Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default
draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-07

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (nfsv4 WG)
Authors Trond Myklebust  , Chuck Lever 
Last updated 2020-05-27 (latest revision 2020-04-30)
Replaces draft-cel-nfsv4-rpc-tls
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Reviews
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd David Noveck
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2020-02-12)
IESG IESG state Waiting for AD Go-Ahead
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
Telechat date
Responsible AD Magnus Westerlund
Send notices to David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com>
IANA IANA review state IANA - Not OK
Network File System Version 4                               T. Myklebust
Internet-Draft                                               Hammerspace
Updates: 5531 (if approved)                                C. Lever, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Oracle
Expires: November 1, 2020                                 April 30, 2020

          Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default
                      draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-07

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism that, through the use of
   opportunistic Transport Layer Security (TLS), enables encryption of
   in-transit Remote Procedure Call (RPC) transactions while
   interoperating with ONC RPC implementations that do not support this
   mechanism.  This document updates RFC 5531.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 1, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Myklebust & Lever       Expires November 1, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                RPC-Over-TLS                    April 2020

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  RPC-Over-TLS in Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Discovering Server-side TLS Support . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.2.1.  Using TLS with RPCSEC GSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  TLS Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Base Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.1.  Protected Operation on TCP  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.2.  Protected Operation on UDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.3.  Protected Operation on Other Transports . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  TLS Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       5.2.1.  X.509 Certificates Using PKIX trust . . . . . . . . .  11
       5.2.2.  X.509 Certificates Using Fingerprints . . . . . . . .  12
       5.2.3.  Pre-Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.2.4.  Token Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  DESY NFS server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  Hammerspace NFS server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.3.  Linux NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.4.  FreeBSD NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  Limitations of an Opportunistic Approach  . . . . . . . .  15
       7.1.1.  STRIPTLS Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       7.1.2.  Privacy Leakage Before Session Establishment  . . . .  16
     7.2.  TLS Identity Management on Clients  . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.3.  Security Considerations for AUTH_SYS on TLS . . . . . . .  17
     7.4.  Best Security Policy Practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.1.  RPC Authentication Flavor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.2.  ALPN Identifier for SUNRPC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     9.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
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