Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)
draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-06
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Jones , John Bradley , Hannes Tschofenig | ||
| Last updated | 2015-11-04 | ||
| Replaces | draft-jones-oauth-proof-of-possession | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text xml htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Reviews |
SECDIR Telechat review
(of
-07)
Has Issues
|
||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Associated WG milestone |
|
||
| Document shepherd | Kepeng Li | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2015-11-04 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Publication Requested | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Kathleen Moriarty | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-06
OAuth Working Group M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: May 7, 2016 Ping Identity
H. Tschofenig
ARM Limited
November 4, 2015
Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)
draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-06
Abstract
This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web
Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular key
and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of-
possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove
possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter
being a holder-of-key.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 7
3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric
Proof-of-Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession
Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5. Representation of a URL for a Proof-of-Possession Key . . 9
3.6. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
1. Introduction
This specification defines how a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] can
declare that the presenter of the JWT possesses a key and that the
recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter possesses
that key. Proof-of-possession of a key is also sometimes described
as the presenter being a holder-of-key. The
[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture] specification describes key
confirmation, among other confirmation mechanisms. This
specification defines how to communicate key confirmation key
information in JWTs.
Envision the following two use cases. The first use case employs a
symmetric proof-of-possession key and the second use case employs an
asymmetric proof-of-possession key.
+--------------+
| | +--------------+
| |--(4) Presentation of -->| |
| | JWT w/ Encrypted | |
| Presenter | PoP Key | |
| | | |
| |<-(5) Communication ---->| |
| | Authenticated by | |
+--------------+ PoP Key | |
| ^ | |
| | | |
(1) Sym. (3) JWT w/ | Recipient |
| PoP | Encrypted | |
| Key | PoP Key | |
v | | |
+--------------+ | |
| | | |
| | | |
| |<-(2) Key Exchange for ->| |
| Issuer | Key Encryption Key | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | +--------------+
+--------------+
Figure 1: Proof-of-Possession with a Symmetric Key
In the case illustrated in Figure 1, the presenter generates a
symmetric key and (1) privately sends it to the issuer. The issuer
generates a JWT with an encrypted copy of this symmetric key in the
newly introduced confirmation claim. This symmetric key is encrypted
with a key known only to the issuer and the recipient, which is
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
established in step (2), if it doesn't already exist. The entire JWT
is integrity protected by the issuer. The JWT is then (3) sent to
the presenter. Now, the presenter is in possession of the symmetric
key as well as the JWT (which includes the confirmation claim). When
the presenter (4) presents the JWT to the recipient, it also needs to
demonstrate possession of the symmetric key; the presenter, for
example, (5) uses the symmetric key in a challenge/response protocol
with the recipient. The recipient is then able to verify that it is
interacting with the genuine presenter by decrypting the key in the
confirmation claim of the JWT. By doing this, the recipient obtains
the symmetric key, which it then uses to verify cryptographically
protected messages exchanged with the presenter (5). This symmetric
key mechanism described above is conceptually similar to the use of
Kerberos tickets.
+--------------+
| | +--------------+
| |--(3) Presentation of -->| |
| | JWT w/ Public | |
| Presenter | PoP Key | |
| | | |
| |<-(4) Communication ---->| |
| | Authenticated by | |
+--------------+ PoP Key | |
| ^ | |
| | | |
(1) Public (2) JWT w/ | Recipient |
| PoP | Public | |
| Key | PoP Key | |
v | | |
+--------------+ | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Issuer | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | +--------------+
+--------------+
Figure 2: Proof-of-Possession with an Asymmetric Key
In the case illustrated in Figure 2, the presenter generates a
public/private key pair and (1) sends the public key to the issuer,
which creates a JWT that contains the public key (or an identifier
for it) in the newly introduced confirmation claim. The entire JWT
is integrity protected using a digital signature to protect it
against modifications. The JWT is then (2) sent to the presenter.
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
When the presenter (3) presents the JWT to the recipient, it also
needs to demonstrate possession of the private key. The presenter,
for example, (4) uses the private key in a TLS exchange with the
recipient or (4) signs a nonce with the private key. The recipient
is able to verify that it is interacting with the genuine presenter
by extracting the public key from the confirmation claim of the JWT
(after verifying the digital signature of the JWT) and utilizing it
with the private key in the TLS exchange or by checking the nonce
signature.
In both cases, the JWT may contain other claims that are needed by
the application.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.
2. Terminology
This specification uses terms defined in the JSON Web Token (JWT)
[JWT], JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK], and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE]
specifications.
These terms are defined by this specification:
Issuer
Party that creates the JWT and binds the proof-of-possession key
to it.
Presenter
Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key
cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a
recipient.
Recipient
Party that receives the JWT containing the proof-of-possession key
information from the presenter.
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys
The issuer of a JWT declares that the presenter possesses a
particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object.
Members in the JSON object identify the proof-of-possession key.
The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the JWT,
depending upon the application requirements. If the JWT contains a
"sub" (subject) claim [JWT], the presenter is normally the subject
identified by the JWT. (In some applications, the subject identifier
will be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer) claim
[JWT].) If the JWT contains no "sub" (subject) claim, the presenter
is normally the issuer identified by the JWT using the "iss" (issuer)
claim. The case in which the presenter is the subject of the JWT is
analogous to SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation
usage. At least one of the "sub" and "iss" claims MUST be present in
the JWT. Some use cases may require that both be present.
Another means used by some applications to identify the presenter is
an explicit claim, such as the "azp" (authorized party) claim defined
by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]. Ultimately, the means of
identifying the presenter is application-specific, as is the means of
confirming possession of the key that is communicated.
3.1. Confirmation Claim
The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT to contain members
used to identify the proof-of-possession key. Other members of the
"cnf" object may be defined because a proof-of-possession key may not
be the only means of confirming the authenticity of the token. This
is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
SubjectConfirmation element, in which a number of different subject
confirmation methods can be included, including proof-of-possession
key information. When a recipient receives a "cnf" claim with a
member that it does not understand, it MUST ignore that member.
This specification establishes the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods"
registry for these members in Section 6.2 and registers the members
defined by this specification. Other specifications can register
other members used for confirmation, including other members for
conveying proof-of-possession keys, possibly using different key
representations.
Note that if an application needs to represent multiple proof-of-
possession keys in the same JWT, one way for it to achieve this is to
use other claim names, in addition to "cnf", to hold the additional
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
proof-of-possession key information. These claims could use the same
syntax and semantics as the "cnf" claim. Those claims would be
defined by applications or other specifications and could be
registered in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry
[IANA.JWT.Claims].
3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the
"jwk" member is a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] representing the
corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example
demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"aud": "https://client.example.org",
"exp": "1361398824",
"cnf":{
"jwk":{
"kty": "EC",
"use": "sig",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM",
"y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA"
}
}
}
The JWK MUST contain the required key members for a JWK of that key
type and MAY contain other JWK members, including the "kid" (key ID)
member.
The "jwk" member MAY also be used for a JWK representing a symmetric
key, provided that the JWT is encrypted so that the key is not
revealed to unintended parties. If the JWT is not encrypted, the
symmetric key MUST be encrypted as described below.
3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the "jwe"
member is an encrypted JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] encrypted to a key
known to the recipient using the JWE Compact Serialization containing
the symmetric key. The rules for encrypting a JWK are found in
Section 7 of the JSON Web Key [JWK] specification.
The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could
subsequently be encrypted for use in the "jwe" member:
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
{
"kty": "oct",
"alg": "HS256",
"k": "ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE"
}
The UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoding of this JWK is used as the JWE Plaintext
when encrypting the key.
The following example is a JWE Header that could be used when
encrypting this key:
{
"alg": "RSA-OAEP",
"enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
}
The following example JWT Claims Set of a JWT illustrates the use of
an encrypted symmetric key as the "jwe" member value:
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"cnf":{
"jwe":
"eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ.
(remainder of JWE omitted for brevity)"
}
}
3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key
The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a
Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the
recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In
this case, the issuer of a JWT declares that the presenter possesses
a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with
the JSON object containing a "kid" (key ID) member identifying the
key.
The following example demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT
Claims Set of a JWT:
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"aud": "https://client.example.org",
"exp": "1361398824",
"cnf":{
"kid": "dfd1aa97-6d8d-4575-a0fe-34b96de2bfad"
}
}
The content of the "kid" value is application specific. For
instance, some applications may choose to use a JWK Thumbprint
[JWK.Thumbprint] value as the "kid" value.
3.5. Representation of a URL for a Proof-of-Possession Key
The proof-of-possession key can be passed by reference instead of
being passed by value. This is done using the "jku" (JWK Set URL)
member. Its value is a URI [RFC3986] that refers to a resource for a
set of JSON-encoded public keys represented as a JWK Set [JWK], one
of which is the proof-of-possession key. If there are multiple keys
in the referenced JWK Set document, a "kid" member MUST also be
included, with the referenced key's JWK also containing the same
"kid" value.
The protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide integrity
protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the JWK Set MUST use
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246]; and the identity of the
server MUST be validated, as per Section 6 of RFC 6125 [RFC6125].
The following example demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT
Claims Set of a JWT:
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "17760704",
"aud": "https://client.example.org",
"exp": "1440804813",
"cnf":{
"jku": "https://keys.example.net/pop-keys.json",
"kid": "2015-08-28"
}
}
3.6. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
Proof-of-possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter
sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by
the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
"challenge".
The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents
are intentionally not described in this specification, as different
protocols will communicate this information in different ways.
Likewise, the means of communicating the signed nonce is also not
specified, as this is also protocol-specific.
Note that another means of proving possession of the key when it is a
symmetric key is to encrypt the key to the recipient. The means of
obtaining a key for the recipient is likewise protocol-specific.
For examples using the mechanisms defined in this specification, see
[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].
4. Security Considerations
All of the normal security issues, especially in relationship to
comparing URIs and dealing with unrecognized values, that are
discussed in JWT [JWT] also apply here.
In addition, proof-of-possession introduces its own unique security
issues. Possessing the key is only valuable if it is kept secret.
Appropriate means must be used to ensure that unintended parties do
not learn the private key or symmetric key value.
Proof-of-possession via encrypted symmetric secrets is subject to
replay attacks. This attack can be avoided when a signed nonce or
challenge is used, since the recipient can use a distinct nonce or
challenged for each interaction.
Similarly to other information included in a JWT, it is necessary to
apply data origin authentication and integrity protection (via a
keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data origin
authentication ensures that the recipient of the JWT learns about the
entity that created the JWT, since this will be important for any
policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary from
changing any elements conveyed within the JWT payload. Special care
has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the JWT, since
those not only require integrity protection, but also confidentiality
protection.
A recipient may not understand the newly introduced "cnf" claim and
may consequently treat it as a bearer token. While this is a
legitimate concern, it is outside the scope of this specification,
since demonstration the possession of the key associated with the
"cnf" claim is not covered by this specification. For more details,
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
please consult [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].
5. Privacy Considerations
A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the
same key is used with multiple parties. Thus, for privacy reasons,
it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys be used
when interacting with different parties.
6. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification.
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis
after a three-week review period on the oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org
mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
satisfied that such a specification will be published. [[ Note to the
RFC Editor: The name of the mailing list should be determined in
consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name:
oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org. ]]
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWT Confirmation
Method: example").
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than
21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general
applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration makes sense.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list.
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Experts.
6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA "JSON Web
Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] established by [JWT].
6.1.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "cnf"
o Claim Description: Confirmation
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]
6.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry
This specification establishes the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods"
registry for JWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the
confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that
defines it.
6.2.1. Registration Template
Confirmation Method Value:
The name requested (e.g., "kid"). Because a core goal of this
specification is for the resulting representations to be compact,
it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8
characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is
case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a
case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that
there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.
Confirmation Method Description:
Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Key
Identifier").
Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.
6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
o Confirmation Method Value: "jwk"
o Confirmation Method Description: JSON Web Key Representing Public
Key
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [[ this document ]]
o Confirmation Method Value: "jwe"
o Confirmation Method Description: Encrypted JSON Web Key
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this document ]]
o Confirmation Method Value: "kid"
o Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]]
o Confirmation Method Value: "jku"
o Confirmation Method Description: JWK Set URL
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.5 of [[ this document ]]
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[IANA.JWT.Claims]
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629,
November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125,
March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]
Hunt, P., Richer, J., Mills, W., Mishra, P., and H.
Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security
Architecture", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-03 (work
in progress), September 2015.
[JWK.Thumbprint]
Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint (work in
progress), July 2015, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint-08>.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
2.0-os, March 2005.
[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Brian Campbell, Kepeng Li, James Manger,
Justin Richer, and Nat Sakimura for their reviews of the
specification.
Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-06
o Added diagrams to the introduction.
-05
o Addressed review comments by Kepeng Li.
-04
o Allowed the use of "jwk" for symmetric keys when the JWT is
encrypted.
o Added the "jku" (JWK Set URL) member.
o Added privacy considerations.
o Reordered sections so that the "cnf" (confirmation) claim is
defined before it is used.
o Noted that applications can define new claim names, in addition to
"cnf", to represent additional proof-of-possession keys, using the
same representation as "cnf".
o Applied wording clarifications suggested by Nat Sakimura.
-03
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
o Separated the "jwk" and "jwe" confirmation members; the former
represents a public key as a JWK and the latter represents a
symmetric key as a JWE encrypted JWK.
o Changed the title to indicate that a proof-of-possession key is
being communicated.
o Updated language that formerly assumed that the issuer was an
OAuth 2.0 authorization server.
o Described ways that applications can choose to identify the
presenter, including use of the "iss", "sub", and "azp" claims.
o Harmonized the registry language with that used in JWT [RFC 7519].
o Addressed other issues identified during working group last call.
o Referenced the JWT and JOSE RFCs.
-02
o Defined the terms Issuer, Presenter, and Recipient and updated
their usage within the document.
o Added a description of a use case using an asymmetric proof-of-
possession key to the introduction.
o Added the "kid" (key ID) confirmation method.
o These changes address the open issues identified in the previous
draft.
-01
o Updated references.
-00
o Created the initial working group draft from
draft-jones-oauth-proof-of-possession-02.
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs November 2015
Authors' Addresses
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Limited
Austria
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Jones, et al. Expires May 7, 2016 [Page 17]