Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0
draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG)
Last updated 2017-07-28
Replaces draft-campbell-oauth-mtls
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OAuth Working Group                                          B. Campbell
Internet-Draft                                             Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track                              J. Bradley
Expires: January 28, 2018                                         Yubico
                                                             N. Sakimura
                                               Nomura Research Institute
                                                          T. Lodderstedt
                                                           YES Europe AG
                                                           July 27, 2017

                    Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0
                        draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03

Abstract

   This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual
   authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for OAuth
   client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for
   certificate bound sender constrained access tokens.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

Campbell, et al.        Expires January 28, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              OAuth Mutual TLS                   July 2017

   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Mutual TLS for Client Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Mutual TLS Client Authentication to the Token Endpoint  .   4
     2.2.  Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Dynamic Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Mutual TLS Sender Constrained Resources Access  . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint Confirmation Method
           for JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Confirmation Method for Token Introspection . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Authorization Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  Resource Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Sender Constrained Access Tokens Without Client
           Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Certificate Bound Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  JWT Confirmation Methods Registration . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.1.  Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration  . . . .  11
       5.2.1.  Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration . . . .  11
       5.3.1.  Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.4.  OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration . . . . .  11
       5.4.1.  Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.5.  OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration .  12
       5.5.1.  Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  TLS Versions and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.2.  X.509 Certificate Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
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