258]
and [RFC7264] to consumer devices and services, they have
occasionally introduced unexpected and sometimes non-easily
detectable changes to the network behavior and the video pipeline in
ways that can interfere with and undermine the efficiencies, scaling
and low latency engineering that video platforms have spent
considerable time, money and talent developing and deploying to meet
user video experience expectations.
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The authors readily acknowledge the many challenges and difficulties
in improving Internet privacy in an area as complex as the Internet
while also maintaining compatibility with the wildly varied
applications and uses of the Internet on which users rely upon daily
in their lives. This is hard stuff and it's very natural for there
to be operational considerations that must be understood and folded
back into architectural designs and consumer products.
This document is intended to document the various impacts that have
been observed by streaming applications from a streaming platform
operational perspective on the impacts of certain enhanced privacy
architecture approaches that have been pursued at the IETF.
2. Internet Privacy Enhancements
The IETF's work to enhance the privacy of Internet and defend against
pervasive monitoring as described in [RFC7258] has employed as series
of techniques starting with encrypting network data flows, typically
using TLS. Other approaches, involve changing things at a policy
level such as changing routing, DNS resolver choices so as to further
obfuscate and isolate the network and data flows from the underlying
base network as means of interfering with pervasive monitoring.
[RFC7258] from the IAB examines various pervasive montoring
approaches while [RFC7624] discusses responses that enhance privacy.
[RFC9000] itself is an excellent example of the applied design
approaches and introduces the QUIC transport protocol that is always
encrypted.
2.1. Network Overlays
The IETF's privacy enhancement work to address [RFC72558] covers a
lot of design choices and policies such as the approach of always-on
encryption as shown in the design of QUIC [RFC9000]. Many of these
do not affect video streaming, however those that do impact streaming
fall into a class of design choices that can be described as creating
a new network overlay, operating as an overlay on top of the
underlying native network, but following one or more different
policies than the underlying network or the streaming application
would follow on their own.
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The Network Overlays that have been found by video platform operators
to impact streaming operations are those that make policy changes in
ways that are not directly visible, selectable, or detectable by the
video streaming application or streaming platform. These changes,
when made under the covers and out of visibiltiy to the streaming
application, often can make unexpected changes to the streaming
pipeline in ways that undermine the architecture choices of the
streaming application and platform engineers.
Network Overlay's that cause network connection behavior and
properties to differ from what the application expects can lead to
situations where the application user and operator assume one set of
behaviors of the network data flow to be true while in reality one or
more different behaviors may occur. This in turn can lead to
unanticipated outcomes that can have operational impacts.
Protocols such as MASQUE [RFC9484] and services built on it such as
Apple's iCloud Private Relay (https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/
iCloud_Private_Relay_Overview_Dec2021.PDF) are examples of Privacy
Enhancing Network Overlays that involve making a number of network
policy changes from the open Internet for the connections passed
through them.
2.1.1. Emerging Operational Issues with Network Overlay Policy Changes
Streaming video applications and the streaming platforms delivering
content are starting to encounter various operational challenges
related to Network Overlays. Typically the primary problems are
encountered when the network overlay has made policy changes that are
either unexpected, are difficult or impossible for the streaming
platform to detect, or the changes are inconsistently applied.
There are a variety of impacts but a few common classes of issues
have been observed:
2.2. Policy Changes
Changing the encryption policy from that expected by the streaming
application, for example changing HTTP urls in manifests into HTTPS
connections can disrupt architectures which involve the network being
able to detect video flows.
Changing routing policy from what is expected by the streaming
application can break CDN cache selection logic, resulting in a
farther away cache delivering lower quality video at higher latency
than the closer cache that would be selected by the CDN cache
selection logic might.
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A routing policy change example is illustrated in figure 1 of
different policies for a network overlay vs the underlying base
network which changes the traffic path from the Network Overlay
having a different routing policy from that of the underlying native
base network.
R = router
<--- non-overlay traffic path --->
device -- R ---- R ------------- R ------------- R ---- R -- dest-node
\ /
\ /
\ /
R -- R -- ingest -- egress -- R ------+
<--- overlay traffic path --->
Figure 1: Network Overlay routing selects traffic via an alternate path
2.2.1. Partitioning
Network Overlay policy changes include an alternate routing policy
since a fundamental aspect of this design is the tunneling of
connections through alternate paths to enhance privacy. The reasons
for this approach are discussed in the IAB document Partitioning as
an Architecture for Privacy (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
iab-privacy-partitioning/).
2.2.2. Protocol Policy Changes
Network overlays have been seen to make application and transport
protocol changes from what is expected. Changes such as HTTP2/tcp
into HTTP3/QUIC and HTTP2 into HTTPS2+TLS are performed by some
privacy enhancing approaches, converting what is considered an
undesirable protocol choice into what is considered a better
alternative, hidden under the covers from the application.
One impact occurs when the protocol change alters the network as seen
by the video application. For instance, a video application may make
a test fetch of video in order measure network conditions which will
be used to make streaming decisions for the actual content being
accessed. If the application test probe uses HTTP2/tcp to test, but
the actual content access request over HTTP2/tcp is converted to
HTTP3/QUIC then the video platform does not have accurate results
from its test probe which can directly lead to erroneous non-optimal
choices by the video player algorithm.
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2.2.3. Encryption Policy
Changing the encryption policy applied to video streams either adding
where it wasn't originally used or removing if it was originally
specified can cause a wide range of operational problems.
2.2.3.1. Forced Encryption Upgrade
Changing unencrypted HTTP2 to encrypted HTTP2+TLS connects will
prohibit streaming workflows that involve content detection as part
of the network delivery. This can result in video traffic not being
correctly identified and the incorrect network policies being applied
to it. This is particularly problematic in environments using
multicast and in mobile environments.
2.2.3.2. Forced Encryption Downgrade
Equally so, the removal of encryption applied to the transport stream
by a streaming platform would be significantly problematic as such
encryption may be part of a content protection and content integrity
protections architecture.
2.2.4. Address Policy Changes
IP address changes such as converting from IPv4 to IPv6 or IPv6 to
IPv4, done unexpectantly unexpectedlyor done invisibly to the
application can cause both routing and cache selection issues, as
well as cause problems in debugging situations causing engineers to
not be using the correct address when examining logs, doing their own
test probes etc.
Source IP Address assignment changes, again when done invisibly to
the application can cause significant disruption. Platform
authentication gateways that associate session authorizations with
the session's device's IP address can result in service access denial
when associated addresses change unexpectedly. For example, when the
device address as seen by the video application is different from the
device address seen by the associated streaming platform, this can
result in the platform rejecting logins, content access and other
service functions from the device.
2.2.5. DNS Policy Changes
Network overlays that change DNS settings have long been an issue for
CDN architectures that use DNS as part of their load balancing
architecture.
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2.2.5.1. DNS0
DNS0 extension information was specifically designed to help CDN
cache selection logic by providing more information to the decision
making algorithms, so a policy change that changes the DNS resolver
for an application to a different resolver that does not support DNS0
can have quite a significant impact to a video application.
2.2.6. Log Data Changes
Logging is often the first tool used to find and diagnose problems.
Network overlays which change policies that result in unexpected and
non-understandable log entries on either the user device or the video
platform can greatly undermine the use of logs in problem
determination and resolution.
2.2.7. Geo Location & Identification
Network Overlays that change the apparent location of devices can
result in platforms not being able to properly identify the
geospatial location of the user. It is very common for CDN caches to
apply IP address level geolocation to determine in broad terms, such
as identifying the country the user is in. If an overlay changes the
apparent origin addresses of video device to one outside the of the
address blocks mapped by location providers, then geolocation can
fail and users can be denied access to content they otherwise are
able to access.
2.2.8. CDN interconnection troubleshooting
In a CDN interconnection when two CDN domains have to localize a
point of failure, they first determine the delivery path and a point
of observation where to take measurements. Then they proceed by
dichotomy to determine the domain where the point of failure is. The
issue with overlay networking is the following: CDNs use their
request routing information to determine a point of observation on
the delivery path where to do the measurement, as their delivery path
is overwritten by the re-routing of the overlay networking, the flow
can't be observed at the observation point.
2.2.9. Routing Changes
Routing changes which cause connections between video applications
and the infrastructure services they use can create a large number of
problems.
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2.2.9.1. End to End Problem Discovery
A common issue in video delivery is locating where along the delivery
path the video transport is encountering problems. Often such
problems are more complex than the connection not working at but
instead involve identifying bottlenecks, lost packets, and congestion
issues. When the routing changes from what is expected or visible to
support tools it becomes an operational trouble spot for users and
platform suport to locate and determine the source of the problems.
2.2.9.2. CDN Edge Cache Selection due to Routing
A significant, and often overlooked problem is the addition of
network latency compared to edge CDN caches or access network peering
connections. Routing changes which cause bypassing edge CDN caches
and instead choosing less optimal caches
R = router
<--- non-overlay traffic path --->
device -- R ---- R ---- Edge CDN Cache
\
\
\
R --- R -- ingest -- R --- R -- egress -- R ------R ---- Less Optimal CDN Cache
<--- overlay traffic path --->
Figure: Routing Changes altering CDN Cache selection
2.2.9.3. Performance and Problem determination
Network overlays often interfere with the tools used in performance
and problem determination. This is due to either the tool and
protocols not being able to traverse the alternative route tunnel
impacting service's ability to diagnose connection and performance
problems, or the network overlay itself not supporting the tool and
not supporting or carrying the tools functions.
2.2.9.4. Impact of Changing Network Routing and other Policies
The problem for streaming applications occurs when the underlying
network properties and policies change from what is expected by the
streaming application. In particular when such changes are either
hidden or not visible to the streaming application.
While the open Internet is a dynamic environment, changing of basic
network behavior and policies from what is expected as seen from the
streaming application, deviates unexpectedly from what the streaming
application expects. This behavior disrupts the optimized streaming
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delivery architecture for the end-user device. Changes to Network
Policies such as routing, source IP address assigned to the streaming
application traffic, DNS resolver choice etc influences this
behavior.
Having a reliable understanding of the delivery path is essential for
streaming operators and the introduction of network overlays like
those based on technologies such as MASQUE especially when designed
to be undetectable by the applications using them has introduced new
technical challenges for streaming operators and network operators as
well as for their viewers.
The core problem occurs when changes to network policies are made
often without notification or visibility to applications and without
clear methods of probing to determine and test changed behaviors that
affect the streaming application's content delivery path resulting in
increased latency, changes of IP address for the application as seen
by either the application or the streaming service connection,
changes to DNS resolvers being queried and the results returned by
DNS, and changes to application transports such as adding or removing
outer layer encryption are all problems that have been observed in
production streaming platforms.
2.2.10. Unintended Content Blocking
A strongly undesirable unintended side-effect of network policy
changes is the blocking of content to the viewer. This may be the
primary content URLs access which are blocked, or possibly
advertising fetched from a second URL from the main video content.
This can be due to policy changes altering device IP addresses, or
changes to routing that run afoul of enforced traffic routing
policies.
Such blocking may be connected to restrictions built upon data feeds
used for geofiltering and georestuctions, for example restriction
which block delivery to networks identified as either commercial
data-centers or other CDNs service network addresses. Essentially,
running afoul of configurations possibly used to combat security
threats that expect streaming viewers to be on home or possibly
mobile networks, but not in commercial data centersor CDN content
networks and so block delivery to IP addresses in those unexpected
network blocks. This is more likely to occur in network overlays
that shift egress traffic to commeerical or CDN blocks.
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This is a particularly troublesome problem to determine as it may
appear inconsistently from one streaming session to another. Small
changes in URLs in manifests from on session to another, especially
on streaming platforms that make use of multi-CDN delivery and may
encounter different delivery and security protection policies from
the different multi-CDN operators invovled.
3. Policy Changes Hidden from Applications
One of the central recurring issues with streaming applications
running on devices or networks with changed policies due to network
overlays is that the changes are often hidden from the applications.
Applications often find it difficult or even impossible to detect
when network policy changes will be active and what they are
changing. For example, a device may have a designated default DNS
resolver for the device, but may have a different resolver selected
depending on how the streaming application queries the DNS.
Likewise, a streaming application might find that one application
transport protocol such as HTTP queries will have one set of routing
policies applied to it but a different application transport like
HTTPS may have a different set of routing policies applied.
Streaming applications that cannot determine the exact behavior to be
expected can prevent the streaming application from making good
content source decisions and can prevent applications from being able
to provide reliable feedback and logs when problems are encountered.
4. Making It Easy (for Users) by Working Under the Covers
Historically, incorporating privacy features into consumer-facing
products has been complex. This challenge arises from the need to
address a wide range of use cases while also offering users easy
access to advanced privacy frameworks and taxonomies. Many attempts
have been made and very few have achieved finding success with end
users.
Perhaps learning from the lessons of offering too many options, the
recent trend in privacy enhancements has steered toward either a very
simple "Privacy On or Off" switch or in other cases automatically
enabling or "upgrading" to enhance privacy. Apple's iCloud Private
Relay can be easily turned on with a single settings switch, while
privacy features such as Encrypted DNS over HTTP and upgrade from
HTTP to HTTPS connections have had a number of deployments that
automatically enable them for users when possible.
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Keeping with the motto of "Keep It Simple", users are generally not
provided with granular Network Overlay controls permitting the user
to select what applications, or what network connections the Network
Overlay policies can apply to.
Adhering to the "Keep It Simple" approach the application itself has
very little connection to privacy enhancing Network Overlays.
Applications generally do not have a means to detect when networking
policy changes are active. Applications generally do not have a
means to access policy change settings or to interact to change them.
5. Streaming Video
Streaming Video, while just one of the many different Internet
applications does standout from other uses in a number of significant
ways that perhaps merit some amount of special consideration in
understanding and addressing the impacts caused by particular privacy
enhancing design and service offering choices.
Firstly, Streaming video operates at a hard to imagine scale -
streaming video is served globally to more than 2 billion user daily
currently and continuing to grow in leaps and bounds.
Secondly, the content types delivered through streaming has evolved
from the pre-recorded low-resolution, low-bit rate, latency tolerant
video-on-demand movies, live or pre-recorded TV shows, and user
generated videos delivered by pioneering streaming platforms to now
including low-latency 4K and 8K live sports events, while also
evolving the pre-recorded content with high-bit rate such as 4K and
8K cinema quality and High Dynamic Range (HDR) lighting.
Finally, the expectations of streaming video viewers have
significantly evolved from the days of settling for being able to
watch a movie in a PC browser. Viewers expect to watch on any device
type they want ranging from low-end-streaming sticks that plug into a
USB port, to 4K and HDR capable laptops, 4K and 8K HDR TV screens,
gaming consoles, smart phones and many more choices. Viewers also
expect to have the same great viewing experience while at home
connected via high-speed wired Internet, high-speed WiFi, or mobile
cellular 5G and even satellite Internet connections.
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To meet the growth to billions of users, the growth in content type,
quality and speed expectations, and on-any-device anywhere that I am
over any-network-connection expectations of users the Streaming Video
technology infrastructure has had to itself evolve significantly.
This video streaming evolution work is being done in the IETF and in
the Streaming Video Technology Alliance (SVTA)
(https://www.svta.org/), and in a number of other technical and
industry groups.
It's hard to overstate just how much the growth of streaming video
has contributed to the growth of the Internet. Internet connections
of multiples of hundreds of megabits and gigabits speeds today are
because of the needs of video streaming, the ongoing work on low-
latency networking and ultra-low-latency video delivery are both
driven by the use of streaming video.
5.1. Advances in Streaming Video Architecture
Internet streaming has greatly matured and diversified from its early
days of viewers watching pre-recorded 320x240, 640x480 standard
definition 480p movies to wired PCs connected to the Internet via
high-latency, low-bandwidth DSL as early DOCSIS modems.
Streaming has grown to the extent that it has become a daily go-to
video source worldwide for billions of viewers and has expanded from
pre-recorded movies to encompass every type of video content
imaginable. This growth to billions of viewers and the addition of
low latency sensitive content and new connectivity options like WiFi,
Cellular and Satellite in addition to high-speed DOCSIS and fiber is
the world streaming platforms now provide service in.
With the large user base and its usage, the Streaming platforms also
have significant technical challenges to meet viewer expectations:
* (1) Delivery scales that commonly range from hundreds of thousands
to many millions of viewers simultaneously, with billions of views
globally daily;
* (2) Low latency demands from live sports, live events and live
streamed content;
* (3) content resolutions and corresponding formats which have
jumped from the days of SD-480p to 4K (3840x2160) and 8K
(7680x4320) along with bit rates which can had data needs of
10-24+ Mbps for 4K with 8K demanding 40 Mbps under extreme
compression and 150-300 Mbps for high quality such as cinema;
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* (4) devices with very diverse capabilities low-cost streaming
sticks, to Smart TVs, tablets, phones, and game consoles
* (5) broad range of connectivity choices including WiFi, Gig speed-
low latency DOCSIS, Fiber, satellite, and 5G cellular networks;
* (6) application transport protocols including MPEG DASH, HLS,
HTTP2/TCP, HTTP3/QUIC, WebRTC, Media over QUIC (MoQ) and specialty
application transports such as SRT, HESP etc.
To meet these challenges streaming platforms have significantly
invested in developing delivery architectures that are built with
detailed understandings of each element in the content delivery
pathway, starting from the content capture all the way through to the
screen of the viewer.
Streaming applications are part of an end-to-end architecture that is
optimized around achieving the best experience including low latency
video delivery to viewing devices. The open Internet can be
unpredictable with temporary issues like packet loss, congestion and
other conditions. However, streaming architecture is designed to
handle these momentary problems as effectively as possible often
through use of dynamic adaptive approaches designed into streaming
protocols and platform components.
6. Middleboxes and learning from the past
The IETF has discussed this situation in the past, more than 20 years
ago in 2002 Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues [RFC3234] was published
capturing the issues with Middleboxes in the network and the effects
of hidden changes occuring on the network between the sender and
receiver.
7. Appendix A: Network Overlays are different than VPNs
While conceptually similar in many ways to VPN (Virtual Private
Network) technology, the various network overlay technologies
currently being deployed as well as new ones currently being designed
by the IETF differ quite significantly from the older VPN approach
they are replacing in a number of ways.
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It is also worth noting that one reason why the issues discussed in
this document have not been concern with regard to VPNs is that
largely VPNs have not been a pervasive way to stream video. First,
many VPNs have not had very good or consistent throughput compared to
the direct open Internet and so provide a poor viewing experience.
Second, many video platforms block or deny service to VPN connections
due to the very common use of VPNs to bypass geofiltering
restrictions.
Whatever the reason, it is worthlooking at how VPNs differ from the
Network Overlays being discussed herein.
7.1. VPNs typically:
* (1) VPNs typically are detectable by both the video application
and often by the streaming platform.
* (2) VPNs typically work at the network layer of a device,
resulting in a wide-range (if not all) transports
* and protocols from the device flowing through the VPN
* (3) VPNs typically provide exception options allowing for
exclusion from traversing via the VPN based on
* various criteria such as application, destination IP address,
application protocol etc.
7.1.1. Network Overlays typically:
* (1) Network Overlays are often undetectable by video applications
or by the streaming platform, when in use
* (2) Network Overlays often only apply to specific application
transports such as HTTP2/TCP or HTTP3/QUIC while not applying to
HTTP2/TCP+TLS on the same device.
* (3) Network Overlays often only apply to HTTP connections and do
not support ICMP, non-HTTP versions of DNS, NTP etc, and various
tools used for network measurement, problem determination, and
network management that are not HTTP based.
* (4) Network Overlays do not expose to applications any means for
the application to discover the policy changes the overlay will
apply to the applications network connections.
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* (5) Network Overlays do not expose mechanisms or APIs for
applications to interact with them such as getting or setting
options.
8. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
9. Security Considerations
TODO Security
10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
11. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3234] Carpenter, B. and S. Brim, "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and
Issues", RFC 3234, DOI 10.17487/RFC3234, February 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3234>.
[RFC72558] "*** BROKEN REFERENCE ***".
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7258>.
[RFC7264] Zong, N., Jiang, X., Even, R., and Y. Zhang, "An Extension
to the REsource LOcation And Discovery (RELOAD) Protocol
to Support Relay Peer Routing", RFC 7264,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7264, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7264>.
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[RFC7624] Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
"Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7624>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.
[RFC9317] Holland, J., Begen, A., and S. Dawkins, "Operational
Considerations for Streaming Media", RFC 9317,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9317, October 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9317>.
[RFC9484] Pauly, T., Ed., Schinazi, D., Chernyakhovsky, A.,
Kühlewind, M., and M. Westerlund, "Proxying IP in HTTP",
RFC 9484, DOI 10.17487/RFC9484, October 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9484>.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions from the
Streaming Video Technology Alliance (SVTA) based on their work
studying the impacts of network overlays on the streaming platforms.
In particular, contributions from Brian Paxton have been very
helpful.
Authors' Addresses
Glenn Deen
Comcast-NBCUniversal
Email: glenn_deen@comcast.com
Sanjay Mishra
Verizon
Email: sanjay.mishra@verizon.com
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