Using the Network Time Security Specification to Secure the Network Time Protocol
draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-07

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NTP Working Group                                              D. Franke
Internet-Draft                                                    Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track                               D. Sibold
Expires: May 4, 2017                                          K. Teichel
                                                                     PTB
                                                        October 31, 2016

Using the Network Time Security Specification to Secure the Network Time
                                Protocol
                  draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-07

Abstract

   This document describes how to reach the objectives described in the
   Network Time Security (NTS) specification when securing time
   synchronization with servers using the Network Time Protocol (NTP).

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Franke, et al.             Expires May 4, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                   NTS4NTP                    October 2016

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Overview of NTS-Secured NTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Client-Server Mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Symmetric/Peer Mode and Control Modes . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Employing DTLS for NTP Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  DTLS profile for Network Time Security  . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.2.  Transport mechanisms for DTLS records . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.2.1.  Transport via NTS port  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.2.2.  Transport via NTP extension field . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.3.  The NTS-encapsulated NTPv4 protocol . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.4.  The NTS Key Establishment protocol  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.4.1.  NTS-KE record types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       5.4.2.  Key Extraction (generally)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.5.  NTS Extensions for NTPv4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.5.1.  Key Extraction (for NTPv4)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.5.2.  Packet structure overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.5.3.  The Unique Identifier extension . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       5.5.4.  The NTS Cookie extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       5.5.5.  The NTS Cookie Placeholder extension  . . . . . . . .  16
       5.5.6.  The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions
               extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.5.7.  Protocol details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.6.  Recommended format for NTS cookies  . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.1.  Field Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.2.  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry . . . .  21
     6.3.  DTLS-Based Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     7.1.  Usage of NTP Pools  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     7.2.  Initial Verification of the Server Certificates . . . . .  26
     7.3.  Treatment of Initial Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
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