Protecting Network Time Security Messages with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-ntp-cms-for-nts-message-05
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Dieter Sibold , Kristof Teichel , Stephen Roettger , Russ Housley | ||
| Last updated | 2016-01-26 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
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draft-ietf-ntp-cms-for-nts-message-05
NTP Working Group D. Sibold
Internet-Draft K. Teichel
Intended status: Standards Track PTB
Expires: July 29, 2016 S. Roettger
Google Inc.
R. Housley
Vigil Security
January 26, 2016
Protecting Network Time Security Messages with the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-ntp-cms-for-nts-message-05
Abstract
This document describes a convention for using the Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) to protect the messages in the Network Time
Security (NTS) protocol. NTS provides authentication of time servers
as well as integrity protection of time synchronization messages
using Network Time Protocol (NTP) or Precision Time Protocol (PTP).
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 29, 2016.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. CMS Conventions for NTS Message Protection . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Fields of the employed CMS Content Types . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1. ContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2. SignedData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.3. EnvelopedData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Implementation Notes: ASN.1 Structures and Use of the CMS . . 9
3.1. Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Unicast Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Association Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.2. Cookie Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.3. Time Synchronization Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Broadcast Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.1. Broadcast Parameter Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.2. Broadcast Time Synchronization Message . . . . . . . 13
3.3.3. Broadcast Keycheck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Certificate Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier Registry . . . 15
5.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry . . . . 16
5.3. SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Registry . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
This document provides details on how to construct NTS messages in
practice. NTS provides secure time synchronization with time servers
using Network Time Protocol (NTP) [RFC5905] or Precision Time
Protocol (PTP) [IEEE1588]. Among other things, this document
describes a convention for using the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) [RFC5652] to protect messages in the Network Time Security
(NTS) protocol. Encryption is used to provide confidentiality of
secrets, and digital signatures are used to provide authentication
and integrity of content.
Sometimes CMS is used in an exclusively ASN.1 [ASN1] environment. In
this case, the NTS message may use any syntax that facilitates easy
implementation.
2. CMS Conventions for NTS Message Protection
Regarding the usage of CMS, we differentiate between three archetypes
according to which the NTS message types can be structured. They are
presented below. Note that the NTS Message Object that is at the
core of each structure does not necessarily contain all the data
needed for the particular message type, but may contain only that
data which needs to be secured directly with cryptographic operations
using the CMS. Specific information about what is included can be
found in Section 3.
NTS-Plain: This archetype is used for actual time synchronization
messages (explicitly, the following message types: time_request,
time_response, server_broad, see
[I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security], Section 6) as well as for
client-side messages of all unicast and broadcast bootstrapping
exchanges (explicitly client_assoc, client_cook and client_bpar)
as well as the broadcast keycheck exchange (client_keycheck and
server_keycheck). This archetype does not make use of any CMS
structures at all. Figure 1 illustrates this structure.
+-----------------------------------------------------+
| |
| NTS Message Object |
| |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------------+
NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed: This archetype is used for secure
transmission of the cookie (only for the server_cook message type,
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see [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security], Section 6). For this,
the following CMS structure is used:
First, the NTS message MUST be encrypted using the
EnvelopedData content type. EnvelopedData supports nearly any
form of key management. In the NTS protocol the client
provides a certificate in an unprotected message, and the
public key from this certificate, if it is valid, will be used
to establish a pairwise symmetric key for the encryption of the
protected NTS message.
Second, the EnvelopedData content MUST be digitally signed
using the SignedData content type. SignedData supports nearly
any form of digital signature, and in the NTS protocol the
server will include its certificate within the SignedData
content type.
Third, the SignedData content type MUST be encapsulated in a
ContentInfo content type.
Figure 2 illustrates this structure.
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| ContentInfo |
| |
| +-----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | | |
| | SignedData | |
| | | |
| | +-------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | | | | |
| | | EnvelopedData | | |
| | | | | |
| | | +---------------------------------------------+ | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | NTS Message Object | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | +---------------------------------------------+ | | |
| | | | | |
| | +-------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | | |
| +-----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
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NTS-Signed: This archetype is used for server_assoc and server_bpar
message types. It uses the following CMS structure:
First, the NTS message object MUST be wrapped in a SignedData
content type. The messages MUST be digitally signed, and
certificates included. SignedData supports nearly any form of
digital signature, and in the NTS protocol the server will
include its certificate within the SignedData content type.
Second, the SignedData content type MUST be encapsulated in a
ContentInfo content type.
Figure 3 illustrates this structure.
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| ContentInfo |
| |
| +-----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | | |
| | SignedData | |
| | | |
| | +-------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | | | | |
| | | NTS Message Object | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | +-------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | | |
| +-----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
2.1. Fields of the employed CMS Content Types
Overall, three CMS content types are used for NTS messages by the
archetypes above. Explicitly, those content types are ContentInfo,
SignedData and EnvelopedData. The following is a description of how
the fields of those content types are used in detail.
2.1.1. ContentInfo
The ContentInfo content type is used in all archetypes except NTS-
Plain. The fields of the ContentInfo content type are used as
follows:
contentType -- indicates the type of the associated content. For
all archetypes which use ContentInfo (these are NTS-Signed and
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NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed), it MUST contain the object identifier
for the SignedData content type:
id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 }
content -- is the associated content. For all archetypes using
ContentInfo, it MUST contain the DER encoded SignedData content
type.
2.1.2. SignedData
The SignedData content type is used in the NTS-Signed and NTS-
Encrypted-and-Signed archetypes, but not in the NTS-Plain archetype.
The fields of the SignedData content type are used as follows:
version -- the appropriate value depends on the optional items
that are included. In the NTS protocol, the signer certificate
MUST be included and other items MAY be included. The
instructions in [RFC5652] Section 5.1 MUST be followed to set the
correct value.
digestAlgorithms -- is a collection of message digest algorithm
identifiers. In the NTS protocol, there MUST be exactly one
algorithm identifier present. The instructions in Section 5.4 of
[RFC5652] MUST be followed.
encapContentInfo -- this structure is always present. In the NTS
protocol, it MUST follow these conventions:
eContentType -- is an object identifier. In the NTS protocol,
for the NTS-Signed archetype, it MUST identify the type of the
NTS message that was encapsulated. For the NTS-Encrypted-and-
Signed archetype, it MUST contain the object identifier for the
EnvelopedData content type:
id-envelopedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 3 }.
eContent is the content itself, carried as an octet string.
For the NTS-Signed archetype, it MUST contain the DER encoded
encapsulated NTS message object. The instructions in
Section 6.3 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed. For the NTS-
Encrypted-and-Signed archetype, it MUST contain the DER encoded
EnvelopedData content type.
certificates -- is a collection of certificates. In the NTS
protocol, it MUST contain the DER encoded certificate [RFC5280] of
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the sender. It is intended that the collection of certificates be
sufficient for the recipient to construct a certification path
from a recognized "root" or "top-level certification authority" to
the certificate used by the sender.
crls -- is a collection of revocation status information. In the
NTS protocol, it MAY contain one or more DER encoded CRLs
[RFC5280]. It is intended that the collection contain information
sufficient to determine whether the certificates in the
certificates field are valid.
signerInfos -- is a collection of per-signer information. In the
NTS protocol, for the NTS-Signed and the NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed
archetypes, there MUST be exactly one SignerInfo structure
present. The details of the SignerInfo type are discussed in
Section 5.3 of [RFC5652]. In the NTS protocol, it MUST follow
these conventions:
version -- is the syntax version number. In the NTS protocol,
the SignerIdentifier is subjectKeyIdentifier, therefore the
version MUST be 3.
sid -- identifies the signer's certificate. In the NTS
protocol, the "sid" field contains the subjectKeyIdentifier
from the signer's certificate.
digestAlgorithm -- identifies the message digest algorithm and
any associated parameters used by the signer. In the NTS
protocol, the identifier MUST match the single algorithm
identifier present in the digestAlgorithms.
signedAttrs -- is a collection of attributes that are signed.
In the NTS protocol, it MUST be present, and it MUST contain
the following attributes:
Content Type -- see Section 11.1 of [RFC5652].
Message Digest -- see Section 11.2 of [RFC5652].
In addition, it MAY contain the following attributes:
Signing Time -- see Section 11.3 of [RFC5652].
Binary Signing Time -- see Section 3 of [RFC5652].
signatureAlgorithm -- identifies the signature algorithm and
any associated parameters used by the signer to generate the
digital signature.
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signature is the result of digital signature generation using
the message digest and the signer's private key. The
instructions in Section 5.5 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed.
unsignedAttrs -- is an optional collection of attributes that
are not signed. In the NTS protocol, it MUST be absent.
2.1.3. EnvelopedData
The EnvelopedData content type is used only in the NTS-Encrypted-and-
Signed archetype. The fields of the EnvelopedData content type are
used as follows:
version -- the appropriate value depends on the type of key
management that is used. The instructions in [RFC5652]
Section 6.1 MUST be followed to set the correct value.
originatorInfo -- this structure is present only if required by
the key management algorithm. In the NTS protocol, it MUST be
present when a key agreement algorithm is used, and it MUST be
absent when a key transport algorithm is used. The instructions
in Section 6.1 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed.
recipientInfos -- this structure is always present. In the NTS
protocol, it MUST contain exactly one entry that allows the client
to determine the key used to encrypt the NTS message. The
instructions in Section 6.2 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed.
encryptedContentInfo -- this structure is always present. In the
NTS protocol, it MUST follow these conventions:
contentType -- indicates the type of content. In the NTS
protocol, it MUST identify the type of the NTS message that was
encrypted.
contentEncryptionAlgorithm -- identifies the content-encryption
algorithm and any associated parameters used to encrypt the
content.
encryptedContent -- is the encrypted content. In the NTS
protocol, it MUST contain the encrypted NTS message. The
instructions in Section 6.3 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed.
unprotectedAttrs -- this structure is optional. In the NTS
protocol, it MUST be absent.
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3. Implementation Notes: ASN.1 Structures and Use of the CMS
This section presents some hints about the structures of the NTS
message objects for the different message types when one wishes to
implement the security mechanisms.
3.1. Preliminaries
The following ASN.1 coded data types "NTSNonce" and "NTSVersion" are
needed for other types used below for NTS messages. "NTSNonce"
specifies a 128 bit nonce as required in several message types:
NTSNonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
"NTSVersion" specifies a version number, which is required for
version negotiation.
NTSVersion ::= INTEGER (0..255)
The following ASN.1 coded data types are also necessary for other
types.
KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifiers ::=
SET OF KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier
ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifiers ::=
SET OF ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier
3.2. Unicast Messages
3.2.1. Association Messages
3.2.1.1. Message Type: "client_assoc"
This message is structured according to the NTS-Plain archetype.
There is no data necessary besides that which is transported in the
NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of type
"ClientAssocData" and structured as follows:
ClientAssocData ::= SEQUENCE {
nonce NTSNonce,
minVersion NTSVersion,
clientId SubjectKeyIdentifier,
hmacHashAlgos DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
keyEncAlgos KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifiers,
contentEncAlgos ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifiers
}
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It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-clientAssoc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD1
3.2.1.2. Message Type: "server_assoc"
This message is structured according to the NTS-Signed archetype. It
requires additional data besides that which is transported in the NTS
message object, namely the signature and certificate chain are
included in the appropriate fields of the "SignedData" CMS structure
that the NTS message object is wrapped in. The NTS message object
itself is an ASN.1 object of type "ServerAssocData" and structured as
follows:
ServerAssocData ::= SEQUENCE {
nonce NTSNonce,
proposedVersion NTSVersion,
clientId SubjectKeyIdentifier,
hmacHashAlgos DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
choiceHmacHashAlgo DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
keyEncAlgos KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifiers,
choiceKeyEncAlgo KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
contentEncAlgos ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifiers,
choiceContentEncAlgo ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier
}
It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-serverAssoc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD2
3.2.2. Cookie Messages
3.2.2.1. Message Type: "client_cook"
This message is structured according to the NTS-Plain archetype. It
requires no additional data besides that which is transported in the
NTS message object. The NTS message object itself is an ASN.1 object
of type "ClientCookieData" and structured as follows:
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ClientCookieData ::= SEQUENCE {
nonce NTSNonce,
signAlgo SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
hmacHashAlgo DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
encAlgo ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
keyEncAlgo KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
certificates CertificateSet
}
It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-clientCookie OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD3
3.2.2.2. Message Type: "server_cook"
This message is structured according to the "NTS-Encrypted-and-
Signed" archetype. It requires additional data besides that which is
transported in the NTS message object, namely the signature is
included in the appropriate field of the "SignedData" CMS structure
that the NTS message object is wrapped in. The NTS message object
itself is an ASN.1 sequence of type "ServerCookieData" and structured
as follows:
ServerCookieData ::= SEQUENCE {
nonce NTSNonce,
cookie OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
}
It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-serverCookie OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD4
3.2.3. Time Synchronization Messages
3.2.3.1. Message Type: "time_request"
This message is structured according to the "NTS-Plain" archetype.
This message type requires additional data to that which is included
in the NTS message object, namely it requires regular time
synchronization data, as an unsecured packet from a client to a
server would contain. Optionally, it requires the Message
Authentication Code (MAC) to be generated over the whole rest of the
packet (including the NTS message object) and transported in some
way. The NTS message object itself is an ASN.1 object of type
"TimeRequestSecurityData", whose structure is as follows:
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TimeRequestSecurityData ::=
SEQUENCE {
nonce NTSNonce,
hmacHashAlgo DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
keyInputValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
}
It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-securityDataReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD5
3.2.3.2. Message Type: "time_response"
This message is structured according to the "NTS-Plain" archetype.
It requires two items of data in addition to that which is
transported in the NTS message object. Like "time_request", it
requires regular time synchronization data. Furthermore, it requires
the Message Authentication Code (MAC) to be generated over the whole
rest of the packet (including the NTS message object) and transported
in some way. The NTS message object itself is an ASN.1 object of
type "TimeResponseSecurityData", with the following structure:
TimeResponseSecurityData ::=
SEQUENCE {
nonce NTSNonce,
}
It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-securityDataResp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD6
3.3. Broadcast Messages
3.3.1. Broadcast Parameter Messages
3.3.1.1. Message Type: "client_bpar"
This first broadcast message is structured according to the NTS-Plain
archetype. There is no data necessary besides that which is
transported in the NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of
type "BroadcastParameterRequest" and structured as follows:
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BroadcastParameterRequest ::=
SEQUENCE {
nonce NTSNonce,
clientId SubjectKeyIdentifier
}
It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-broadcastParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD7
3.3.1.2. Message Type: "server_bpar"
This message is structured according to "NTS-Signed". It requires
additional data besides that which is transported in the NTS message
object, namely the signature is included in the appropriate field of
the "SignedData" CMS structure that the NTS message object is wrapped
in. The NTS message object itself is an ASN.1 object of type
"BroadcastParameterResponse" and structured as follows:
BroadcastParameterResponse ::=
SEQUENCE {
nonce NTSNonce,
oneWayAlgo1 DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
oneWayAlgo2 DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
lastKey OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),
intervalDuration BIT STRING,
disclosureDelay INTEGER,
nextIntervalTime BIT STRING,
nextIntervalIndex INTEGER
}
It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-broadcastParamResp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD8
3.3.2. Broadcast Time Synchronization Message
3.3.2.1. Message Type: "server_broad"
This message is structured according to the "NTS-Plain" archetype.
It requires regular broadcast time synchronization data in addition
to that which is carried in the NTS message object. Like
"time_response", this message type also requires a MAC, generated
over all other data, to be transported within the packet. The NTS
message object itself is an ASN.1 object of type "BroadcastTime". It
has the following structure:
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BroadcastTime ::=
SEQUENCE {
thisIntervalIndex INTEGER,
disclosedKey OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),
}
It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-broadcastTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD9
3.3.3. Broadcast Keycheck
3.3.3.1. Message Type: "client_keycheck"
This message is structured according to the "NTS-Plain" archetype.
There is no data necessary besides that which is transported in the
NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of type
"ClientKeyCheckSecurityData" and structured as follows:
ClientKeyCheckSecurityData ::=
SEQUENCE {
nonce_k NTSNonce,
interval_number INTEGER,
hmacHashAlgo DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
keyInputValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
}
It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional
values):
id-ct-nts-clientKeyCheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD10
3.3.3.2. Message Type: "server_keycheck"
This message is also structured according to "NTS-Plain". It
requires only a MAC, generated over the NTS message object, to be
included in the packet in addition to what the NTS message object
itself contains. The latter is an ASN.1 object of type
"ServerKeyCheckSecurityData", which is structured as follows:
ServerKeyCheckSecurityData ::=
SEQUENCE {
nonce NTSNonce,
interval_number INTEGER
}
It is identified by the following object identifier:
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id-ct-nts-serverKeyCheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= TBD11
4. Certificate Conventions
The syntax and processing rules for certificates are specified in
[RFC5280]. In the NTS protocol, the server certificate MUST contain
the following extensions:
Subject Key Identifier -- see Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280].
Key Usage -- see Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280].
Extended Key Usage -- see Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280].
For a certificate issued to a time server, the Extended Key Usage
extension MAY include the id-kp-ntsServerAuth object identifier.
When a certificate issuer includes this object identifier in the
extended key usage extension, it provides an attestation that the
certificate subject is a time server that supports the NTS protocol.
The extension MAY also include the id-kp-ntsServerAuthz object
identifier. When a certificate issuer includes this object
identifier in the extended key usage extension, it provides an
attestation that the certificate subject is a time server which the
issuer believes to be willing and able to disseminate correct time
(for example, this can be used to signal a server's authorization to
disseminate legal time).
For a certificate issued to a time client, the Extended Key Usage
extension MAY include the id-kp-ntsClientAuthz object identifier.
When a certificate issuer includes this object identifier in the
extended key usage extension, it provides an attestation that the
certificate subject is a time client who has authorization from the
issuer to access secured time synchronization (for example, this can
be used to provide access in the case of a paid service for secure
time synchronization).
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier Registry
Within the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" table, add one module identifier:
Decimal Description References
------- -------------------------------------- ----------
TBD0 id-networkTimeSecurity-2015 [this doc]
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5.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry
Within the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" table, add eleven content type
identifiers:
Decimal Description References
------- -------------------------------------- ----------
TBD1 id-ct-nts-clientAssoc [this doc]
TBD2 id-ct-nts-serverAssoc [this doc]
TBD3 id-ct-nts-clientCookie [this doc]
TBD4 id-ct-nts-serverCookie [this doc]
TBD5 id-ct-nts-securityDataReq [this doc]
TBD6 id-ct-nts-securityDataResp [this doc]
TBD7 id-ct-nts-broadcastParamReq [this doc]
TBD8 id-ct-nts-broadcastParamResp [this doc]
TBD9 id-ct-nts-broadcastTime [this doc]
TBD10 id-ct-nts-clientKeyCheck [this doc]
TBD11 id-ct-nts-serverKeyCheck [this doc]
5.3. SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Registry
Within the "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Identifiers
(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" table, add three key purpose identifiers:
Decimal Description References
------- -------------------------------------- ----------
TBD12 id-kp-ntsServerAuth [this doc]
TBD13 id-kp-ntsServerAuthz [this doc]
TBD14 id-kp-ntsClientAuthz [this doc]
6. Security Considerations
To be written.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[ASN1] International Telecommunication Union, "Abstract Syntax
Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
ITU-T Recommendation X.680, November 2008.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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Internet-Draft CMS4NTS January 2016
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security]
Sibold, D., Roettger, S., and K. Teichel, "Network Time
Security", draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-12 (work
in progress), December 2015.
[IEEE1588]
IEEE Instrumentation and Measurement Society. TC-9 Sensor
Technology, "IEEE standard for a precision clock
synchronization protocol for networked measurement and
control systems", 2008.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
The ASN.1 module contained in this appendix defines the id-kp-
NTSserver object identifier.
NTSserverKeyPurpose
{ TBD }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
id-kp-NTSserver OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
END
Authors' Addresses
Sibold, et al. Expires July 29, 2016 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft CMS4NTS January 2016
Dieter Sibold
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
Bundesallee 100
Braunschweig D-38116
Germany
Phone: +49-(0)531-592-8420
Fax: +49-531-592-698420
Email: dieter.sibold@ptb.de
Kristof Teichel
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
Bundesallee 100
Braunschweig D-38116
Germany
Phone: +49-(0)531-592-8421
Email: kristof.teichel@ptb.de
Stephen Roettger
Google Inc.
Email: stephen.roettger@googlemail.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
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