NEA Asokan Attack Analysis
draft-ietf-nea-asokan-01

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (nea WG)
Last updated 2012-09-27 (latest revision 2012-08-22)
Replaces draft-salowey-nea-asokan
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
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Stream WG state WG Document
Consensus Unknown
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IESG IESG state Approved-announcement to be sent::Point Raised - writeup needed
Telechat date
Responsible AD Stephen Farrell
IESG note Susan Thomson (sethomso@cisco.com) is the Document Shepherd.
Send notices to nea-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-nea-asokan@tools.ietf.org
Network Working Group                                        J. Salowey
Internet Draft                                            Cisco Systems
Intended status: Informational                                 S. Hanna
Expires: February 2013                                 Juniper Networks
                                                        August 22, 2012

                        NEA Asokan Attack Analysis
                       draft-ietf-nea-asokan-01.txt

Abstract

   The Network Endpoint Assessment protocols are subject to a subtle
   forwarding attack that has become known as the NEA Asokan Attack.
   This document describes the attack and countermeasures that may be
   mounted.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 22, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document. Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
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   document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in
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   warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................2
   2. NEA Asokan Attack Explained....................................2
   3. Lying Endpoints................................................4
   4. Countermeasures Against The NEA Asokan Attack..................4
      4.1. Identity Binding..........................................4
      4.2. Cryptographic Binding.....................................5
         4.2.1. Binding Options......................................5
   5. Conclusions....................................................6
   6. IANA Considerations............................................6
   7. Security Considerations........................................6
   8. References.....................................................6
      8.1. Informative References....................................6
   9. Acknowledgments................................................7

1. Introduction

   The Network Endpoint Assessment protocols are subject to a subtle
   forwarding attack that has become known as the NEA Asokan Attack.
   This document describes the attack and countermeasures that may be
   mounted. The PT-TLS [5] and PT-EAP [6] protocols developed by the
   NEA working group include mechanisms that can provide cryptographic
   binding and identity binding countermeasures.

2. NEA Asokan Attack Explained

   The NEA Asokan Attack is a variation on an attack described in a
   2002 paper written by Asokan, Niemi, and Nyberg [1]. Figure 1
   depicts one version of the original Asokan attack. This attack
   involves tricking an authorized user into authenticating to a decoy
   AAA server, which forwards the authentication protocol from one
   tunnel to another, tricking a AAA server into believing these
   messages came from the attacker and granting access to him.

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                            +-------------+ ========== +----------+
                            |   Attacker  |-AuthProto--|AAA Server|
                            +-------------+ ========== +----------+
                                   |
                               AuthProto
                                   |
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