Note: This ballot was opened for revision 10 and is now closed.

(Spencer Dawkins) Yes

(Jari Arkko) No Objection

(Alia Atlas) No Objection

(Deborah Brungard) No Objection

(Ben Campbell) No Objection

(Alissa Cooper) No Objection

(Stephen Farrell) No Objection

- 3.4.5: Can a requester DoS a responder by asking the
latter to read giga- or tera-bytes?  And the same question
the other way about for 3.4.6.

- 4.4.1: not having access to memory allocated for
"cancelled RPCs" also seems like a potential DoS that ought
be noted. Is it?

- General: I was surprised see no mention of DoS. Is that
covered in some reference? Even if so, I'd have expected
some discussion of DoS attacks and mitigations.

- 8.2.1: "Protection below the RDMA layer is a more
appropriate security mechanism for RDMA transports in
performance-sensitive deployments." I think that's a bit
over-stated. A deployment could be performance-sensitive
but yet prioritise application layer crypto for various
reasons. As you're really just talking about trade-offs,
and I think that's sufficiently explained already, I figure
you could omit that sentence.

(Joel Jaeggli) No Objection

(Suresh Krishnan) No Objection

(Mirja Kühlewind) No Objection

(Terry Manderson) No Objection

(Alexey Melnikov) No Objection

(Kathleen Moriarty) No Objection