OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-12
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Justin Richer , John Bradley , Michael Jones , Maciej Machulak | ||
| Last updated | 2013-06-06 | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-12
OAuth Working Group J. Richer, Ed.
Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: December 08, 2013 Ping Identity
M. Jones
Microsoft
M. Machulak
Newcastle University
June 06, 2013
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-12
Abstract
This specification defines an endpoint and protocol for dynamic
registration of OAuth 2.0 Clients at an Authorization Server and
methods for the dynamically registered client to manage its
registration.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 08, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials . . . . . . . 6
1.4.1. Credential Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Relationship Between Grant Types and Response Types . . . 10
2.2. Human Readable Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Client Registration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. Client Registration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2. Client Registration Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL . . . . . . 15
4.2. Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4. Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2. Client Registration Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Registry . . 22
6.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix B. Client Lifecycle Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
B.1. Open Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B.2. Protected Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B.3. Developer Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction
In some use-case scenarios, it is desirable or necessary to allow
OAuth 2.0 clients to obtain authorization from an OAuth 2.0
authorization server without requiring the two parties to interact
beforehand. Nevertheless, for the authorization server to accurately
and securely represent to end-users which client is seeking
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authorization to access the end-user's resources, a method for
automatic and unique registration of clients is needed. The OAuth
2.0 authorization framework does not define how the relationship
between the Client and the Authorization Server is initialized, or
how a given client is assigned a unique Client Identifier.
Historically, this has happened out-of-band from the OAuth 2.0
protocol. This draft provides a mechanism for a client to register
itself with the Authorization Server, which can be used to
dynamically provision a Client Identifier, and optionally a Client
Secret. Additionally, the mechanisms in this draft may can be used
by a client developer to register the client with the authorization
server in a programmatic fashion.
As part of the registration process, this specification also defines
a mechanism for the client to present the Authorization Server with a
set of metadata, such as a display name and icon to be presented to
the user during the authorization step. This draft also provides a
mechanism for the Client to read and update this information after
the initial registration action. This draft protects these actions
through the use of an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Access Token that is issued to
the client during registration explicitly for this purpose.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.
1.2. Terminology
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token",
"Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server",
"Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client
Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server",
and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
This specification defines the following additional terms:
Client Registration Endpoint OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through which a
Client can be registered at an Authorization Server. The means by
which the URL for this endpoint are obtained are out of scope for
this specification.
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Client Configuration Endpoint OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through which
registration information for a registered Client can be managed.
This URL for this endpoint is returned by the Authorization Server
in the Client Information Response.
Registration Access Token OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token issued by the
Authorization Server through the Client Registration Endpoint that
is used to authenticate the caller when accessing the Client's
registration information at the Client Configuration Endpoint.
This Access Token is associated with a particular registered
Client.
Initial Access Token OAuth 2.0 Access Token optionally issued by an
Authorization Server and used to authorize calls to the Client
Registration Endpoint. The means by which the Authorization
Server issues this token as well as the means by which the
Registration Endpoint validates this token are out of scope for
this specification.
1.3. Protocol Flow
(preamble)
+--------(A)- Initial Access Token
|
v
+-----------+ +---------------+
| |--(B)- Client Registration Request -->| Client |
| | | Registration |
| |<-(C)- Client Information Response ---| Endpoint |
| | +---------------+
| |
| | +---------------+
| Client or |--(D)- Read or Update Request ------->| |
| Developer | | |
| |<-(E)- Client Information Response ---| Client |
| | | Configuration |
| | | Endpoint |
| | | |
| |--(F)- Delete Request --------------->| |
| | | |
| |<-(G)- Delete Confirmation -----------| |
+-----------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: Abstract Protocol Flow
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The abstract OAuth 2.0 Client Dynamic Registration flow illustrated
in Figure 1 describes the interaction between the Client or Developer
and the two Endpoints defined in this specification. This figure
does not demonstrate error conditions. This flow includes the
following steps:
(A)
Optionally, the Client or Developer is issued an Initial Access
Token for use with the Client Registration Endpoint. The method
by which the Initial Access Token is issued to the Client or
Developer is out of scope for this specification.
(B)
The Client or Developer calls the Client Registration Endpoint
with its desired registration metadata, optionally including the
Initial Access Token from (A) if one is required by the
Authorization Server.
(C)
The Authorization Server registers the Client and returns the
client's registered metadata, a Client Identifier that is unique
at the server, a set of Client Credentials such as a Client Secret
if applicable for this Client, a URI pointing to the Client
Configuration Endpoint, and a Registration Access Token to be used
when calling the Client Configuration Endpoint.
(D)
The Client or Developer optionally calls the Client Configuration
Endpoint with a Read or Update request using the Registration
Access Token issued in (C). An Update request contains all of the
client's registered metadata.
(E)
The Authorization Server responds with the Client's current
configuration, potentially including a new Registration Access
Token and a new set of Client Credentials such as a Client Secret
if applicable for this Client. If a new Registration Access Token
is issued, it replaces the token issued in (C) for all subsequent
calls to the Client Configuration Endpoint.
(F)
The Client or Developer optionally calls the Client Configuration
Endpoint with a Delete request using the Registration Access Token
issued in (C).
(G)
The Authorization Server deprovisions the client and responds with
a confirmation that the deletion has taken place.
Further discussion of possible example lifecycles are found in the
Appendix to this specification, Client Lifecycle Examples
(Appendix B).
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1.4. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials
Throughout the course of the Dynamic Registration protocol, there are
three different classes of credentials in play, each with different
properties and targets.
o The Initial Access Token is optionally used by the Client or
Developer at the Registration Endpoint. This is an OAuth 2.0
Token that is used to authorize the initial Client Registration
Request. The content, structure, generation, and validation of
this token are out of scope for this specification. The
Authorization Server can use this token to verify that the
presenter is allowed to dynamically register new clients. This
token may be shared between multiple instances of a Client to
allow them to each register separately, thereby letting the
Authorization Server use this token to tie multiple instances of
registered clients (each with their own distinct Client
Identifier) back to the party to whom the Initial Access Token was
issued, usually an application developer. This token should be
used only at the Client Registration Endpoint.
o The Registration Access Token is used by the Client or Developer
at the Client Configuration Endpoint and represents the holder's
authorization to manage the registration of a Client. This is an
OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token that is issued from the Client Registration
Endpoint in response to a Client Registration Request and is
returned in a Client Information Response. The Registration
Access Token is uniquely bound to the Client Identifier and is
required to be presented with all calls to the Client
Configuration Endpoint. The Registration Access Token should be
protected and should not be shared between instances of a client
(otherwise, one instance could change or delete registration
values for all instances of the client). The Registration Access
Token can be rotated through the use of the client read and update
methods on the Client Configuration Endpoint. The Registration
Access Token should be used only at the Client Configuration
Endpoint.
o The Client Credentials (such as "client_secret") are optional
depending on the type of Client and are used to retrieve OAuth
tokens. Client Credentials are usually bound to particular
instances of a Client and should not be shared between instances.
Since not all types of Clients have Client Credentials, they
cannot be used to manage client registrations. The Client
Credentials can be rotated through the use of the client read and
update methods on the Client Configuration Endpoint. The Client
Credentials should not be used for authentication at the Client
Registration Endpoint or at the Client Configuration endpoint.
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1.4.1. Credential Rotation
The Authorization Server MAY rotate the Client's Registration Access
Token and/or Client Credentials (such as a client_secret) throughout
the lifetime of the Client. The Client is informed of the changed
values changing by making calls either Read or Update requests to the
Client Configuration Endpoint, and the new values of the Registration
Access Token and the Client Credentials will be included in the
Client Information Response.
The Registration Access Token SHOULD be rotated only in response to a
Read or Update request to the Client Configuration Endpoint, at which
point the new Registration Access Token is returned to the Client and
the old Registration Access Token SHOULD be discarded by both
parties.
2. Client Metadata
Clients generally have an array of metadata associated with their
unique Client Identifier at the Authorization Server. These can
range from human-facing display strings, such as a client name, to
items that impact the security of the protocol, such as the list of
valid redirect URIs.
The client metadata values serve two parallel purposes in the overall
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration protocol:
o the Client requesting its desired values for each parameter to the
Authorization Server in a register (Section 3.1) or update
(Section 4.3) request, and
o the Authorization Server informing the Client of the current
values of each parameter that the Client has been registered to
use through a client information response (Section 5.1).
An Authorization Server MAY override any value that a Client requests
during the registration process (including any omitted values) and
replace the requested value with a default at the server's
discretion. The Authorization Server SHOULD provide documentation
for any fields that it requires to be filled in by the client or to
have particular values or formats. An Authorization Server MAY
ignore the values in any field in this list.
Extensions and profiles of this specification MAY expand this list,
and Authorization Servers MUST accept all fields in this list. The
Authorization Server MUST ignore any additional parameters sent by
the Client that it does not understand.
redirect_uris
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Array of redirect URIs for use in redirect-based flows such as the
Authorization Code and Implicit grant types. It is RECOMMENDED
that clients using these flows register this parameter, and an
Authorization Server SHOULD require registration of valid redirect
URIs for all clients that use these grant types to protect against
token and credential theft attacks.
client_name
Human-readable name of the Client to be presented to the user. If
omitted, the Authorization Server MAY display the raw "client_id"
value to the user instead. It is RECOMMENDED that clients always
send this field. The value of this field MAY be internationalized
as described in Human Readable Client Metadata (Section 2.2).
client_uri
URL of the homepage of the Client. If present, the server SHOULD
display this URL to the end user in a clickable fashion. It is
RECOMMENDED that clients always send this field. The value of
this field MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of this
field MAY be internationalized as described in Human Readable
Client Metadata (Section 2.2).
logo_uri
URL that references a logo for the Client. If present, the server
SHOULD display this image to the end user during approval. The
value of this field MUST point to a valid image file. The value
of this field MAY be internationalized as described in Human
Readable Client Metadata (Section 2.2).
contacts
Array of email addresses for people responsible for this Client.
The Authorization Server MAY make these addresses available to end
users for support requests for the Client. An Authorization
Server MAY use these email addresses as identifiers for an
administrative page for this client.
tos_uri
URL that points to a human-readable Terms of Service document for
the Client. The Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to
the End-User if it is given. The Terms of Service usually
describe a contractual relationship between the End-User and the
Client that the End-User accepts when authorizing the Client. The
value of this field MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of
this field MAY be internationalized as described in Human Readable
Client Metadata (Section 2.2).
policy_uri
URL that points to a human-readable Policy document for the
Client. The Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to the
End-User if it is given. The Policy usually describes how an End-
User's data will be used by the Client. The value of this field
MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of this field MAY be
internationalized as described in Human Readable Client Metadata
(Section 2.2).
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token_endpoint_auth_method
The requested authentication method for the Token Endpoint.
Values defined by this specification are:
* "none": The client is a public client as defined in OAuth 2.0
and does not have a client secret.
* "client_secret_post": The client uses the HTTP POST parameters
defined in OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1.
* "client_secret_basic": the client uses HTTP Basic defined in
OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1
Additional values can be defined via the IANA OAuth Token Endpoint
Authentication Methods registry Section 6.1. Absolute URIs can
also be used as values for this parameter. If unspecified or
omitted, the default is "client_secret_basic", denoting HTTP Basic
Authentication Scheme as specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0.
scope
Space separated list of scope values (as described in OAuth 2.0
Section 3.3 [RFC6749]) that the client can use when requesting
access tokens. The semantics of values in this list is service
specific. If omitted, an Authorization Server MAY register a
Client with a default set of scopes.
grant_types
Array of OAuth 2.0 grant types that the Client may use. These
grant types are defined as follows:
* "authorization_code": The Authorization Code Grant described in
OAuth 2.0 Section 4.1
* "implicit": The Implicit Grant described in OAuth 2.0
Section 4.2
* "password": The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
described in OAuth 2.0 Section 4.3
* "client_credentials": The Client Credentials Grant described in
OAuth 2.0 Section 4.4
* "refresh_token": The Refresh Token Grant described in OAuth 2.0
Section 6.
* "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer": The JWT Bearer
grant type defined in OAuth JWT Bearer Token Profiles
[OAuth.JWT].
* "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer": The SAML 2
Bearer grant type defined in OAuth SAML 2 Bearer Token Profiles
[OAuth.SAML2].
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Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in
grant type extensions to OAuth 2.0. The extension process is
described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.5. If the Token Endpoint is used
in the grant type, the value of this parameter MUST be the same as
the value of the "grant_type" parameter passed to the Token
Endpoint defined in the extension.
response_types
Array of the OAuth 2.0 response types that the Client may use.
These response types are defined as follows:
* "code": The Authorization Code response described in OAuth 2.0
Section 4.1.
* "token": The Implicit response described in OAuth 2.0
Section 4.2.
Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in
response type extensions to OAuth 2.0. The extension process is
described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.5, and the value of this
parameter MUST be the same as the value of the "response_type"
parameter passed to the Authorization Endpoint defined in the
extension.
jwks_uri
URL for the Client's JSON Web Key Set [JWK] document representing
the client's public keys. The value of this field MUST point to a
valid JWK Set. These keys MAY also be used for higher level
protocols that require signing or encryption.
2.1. Relationship Between Grant Types and Response Types
The "grant_types" and "response_types" values described above are
partially orthogonal, as they refer to arguments passed to different
endpoints in the OAuth protocol. However, they are related in that
the "grant_types" available to a client influence the
"response_types" that the client is allowed to use, and vice versa.
For instance, a "grant_types" value that includes
"authorization_code" implies a "response_types" value that includes
code, as both values are defined as part of the OAuth 2.0
Authorization Code Grant. As such, a server supporting these fields
SHOULD take steps to ensure that a client cannot register itself into
an inconsistent state.
The correlation between the two fields is listed in the table below.
+-------------------------------------------------+-----------------+
| grant_types value includes: | response_types |
| | value includes: |
+-------------------------------------------------+-----------------+
| authorization_code | code |
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| implicit | token |
| password | (none) |
| client_credentials | (none) |
| refresh_token | (none) |
| urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer | (none) |
| urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer | (none) |
+-------------------------------------------------+-----------------+
Extensions and profiles of this document that introduce new values to
either the "grant_types" or "response_types" parameter MUST document
all correspondences between these two parameter types.
2.2. Human Readable Client Metadata
Human-readable Client Metadata values and Client Metadata values that
reference human-readable values MAY be represented in multiple
languages and scripts. For example, the values of fields such as
"client_name", "tos_uri", "policy_uri", "logo_uri", and "client_uri"
might have multiple locale-specific values in some Client
registrations.
To specify the languages and scripts, BCP47 [RFC5646] language tags
are added to Client Metadata member names, delimited by a #
character. Since JSON member names are case sensitive, it is
RECOMMENDED that language tag values used in Claim Names be spelled
using the character case with which they are registered in the IANA
Language Subtag Registry [IANA.Language]. In particular, normally
language names are spelled with lowercase characters, region names
are spelled with uppercase characters, and languages are spelled with
mixed case characters. However, since BCP47 language tag values are
case insensitive, implementations SHOULD interpret the language tag
values supplied in a case insensitive manner. Per the
recommendations in BCP47, language tag values used in Metadata member
names should only be as specific as necessary. For instance, using
"fr" might be sufficient in many contexts, rather than "fr-CA" or
"fr-FR".
For example, a Client could represent its name in English as
""client_name#en": "My Client"" and its name in Japanese as
""client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D"" within the same
registration request. The Authorization Server MAY display any or
all of these names to the Resource Owner during the authorization
step, choosing which name to display based on system configuration,
user preferences or other factors.
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If any human-readable field is sent without a language tag, parties
using it MUST NOT make any assumptions about the language, character
set, or script of the string value, and the string value MUST be used
as-is wherever it is presented in a user interface. To facilitate
interoperability, it is RECOMMENDED that clients and servers use a
human-readable field without any language tags in addition to any
language-specific fields, and it is RECOMMENDED that any human-
readable fields sent without language tags contain values suitable
for display on a wide variety of systems.
Implementer's Note: Many JSON libraries make it possible to reference
members of a JSON object as members of an Object construct in the
native programming environment of the library. However, while the
"#" character is a valid character inside of a JSON object's member
names, it is not a valid character for use in an object member name
in many programming environments. Therefore, implementations will
need to use alternative access forms for these claims. For instance,
in JavaScript, if one parses the JSON as follows, "var j =
JSON.parse(json);", then the member "client_name#en-us" can be
accessed using the JavaScript syntax "j["client_name#en-us"]".
3. Client Registration Endpoint
The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Endpoint defined in
this document that is designed to allow a Client to be registered
with the Authorization Server. The Client Registration Endpoint MUST
accept HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the
entity body using the "application/json" format. The Client
Registration Endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-layer security
mechanism, and the server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and
/or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125].
The Client Registration Endpoint MAY be an OAuth 2.0 Protected
Resource and accept an Initial Access Token in the form of an OAuth
2.0 [RFC6749] access token to limit registration to only previously
authorized parties. The method by which the Initial Access Token is
obtained by the registrant is generally out-of-band and is out of
scope for this specification. The method by which the Initial Access
Token is verified and validated by the Client Registration Endpoint
is out of scope for this specification.
To support open registration and facilitate wider interoperability,
the Client Registration Endpoint SHOULD allow initial registration
requests with no authorization (which is to say, with no OAuth 2.0
access token in the request). These requests MAY be rate-limited or
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otherwise limited to prevent a denial-of-service attack on the Client
Registration Endpoint.
To allow registered clients to manage their information, the Client
Registration Endpoint issues a Request Access Token as an OAuth 2.0
Bearer Token [RFC6750] to securely authorize calls to the Client
Configuration Endpoint (Section 4).
The Client Registration Endpoint MUST ignore all parameters it does
not understand.
3.1. Client Registration Request
This operation registers a new Client to the Authorization Server.
The Authorization Server assigns this client a unique Client
Identifier, optionally assigns a Client Secret, and associates the
metadata given in the request with the issued Client Identifier. The
request includes any parameters described in Client Metadata
(Section 2) that the client wishes to specify for itself during the
registration. The Authorization Server MAY provision default values
for any items omitted in the Client Metadata.
The Client sends an HTTP POST to the Client Registration Endpoint
with a content type of "application/json". The HTTP Entity Payload
is a JSON [RFC4627] document consisting of a JSON object and all
parameters as top-level members of that JSON object.
For example, if the server supports open registration (with no
Initial Access Token), the Client could send the following
registration request to the Client Registration Endpoint:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
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POST /register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
{
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"]
"client_name":"My Example Client",
"client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic",
"scope":"read write dolphin",
"logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwks_uri":"https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
}
Alternatively, if the server supports authorized registration, the
developer or the client will be provisioned with an Initial Access
Token (the method by which the Initial Access Token is obtained is
out of scope for this specification). The developer or client sends
the following authorized registration request to the Client
Registration Endpoint, with the Initial Access Token sent in this
example as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token [RFC6750]:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json
Authorization: Bearer ey23f2.adfj230.af32-developer321
Host: server.example.com
{
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"]
"client_name":"My Example Client",
"client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic",
"scope":"read write dolphin",
"logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwks_uri":"https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
}
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3.2. Client Registration Response
Upon successful registration, the Authorization Server generates a
new Client Identifier for the client. This Client Identifier MUST be
unique at the server and MUST NOT be in use by any other client. The
server responds with an HTTP 201 Created code and a body of type
"application/json" with content described in Client Information
Response (Section 5.1).
Upon an unsuccessful registration, the Authorization Server responds
with an error as described in Client Registration Error
(Section 5.2).
4. Client Configuration Endpoint
The Client Configuration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected resource
that is provisioned by the server for a specific client to be able to
view and update its registered information. The location of this
endpoint is communicated to the Client through the
"registration_client_uri" member of the Client Information Response
(Section 5.1). The Client MUST use its Registration Access Token in
all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token [RFC6750].
Operations on this endpoint are switched through the use of different
HTTP methods [RFC2616].
4.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL
The Authorization Server MUST provide the client with the fully
qualified URL in the "registration_client_uri" element of the Client
Information Response (Section 5.1). The Authorization Server MUST
NOT expect the client to construct or discover this URL on its own.
The Client MUST use the URL as given by the server and MUST NOT
construct this URL from component pieces.
Depending on deployment characteristics, the Client Configuration
Endpoint URL may take any number of forms. It is RECOMMENDED that
this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed
URL string which combines the Client Registration Endpoint's URL and
the issued "client_id" for this Client, with the latter as either a
path parameter or a query parameter. For example, a Client with the
Client ID "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a Client Configuration Endpoint
URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3" (path
parameter) or of "https://server.example.com/
register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query parameter). In both of these
cases, the client simply uses the URL as given.
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These common patterns can help the Server to more easily determine
the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched
against the client to which the Registration Access Token was issued.
If desired, the server MAY simply return the Client Registration
Endpoint URL as the Client Configuration Endpoint URL and change
behavior based on the authentication context provided by the
Registration Access Token.
4.2. Client Read Request
To read the current configuration of the Client on the Authorization
Server, the Client makes an HTTP GET request to the Client
Configuration Endpoint, authenticating with its Registration Access
Token.
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
GET /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
Upon successful read of the information for a currently active
Client, the Authorization Server responds with an HTTP 200 OK with
content type of "application/json" and a payload as described in
Client Information Response (Section 5.1). Some values in the
response, including the "client_secret" and
"registration_access_token", MAY be different from those in the
initial registration response. If the Authorization Server includes
a new Client Secret and/or Registration Access Token in its response,
the Client MUST immediately discard its previous Client Secret and/or
Registration Access Token. The value of the "client_id" MUST NOT
change from the initial registration response.
If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the Registration Access Token used to
make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.
If the Client does not have permission to read its record, the server
MUST return an HTTP 403 Forbidden.
4.3. Client Update Request
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This operation updates a previously-registered client with new
metadata at the Authorization Server. This request is authenticated
by the Registration Access Token issued to the client.
The Client sends an HTTP PUT to the Client Configuration Endpoint
with a content type of "application/json". The HTTP Entity Payload
is a JSON [RFC4627] document consisting of a JSON object and all
parameters as top- level members of that JSON object.
This request MUST include all fields described in Client Metadata
(Section 2) as returned to the Client from a previous register, read,
or update operation. The Client MUST NOT include the
"registration_access_token", "registration_client_uri",
"client_secret_expires_at", or "client_id_issued_at" fields described
in Client Information Response (Section 5.1).
Valid values of Client Metadata fields in this request MUST replace,
not augment, the values previously associated with this Client.
Omitted fields MUST be treated as null or empty values by the server.
The Client MUST include its "client_id" field in the request, and it
MUST be the same as its currently-issued Client Identifier. If the
client includes the "client_secret" field in the request, the value
of this field MUST match the currently-issued Client Secret for that
Client. The Client MUST NOT be allowed to overwrite its existing
Client Secret with its own chosen value.
For all metadata fields, the Authorization Server MAY replace any
invalid values with suitable default values, and it MUST return any
such fields to the Client in the response.
For example, a client could send the following request to the Client
Registration Endpoint to update the client registration in the above
example with new information:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
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PUT /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
{
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/alt"],
"scope": "read write dolphin",
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
"client_name":"My New Example",
"client_name#fr":"Mon Nouvel Exemple",
"logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/newlogo.png"
"logo_uri#fr":"https://client.example.org/fr/newlogo.png"
}
Upon successful update, the Authorization Server responds with an
HTTP 200 OK Message with content type "application/json" and a
payload as described in Client Information Response (Section 5.1).
Some values in the response, including the "client_secret" and
r"egistration_access_token", MAY be different from those in the
initial registration response. If the Authorization Server includes
a new Client Secret and/or Registration Access Token in its response,
the Client MUST immediately discard its previous Client Secret and/or
Registration Access Token. The value of the "client_id" MUST NOT
change from the initial registration response.
If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
with HTTP 401 Unauthorized, and the Registration Access Token used to
make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.
If the Client is not allowed to update its records, the server MUST
respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.
If the Client attempts to set an invalid metadata field and the
Authorization Server does not set a default value, the Authorization
Server responds with an error as described in Client Registration
Error Response (Section 5.2).
4.4. Client Delete Request
To deprovision itself on the Authorization Server, the Client makes
an HTTP DELETE request to the Client Configuration Endpoint. This
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request is authenticated by the Registration Access Token issued to
the client.
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
A successful delete action will invalidate the "client_id",
"client_secret", and "registration_access_token" for this client,
thereby preventing the "client_id" from being used at either the
Authorization Endpoint or Token Endpoint of the Authorization Server.
The Authorization Server SHOULD immediately invalidate all existing
authorization grants and currently-active tokens associated with this
Client.
If a Client has been successfully deprovisioned, the Authorization
Server responds with an HTTP 204 No Content message.
If the server does not support the delete method, the server MUST
respond with an HTTP 405 Not Supported.
If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the Registration Access Token used to
make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.
If the client is not allowed to delete itself, the server MUST
respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.
Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
5. Responses
In response to certain requests from the Client to either the Client
Registration Endpoint or the Client Configuration Endpoint as
described in this specification, the Authorization Server sends the
following response bodies.
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5.1. Client Information Response
The response contains the Client Identifier as well as the Client
Secret, if the Client is a confidential Client. The response also
contains the fully qualified URL to the Client Configuration Endpoint
for this specific client that the client may use to obtain and update
information about itself. The response also contains a Registration
Access Token that is to be used by the client to perform subsequent
operations at the Client Configuration Endpoint.
client_id
REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier, MUST NOT be currently
valid for any other registered Client.
client_secret
OPTIONAL. The Client secret. If issued, this MUST be unique for
each "client_id". This value is used by confidential clients to
authenticate to the Token Endpoint as described in OAuth 2.0
Section 2.3.1.
client_id_issued_at
OPTIONAL. Time at which the Client Identifier was issued. The
time is represented as the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
client_secret_expires_at
REQUIRED if "client_secret" is issued. Time at which the
"client_secret" will expire or 0 if it will not expire. The time
is represented as the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as
measured in UTC until the date/time.
registration_access_token
REQUIRED. Access Token that is used at the Client Configuration
Endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon the Client
registration.
registration_client_uri
REQUIRED. The fully qualified URL of the Client Configuration
Endpoint for this client. The Client MUST use this URL as given
when communicating with the Client Configuration Endpoint.
Additionally, the Authorization Server MUST return all registered
metadata (Section 2) about this client, including any fields
provisioned by the Authorization Server itself. The Authorization
Server MAY reject or replace any of the client's requested metadata
values submitted during the registration or update requests and
substitute them with suitable values.
The response is an "application/json" document with all parameters as
top-level members of a JSON object [RFC4627].
Following is a non-normative example response:
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483",
"registration_client_uri":
"https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
"client_id_issued_at":2893256800
"client_secret_expires_at":2893276800
"client_name":"My Example Client",
"client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"]
"scope": "read write dolphin",
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
}
5.2. Client Registration Error Response
When an OAuth 2.0 error condition occurs, such as the client
presenting an invalid Registration Access Token, the Authorization
Server returns an Error Response as defined in Section 5.2 of the
OAuth 2.0 specification.
When a registration error condition occurs, the Authorization Server
returns an HTTP 400 status code with content type "application/json"
consisting of a JSON object [RFC4627] describing the error in the
response body.
The JSON object contains two members:
error
The error code, a single ASCII string.
error_description
A human-readable text description of the error for debugging.
This specification defines the following error codes:
invalid_redirect_uri
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The value of one or more "redirect_uris" is invalid.
invalid_client_metadata
The value of one of the client metadata (Section 2) fields is
invalid and the server has rejected this request. Note that an
Authorization server MAY choose to substitute a valid value for
any requested parameter of a client's metadata.
invalid_client_id
Value of "client_id" is invalid.
Following is a non-normative example of an error response (with line
wraps for display purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"error":"invalid_redirect_uri",
"error_description":"The redirect URI of http://sketchy.example.com
is not allowed for this server."
}
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Registry
This specification establishes the OAuth Token Endpoint
Authentication Methods registry.
Additional values for use as "token_endpoint_auth_method" metadata
values are registered with a Specification Required ([RFC5226]) after
a two-week review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org mailing
list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to
allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the
Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied
that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests must be sent to the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org
mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject
(e.g., "Request to register token_endpoint_auth_method value:
example").
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Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either
approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision
to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation
and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request
successful.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s)
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list.
6.1.1. Registration Template
Token Endpoint Authorization Method name:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case
sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case
insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
Change controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,
email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specify the token endpoint
authorization method, preferably including a URI that can be used
to retrieve a copy of the document(s). An indication of the
relevant sections may also be included but is not required.
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
The OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry's initial
contents are:
o Token Endpoint Authorization Method name: "none"
o Change controller: IETF
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]
o Token Endpoint Authorization Method name: "client_secret_post"
o Change controller: IETF
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]
o Token Endpoint Authorization Method name: "client_secret_basic"
o Change controller: IETF
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]
7. Security Considerations
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Since requests to the Client Registration Endpoint result in the
transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and
response), the server MUST require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when sending requests to the Registration
Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and/or
TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125].
Since the Client Configuration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected
Resource, it SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to prevent
the Registration Access Token from being disclosed though repeated
access attempts.
For clients that use redirect-based grant types such as Authorization
Code and Implicit, Authorization Servers SHOULD require clients to
register their "redirect_uris". Requiring Clients to do so can help
mitigate attacks where rogue actors inject and impersonate a validly
registered client and intercept its authorization code or tokens
through an invalid redirect URI.
The authorization server MUST treat all client metadata as self-
asserted. A rogue Client might use the name and logo for the
legitimate Client, which it is trying to impersonate. An
Authorization Server needs to take steps to mitigate this phishing
risk, since the logo could confuse users into thinking they're
logging in to the legitimate Client. For instance, an Authorization
Server could warn if the domain/site of the logo doesn't match the
domain/site of redirect URIs. An Authorization Server can also
present warning messages to end users about untrusted Clients in all
cases, especially if such clients have been dynamically registered
and have not been trusted by any users at the Authorization Server
before.
In a situation where the Authorization Server is supporting open
Client registration, it must be extremely careful with any URL
provided by the Client that will be displayed to the user (e.g.
"logo_uri", "tos_uri", "client_uri", and "policy_uri"). For
instance, a rogue Client could specify a registration request with a
reference to a drive-by download in the "policy_uri". The
Authorization Server SHOULD check to see if the "logo_uri",
"tos_uri", "client_uri", and "policy_uri" have the same host and
scheme as the those defined in the array of "redirect_uris" and that
all of these resolve to valid Web pages.
While the Client Secret can expire, the Registration Access Token
should not expire while a client is still actively registered. If
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this token were to expire, a developer or Client could be left in a
situation where they have no means of retrieving the Client's
registration information or updating it. Were that the case, a new
registration would be required, thereby getting a new Client
Identifier. However, Registration Access Tokens MAY be rotated when
the developer or client does a read or update operation on its Client
Configuration Endpoint, and the developer or Client MUST use this new
Registration Access Token. As the Registration Access Tokens are
long-term credentials, and since the Registration Access Token is a
Bearer token and acts as the sole authentication for use at the
Client Configuration Endpoint, it MUST be protected by the developer
or Client as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer [RFC6750].
If a Client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding
Registration Access Token for that client MUST be invalidated at the
same time. Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein
a Client could make requests to the Client Configuration Endpoint
where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail
because the Client is no longer valid.
Public clients MAY register with an Authorization Server using this
protocol, if the Authorization Server's policy allows them, by using
a "none" value for the "token_endpoint_auth_method" metadata field
and generally used with the "implicit" grant type. Often these
clients will be short-lived in-browser applications requesting access
to a user's resources and access is tied to a user's active session
at the Authorization Server. Since such clients often do not have
long-term storage, it's possible that such clients would need to re-
register every time the browser application is loaded. To avoid the
resulting proliferation of dead Client Identifiers, an Authorization
Server MAY decide to expire registrations for existing clients
meeting certain criteria after a period of time has elapsed.
8. Normative References
[IANA.Language]
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Language
Subtag Registry", 2005.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
key (work in progress), May 2013.
[OAuth.JWT]
Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token
(JWT) Bearer Token Profiles for OAuth 2.0", draft-ietf-
oauth-jwt-bearer (work in progress), March 2013.
[OAuth.SAML2]
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Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and M. Jones, "SAML 2.0
Bearer Assertion Profiles for OAuth 2.0", draft-ietf-
oauth-saml2-bearer (work in progress), March 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
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The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access
Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
their input to this document. In particular, the following
individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Tim Bray,
Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono,
Phil Hunt, Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake,
Nat Sakimura, Christian Scholz, and Hannes Tschofenig.
Appendix B. Client Lifecycle Examples
In the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749], a Client is identified by
its own unique Client Identifier ("client_id") at each Authorization
Server that it associates with. Dynamic Registration as defined in
this document is one way for a Client to get a Client Identifier and
associate a set of metadata with that identifier. Lack of such a
Client Identifier is the expected trigger for a client registration
operation.
In many cases, this Client Identifier is a unique, pairwise
association between a particular running instance of a piece of
Client software and a particular running instance of an Authorization
Server software. In particular:
o A single instance of Client software (such as a Web server)
talking to multiple Authorization Servers will need to register
with each Authorization Server separately, creating a distinct
Client Identifier with each Authorization Server. The Client can
not make any assumption that the Authorization Server is
correlating separate instances of the client together without
further profiles and extensions to this specification document.
The means by which a Client discovers and differentiates between
multiple Authorization Servers is out of scope for this
specification.
o Multiple instances of Client software (such as a native
application installed on multiple devices simultaneously) talking
to the same Authorization Server will need to each register with
that Authorization Server separately, creating a distinct Client
Identifier for each copy of the application. The Authorization
Server cannot make any assumption of correlation between these
clients without further specifications, profiles, and extensions
to this specification.
A Client Identifier (and its associated credentials) could also be
shared between multiple instances of a Client. Mechanisms for
sharing Client Identifiers between multiple instances of a piece of
software (either Client or Authorization Server) are outside the
scope of this specification, as it is expected that every successful
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registration request (Section 3.1) results in the issuance of a new
Client Identifier.
There are several patterns of OAuth Client registration that this
protocol can enable. The following non-normative example lifecycle
descriptions are not intended to be an exhaustive list. It is
assumed that the Authorization Server supports the Dynamic
Registration protocol and that all necessary discovery steps (which
are out of scope for this specification) have already been performed.
B.1. Open Registration
Open Registration, with no authentication on the Registration
Endpoint, works as follows:
a. A Client needs to get OAuth 2.0 tokens from an Authorization
Server, but the Client does not have a Client Identifier for that
Authorization Server.
b. The Client sends an HTTP POST request to the Client Registration
Endpoint at the Authorization Server and includes its metadata.
c. The Authorization Server issues a Client Identifier and returns
it to the Client along with a Registration Access Token and a
reference to the Client's Client Configuration Endpoint.
d. The Client stores the returned response from the Authorization
Server. At a minimum, it should know the values of "client_id",
"client_secret" (if present), "registration_access_token", and
"registration_client_uri".
e. The Client uses the its "client_id" and "client_secret" (if
provided) to request OAuth 2.0 tokens using any valid OAuth 2.0
flow.
f. If the Client's "client_secret" expires or otherwise stops
working, the Client sends an HTTP GET request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. This response will contain the Client's
refreshed "client_secret" along with any changed metadata values.
Its "client_id" will remain the same.
g. If the Client needs to update its configuration on the
Authorization Server, it sends an HTTP PUT request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. This response will contain the Client's
changed metadata values. Its "client_id" will remain the same.
h. If the Client is uninstalled or otherwise deprovisioned, it can
send an HTTP DELETE request to the "registration_client_uri" with
the "registration_access_token" as its authorization. This will
effectively deprovision the client from the Authorization Server.
B.2. Protected Registration
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An Authorization Server may require an Initial Access Token for
requests to its Registration Endpoint. While the method by which a
Client receives this Initial Access Token and the method by which the
Authorization Server validates this Initial Access Token are out of
scope for this specification, a common approach is for the Developer
to use a manual pre-registration portal at the Authorization Server
that issues an Initial Access Token to the Developer. This allows
the Developer to package the Initial Access Token with different
instances of the application. While each copy of the application
would get its own Client Identifier (and Registration Access Token),
all instances of the application would be tied back to the Developer
by their use of this initial registration token.
a. A Developer is creating a Client to use an Authorization Server
and knows that instances of the Client will dynamically register
at runtime, but that the Authorization Server requires
authorization the registration endpoint.
b. The Developer visits a manual pre-registration page at the
Authorization Server and is issued an Initial Access Token in the
form of an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token [RFC6750].
c. The Developer packages that token with all instances of the
Client application.
d. The Client needs to get OAuth 2.0 tokens from an Authorization
Server, but the Client does not have a Client Identifier for that
Authorization Server.
e. The Client sends an HTTP POST request to the Client Registration
Endpoint at the Authorization Server with its metadata, and the
Initial Access Token as its authorization.
f. The Authorization Server issues a Client Identifier and returns
it to the Client along with a Registration Access Token and a
reference to the Client's Client Configuration Endpoint.
g. The Client stores the returned response from the Authorization
Server. At a minimum, it should know the values of "client_id",
"client_secret" (if present), "registration_access_token", and
"registration_client_uri".
h. The Client uses the its "client_id" and "client_secret" (if
provided) to request OAuth 2.0 tokens using any supported OAuth
2.0 flow.
i. If the Client's "client_secret" expires or otherwise stops
working, the Client sends an HTTP GET request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. This response will contain the Client's
refreshed "client_secret" along with any metadata values
registered to that client, some of which may have changed. Its
"client_id" will remain the same.
j. If the Client needs to update its configuration on the
Authorization Server, it sends an HTTP PUT request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
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its authorization. The response will contain the Client's
changed metadata values. Its "client_id" will remain the same.
k. If the Client is uninstalled or otherwise deprovisioned, it can
send an HTTP DELETE request to the "registration_client_uri" with
the "registration_access_token" as its authorization. This will
effectively deprovision the client from the Authorization Server.
B.3. Developer Automation
The Dynamic Registration protocol can also be used in place of a
manual registration portal, for instance as part of an automated
build and deployment process. An Authorization Server may require an
Initial Access Token for requests to its Registration Endpoint, as
described in Protected Registration (Appendix B.2). However, in this
scenario, the Developer manages the Client's registration instead of
the Client itself. Therefore, the initial registration token and
Registration Access Token all remain with the Developer. The
Developer packages the Client Identifier with the Client as part of
the Client's build process.
a. A Developer is creating a Client to use an Authorization Server
and knows that instances of the Client will not dynamically
register at runtime.
b. If required for registrations at the Authorization Server, the
Developer performs an OAuth 2.0 authorization of his build
environment against the Authorization Server. The Authorization
Server and is issues an Initial Access Token to the Developer's
build environment in the form of an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token
[RFC6750].
c. The Developer configures his build environment to send an HTTP
POST request to the Client Registration Endpoint at the
Authorization Server with the Client's metadata, using the
Initial Access Token obtained the previous step as an OAuth 2.0
Bearer Token [RFC6750], if needed.
d. The Authorization Server issues a Client Identifier and returns
it to the Developer along with a Registration Access Token and a
reference to the Client's Client Configuration Endpoint.
e. The Developer packages the Client Identifier with the Client and
stores the "registration_access_token", and
"registration_client_uri" in the deployment system.
f. The Client uses the its "client_id" and "client_secret" (if
provided) to request OAuth 2.0 tokens using any supported OAuth
2.0 flow.
g. If the Client's "client_secret" expires or otherwise stops
working, the Developer's deployment system sends an HTTP GET
request to the "registration_client_uri" with the
"registration_access_token" as its authorization. This response
will contain the Client's refreshed "client_secret" along with
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any changed metadata values. Its "client_id" will remain the
same. These new values will then be packaged and shipped to or
retrieved by instances of the Client, if necessary.
h. If the Developer needs to update its configuration on the
Authorization Server, the deployment system sends an HTTP PUT
request to the "registration_client_uri" with the
"registration_access_token" as its authorization. This response
will contain the Client's changed metadata values. Its
"client_id" will remain the same. These new values will then be
packaged and shipped to or retrieved by instances of the Client,
if necessary.
i. If the Client is deprovisioned, the Developer's deployment system
can send an HTTP DELETE request to the "registration_client_uri"
with the "registration_access_token" as its authorization. This
will effectively deprovision the client from the Authorization
Server and prevent any instances of the client from functioning.
Appendix C. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-12
o Improved definition of Initial Access Token
o Changed developer registration scenario to have the Initial Access
Token gotten through a normal OAuth 2.0 flow
o Moved non-normative client lifecycle examples to appendix
o Marked differentiating between auth servers as out of scope
o Added protocol flow diagram
o Added credential rotation discussion
o Called out Client Registration Endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Protected
Resource
o Cleaned up several pieces of text
-11
o Added localized text to registration request and response
examples.
o Removed "client_secret_jwt" and "private_key_jwt".
o Clarified "tos_uri" and "policy_uri" definitions.
o Added the OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry for
registering "token_endpoint_auth_method" metadata values.
o Removed uses of non-ASCII characters, per RFC formatting rules.
o Changed "expires_at" to "client_secret_expires_at" and "issued_at"
to "client_id_issued_at" for greater clarity.
o Added explanatory text for different credentials (Initial Access
Token, Registration Access Token, Client Credentials) and what
they're used for.
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o Added Client Lifecycle discussion and examples.
o Defined Initial Access Token in Terminology section.
-10
o Added language to point out that scope values are service-specific
o Clarified normative language around client metadata
o Added extensibility to token_endpoint_auth_method using absolute
URIs
o Added security consideration about registering redirect URIs
o Changed erroneous 403 responses to 401's with notes about token
handling
o Added example for initial registration credential
-09
o Added method of internationalization for Client Metadata values
o Fixed SAML reference
-08
o Collapsed jwk_uri, jwk_encryption_uri, x509_uri, and
x509_encryption_uri into a single jwks_uri parameter
o Renamed grant_type to grant_types since it's a plural value
o Formalized name of "OAuth 2.0" throughout document
o Added JWT Bearer Assertion and SAML 2 Bearer Assertion to example
grant types
o Added response_types parameter and explanatory text on its use
with and relationship to grant_types
-07
o Changed registration_access_url to registration_client_uri
o Fixed missing text in 5.1
o Added Pragma: no-cache to examples
o Changed "no such client" error to 403
o Renamed Client Registration Access Endpoint to Client
Configuration Endpoint
o Changed all the parameter names containing "_url" to instead use
"_uri"
o Updated example text for forming Client Configuration Endpoint URL
-06
o Removed secret_rotation as a client-initiated action, including
removing client secret rotation endpoint and parameters.
o Changed _links structure to single value registration_access_url.
o Collapsed create/update/read responses into client info response.
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o Changed return code of create action to 201.
o Added section to describe suggested generation and composition of
Client Registration Access URL.
o Added clarifying text to PUT and POST requests to specify JSON in
the body.
o Added Editor's Note to DELETE operation about its inclusion.
o Added Editor's Note to registration_access_url about alternate
syntax proposals.
-05
o changed redirect_uri and contact to lists instead of space
delimited strings
o removed operation parameter
o added _links structure
o made client update management more RESTful
o split endpoint into three parts
o changed input to JSON from form-encoded
o added READ and DELETE operations
o removed Requirements section
o changed token_endpoint_auth_type back to
token_endpoint_auth_method to match OIDC who changed to match us
-04
o removed default_acr, too undefined in the general OAuth2 case
o removed default_max_auth_age, since there's no mechanism for
supplying a non-default max_auth_age in OAuth2
o clarified signing and encryption URLs
o changed token_endpoint_auth_method to token_endpoint_auth_type to
match OIDC
-03
o added scope and grant_type claims
o fixed various typos and changed wording for better clarity
o endpoint now returns the full set of client information
o operations on client_update allow for three actions on metadata:
leave existing value, clear existing value, replace existing value
with new value
-02
o Reorganized contributors and references
o Moved OAuth references to RFC
o Reorganized model/protocol sections for clarity
o Changed terminology to "client register" instead of "client
associate"
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o Specified that client_id must match across all subsequent requests
o Fixed RFC2XML formatting, especially on lists
-01
o Merged UMA and OpenID Connect registrations into a single document
o Changed to form-paramter inputs to endpoint
o Removed pull-based registration
-00
o Imported original UMA draft specification
Authors' Addresses
Justin Richer (editor)
The MITRE Corporation
Email: jricher@mitre.org
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/
Maciej Machulak
Newcastle University
Email: m.p.machulak@ncl.ac.uk
URI: http://ncl.ac.uk/
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