JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection
draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Torsten Lodderstedt , Vladimir Dzhuvinov | ||
| Last updated | 2019-09-25 (Latest revision 2019-09-20) | ||
| Replaces | draft-lodderstedt-oauth-jwt-introspection-response | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text xml htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Rifaat Shekh-Yusef | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2019-06-03 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::AD Followup | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
(None)
Needs 2 more YES or NO OBJECTION positions to pass. |
||
| Responsible AD | Roman Danyliw | ||
| Send notices to | Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - Actions Needed | |
| IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK |
draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08
Open Authentication Protocol T. Lodderstedt, Ed.
Internet-Draft yes.com AG
Intended status: Standards Track V. Dzhuvinov
Expires: March 22, 2020 Connect2id Ltd.
Sep 19, 2019
JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection
draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08
Abstract
This specification proposes an additional JSON Web Token (JWT)
secured response for OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 22, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Resource server management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Requesting a JWT Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. JWT Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Cross-JWT Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Token Data Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.3. Keeping Token Data Confidential from OAuth Clients . . . 10
8.4. Logging and Audit of Introspection Activity . . . . . . . 10
9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration 11
11.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration . . . . 12
11.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] specifies a method for a
protected resource to query an OAuth 2.0 authorization server to
determine the state of an access token and obtain data associated
with the access token. This enables deployments to implement opaque
access tokens in an interoperable way.
The introspection response, as specified in OAuth 2.0 Token
Introspection [RFC7662], is a plain JSON object. However, there are
use cases where the resource server requires stronger assurance that
the authorization server issued the token introspection response for
an access token, including cases where the authorization server
assumes liability for the content of the token introspection
response. An example is a resource server using verified person data
to create certificates, which in turn are used to create qualified
electronic signatures.
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In such use cases it may be useful or even required to return a
signed JWT [RFC7519] as the introspection response. This
specification extends the token introspection endpoint with the
capability to return responses as JWTs.
2. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Resource server management
The authorization server (AS) and the resource server (RS) maintain a
strong two-way trust relationship. The resource server relies on the
authorization server to obtain authorization, user and other data as
input to its access control decisions and service delivery. The
authorization server relies on the resource server to handle the
provided data appropriately.
In the context of this specification, the Token Introspection
Endpoint is used to convey such security data and potentially also
privacy sensitive data related to an access token.
In order to process the introspection requests in a secure and
privacy-preserving manner, the authorization server MUST be able to
identify, authenticate and authorize resource servers.
To support encrypted token introspection response JWTs, the
authorization server MUST also be provided with the respective
resource server encryption keys and algorithms.
The authorization server MUST be able to determine whether an RS is
the audience for a particular access token and what data it is
entitled to receive, otherwise the RS is not authorized to obtain
data for the access token. The AS has the discretion how to fulfil
this requirement. The AS could, for example, maintain a mapping
between scopes values and resource servers.
The requirements given above imply that the authorization server
maintains credentials and other configuration data for each RS.
One way is by utilizing dynamic client registration [RFC7591] and
treating every RS as an OAuth client. In this case, the
authorization server is assumed to at least maintain "client_id" and
"token_endpoint_auth_method" with complementary authentication method
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metadata, such as "jwks" or "client_secret". In cases where the AS
needs to acquire consent to transmit data to a RS, the following
client metadata fields are recommended: "client_name", "client_uri",
"contacts", "tos_uri", "policy_uri".
The AS MUST restrict the use of client credentials by a RS to the
calls it requires, e.g. the AS MAY restrict such a client to call the
token introspection endpoint only. How the AS implements this
restriction is beyond the scope of this specification.
This specification further introduces client metadata to manage the
configuration options required to sign and encrypt token
introspection response JWTs.
4. Requesting a JWT Response
A resource server requests to receive a JWT introspection response by
including an Accept header with content type "application/jwt" in the
introspection request.
Authentication at the token introspection endpoint can utilize client
authentication methods or a separate access token issued to the
resource server. Whether a resource server is required to
authenticate is determined by the respective RS-specific policy at
the AS.
The following is a non-normative example request using client
authentication:
POST /introspect HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Accept: application/jwt
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
token=2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA
If required by its policy, the authorization server MUST authenticate
the caller and check its authorization to use the token introspection
endpoint.
5. JWT Response
The introspection endpoint responds with a JWT, setting the "Content-
Type" header to "application/jwt". This JWT is a cryptographically
protected representation of the token introspection response as
specified in [RFC7662].
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Note: Although the JWT format is widely used as an access token
format, the JWT returned in the introspection response is not an
alternative representation of the introspected access token and is
not intended to be used as an access token.
JWT metadata values, such as "iat", might differ between the token
introspection response in JWT format and the introspected access
token (see below).
This specification registers the "application/token-
introspection+jwt" media type, which is used as value of the "typ"
header parameter of the JWT to indicate that the payload is a token
introspection response.
If the access token is invalid, expired, has been revoked, or is not
intended to be consumed by the calling resource server (audience),
the authorization server MUST set the value of the response claim
"active" to "false". Otherwise, this claim is set to "true".
If the access token is considered active, it MUST contain the claims
"iss" and "aud" in order to prevent misuse of the JWT as an ID or
access token (see Section 8.1).
The "iss" MUST be set to the issuer URL of the AS.
The value of the "aud" claims MUST identify the resource server
receiving the token introspection response.
If the AS adds the following claims to the token introspection
response their meaning is defined as follows:
iat The "iat" claim indicates when the introspection response was
issued by the AS.
exp The "exp" claim indicates when the access token passed in the
introspection request will expire.
jti The "jti" claim is a unique identifier for the access token
passed in the introspection request. This identifier MUST be
stable for all introspection calls for a given access token.
Further content of the introspection response is determined by the
RS-specific policy at the AS.
If possible, the AS MUST narrow down the "scope" value to the scopes
relevant to the particular RS.
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The JWT formatted introspection response MAY contain further claims,
especially the claims defined in the "OAuth Token Introspection
Response" registry established by [RFC7662] and the "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry established by [RFC7519].
This includes claims from the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry that
are commonly used in [OpenID.Core] and can be applied to the resource
owner. These claims can serve to identify the resource owner as a
natural person or to provide a required contact detail, such as an
e-Mail address or phone number. When transmitting such claims the AS
acts as an identity provider in regard to the RS.
The AS determines based on the RS-specific policy what claims about
the resource owner to return in the token introspection response.
The AS MUST ensure that the release of any privacy-sensitive data is
legally based.
The following is a non-normative example response (with line breaks
for display purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/jwt
eyJ0eXAiOiJ0b2tlbi1pbnRyb3NwZWN0aW9uK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2In0.eyJ
pc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS8iLCJhdWQiOiJzNkJoZFJrcX
QzIiwianRpIjoidDFGb0NDYVpkNFh2NE9SSlVXVlVlVFpmc0toVzMwQ1FDcldERGp3W
Hk2dyIsImFjdGl2ZSI6dHJ1ZSwic2NvcGUiOiJyZWFkIHdyaXRlIGRvbHBoaW4iLCJl
eHAiOjE1MTQ3OTc5NDIwMDAsImlhdCI6MTUxNDc5NzgyMjAwMCwiY2xpZW50X2lkIjo
iczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsInN1YiI6Ilo1TzN1cFBDODhRckFqeDAwZGlzIiwiZ2l2ZW5fbm
FtZSI6IkpvaG4iLCJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSI6IkRvZSIsImJpcnRoZGF0ZSI6IjE5ODItM
DItMDEifQ.mnGNVJJwMaMR-drVHIyjOd7S5mScHT5tYC_sLdeaS9C4pkmiOgwHNGah9
w_15kbotjDckotJNHpNTQCcE5nRC29L_jz5hSCNTMmK62fJdEcq0QVuCL_roeHzc-s1
bjU2V2Qme6_2468zqcuhf1fhcieWxx9bDwFFwk3su0qdoF9RBa0HobWzy1ENU6MjiKH
vmrnd5PkJenn1rJEt0EQTUuVE0vh2tQGhxbaZkQ34mLLgES5TCuBK7ALDXhT4aGCzxg
3jLprs_jYTjCq2kugptseKaxsvti0TxOxmxLPcuy5xRxHDUzV2h9_VWVJRgM8y0vhLN
v9XKDe4EQqaIFLA_YD4TBeyPV7Sm4xMQ-2OsSmAz0E2BY_b_s0WrFN2K8tspQhj2mnG
v7Zz8O3zeE2gC59JR56aU_SNspGPbt8GvTwuL5ZZTCmiWKUzQ0ev4zVthUczQmK53dx
Zl6ZxBfIRPV5k1GTPyEPbWehizbJT4JBSLlk-l8JvJcfL2USLtJgMLH1D01fww0IqN1
ofHeHFUmZWB_LR7kGaJ8Kx_a9z4CaaVesW8jzgSmwA8K_pv9yJqqjnUhsh51c49OAgn
cqwAahGrUhrN0dIBrd6sRXU3AiRpaah0MMNcjR2UJbEZKwnMyHTkBQAeZAe9vO9pKV8
JOd0ziYBpAbEpYGE4p3wog4
The example response header contains the following JSON document:
{
"typ": "token-introspection+jwt",
"alg": "RS256"
}
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The example response payload contains the following JSON document:
{
"iss":"https://server.example.com/",
"aud":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"jti": "t1FoCCaZd4Xv4ORJUWVUeTZfsKhW30CQCrWDDjwXy6w",
"active":true,
"scope":"read write dolphin",
"exp":1514797942000,
"iat":1514797822000,
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"sub":"Z5O3upPC88QrAjx00dis",
"given_name":"John",
"family_name":"Doe",
"birthdate":"1982-02-01"
}
Depending on the specific resource server policy the JWT is either
signed, or signed and encrypted. If the JWT is signed and encrypted
it MUST be a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519].
Note: If the resource server policy requires a signed and encrypted
response and the authorization server receives an unauthenticated
request containing an Accept header with content type other than
"application/jwt", it MUST refuse to serve the request and return an
HTTP status code 400. This is done to prevent downgrading attacks to
obtain token data intended for release to legitimate recipients only
(see Section 8.2).
6. Client Metadata
The authorization server determines what algorithm to employ to
secure the JWT for a particular introspection response. This
decision can be based on registered metadata parameters for the
resource server, supplied via dynamic client registration [RFC7591]
with the resource server acting as a client, as specified below.
The parameter names follow the pattern established by OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration [OpenID.Registration] for configuring
signing and encryption algorithms for JWT responses at the UserInfo
endpoint.
The following client metadata parameters are introduced by this
specification:
introspection_signed_response_alg OPTIONAL. JWS [RFC7515] algorithm
("alg" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for signing
introspection responses. If this is specified, the response
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will be signed using JWS and the configured algorithm. The
default, if omitted, is "RS256".
introspection_encrypted_response_alg OPTIONAL. JWE [RFC7516]
algorithm ("alg" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for
content key encryption. If this is specified, the response
will be encrypted using JWE and the configured content
encryption algorithm
("introspection_encrypted_response_enc"). The default, if
omitted, is that no encryption is performed. If both signing
and encryption are requested, the response will be signed
then encrypted, with the result being a Nested JWT, as
defined in JWT [RFC7519].
introspection_encrypted_response_enc OPTIONAL. JWE [RFC7516]
algorithm ("enc" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for
content encryption of introspection responses. The default,
if omitted, is "A128CBC-HS256". Note: This parameter MUST
NOT be specified without setting
"introspection_encrypted_response_alg".
Resource servers may register their public encryption keys using the
"jwks_uri" or "jwks" metadata parameters.
7. Authorization Server Metadata
Authorization servers SHOULD publish the supported algorithms for
signing and encrypting the JWT of an introspection response by
utilizing OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414]
parameters. Resource servers use this data to parametrize their
client registration requests.
The following parameters are introduced by this specification:
introspection_signing_alg_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array
containing a list of the JWS [RFC7515] signing algorithms
("alg" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the
introspection endpoint to sign the response.
introspection_encryption_alg_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array
containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms
("alg" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the
introspection endpoint to encrypt the content encryption key
for introspection responses (content key encryption).
introspection_encryption_enc_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array
containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms
("enc" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the
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introspection endpoint to encrypt the response (content
encryption).
8. Security Considerations
8.1. Cross-JWT Confusion
Token introspection responses in JWT format, access tokens in JWT
format, and OpenID Connect ID Tokens are syntactical similar.
Attackers could try to utilize this fact and attempt to use a token
introspection response as access token when invoking a resource
server or as ID Token when logging into at a OpenID Connect RP.
Any relying party processing the "typ" JWT header element should
detect the attack since token introspection responses in JWT format
set this header to the value "token-introspection+jwt".
Unfortunately, this is not a well established practice yet.
As an alternative approach, such an attack can be prevented like any
other token substitution attack by restricting the audience of the
JWT. As specified in Section 5, the authorization server includes
the claims "iss" and "aud" in each JWT introspection response, with
the "iss" value set to the authorization server's issuer URL and the
"aud" value set to the resource server's identifier. Any recipient
of an JWT MUST check these values in order to detect substitution
attacks.
OpenID Connect RPs are additionally expected to use and check the
"nonce" parameter and claim to prevent token and code replay.
Resource servers MUST additionally apply the countermeasures against
replay as described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics], section 3.2.
JWT Confusion and other attacks involving JWTs are discussed in
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp].
8.2. Token Data Leakage
The authorization server MUST use Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2
(or higher) per BCP 195 [RFC7525] in order to prevent token data
leakage.
To prevent introspection of leaked tokens and to present an
additional security layer against token guessing attacks the
authorization server MAY require all requests to the token
introspection endpoint to be authenticated. As an alternative or as
an addition to the authentication, the intended recipients MAY be set
up for encrypted responses.
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In the latter case, confidentiality is ensured by the fact that only
the legitimate recipient is able to decrypt the response. An
attacker could try to circumvent this measure by requesting a plain
JSON response, using an Accept header with the content type set to,
for example, "application/json" instead of "application/jwt". To
prevent this attack the authorization server MUST NOT serve requests
with a content type other than "application/jwt" if the resource
server is set up to receive encrypted responses (see also Section 5).
8.3. Keeping Token Data Confidential from OAuth Clients
Authorization servers with a policy that requires token data to be
kept confidential from OAuth clients must require all requests to the
token introspection endpoint to be authenticated. As an alternative
or as an addition to the authentication, the intended recipients may
be set up for encrypted responses.
8.4. Logging and Audit of Introspection Activity
Authorization servers with a policy that requires token introspection
activity to be logged and audited must require all requests to the
token introspection endpoint to be authenticated.
9. Privacy Considerations
The token introspection response can be used to transfer personal
identifiable information from the AS to the RS. The AS MUST ensure a
legal basis exists for the data transfer before any data is released
to a particular RS. The way the legal basis is established might
vary among jurisdictions and MUST consider the legal entities
involved.
For example, the classical way to establish the legal basis is by
explicit user consent gathered from the resource owner by the AS
during the authorization flow.
It is also possible that the legal basis is established out of band,
e.g. in an explicit contract or by the client gathering the resource
owner's consent.
If the AS and the RS belong to the same legal entity (1st party
scenario), there is potentially no need for an explicit user consent
but the terms of service and policy of the respective service
provider MUST be enforced at all times.
In any case, the AS MUST ensure that the scope of the legal basis is
enforced throughout the whole process. The AS MUST retain the scope
of the legal basis with the access token, e.g. in the scope value,
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and the AS MUST determine the data a resource server is allowed to
receive based on the resource server's identity and suitable token
data, e.g. the scope value.
10. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Petteri Stenius, Neil Madden, Filip Skokan,
Tony Nadalin, and Remco Schaar for their valuable feedback.
11. IANA Considerations
11.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration
This specification requests registration of the following client
metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration
Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]:
11.1.1. Registry Contents
o Client Metadata Name: "introspection_signed_response_alg"
o Client Metadata Description: String value indicating the client's
desired introspection response signing algorithm.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this specification ]]
o Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_alg"
o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired
introspection response content key encryption algorithm (alg
value).
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this specification ]]
o Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_enc"
o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired
introspection response content encryption algorithm (enc value).
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this specification ]]
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11.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration
This specification requests registration of the following values in
the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414].
11.2.1. Registry Contents
o Metadata Name: "introspection_signing_alg_values_supported"
o Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms
supported by the authorization server for introspection response
signing.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 7 of [[ this specification ]]
o Metadata Name: "introspection_encryption_alg_values_supported"
o Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms
supported by the authorization server for introspection response
content key encryption (alg value).
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 7 of [[ this specification ]]
o Metadata Name: "introspection_encryption_enc_values_supported"
o Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms
supported by the authorization server for introspection response
content encryption (enc value).
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 7 of [[ this specification ]]
11.3. Media Type Registration
This section registers the "application/token-introspection+jwt"
media type in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the
manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the
content is a token introspection response in JWT format.
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11.3.1. Registry Contents
o Type name: application
o Subtype name: token-introspection+jwt
o Required parameters: N/A
o Optional parameters: N/A
o Encoding considerations: binary; A token introspection response is
a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded
values (with trailing '=' characters removed), some of which may
be the empty string, separated by period ('.') characters.
o Security considerations: See Section 7 of this specification
o Interoperability considerations: N/A
o Published specification: Section 4 of this specification
o Applications that use this media type: Applications that produce
and consume OAuth Token Introspection Responses in JWT format
o Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
o Additional information:
* Magic number(s): N/A
* File extension(s): N/A
* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
o Person & email address to contact for further information: Torsten
Lodderstedt, torsten@lodderstedt.net
o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Torsten Lodderstedt, torsten@lodderstedt.net
o Change controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No
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12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Current Practices", draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-06 (work in
progress), June 2019.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", draft-ietf-
oauth-security-topics-13 (work in progress), July 2019.
[IANA.MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B. D., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 1", Nov 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Registration]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set
1", Nov 2014, <https://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
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[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
12.2. Informative References
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
Appendix A. Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-08
o made difference between introspected access token and
introspection response clearer
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o defined semantics of JWT claims overlapping between introspected
access token and introspection response as JWT
o added section about RS management
o added text about user claims including a privacy considerations
section
o removed registration of OpenID Connect claims to "Token
Introspection Response" registry and refer to "JWT Claims"
registry instead
o added registration of "application/token-introspection+jwt" media
type as type identifier of token introspection responses in JWT
format
o more changed to incorporate IESG review feedback
-07
o fixed wrong description of "locale"
o added references for ISO and ITU specifications
-06
o replaced reference to RFC 7159 with reference to RFC 8259
-05
o improved wording for TLS requirement
o added RFC 2119 boilerplate
o fixed and updated some references
-04
o reworked definition of parameters in section 4
o added text on data minimization to security considerations section
o added statement regarding TLS to security considerations section
-03
o added registration for OpenID Connect Standard Claims to OAuth
Token Introspection Response registry
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-02
o updated references
-01
o adapted wording to preclude any accept header except "application/
jwt" if encrypted responses are required
o use registered alg value RS256 for default signing algorithm
o added text on claims in the token introspection response
-00
o initial version of the WG draft
o defined default signing algorithm
o changed behavior in case resource server is set up for encryption
o Added text on token data leakage prevention to the security
considerations
o moved Security Considerations section forward
WG draft
-01
o fixed typos in client meta data field names
o added OAuth Server Metadata parameters to publish algorithms
supported for signing and encrypting the introspection response
o added registration of new parameters for OAuth Server Metadata and
Client Registration
o added explicit request for JWT introspection response
o made iss and aud claims mandatory in introspection response
o Stylistic and clarifying edits, updates references
-00
o initial version
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Authors' Addresses
Torsten Lodderstedt (editor)
yes.com AG
Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net
Vladimir Dzhuvinov
Connect2id Ltd.
Email: vladimir@connect2id.com
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