OAuth 2.0 Mutual TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens
draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-14

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG)
Last updated 2019-04-11
Replaces draft-campbell-oauth-mtls
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2018-10-10)
IESG IESG state AD Evaluation::AD Followup
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
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Responsible AD Roman Danyliw
Send notices to Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
OAuth Working Group                                          B. Campbell
Internet-Draft                                             Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track                              J. Bradley
Expires: October 13, 2019                                         Yubico
                                                             N. Sakimura
                                               Nomura Research Institute
                                                          T. Lodderstedt
                                                              YES.com AG
                                                          April 11, 2019

    OAuth 2.0 Mutual TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound
                             Access Tokens
                        draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-14

Abstract

   This document describes OAuth client authentication and certificate-
   bound access and refresh tokens using mutual Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) authentication with X.509 certificates.  OAuth clients are
   provided a mechanism for authentication to the authorization server
   using mutual TLS, based on either self-signed certificates or public
   key infrastructure (PKI).  OAuth authorization servers are provided a
   mechanism for binding access tokens to a client's mutual TLS
   certificate, and OAuth protected resources are provided a method for
   ensuring that such an access token presented to it was issued to the
   client presenting the token.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 13, 2019.

Campbell, et al.        Expires October 13, 2019                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              OAuth Mutual TLS                  April 2019

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Mutual TLS for OAuth Client Authentication  . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  PKI Mutual TLS Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.1.  PKI Method Metadata Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.2.  Client Registration Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Self-Signed Certificate Mutual TLS Method . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.1.  Self-Signed Method Metadata Value . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.2.2.  Client Registration Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Mutual TLS Client Certificate-Bound Access Tokens . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  JWT Certificate Thumbprint Confirmation Method  . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Confirmation Method for Token Introspection . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.4.  Client Registration Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Public Clients and Certificate-Bound Tokens . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Metadata for Mutual TLS Endpoint Aliases  . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Authorization Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  Resource Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.3.  Certificate Expiration and Bound Access Tokens  . . . . .  15
     6.4.  Implicit Grant Unsupported  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.5.  TLS Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  Certificate-Bound Refresh Tokens  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.2.  Certificate Thumbprint Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.3.  TLS Versions and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
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