An Architecture for a Network Anomaly Detection Framework
draft-ietf-nmop-network-anomaly-architecture-01

NMOP                                                             T. Graf
Internet-Draft                                                     W. Du
Intended status: Informational                                  Swisscom
Expires: 23 April 2025                                       P. Francois
                                                               INSA-Lyon
                                                         20 October 2024

       An Architecture for a Network Anomaly Detection Framework
            draft-ietf-nmop-network-anomaly-architecture-01

Abstract

   This document describes the motivation and architecture of a Network
   Anomaly Detection Framework and the relationship to other documents
   describing network symptom semantics and network incident lifecycle.

   The described architecture for detecting IP network service
   interruption is generic applicable and extensible.  Different
   applications are being described and exampled with open-source
   running code.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Operations and
   Management Area Working Group Working Group mailing list
   (nmop@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/nmop/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/ietf-wg-nmop/draft-ietf-nmop-network-anomaly-
   architecture/ .

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Outlier Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Knowledge Based Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  Data Mesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Elements of the Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Service Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.2.  SDD Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  Operational Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Operational Data Aggregation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.5.  Service Disruption Detection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.6.  Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.7.  Postmortem  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.8.  Replaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.1.  Cosmos Bright Lights  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

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   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   Today's highly virtualized large scale IP networks are a challenge
   for network operation to monitor due to its vast number of
   dependencies.  Humans are no longer capable to verify manually all
   dependencies end to end in an appropriate time.

   IP networks are the backbone of today's society.  We individually
   depend on networks fulfilling the purpose of forwarding our IP
   packets from A to B at any time of the day in a timely fashion.  A
   loss of connectivity for a short period of time has manyfold
   implications.  From unable to browse the web, watch a soccer game,
   access the company intranet or even in life threatening situations
   being no longer able to reach emergency services.  Where increased
   packet forwarding delay due to congestion, depending on the real-time
   character of the network application, have none to severe impact on
   the performance of the application.

   Networks are in general deterministic.  However, the usage of
   networks only somewhat.  Humans, as in a large group of people, are
   somehow predictable.  There are time of the day patterns in terms of
   when we are eating, sleeping, working or leisure.  And these patterns
   are potentially changing depending on age, profession and cultural
   background.

1.1.  Motivation

   When operational or configurational changes in connectivity services
   are happening, the objective therefore is to detect interruption at
   network operation faster than the users using those connectivity
   services.

   In order to achieve this objective, automation in network monitoring
   is required since the amount or people operating the network are
   simply outnumbered by the amount of people using connectivity
   services.

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   This automation needs to monitor network changes holistically by
   monitoring all 3 network planes simultaneously for a given
   connectivity service and detect whether that change is service
   disruptive, received packets are no longer forwarded to the desired
   destination, or not.  A change in control and management plane
   indicate a network topology change.  Where a change in the forwarding
   plane describe how the packets are being forwarded.  Or in other
   words, control and management plane changes can be attributed to
   network topology state changes where forwarding plane to the outcome
   of these network topology state changes.

   Since changes in networks are happening all the time due to the vast
   number of dependencies, a scoring system is needed to indicate
   whether the change is disruptive, the amount of transport sessions,
   flows, are affected and whether such interruptions are usual or
   exceptional.

1.2.  Scope

   Such objectives can be achieved by applying checks on network
   modelled time series data containing semantics describing their
   dependencies across network planes.  These checks can be based on
   domain knowledge, in essence, how networks should work, or on outlier
   detection techniques that identify measurements deviating
   significantly from the norm due to human factors.

   The described scope does not take the connectivity service intent
   into account nor does it verify whether the intent is being achieved
   all the time.  Changes to the service intent causing service
   disruptions are therefore considered service disruptions where on
   monitoring systems taking the intent into account this is considered
   as intended.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.1.  Terminology

   This document defines the following terms:

   Outlier Detection: Is a systematic approach to identify rare data
   points deviating significantly from the majority.

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   Service Disruption Detection (SDD): The process of detecting a
   service degradation by discovering anomalies in network monitoring
   data.

   Service Disruption Detection System (SDDS): A system allowing to
   perform SDD.

   Additionally it makes use of the terms defined in
   [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology] and
   [I-D.netana-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle].

   The following terms are used as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology] :

   *  System

   *  Resource

   *  Characteristic

   *  Change

   *  Detect

   *  Event

   *  State

   *  Relevance

   *  Occurrence

   *  Incident

   *  Problem

   *  Symptom

   *  Cause

   *  Consolidation

   *  Alarm

   *  Transient

   *  Intermittent

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   Figure 2 in Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology] shows
   characteristics of observed operational network telemetry metrics.

   Figure 4 in Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology] shows
   relationships between, state, relevant state, problem, symptom, cause
   and alarm.

   Figure 5 in Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology] shows
   relationships between problem, symptom and cause.

   The following terms are used as defined in
   [I-D.netana-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle] :

   *  False Positive

   *  False Negative

2.2.  Outlier Detection

   Outlier Detection, also known as anomaly detection, describes a
   systematic approach to identify rare data points deviating
   significantly from the majority.  Outliers can manifest as single
   data point or as a sequence of data points.  There are multiple ways
   in general to classify anomalies, but for the context of this draft,
   the following three classes are taken into account:

   Global outliers:  An outlier is considered "global" if its behavior
      is outside the entirety of the considered data set.  For example,
      if the average dropped packet count is between 0 and 10 per minute
      and a small time-window gets the value 1000, this is considered a
      global anomaly.

   Contextual outliers:  An outlier is considered "contextual" if its
      behavior is within a normal (expected) range, but it would not be
      expected based on some context.  Context can be defined as a
      function of multiple parameters, such as time, location, etc.  For
      example, the forwarded packet volume overnight reaches levels
      which might be totally normal for the daytime, but anomalous and
      unexpected for the nighttime.

   Collective outliers:  An outlier is considered "collective" if the
      behavior of each single data point that are part of the anomaly
      are within expected ranges (so they are not anomalous it either a
      contextual or a global sense), but the group, taking all the data
      points together, is.  Note that the group can be made within a
      single time series (a sequence of data points is anomalous) or
      across multiple metrics (e.g. if looking at two metrics together,
      the combined behavior turns out to be anomalous).  In Network

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      Telemetry time series, one way this can manifest is that the
      amount of network paths and interface state changes matches the
      time range when the forwarded packet volume decreases as a group.

   For each outlier a score between 0 and 1 is being calculated.  The
   higher the value, the higher the probability that the observed data
   point is an outlier.  Anomaly detection: A survey [VAP09] gives
   additional details on anomaly detection and its types.

2.3.  Knowledge Based Detection

   Knowledge-based anomaly detection, also known as rule-based anomaly
   detection, is a technique used to identify anomalies or outliers by
   comparing them against predefined rules or patterns.  This approach
   relies on the use of domain-specific knowledge to set standards,
   thresholds, or rules for what is considered "normal" behavior.
   Traditionally, these rules are established manually by a
   knowledgeable network engineer.  Forewardlooking, these rules can be
   formally, human and machine readable, expressed in ontologies,
   Section 5.3 of [I-D.mackey-nmop-kg-for-netops] based on RFC like
   document defined network protocol behaviour and derived network
   symptoms with defined patterns.

   Additionally, in the context of network anomaly detection, the
   knowledge-based approach works hand in hand with the deterministic
   understanding of the network, which is reflected in network modeling.
   Components are organized into three network planes: the Management
   Plane, the Control Plane, and the Forwarding Plane.  A component can
   relate to a physical, virtual, or configurational entity, or to a sum
   of packets belonging to a flow being forwarded in a network.

   Such relationships can be modelled in a Digital Map to automate that
   process.  [I-D.havel-nmop-digital-map-concept] examples a concept and
   [I-D.havel-nmop-digital-map] an implementation for such network
   modelled relationships.

   It can also be modelled in a Knowledge Graph Section 5 of
   [I-D.mackey-nmop-kg-for-netops] where ontologies can be used to
   augment the relationships among different network elements in the
   network model.

2.4.  Data Mesh

   The Data Mesh [Deh22] Architecture distinguishes between operational
   and analytical data.  Operational data refers to collected data from
   operational systems.  While analytical data refers to insights gained
   from operational data.

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2.4.1.  Operational Network Data

   In terms of network observability, semantics of operational network
   metrics are defined by IETF and are categorized as described in the
   Network Telemetry Framework [RFC9232] in the following three
   different network planes:

   Management Plane:  Time series data describing the state changes and
      statistics of a network node and its resources.  For example,
      Interface state and statistics modelled in ietf-interfaces.yang
      [RFC8343]

   Control Plane:  Time series data describing the state and state
      changes of network reachability.  For example, BGP VPNv6 unicast
      updates and withdrawals exported in BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP)
      [RFC7854] and modeled in BGP [RFC4364]

   Forwarding Plane:  Time series data describing the forwarding
      behavior of packets and its data-plane context.  For example,
      dropped packet count modelled in IPFIX entity
      forwardingStatus(IE89) [RFC7270] and packetDeltaCount(IE2)
      [RFC5102] and exportet with IPFIX [RFC7011] .

2.4.2.  Analytical Observed Symptoms

   The Service Disruption Detection process generates analytical metrics
   describing symptom and outlier pattern of the connectivity service
   disruption.

   The obeserved symptoms are categorized into a semantic triple as
   described in [W3C-RDF-concept-triples]: action, reason, cause.  Where
   the object is the action, decribing the change in the network.  Where
   the reason is the predicate, explaining why this changed occured and
   where the subject is the cause which triggered that change.

   Symptom definitions are described in Section 3 of
   [I-D.netana-nmop-network-anomaly-semantics] and outlier pattern
   semantics in Section 4 of [I-D.netana-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle]
   and expressed YANG information models.

   However the semantic triples could also be expressed with the
   Semantic Web Technology Stack in RDF, RDFS and OWL definitions as
   described in Section 6 of [I-D.mackey-nmop-kg-for-netops].  Together
   with the ontology definitions described in Section 2.3 a Knowledge
   Graph can be created describing the relationship between the network
   state and the observed symptom.

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3.  Elements of the Architecture

   A system architecture aimed at detecting service disruptions is
   typically built upon multiple components, for which design choices
   need to be made.  In this section, we describe the main components of
   the architecture, and delve into considerations to be made when
   designing such componenents in an implementation.

   The system architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 and its main
   components are described in the following subsections.

         +---------+                     +-------------------+
         |Service  |                     |     Alarm and     |
    |--- |Inventory|                     | Problem Management|
    |    |         |                     |      System       |
    |    +---------+                     +-------------------+
    |      |                                      ^     Stream
    |      |                                      |
    |      |       +---------+           +-------------------+
    |      |       | Post-   | Stream    |   Message Broker  |
    |      |       | mortem  | <-------- |  with Analytical  |
    |      |       | System  |           |    Network Data   |
    |      |       +---------+           +-------------------+
    |      |            |                         ^     Stream
    |      |            |                         |
    |      |            |                +-------------------+
    |      | Profile    | Fine           | Alarm Aggregation | Store Label
    |      | and        | Tune           | for Anomaly       | ------------|
    |      | Generate   | SDD            | Detection         |             |
    |      | SDD Config | Config         +-------------------+             |
    |      |            |                       ^  ^  ^ Stream             |
    |      v            v                       |  |  |                    v
    |   +-------------------+            +-------------------+        +---------+
    |   | Service Disruption| Schedule   | Service Disruption| Replay |  Data   |
    |   |     Detection     | ---------> |     Detection     |<------ | Storage |
    |   |   Configuration   | Detection  |                   |        |         |
    |   +-------------------+            +-------------------+        +---------+
    |                                       ^ ^ Stream ^ ^ ^               ^
    |                                       | |        | | |               |
    |                                    +---------+---------+             |
    |                                    | Network |  Data   | Store       |
    |----------------------------------> |  Model  |  Aggr.  | ------------|
                                         |         | Process | Operational Data
                                         +---------+---------+
                                                ^  ^  ^ Stream
                                                |  |  |
                                         +-------------------+
                                         |   Message Broker  |

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                                         |  with Operational |
                                         |    Network Data   |
                                         +-------------------+
                                                ^  ^  ^ Stream
 Subscribe                       Publish        |  |  |
           +-------------------+         +-------------------+
           | Network Node with | ------> | Network Telemetry |
 --------> | Network Telemetry | ------> |  Data Collection  |
           |   Subscription    | ------> |                   |
           +-------------------+         +-------------------+

         Figure 1: Service Disruption Detection Architecture

3.1.  Service Inventory

   A service inventory is used to obtain a list of the connectivity
   services for which Anomaly Detection is to be performed.  A service
   profiling process may be executed on the service in order to define a
   configuration of the service disruption detection approach and
   parameters to be used.

3.2.  SDD Configuration

   Based on this service list and potential preliminary service
   profiling, a configuration of the Service Disruption Detection is
   produced.  It defines the set of approaches that need to be applied
   to perform SDD, as well as parameters that are to be set when
   executing the algorithms performing SDD per se.

   As the service lives on, the configuration may be adapted as a result
   of an evolution of the profiling being performed, as the result of a
   postmortem analysis being produced as a result of an event impacting
   the service, or the occurrence of false positives being raised by the
   alarm system.

3.3.  Operational Data Collection

   Collection of network monitoring data involves the management of the
   subscriptions to network telemetry on nodes of the network, and the
   configuration of the collection infrastructure to receive the
   monitoring data produced by the network.

   The monitoring data produced by the collection infrastructure is then
   streamed through a message broker system. for further processing.

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   Networks tend to produce extremely large amounts of monitoring data.
   To preserve scaling and reduce costs, decisions need to be made on
   the duration of retention of such data in storage, and at which level
   of storage they need to be kept.  A retention time need to be set on
   the raw data produced by the collection system, in accordance to
   their utility for further used.  This aspect will be elaborated in
   further sections.

3.4.  Operational Data Aggregation

   Aggregation is the process of producing data upon which detection of
   a service disruption can be performed, based on collected network
   monitoring data.

   Pre-processing of collected network monitoring data is usually
   performed so as to produce input for the Service Disruption Detection
   component.  This can be achieved in multiple ways, depending on the
   architecture of the SDD component.  As an example, the granularity at
   which forwarding data is produced by the network may be too high for
   the SDD algorithms, and instead be aggregated into a coarser
   dimension for SDD execution.

   A retention time also needs to be decided upon for Aggregated data.
   Note that the retention time must be set carefully, in accordance
   with the replay ability requirement discussed in Section 3.8.

3.5.  Service Disruption Detection

   Service Disruption Detection processes the aggregated network data in
   order to decide whether a service is degraded to the point where
   network operation needs to be alerted of an ongoing problem within
   the network.

   Two key aspects need to be considered when designing the SDD
   component.  First, the way the data is being processed needs to be
   carefully designed, as networks typically produce extremely large
   amounts of data which may hinder the scalability of the architecture.
   Second, the algorithms used to make a decision to alert the operator
   need to be designed in such a way that the operator can trust that a
   targeted Service Disruption will be detected (no false negatives),
   while not spamming the operator with alarms that do not reflect an
   actual issue within the network (false positives) leading to alarm
   fatigue.

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   Two approaches are typically followed to present the data to the SDD
   system.  Classically, the aggregated data can be stored in a database
   that is polled at regular intervals by the SDD component for decision
   making.  Alternatively, a streaming approach can be followed so as to
   process the data while they are being consumed from the collection
   component.

   For SDD per-se, two families of algorithms can be decided upon.
   First, knowledge based detection approaches can be used, mimicking
   the process that human operators follow when looking at the data.
   Machine Learning based outlier detection based approaches to detect
   deviations from the norm.

3.5.1.  Network Modeling

   Some input to SDD is made of established knowledge of the network
   that is unrelated to the dimensions according to which outlier
   detection is performed.  For example, the knowledge of the network
   infrastructure may be required to perform some service disruption
   detection.  Such data need to be rendered accessible and updatable
   for use by SDD.  They may come from inventories, or automated
   gathering of data from the network itself.

3.5.2.  Data Profiling

   As rules cannot be crafted specifically for each customer, they need
   to be defined according to pre-established service profiles.
   Processing of monitoring data can be performed in order to associate
   each service with a profile.  External knowledge on the customer can
   also help in associating a service with a profile.

3.5.3.  Detection Strategies

   For a profile, a set of strategies is defined.  Each strategy
   captures one approach to look at the data (as a human operator does)
   to observe if an abnormal situation is arising.  Strategies are
   defined as a function of observed outliers as defined in Section 2.2
   .

   When one of the strategies applied for a profile detects a concerning
   outlier or combined outlier, an alarm needs to be raised.

   Depending on the implementation of the architecture, a scheduler may
   be needed in order to orchestrate the evaluation of the alarm levels
   for each strategy applied for a profile, for all service instances
   associated with such profile.

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3.5.4.  Machine Learning

   Machine learning-based anomaly detection can also be seamlessly
   integrated into such SDDS.  Machine learning is commonly used for
   detecting outliers or anomalies.  Typically, unsupervised learning is
   widely recognized for its applicability, given the inherent
   characteristics of network data.  Although machine learning requires
   a sizeable amount of high-quality data and considerable advanced
   training, the advantages it offers make these requirements
   worthwhile.  The power of this approach lies in its generalizability,
   robustness, ability to simplify the fine-tuning process, and most
   importantly, its capability to identify anomaly patterns that might
   go unnoticed to the human observer.

3.5.5.  Storage

   Storage may be required to execute SDD, as some algorithms may be
   relying on historical (aggregated) monitoring data in order to detect
   anomalies.  Careful considerations need to be made on the level at
   which such data is stored, as slow access to such data may be
   detrimental to the reactivity of the system.

3.6.  Alarm

   When the SDD component decides that a service is undergoing a
   disruption, a relevant-state change notification needs to be sent to
   the alarm and problem management system as shown in Figure 4 in
   Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology].  Multiple practical aspects
   need to be taken into account in this component.

   When the issue lasts longer than the interval at which the SDD
   component runs, the relevant-state change mechanism should not create
   multiple notifications to the operator, so as to not overwhelm the
   management of the issue.  However, the information provided along
   with the alarm should be kept up to date during the full duration of
   the issue.

3.7.  Postmortem

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   Network Anomaly
     Detection               Symptoms
+-------------------+           &
|   +-----------+   |   Network Anomalies
|   | Detection |---|-------------+
|   |   Stage   |   |             |
|   +-----------+   |             v
+---------^---------+        +-------------------+      Labels     +------------+
          |                  | Anomaly Detection |---------------->| Validation |
          |                  |   Label Store     |<----------------|   Stage    |
          |                  +-------------------+     Revised     +------------+
   +------------+                 |                    Labels
   | Refinement |                 |
   |   Stage    |<----------------+
   +------------+        Historical Symptoms
                                  &
                          Network Anomalies

           Figure 2: Anomaly Detection Refinement Lifecycle

   Validation and refinement are performed during Postmortem.

   From an Anomaly Detection Lifecycle point of view as described in
   [I-D.netana-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle], the Service Disruption
   Detection Configuration evolves over time, iteratively, looping over
   three main phases: detection, validation and refinement.

   The Detection phase produces the alarms that are sent to the Alarm
   and Problem Management System and at the same time it stores the
   network anomaly and symptom labels into the Label Store.  This
   enables network engineers to review the labels to validate and edit
   them as needed.

   The Validation stage is typically performed by network engineers
   reviewing the results of the detection and indicating which symptoms
   and network anomalies have been useful for the identification of
   problems in the network.  The original labels from the Service
   Disruption Detection are analyzed and an updated set of more accurate
   labels is provided back to the label store.

   The resulting labels will be then provided back into the Network
   Anomaly Detection via its refinement capabilities: the refinement is
   about the update of the Service Disruption Detection configuration in
   order to improve the results of the detection (e.g. false positives,
   false negatives, accuracy of the boundaries, etc.).

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3.8.  Replaying

   When a service disruption has been detected, it is essential for the
   human operator to be able to analyze the data which led to the
   raising of an Alarm.  It is thus important that a SSDS preserves both
   the data which led to the creation of the alarm as well as human
   understandable information on why the data led to the raising of an
   alarm.

   In early stages of operations or when experimenting with a SDDS, it
   is common that the parameters used for SDD are to be fined tuned.
   This process is facilitated by designing the SDDS architecture in a
   way that allows to rerun the SDD algorithms on the same input.

   Data retention, as well as its level, need to be defined in order not
   to sacrifice the ability of replaying SDD execution for the sake of
   improving its accuracy.

4.  Implementation Status

   Note to the RFC-Editor: Please remove this section before publishing.

   This section records the status of known implementations.

4.1.  Cosmos Bright Lights

   This architecture have been developed as part of a proof of concept
   started in September 2022 first in a dedicated network lab
   environment and later in December 2022 in Swisscom production to
   monitor a limited amount of 16 L3 VPN connectivity services.

   At the Applied Networking Research Workshop at IRTF 117 the
   architecture was the first time published in the following academic
   paper: [Ahf23].

   Since December 2022, 20 connectivity service disruptions have been
   monitored and 52 false positives due to time series database
   temporarily not being real-time and missing traffic profiling,
   comparing to previous week was not applicable, occurred.  Out of 20
   connectivity service disruptions 6 parameters where monitored and 3
   times 1, 8 times 2, 6 times 3, 2 times 4 parameters recognized the
   service disruption.

   A real-time streaming based version has been deployed in Swisscom
   production as a proof of concept in June 2024 monitoring approximate
   >12'000 L3 VPN's concurrently.  Improved profiling capabilities are
   currently under development.

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5.  Security Considerations

   TBD

6.  Contributors

   The authors would like to thank Alex Huang Feng, Ahmed Elhassany and
   Vincenzo Riccobene for their valuable contribution.

7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Qin Wu, Ignacio Dominguez Martinez-
   Casanueva and Adrian Farrel for their review and valuable comments.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.havel-nmop-digital-map]
              Havel, O., Claise, B., de Dios, O. G., Elhassany, A., and
              T. Graf, "Modeling the Digital Map based on RFC 8345:
              Sharing Experience and Perspectives", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-havel-nmop-digital-map-01, 5 July
              2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-havel-
              nmop-digital-map-01>.

   [I-D.havel-nmop-digital-map-concept]
              Havel, O., Claise, B., de Dios, O. G., and T. Graf,
              "Digital Map: Concept, Requirements, and Use Cases", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-havel-nmop-digital-map-
              concept-00, 4 July 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-havel-nmop-
              digital-map-concept-00>.

   [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology]
              Davis, N., Farrel, A., Graf, T., Wu, Q., and C. Yu, "Some
              Key Terms for Network Fault and Problem Management", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-nmop-terminology-
              06, 17 October 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nmop-
              terminology-06>.

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   [I-D.mackey-nmop-kg-for-netops]
              Mackey, M., Claise, B., Graf, T., Keller, H., Voyer, D.,
              and P. Lucente, "Knowledge Graph Framework for Network
              Operations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              mackey-nmop-kg-for-netops-00, 10 September 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mackey-nmop-
              kg-for-netops-00>.

   [I-D.netana-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle]
              Riccobene, V., Roberto, A., Graf, T., Du, W., and A. H.
              Feng, "Experiment: Network Anomaly Lifecycle", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-netana-nmop-network-
              anomaly-lifecycle-03, 8 July 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-netana-nmop-
              network-anomaly-lifecycle-03>.

   [I-D.netana-nmop-network-anomaly-semantics]
              Graf, T., Du, W., Feng, A. H., Riccobene, V., and A.
              Roberto, "Semantic Metadata Annotation for Network Anomaly
              Detection", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              netana-nmop-network-anomaly-semantics-02, 8 July 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-netana-nmop-
              network-anomaly-semantics-02>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9232]  Song, H., Qin, F., Martinez-Julia, P., Ciavaglia, L., and
              A. Wang, "Network Telemetry Framework", RFC 9232,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9232, May 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9232>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [Ahf23]    Huang Feng, A., "Daisy: Practical Anomaly Detection in
              large BGP/MPLS and BGP/SRv6 VPN Networks", IETF 117,
              Applied Networking Research Workshop,
              DOI 10.1145/3606464.3606470, July 2023,
              <https://hal.science/hal-04307611>.

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   [Deh22]    Dehghani, Z., "Data Mesh", O'Reilly Media,
              ISBN 9781492092391, March 2022,
              <https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/data-
              mesh/9781492092384/>.

   [RFC4364]  Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
              Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>.

   [RFC5102]  Quittek, J., Bryant, S., Claise, B., Aitken, P., and J.
              Meyer, "Information Model for IP Flow Information Export",
              RFC 5102, DOI 10.17487/RFC5102, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5102>.

   [RFC7011]  Claise, B., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and P. Aitken,
              "Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
              Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information", STD 77,
              RFC 7011, DOI 10.17487/RFC7011, September 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7011>.

   [RFC7270]  Yourtchenko, A., Aitken, P., and B. Claise, "Cisco-
              Specific Information Elements Reused in IP Flow
              Information Export (IPFIX)", RFC 7270,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7270, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7270>.

   [RFC7854]  Scudder, J., Ed., Fernando, R., and S. Stuart, "BGP
              Monitoring Protocol (BMP)", RFC 7854,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7854, June 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7854>.

   [RFC8343]  Bjorklund, M., "A YANG Data Model for Interface
              Management", RFC 8343, DOI 10.17487/RFC8343, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8343>.

   [VAP09]    Chandola, V., Banerjee, A., and V. Kumar, "Anomaly
              detection: A survey", IETF 117, Applied Networking
              Research Workshop, DOI 10.1145/1541880.1541882, July 2009,
              <https://www.researchgate.net/
              publication/220565847_Anomaly_Detection_A_Survey>.

   [W3C-RDF-concept-triples]
              Cyganiak, R., Wood, D., and M. Lanthaler, "W3C RDF concept
              semantic triples", W3 Consortium, February 2014,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-concepts/#section-triples>.

Authors' Addresses

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   Thomas Graf
   Swisscom
   Binzring 17
   CH-8045 Zurich
   Switzerland
   Email: thomas.graf@swisscom.com

   Wanting Du
   Swisscom
   Binzring 17
   CH-8045 Zurich
   Switzerland
   Email: wanting.du@swisscom.com

   Pierre Francois
   INSA-Lyon
   Lyon
   France
   Email: pierre.francois@insa-lyon.fr

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