A Secure Selection and Filtering Mechanism for the Network Time Protocol with Chronos
draft-ietf-ntp-chronos-06

Network Working Group                                    N. Rozen-Schiff
Internet-Draft                                                  D. Dolev
Intended status: Informational            Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Expires: 25 February 2023                                     T. Mizrahi
                                        Huawei Network.IO Innovation Lab
                                                             M. Schapira
                                          Hebrew University of Jerusalem
                                                          24 August 2022

A Secure Selection and Filtering Mechanism for the Network Time Protocol
                              with Chronos
                       draft-ietf-ntp-chronos-06

Abstract

   The Network Time Protocol version 4 (NTPv4), as defined in RFC 5905,
   is the mechanism used by NTP clients to synchronize with NTP servers
   across the Internet.  This document specifies an extension to the
   NTPv4 client, named Chronos, which is used as a "watchdog" alongside
   NTPv4, and provides improved security against time shifting attacks.
   Chronos involves changes to the NTP client's system process only.
   Since it does not affect the wire protocol, the Chronos mechanism is
   applicable to any current or future time protocol.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 February 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Terms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Chronos' Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Chronos Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Chronos' Poll and System Processes  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Chronos' Recommended Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Threat Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Attack Detection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Security Analysis Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Chronos' Pseudocode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Precision vs. Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   NTPv4, as defined in RFC 5905 [RFC5905], is vulnerable to time
   shifting attacks, in which the attacker's goal is to shift the local
   time at an NTP client.  See [Chronos_paper] for details.  Time
   shifting attacks on NTP are possible even if NTP communication is
   encrypted and authenticated.  A weaker man-in-the-middle (MitM)
   attacker can shift time simply by dropping or delaying packets,
   whereas a powerful attacker, who has full control over an NTP server,
   can do so by explicitly determining the NTP response content.  This
   document introduces a time shifting mitigation mechanism called
   Chronos.  Chronos can be integrated into NTPv4-compatible servers as
   an NTPv4 client's "watchdog" against time shifting attacks.  An NTP
   client that runs Chronos is interoperable with [RFC5905]-compatible
   NTPv4 servers.  The Chronos mechanism does not affect the wire

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   mechanism and is therefore applicable to any current or future time
   protocol.

   Chronos is a mechanism that runs in the background, continuously
   maintains a virtual "Chronos" clock, and compares this clock's
   reading to NTPv4's clock updates.  When the gap between the two
   clocks exceeds a certain threshold (specified in Section 4), this is
   interpreted as the client experiencing a time shifting attack.  In
   this case, Chronos is used to update the client's clock, and the
   conventional NTPv4 client time-synchronization algorithm is run in
   the background until the gap between the two algorithms is again
   below this threshold, and hence the conventional NTPv4 client
   algorithm is deemed safe to use again.

   When the client is not under attack, Chronos is passive, allowing
   NTPv4 to control the client clock and providing the ordinary high
   precision and accuracy of NTPv4.  When under attack, Chronos takes
   control over the client's clock, mitigating the time shift, while
   guaranteeing relatively high accuracy with respect to the UTC (error
   is bounded by 100 ms when using the recommended parameters) and
   precision, as discussed in Section 6.

   By leveraging techniques from distributed computing theory for time-
   synchronization in the presence of Byzantine attackers, Chronos
   achieves accurate synchronization even in the presence of powerful
   attackers who are in direct control of a large number of NTP servers
   - up to 1/3 of the servers in local Chronos pool (where a local
   Chronos pool may consist of hundreds of servers).  In contrast,
   NTPv4, which employs an algorithm that is not designed to withstand
   attacks by Byzantine servers, and, in particular, typically relies on
   a small subset of the NTP server pool (e.g., 4 servers) for time
   synchronization, is much more vulnerable to time shifting attacks.
   Chronos is carefully engineered to minimize the load on NTP servers
   and the communication overhead.

   A Chronos client iteratively "crowdsources" time queries across NTP
   servers and applies a provably secure algorithm for eliminating
   "suspicious" responses and for averaging over the remaining
   responses.  In each poll interval, the Chronos client selects,
   uniformly at random, a small subset (e.g., 10-15 servers) of a large
   server pool (containing hundreds of servers).  To minimize the load
   on NTP servers and the communication overhead, the frequency of
   Chronos poll intervals should be much less dense than that of
   standard NTPv4 clock updates, e.g., the Chronos clock can be updated
   once every 10 NTPv4 clock updates.  Chronos' security was evaluated
   both theoretically and experimentally with a prototype
   implementation.  According to this security analyses, if a local
   Chronos pool consists of, for example, 500 servers, 1/7 of whom are

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   controlled by a man-in-the-middle, attacker and Chronos queries 15
   servers in each Chronos poll interval (around 10 times the NTPv4 poll
   interval), then over 20 years of effort are required (in expectation)
   to successfully shift time at a Chronos client by over 100
   milliseconds from the UTC.  The full exposition of the formal
   analysis of this guarantee is available at [Chronos_paper].

   Chronos introduces a watchdog mechanism that is added to the client's
   system process and maintains a virtual clock value that is used as a
   reference for detecting attacks.  The virtual clock value computation
   differs from the current NTPv4 in two key aspects.  First, Chronos
   periodically synchronizes, in each Chronos poll interval, with only a
   few (tens) randomly selected servers out of a pool consisting of a
   large number (e.g., hundreds) of NTP servers, thereby providing high
   security while minimizing the load on the NTP servers.  Second, the
   selection algorithm of the virtual clock uses an approximate
   agreement technique to remove outliers, thus limiting the attacker's
   ability to contaminate the "time samples" (offsets) derived from the
   queried NTP servers.  These two elements of Chronos' design provide
   provable security guarantees against both man-in-the-middle attackers
   and attackers capable of compromising a large number of NTP servers.

2.  Conventions Used in This Document

2.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.2.  Terms and Abbreviations

   NTPv4                  Network Time Protocol version 4 [RFC5905].

   Selection process      Clock filter algorithm and system process
                          [RFC5905].

2.3.  Notations

   Describing Chronos algorithm, the following notation is used.

      +==========+=================================================+
      | Notation | Meaning                                         |
      +==========+=================================================+
      |    n     | The number of candidate servers in Chronos pool |
      |          | that Chronos can query (potentially hundreds)   |
      +----------+-------------------------------------------------+
      |    m     | The number of servers that Chronos queries in   |

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      |          | each poll interval (up to tens)                 |
      +----------+-------------------------------------------------+
      |    w     | An upper bound on the distance of the local     |
      |          | time from any NTP server with an accurate clock |
      |          | (termed "truechimer" in [RFC5905])              |
      +----------+-------------------------------------------------+
      |   Cest   | The client's estimate of the time that has      |
      |          | passed since its last synchronization with the  |
      |          | Chronos pool (sec)                              |
      +----------+-------------------------------------------------+
      |    B     | An upper bound on the client's time estimation  |
      |          | error (ms/sec)                                  |
      +----------+-------------------------------------------------+
      |   ERR    | An upper bound on the client's error regarding  |
      |          | its estimate of the time that elapsed from the  |
      |          | last update, which equals to B*Cest (ms)        |
      +----------+-------------------------------------------------+
      |    K     | Panic trigger - the number of Chronos pool re-  |
      |          | samplings until reaching "Panic mode"           |
      +----------+-------------------------------------------------+
      |    tc    | The current time [sec], as indicated by the     |
      |          | virtual clock value that is computed by Chronos |
      +----------+-------------------------------------------------+

                        Table 1: Chronos Notations

   The recommended values are discussed in Section 3.3.

3.  Chronos' Design

   A client that runs Chronos as a watchdog uses NTPv4 as in [RFC5905]
   and in the background runs a modification to the elements of the
   system process described in Section 11.2.1 and 11.2.2 in [RFC5905]
   (namely, the Selection Algorithm and the Cluster Algorithm).  The
   NTPv4 conventional protocol periodically queries p (3-4) servers in
   each poll interval.  In parallel, the Chronos watchdog periodically
   queries a set of m (tens) servers from a large (hundreds) server pool
   in each Chronos poll interval, where the m servers are selected from
   the server pool at random.  Based on empirical analyses, to minimize
   the load on NTP servers while providing high security, the Chronos
   poll interval should be around 10 times the NTPv4 poll interval
   (i.e., a Chronos clock update occurs once every 10 NTPv4 clock
   updates).  In each Chronos poll interval the Chronos virtual clock
   value is compared with the NTPv4 clock value, and if the difference
   exceeds a predetermined value, an attack is detected.

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   Under Chronos, unless an attack is detected, only one sample from
   each server is used (avoiding "Clock Filter Algorithm" as defined in
   Section 10 in [RFC5905]).  When under attack, Chornos uses several
   samples from each server, and executes the "Clock Filter Algorithm"
   for choosing the best sample from each server, with low jitter.
   Then, given a sample from each server, the client discards outliers
   by executing the procedure described in this section and the next.
   Then, the NTPv4 "Combine Algorithm" is used for computing the system
   peer offset, as specified in Section 11.2.3 in [RFC5905].

3.1.  Chronos Calibration

   At the first time the Chronos system process is executed, calibration
   is needed.  The calibration process generates a local Chronos pool of
   servers the client can synchronize with, consisting of n servers (up
   to hundreds).  To this end, the NTP client executes the "Peer
   Process" and "Clock Filter Algorithm" as in Sections 9,10 in
   [RFC5905] (respectively), on an hourly basis, for 24 consecutive
   hours, and generates the union of all received NTP servers' IP
   addresses.  Importantly, this process can also be executed in the
   background periodically, once in a long time (e.g., every few weeks/
   months).  The servers in the Chronos pool should be scattered across
   different regions to make it harder for an attacker to compromise, or
   gain man-in-the-middle capabilities, with respect to a large fraction
   of the Chronos pool.  Therefore, Chronos calibration is with respect
   to the general NTP server pool (for example pool.org), and not only
   with respect to the servers in the client's state or region.

3.2.  Chronos' Poll and System Processes

   In each Chronos poll interval the Chronos system process randomly
   chooses a set of m (tens) servers out of the Chronos pool of n
   (hundreds) servers.  Chronos server polling is allowed to spread
   normally, similar to NTPv4.  Servers which do not respond during the
   Chronos poll are filtered out.  If less than 1/3 of the m servers are
   left, resampling takes place.  Chronos security is higher as the
   servers in its pool are scattered across different regions.  This
   compared to a location limited pool which may be easier for an
   attacker to compromise.  Therefore, Chronos calibration is based on
   the general pool (for example pool.org), regardless of the client's
   state or region.

   Next, out of the time-samples received from this chosen subset of
   servers, the lowest third of the samples' offset values and highest
   third of the samples' offset values are discarded.

   Chronos checks that the following two conditions hold for the
   remaining samples:

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   *  The maximal distance between every two time samples does not
      exceed 2w.

   *  The average value of the remaining samples is at distance at most
      ERR+2w from the client's local clock (as computed by Chronos).

   (where w, ERR are as described in Table 1.

   In the event that both of these conditions are satisfied, the average
   of the remaining samples is set to be the "final offset".  Otherwise,
   a new subset of servers is sampled, in the exact same manner.  This
   process ensures that the Chronos client's queries are spread across
   servers so as to both yield improved security against strategic and
   Byzantine attacks (as discussed in Section Section 4.3) and to
   mitigate the effect of a DoS attack on NTP servers that renders them
   non-responsive.  This resampling process continues in subsequent
   Chronos poll intervals until the two conditions are both satisfied or
   the number of times the servers are re-sampled exceeds a "Panic
   Trigger" (K in Table 1), in which case Chronos enters a "Panic Mode".
   Note that whether the client allows panic mode or not is
   configurable.

   In panic mode, Chronos queries all the servers in its local Chronos
   pool, orders the collected time samples from lowest to highest and
   eliminates the lowest third and the highest third of the samples.
   The client then averages over the remaining samples, and sets this
   average to be the new "final offset".

   As in [RFC5905], the final offset is passed on to the clock
   discipline algorithm for the purpose of steering the Chronos virtual
   clock to the correct time.  The Chronos virtual clock is then
   compared to the NTPv4 clock as part of the watchdog process.

3.3.  Chronos' Recommended Parameters

   According to empirical observations (presented in [Chronos_paper]),
   querying 15 servers at each poll interval (i.e., m=15) out of 500
   servers (i.e., n=500), and setting w to be around 25 milliseconds
   provides both high time accuracy and good security.  Moreover,
   empirical analyses showed that, on average, when selecting w=25ms,
   approximately 83% of the servers' clocks are at most w-away from the
   UTC, and within 2w from each other, satisfying the first condition of
   Chronos' system process.  There might be congested links scenarios,
   where higher values, such as 1 sec, will be more appropriate.

   Furthermore, according to Chronos security analysis, setting K to be
   3 (i.e., if after 3 re-samplings the two conditions are not satisfied
   then Chronos enters "panic mode") is safe when facing time shifting

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   attacks.  Moreover, when setting K to 3, the probability of an
   attacker forcing a panic mode on a client is negligible (less than
   0.000002).

   Chronos' effect on precision and accuracy are discussed in Section 6
   and Section 4.

4.  Security Considerations

4.1.  Threat Model

   Chronos repeatedly gathers time samples from small subsets of a large
   local Chronos pool of NTP servers.  The following man-in-the-middle
   (MitM) byzantine attacker is considered: the attacker is assumed to
   control a subset of the servers in the Chronos pool and is capable of
   fully determining the values of the time samples gathered from these
   NTP servers.  The threat model encompasses a broad spectrum of MitM
   attackers, ranging from fairly weak (yet dangerous) MitM attackers
   only capable of delaying and dropping packets (for example using the
   Bufferbloat attack) to extremely powerful MitM attackers who are in
   control of (even authenticated) NTP servers.

   MitM attackers covered by this model might be, for example, (1) in
   direct control of a fraction of the NTP servers (e.g., by exploiting
   a software vulnerability), (2) an ISP (or other Autonomous-System-
   level attacker) on the default BGP paths from the NTP client to a
   fraction of the available servers, (3) a nation state with authority
   over the owners of NTP servers in its jurisdiction, or (4) an
   attacker capable of hijacking (e.g., through DNS cache poisoning or
   BGP prefix hijacking) traffic to some of the available NTP servers.
   The details of the specific attack scenario are abstracted by
   reasoning about MitM attackers in terms of the fraction of servers
   with respect to which the attacker has MitM capabilities.

   Notably, Chronos provides protection from MitM attacks that cannot be
   achieved by cryptographic authentication protocols since even with
   such measures in place an attacker can still influence time by
   dropping/delaying packets.  However, adding an authentication and
   crypto-based security layer to Chronos will enhance its security
   guarantees and enable the detection of various spoofing and
   modification attacks.

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4.2.  Attack Detection

   Chronos detects time-shifting attacks by constantly monitoring
   NTPv4's (or potentially any other current or future time protocol)
   offset and the offset computed by Chronos and checking whether the
   difference between the two exceeds a certain threshold (10
   milliseconds by default).  Unless an attack was detected, NTPv4
   controls the client's clock.  Under attack, Chronos takes control
   over the clients clock in order to prevent its shift.

   Analytical results (in [Chronos_paper]) indicate that if a local
   Chronos pool consists of 500 servers, 1/7 of whom are controlled by a
   man-in-the-middle attacker, and 15 servers are queried in each
   Chronos poll interval, then succeed in shifting time at a Chronos
   client by even a short time (e.g., 100 milliseconds), takes many
   years of effort (e.g., over 20 years in expectation).  See a brief
   overview of Chronos' security analysis below.

   Chronos' security analysis is briefly described next.

4.3.  Security Analysis Overview

   Time-samples that are at most w away from the UTC are considered
   "good", whereas other samples are considered "malicious".  Two
   scenarios are considered:

   *  Less than 2/3 of the queried servers are under the attacker's
      control.

   *  The attacker controls more than 2/3 of the queried servers.

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   The first scenario, where there are more than 1/3 good samples,
   consists of two sub-cases: (i) there is at least one good sample in
   the set of samples not eliminated by Chronos (in the middle third of
   samples), and (ii) there are no good samples in the remaining set of
   samples.  In the first of these two cases (at least one good sample
   in the set of samples that was not eliminated by Chronos), the other
   remaining samples, including those provided by the attacker, must be
   close to a good sample (for otherwise, the first condition of
   Chronos' system process in Section 3.2 is violated and a new set of
   servers is chosen).  This implies that the average of the remaining
   samples must be close to the UTC.  In the second sub-case (where
   there are no good samples in the set of remaining samples), since
   more than a third of the initial samples were good, both the
   (discarded) third lowest-value samples and the (discarded) third
   highest-value samples must each contain a good sample.  Hence, all
   the remaining samples are bounded from both above and below by good
   samples, and so is their average value, implying that this value is
   close to the UTC [RFC5905].

   In the second scenario, where the attacker controls more than 2/3 of
   the queried servers, the worst possibility for the client is that all
   remaining samples are malicious (i.e., more than w away from the
   UTC).  However, as proved in [Chronos_paper], the probability of this
   scenario is extremely low even if the attacker controls a large
   fraction (e.g., 1/4) of the servers in the local Chronos pool.
   Therefore, the probability that the attacker repeatedly reach this
   scenario decreases exponentially, rendering the probability of a
   significant time shift negligible.  We can express the improvement
   ratio of Chronos over NTPv4 by the ratios of their single shift
   probabilities.  Such ratios are provided in Table Table 2, where
   higher values indicate higher improvement of Chronos over NTPv4 and
   are also proportional to the expected time till a time shift attack
   succeeds once.

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     +========+==========+==========+==========+==========+==========+
     | Attack |    6     |    12    |    18    |    24    |    30    |
     | Ratio  | samples  | samples  | samples  | samples  | samples  |
     +========+==========+==========+==========+==========+==========+
     |  1/3   | 1.93e+01 | 3.85e+02 | 7.66e+03 | 1.52e+05 | 3.03e+06 |
     +--------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
     |  1/5   | 1.25e+01 | 1.59e+02 | 2.01e+03 | 2.54e+04 | 3.22e+05 |
     +--------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
     |  1/7   | 1.13e+01 | 1.29e+02 | 1.47e+03 | 1.67e+04 | 1.90e+05 |
     +--------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
     |  1/9   | 8.54e+00 | 7.32e+01 | 6.25e+02 | 5.32e+03 | 4.52e+04 |
     +--------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
     |  1/10  | 5.83e+00 | 3.34e+01 | 1.89e+02 | 1.07e+03 | 6.04e+03 |
     +--------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
     |  1/15  | 3.21e+00 | 9.57e+00 | 2.79e+01 | 8.05e+01 | 2.31e+02 |
     +--------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+

                        Table 2: Chronos Improvement

   In addition to evaluating the probability of an attacker successfully
   shifting time at the client's clock, we also evaluated the
   probability that the attacker succeeds in launching a DoS attack on
   the servers by causing many clients to enter a panic mode (and query
   all the servers in their local Chronos pools).  This probability
   (with the previous parameters of n=500, m=15, w=25 and k=3) is
   negligible even for an attacker in control of a large number of
   servers in clients' local Chronos pools, and it is expected to take
   decades to force panic mode.

   Further details about Chronos's security guarantees can be found in
   [Chronos_paper].

5.  Chronos' Pseudocode

   The pseudocode for Chronos' Time Sampling Scheme, which is invoked in
   each Chronos poll interval is as follows:

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   counter := 0
   S = []
   T = []
   While counter < K do
      S := sample(m) //gather samples from (tens of) randomly chosen servers
      T := bi-side-trim(S,1/3) //trim the third lowest and highest values
      if (max(T) -min(T) <= 2w) and (|avg(T)-tc| < ERR + 2w) Then
          return avg(T)
      end
      counter ++
      sleep(rand(0,1)*poll interval)
   end
   // panic mode
   S := sample(n)
   T := bi-sided-trim(S,1/3) //trim lowest and highest thirds;
   return avg(T)

6.  Precision vs. Security

   Since NTPv4 updates the clock as long as time-shifting attacks are
   not detected, the precision and accuracy of a Chronos client are the
   same as NTPv4's when not under attack.  Under attack, Chronos takes
   control over the client's clock, mitigating the time shift while
   guaranteeing relatively high accuracy (error is bounded by (Err+2w),
   which is 100 ms for the recommended parameters specified in
   Section 3.3).  Chronos is based on crowdsourcing across servers,
   changes the set of queried servers more frequently than NTPv4
   [Chronos_paper], and avoids some of the filters in NTPv4's system
   process.  These factors can potentially harm its precision.
   Therefore, a smoothing mechanism can be used, where instead of a
   simple average of the remaining samples, the smallest (in absolute
   value) offset is used unless its distance from the average is higher
   than a predefined value Y.  Setting Y to 1 millisecond, was
   impractically demonstrated to result with precision similar to NTPv4.

7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Erik Kline, Miroslav Lichvar, Danny
   Mayer, Karen O'Donoghue, Dieter Sibold, Yaakov.  J.  Stein, Harlan
   Stenn, Hal Murray and Marcus Dansarie, for valuable contributions to
   this document and helpful discussions and comments.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

9.  References

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9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5905]  Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
              "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
              Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [Chronos_paper]
              Deutsch, O., Schiff, N.R., Dolev, D., and M. Schapira,
              "Preventing (Network) Time Travel with Chronos", 2018,
              <https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-
              content/uploads/2018/02/ndss2018_02A-2_Deutsch_paper.pdf>.

Authors' Addresses

   Neta Rozen-Schiff
   Hebrew University of Jerusalem
   Jerusalem
   Israel
   Phone: +972 2 549 4599
   Email: neta.r.schiff@gmail.com

   Danny Dolev
   Hebrew University of Jerusalem
   Jerusalem
   Israel
   Phone: +972 2 549 4588
   Email: danny.dolev@mail.huji.ac.il

   Tal Mizrahi
   Huawei Network.IO Innovation Lab
   Israel
   Email: tal.mizrahi.phd@gmail.com

   Michael Schapira
   Hebrew University of Jerusalem
   Jerusalem
   Israel

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   Phone: +972 2 549 4570
   Email: schapiram@huji.ac.il

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