Remote Direct Memory Access Transport for Remote Procedure Call Version 1
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 10 and is now closed.
(Spencer Dawkins) Yes
(Jari Arkko) No Objection
(Alia Atlas) No Objection
(Deborah Brungard) No Objection
(Ben Campbell) No Objection
(Alissa Cooper) No Objection
(Stephen Farrell) No Objection
Comment (2017-02-28 for -10)
- 3.4.5: Can a requester DoS a responder by asking the latter to read giga- or tera-bytes? And the same question the other way about for 3.4.6. - 4.4.1: not having access to memory allocated for "cancelled RPCs" also seems like a potential DoS that ought be noted. Is it? - General: I was surprised see no mention of DoS. Is that covered in some reference? Even if so, I'd have expected some discussion of DoS attacks and mitigations. - 8.2.1: "Protection below the RDMA layer is a more appropriate security mechanism for RDMA transports in performance-sensitive deployments." I think that's a bit over-stated. A deployment could be performance-sensitive but yet prioritise application layer crypto for various reasons. As you're really just talking about trade-offs, and I think that's sufficiently explained already, I figure you could omit that sentence.