SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credentials (SD-JWT VC)
draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-14
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Oliver Terbu , Daniel Fett , Brian Campbell | ||
| Last updated | 2026-02-05 | ||
| Replaces | draft-terbu-oauth-sd-jwt-vc | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-14
Web Authorization Protocol O. Terbu
Internet-Draft MATTR
Intended status: Standards Track D. Fett
Expires: 9 August 2026 Authlete Inc.
B. Campbell
Ping Identity
5 February 2026
SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credentials (SD-JWT VC)
draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-14
Abstract
This specification describes data formats as well as validation and
processing rules to express Verifiable Digital Credentials with JSON
payloads with and without selective disclosure based on the SD-JWT
[RFC9901] format.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization
Protocol Working Group mailing list (oauth@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-sd-jwt-vc.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 August 2026.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. SD-JWT as a Credential Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Verifiable Digital Credentials based on SD-JWT . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Data Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.2. JWT Claims Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.1. Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.2. Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4. Verification and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.5. Issuer Signature Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. JWT VC Issuer Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. SD-JWT VC Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1. Type Metadata Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2. Type Metadata Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3. Retrieving Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.1. From a URL in the vct Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.2. From a Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.3. Using a Defined Retrieval Method . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3.4. From a Local Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4. Extending Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. Document Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Display Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.1. Rendering Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
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7.1.1. Rendering Method "simple" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.1.2. Rendering Method "svg_templates" . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.2. Extending Display Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8. Claim Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.1. Claim Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.1.1. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.1.2. Processing of path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.2. Claim Display Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.3. Claim Mandatory Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.4. Claim Selective Disclosure Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.5. Extending Claim Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.5.1. Limitations for sd and mandatory . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.5.2. Example for Extending Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . 33
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9.1. Server-Side Request Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9.2. Ecosystem-specific Public Key Verification Methods . . . 35
9.3. Circular "extends" Dependencies of Types . . . . . . . . 35
9.4. Robust Retrieval of Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9.5. Risks Associated with Textual Information . . . . . . . . 36
9.6. Credential Type Extension and Issuer Authorization . . . 36
9.7. Trust in Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9.8. Use of Data URIs for Claim Types . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10.1. Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10.2. Verifiable Digital Credential Type Identifier . . . . . 38
10.3. Issuer Phone-Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10.4. Privacy-Preserving Retrieval of Type Metadata . . . . . 39
11. Relationships to Other Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix A. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.2. Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.2.1. application/dc+sd-jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.3. Well-Known URI Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B.1. Example Person Identification Data (PID) Credential . . . 43
B.2. Example Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendix C. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix D. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1. Introduction
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1.1. Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model
In the so-called Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model, Issuers issue
Verifiable Digital Credentials to a Holder, who can then present the
credentials to Verifiers. Verifiable Digital Credentials are
cryptographically secured statements about a Subject, typically the
Holder.
Figure 1 depicts the Issuer-Holder-Verifier model.
+------------+
| |
| Issuer |
| |
+------------+
|
Issues SD-JWT VC
|
v
+------------+
| |
| Holder |
| |
+------------+
|
Presents SD-JWT VC
|
v
+-------------+
| |-+
| Verifiers | |-+
| | | |
+-------------+ | |
+-------------+ |
+-------------+
Figure 1: Abstract Depiction of the Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model
Verifiers can check the authenticity of the data in Verifiable
Digital Credentials. Verifiers can also optionally enforce Key
Binding, which requires the Holder to prove they are the intended
Holder of the Verifiable Digital Credential. This proof is typically
done by demonstrating possession of a cryptographic key referenced in
the credential. This process is further described in [RFC9901].
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1.2. SD-JWT as a Credential Format
JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [RFC7519] can in principle be used to express
Verifiable Digital Credentials in a way that is easy to understand
and process as it builds upon established web primitives.
Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) [RFC9901] is a specification that
introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For
an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release
(within bounds defined by the Issuer).
SD-JWT is a superset of JWT. It can also be used when there are no
selectively disclosable claims. Furthermore, SD-JWT supports JWS
JSON serialization, which is useful for long-term archiving and
multi-signatures. However, SD-JWT itself does not define the claims
that must be used within the payload or their semantics.
This specification uses SD-JWT and the well-established JWT content
rules and extensibility model as basis for representing Verifiable
Digital Credentials with JSON payloads. These Verifiable Digital
Credentials are called SD-JWT VCs. The use of selective disclosure
in SD-JWT VCs is OPTIONAL.
SD-JWTs VC can contain claims that are registered in "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry as defined in [RFC7519], as well as public and
private claims.
1.3. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
1.4. Terms and Definitions
This specification uses the terms "Holder", "Issuer", "Verifier",
"Disclosure", "Selectively Disclosable JWT (SD-JWT)", "Key Binding",
"Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT)", "Selectively Disclosable JWT with Key
Binding (SD-JWT+KB)" defined by [RFC9901].
Consumer: An application using the Type Metadata specified in
Section 5 is called a Consumer. This typically includes Issuers,
Verifiers, and Holders.
Publisher: An entity that publishes Type Metadata or other auxiliary
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documents referenced by an SD-JWT VC (for example via a vct URI),
but that is not necessarily the Issuer of the SD-JWT VC. A
Publisher can be a standardization body, community, ecosystem
authority, or any other party defining credential types or
associated metadata.
Verifiable Digital Credential: An assertion with claims about a
Subject that is cryptographically secured by an Issuer (usually by
a digital signature).
SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credential (SD-JWT VC): A Verifiable
Digital Credential encoded using the format defined in [RFC9901].
It may or may not contain selectively disclosable claims. Note
that the three-word term “Verifiable Digital Credential” is used
to distinguish it from the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model
and to better align with preferred terminology emerging elsewhere
(see, for example, [NIST-BLOG.VDCE]). However, the “D” is omitted
in the short form “SD-JWT VC” in order to preserve the name that
has been widely used to refer to this specification since its
inception.
Unsecured Payload of an SD-JWT VC: A JSON object containing all
selectively disclosable and non-selectively disclosable claims of
the SD-JWT VC. The Unsecured Payload acts as the input JSON
object to issue an SD-JWT VC complying to this specification.
2. Scope
This specification defines
* a data model and media types for Verifiable Digital Credentials
based on SD-JWTs, and
* validation and processing rules for Verifiers and Holders.
3. Verifiable Digital Credentials based on SD-JWT
This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for
SD-JWT VCs.
3.1. Media Type
SD-JWT VCs compliant with this specification MUST use the media type
application/dc+sd-jwt.
The base subtype name dc is meant to stand for "digital credential",
which is a term that is emerging as a conceptual synonym for
"verifiable credential".
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3.2. Data Format
Issuers MUST encode an SD-JWT VC using the SD-JWT format defined in
Section 4 or Section 8 of [RFC9901], where support for the JWS JSON
Serialization is OPTIONAL.
Note that in some cases, an SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively
disclosable claims, and therefore the encoded SD-JWT will not contain
any Disclosures.
A presentation of an SD-JWT VC MUST be encoded as an SD-JWT or as an
SD-JWT+KB defined in Section 4 or Section 8 of [RFC9901]. By
default, the format defined in Section 4 of [RFC9901] is used,
whereas support for the JWS JSON Serialization in Section 8 of
[RFC9901] is OPTIONAL.
3.2.1. JOSE Header
This section defines JWT header parameters for the SD-JWT component
of the SD-JWT VC.
The Issuer MUST include the typ header parameter in the SD-JWT. The
typ value MUST use dc+sd-jwt. This indicates that the payload of the
SD-JWT contains plain JSON and follows the rules defined in this
specification. It further indicates that the SD-JWT is an SD-JWT
component of an SD-JWT VC.
Figure 2 is a non-normative example of a decoded SD-JWT header:
{
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "dc+sd-jwt"
}
Figure 2: Decoded SD-JWT VC Header
Note that this draft used vc+sd-jwt as the value of the typ header
from its inception in July 2023 until November 2024 when it was
changed to dc+sd-jwt to avoid conflict with the vc media type name
registered by the W3C's Verifiable Credentials Data Model draft. In
order to facilitate a minimally disruptive transition, it is
RECOMMENDED that Verifiers and Holders accept both vc+sd-jwt and
dc+sd-jwt as the value of the typ header for a reasonable
transitional period.
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3.2.2. JWT Claims Set
This section defines the claims that can be included in the payload
of SD-JWT VCs.
3.2.2.1. Verifiable Digital Credential Type - vct Claim
This specification defines the new JWT claim vct (for verifiable
credential type). Its value MUST be a case-sensitive string serving
as an identifier for the type of the SD-JWT VC. The vct value MUST
be a Collision-Resistant Name as defined in Section 2 of [RFC7515].
A type is associated with rules defining which claims are permitted
or required to appear in the Unsecured Payload of the SD-JWT VC and
whether selective disclosure is permitted, necessary, or prohibited
for those claims.
This specification does not define any vct values; instead it is
expected that ecosystems using SD-JWT VCs define such values
including the semantics of the respective claims and associated rules
(e.g., policies for issuing and validating credentials beyond what is
defined in this specification).
For example, a value of https://credentials.example.com/
identity_credential can be associated with rules that define that at
least the registered JWT claims given_name, family_name, birthdate,
and address must appear in the Unsecured Payload. Additionally, the
registered JWT claims email and phone_number, and the private claims
is_over_18, is_over_21, and is_over_65 may be used. The type might
also indicate that any of the aforementioned claims can be
selectively disclosable. The content in Figure 3 shows that vct
value used to express the example type.
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{
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"given_name": "Russ",
"family_name": "Lasky",
"birthdate": "1983-07-29",
"address": {
"street_address": "285 W Huntington Dr.",
"locality": "Arcadia",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": "91007"
},
"email": "sorryfolks@ww.example",
"exp": 1777707000,
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
}
}
Figure 3: Example Unsecured Payload with vct
The vct value also effectively identifies the version of the
credential type definition, as it ties a particular instance of a
credential to a specific structure, set of semantics, and rules.
When evolving a credential type without updating the version, changes
to the structure or meaning of the associated claims need to be made
in a way that preserves compatibility with existing implementations.
If a change alters the meaning of existing content, adds new required
claims, removes previously required elements, or otherwise introduces
incompatibilities, it is generally advisable to treat that as a new
version of the credential type and to convey it using a new vct
value. This allows different versions of a credential type to
coexist and helps ensure that participants interpret credentials
consistently. For example, if such a need came about for the
hypothetical type urn:eudi:pid:aendgard:1, a new version could be
defined using a 'vct' of urn:eudi:pid:aendgard:2.
3.2.2.2. Registered JWT Claims
SD-JWT VCs MAY use any claim registered in the "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry as defined in [RFC7519].
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The following registered JWT claims are used within the SD-JWT
component of the SD-JWT VC and MUST NOT be included in the
Disclosures, i.e., cannot be selectively disclosed:
* iss: OPTIONAL. As defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7519] this
claim explicitly indicates the Issuer of the Verifiable Digital
Credential when it is not conveyed by other means (e.g., the
subject of the end-entity certificate of an x5c header).
* nbf: OPTIONAL. The time before which the Verifiable Digital
Credential MUST NOT be accepted before validating. See [RFC7519]
for more information.
* exp: OPTIONAL. The expiry time of the Verifiable Digital
Credential after which the Verifiable Digital Credential is no
longer valid. See [RFC7519] for more information.
* cnf: OPTIONAL unless cryptographic Key Binding is to be supported,
in which case it is REQUIRED. Contains the confirmation method
identifying the proof of possession key as defined in [RFC7800].
It is RECOMMENDED that this contains a JWK as defined in
Section 3.2 of [RFC7800]. For proof of cryptographic Key Binding,
the KB-JWT in the presentation of the SD-JWT MUST be secured by
the key identified in this claim.
* vct: REQUIRED. The type of the Verifiable Digital Credential,
e.g., https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential, as
defined in Section 3.2.2.1.
* vct#integrity: OPTIONAL. The hash of the Type Metadata document
to provide integrity as defined in Section 6.
* status: OPTIONAL. The information on how to read the status of
the Verifiable Credential. See [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list] for
more information. When the status claim is present and using the
status_list mechanism, the associated Status List Token MUST be in
JWT format.
The following registered JWT claims are used within the SD-JWT
component of the SD-JWT VC and MAY be included in Disclosures, i.e.,
can be selectively disclosed:
* sub: OPTIONAL. The identifier of the Subject of the Verifiable
Digital Credential. The Issuer MAY use it to provide the Subject
identifier known by the Issuer. There is no requirement for a
binding to exist between sub and cnf claims.
* iat: OPTIONAL. The time of issuance of the Verifiable Digital
Credential. See [RFC7519] for more information.
3.2.2.3. Public and Private JWT claims
Additionally, any public and private claims as defined in Sections
4.2 and 4.3 of [RFC7519] MAY be used.
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Binary data in claims SHOULD be encoded as data URIs as defined in
[RFC2397]. Exceptions can be made when data formats are used that
already define a text encoding suitable for use in JSON or where an
established text encoding is commonly used. For example, images
would make use of data URIs, whereas hash digests in base64 encoding
do not need to be encoded as such.
An example of a claim containing binary data encoded as a data URI is
shown in Appendix B.1.
3.2.2.4. SD-JWT VC without Selectively Disclosable Claims
An SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively disclosable claims. In that
case, the SD-JWT VC MUST NOT contain the _sd claim in the JWT body.
It also MUST NOT have any Disclosures.
3.3. Example
3.3.1. Issuance
Figure 4 is a non-normative example of the user data of an Unsecured
Payload of an SD-JWT VC.
{
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"given_name": "John",
"family_name": "Doe",
"email": "johndoe@example.com",
"phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
},
"birthdate": "1940-01-01",
"is_over_18": true,
"is_over_21": true,
"is_over_65": true
}
Figure 4: Unsecured Payload
Figure 5 below shows how the Unsecured Payload above can be used in
an SD-JWT where the resulting SD-JWT VC contains only claims about
the Subject that are selectively disclosable:
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{
"_sd": [
"09vKrJMOlyTWM0sjpu_pdOBVBQ2M1y3KhpH515nXkpY",
"2rsjGbaC0ky8mT0pJrPioWTq0_daw1sX76poUlgCwbI",
"EkO8dhW0dHEJbvUHlE_VCeuC9uRELOieLZhh7XbUTtA",
"IlDzIKeiZdDwpqpK6ZfbyphFvz5FgnWa-sN6wqQXCiw",
"JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE",
"PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI",
"TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo",
"jdrTE8YcbY4EifugihiAe_BPekxJQZICeiUQwY9QqxI",
"jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4"
],
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"_sd_alg": "sha-256",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
}
}
Figure 5: Unsecured Payload
Note that a cnf claim has been added to the SD-JWT payload to express
the confirmation method of the Key Binding.
The following are the Disclosures belonging to the SD-JWT payload
above:
*Claim given_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4
* Disclosure:
WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9o
biJd
* Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "John"]
*Claim family_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo
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* Disclosure:
WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRv
ZSJd
* Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Doe"]
*Claim email*:
* SHA-256 Hash: JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE
* Disclosure:
WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgImpvaG5kb2VA
ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ
* Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "email",
"johndoe@example.com"]
*Claim phone_number*:
* SHA-256 Hash: PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI
* Disclosure:
WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInBob25lX251bWJlciIsICIr
MS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ
* Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "phone_number",
"+1-202-555-0101"]
*Claim address*:
* SHA-256 Hash: IlDzIKeiZdDwpqpK6ZfbyphFvz5FgnWa-sN6wqQXCiw
* Disclosure:
WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVl
dF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRv
d24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0
* Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "address", {"street_address":
"123 Main St", "locality": "Anytown", "region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"}]
*Claim birthdate*:
* SHA-256 Hash: jdrTE8YcbY4EifugihiAe_BPekxJQZICeiUQwY9QqxI
* Disclosure:
WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTQw
LTAxLTAxIl0
* Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "birthdate", "1940-01-01"]
*Claim is_over_18*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 09vKrJMOlyTWM0sjpu_pdOBVBQ2M1y3KhpH515nXkpY
* Disclosure:
WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMTgiLCB0cnVl
XQ
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* Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "is_over_18", true]
*Claim is_over_21*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 2rsjGbaC0ky8mT0pJrPioWTq0_daw1sX76poUlgCwbI
* Disclosure:
WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMjEiLCB0cnVl
XQ
* Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "is_over_21", true]
*Claim is_over_65*:
* SHA-256 Hash: EkO8dhW0dHEJbvUHlE_VCeuC9uRELOieLZhh7XbUTtA
* Disclosure:
WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVl
XQ
* Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "is_over_65", true]
The SD-JWT and the Disclosures would then be serialized by the Issuer
into the format shown in Figure 6 below for issuance to the Holder.
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp
Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dktySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9C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.16gTW
iDGLVybfOnOAV2VyP8__baIx0H413wRiXszQFq3k_oorhjccVrgyfZMycwdMgc42OVx8
o2_UDAoOp3wOQ~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLC
AiSm9obiJd~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgI
kRvZSJd~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgImpvaG5kb2VA
ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ~WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInBob25lX251b
WJlciIsICIrMS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIi
wgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2
FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOi
AiVVMifV0~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOT
QwLTAxLTAxIl0~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMTgiLC
B0cnVlXQ~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMjEiLCB0cnV
lXQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVlXQ~
Figure 6: SD-JWT VC
3.3.2. Presentation
Figure 7 below is an example of a presentation of the SD-JWT shown in
Section 3.3 including a KB-JWT. In this presentation, the Holder
provides only the Disclosures for the address and is_over_65 claims.
Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier.
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp
Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dktySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9C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.16gTW
iDGLVybfOnOAV2VyP8__baIx0H413wRiXszQFq3k_oorhjccVrgyfZMycwdMgc42OVx8
o2_UDAoOp3wOQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLC
B0cnVlXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmV
ldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCA
icmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0~eyJhbGciOiAiRVM
yNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZC
I6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3NzAzMTQ3Nj
AsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogIjdiRFVYaEhRVndybVVka1pqVkN1QVR2ekgweThocmRoNTdHND
U1N291NWsifQ.Z-wPkYBHS4A7ma-ym1PJp0oIzXpdEtO1CtmqIB525iTtVPNPCX8-z8w
TffkvThHVVUQ_-GL9dC7fI41uWwdP2g
Figure 7: Presented SD-JWT+KB
After validation, the Verifier will have the processed SD-JWT payload
in Figure 8 below available for further handling.
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{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
},
"is_over_65": true,
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
}
}
Figure 8: Verified SD-JWT Payload
The example in Figure 9 below shows a presentation of a (similar but
different) SD-JWT without a KB-JWT.
eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dkt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.Gz5XTZY051Nwow369_T1RmfKI3gqRLl3YxI0wwPH1vAyIU
JtTdsT0MegIP0EgZiZMS4hx4ojh62Rq3KQGWIeyw~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5
JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVlXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9B
IiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxv
Y2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnki
OiAiVVMifV0~
Figure 9: Presented SD-JWT
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The Verifier will have the following processed SD-JWT payload shown
in Figure 10 after validation.
{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"is_over_65": true,
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
}
}
Figure 10: Processed SD-JWT Payload
3.4. Verification and Processing
The recipient (Holder or Verifier) of an SD-JWT VC MUST process and
verify an SD-JWT VC as described in Section 7 of [RFC9901]. The
check in point 2.c of Section 7.1 of [RFC9901], which validates the
Issuer and ensures that the signing key belongs to the Issuer, MUST
be satisfied by determining and validating the public verification
key used to verify the Issuer-signed JWT, employing an Issuer
Signature Mechanism (defined in Section 3.5) that is permitted for
the Issuer according to policy.
If Key Binding is required (refer to the security considerations in
Section 9.5 of [RFC9901]), the Verifier MUST verify the KB-JWT
according to Section 7.3 of [RFC9901]. To verify the KB-JWT, the cnf
claim of the SD-JWT MUST be used.
If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to
process the _sd claim nor any Disclosures.
If status is present in the verified payload of the SD-JWT, the
status SHOULD be checked. Verifier policy decides whether to reject
or accept a presentation of a SD-JWT VC based on the status of the
Verifiable Digital Credential.
Additional validation rules MAY apply, but their use is out of the
scope of this specification.
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3.5. Issuer Signature Mechanisms
An Issuer Signature Mechanism defines how a Verifier determines the
appropriate key and associated procedure for verifying the signature
of an Issuer-signed JWT. This allows for flexibility in supporting
different trust anchoring systems and key resolution methods without
changing the core processing model.
A recipient MUST determine and validate the public verification key
for the Issuer-signed JWT using a supported Issuer Signature
Mechanism that is permitted for the given Issuer according to policy.
This specification defines the following two Issuer Signature
Mechanisms:
* JWT VC Issuer Metadata: A mechanism to retrieve the Issuer's
public key using web-based resolution. When the value of the iss
claim of the Issuer-signed JWT is an HTTPS URI, the recipient
obtains the public key using the keys from JWT VC Issuer Metadata
as defined in Section 4.
* X.509 Certificates: A mechanism to retrieve the Issuer's public
key using the X.509 certificate chain in the SD-JWT header. When
the protected header of the Issuer-signed JWT contains the x5c
parameter, the recipient uses the public key from the end-entity
certificate of the certificates from that x5c parameter and
validates the X.509 certificate chain accordingly. In this case,
the Issuer of the Verifiable Digital Credential is the subject of
the end-entity certificate.
To enable different trust anchoring systems or key resolution
methods, separate specifications or ecosystem regulations may define
additional Issuer Signature Mechanisms may complement or override the
mechanisms defined above; however, the specifics of such mechanisms
are out of scope for this specification. See Section 9.2 for related
security considerations.
If a recipient cannot validate that the public verification key
corresponds the Issuer of the Issuer-signed JWT using a permitted
Issuer Signature Mechanism, the SD-JWT VC MUST be rejected.
4. JWT VC Issuer Metadata
This specification defines the JWT VC Issuer Metadata to retrieve the
JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration of the Issuer of the SD-JWT VC.
The Issuer is identified by the iss claim in the JWT. Use of the JWT
VC Issuer Metadata is OPTIONAL.
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Issuers publishing JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST make a JWT VC Issuer
Metadata configuration available at the location formed by inserting
the well-known string /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer between the host
component and the path component (if any) of the iss claim value in
the JWT. The iss MUST be a case-sensitive URL using the HTTPS scheme
that contains scheme, host and, optionally, port number and path
components, but no query or fragment components.
4.1. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Request
A JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration MUST be queried using an HTTP
GET request at the path defined in Section 4.
Figure 11 below is a non-normative example of an HTTP request for the
JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration when iss is set to
https://example.com:
GET /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Figure 11: Example HTTP Request for JWT VC Issuer Metadata
If the iss value contains a path component, any terminating / MUST be
removed before inserting /.well-known/ and the well-known URI suffix
between the host component and the path component.
Figure 12 below is a non-normative example of an HTTP request for the
JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration when iss is set to
https://example.com/tenant/1234:
GET /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer/tenant/1234 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Figure 12: Example HTTP Request for JWT VC Issuer Metadata
4.2. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Response
A successful response MUST use an HTTP 200 status code and return the
JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration using the application/json
content type.
An error response MUST use the applicable HTTP status code value.
This specification defines the following JWT VC Issuer Metadata
configuration parameters:
* issuer: REQUIRED. The Issuer identifier, which MUST be identical
to the iss value in the JWT.
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* jwks_uri: OPTIONAL. URL string referencing the Issuer's JSON Web
Key (JWK) Set [RFC7517] document which contains the Issuer's
public keys. The value of this field MUST point to a valid JWK
Set document.
* jwks: OPTIONAL. Issuer's JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517] document
value, which contains the Issuer's public keys. The value of this
field MUST be a JSON object containing a valid JWK Set.
JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST include either jwks_uri or jwks in their
JWT VC Issuer Metadata, but not both.
It is RECOMMENDED that the Issuer-signed JWT contains a kid JWT
header parameter that can be used to look up the public key in the
JWK Set included by value or referenced in the JWT VC Issuer
Metadata.
Figure 13 below is an example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata
configuration including jwks:
{
"issuer":"https://example.com",
"jwks":{
"keys":[
{
"kid":"doc-signer-05-25-2022",
"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256",
"x": "b28d4MwZMjw8-00CG4xfnn9SLMVMM19SlqZpVb_uNtQ",
"y": "Xv5zWwuoaTgdS6hV43yI6gBwTnjukmFQQnJ_kCxzqk8"
},
{
"kid":"doc-signer-06-05-2025",
"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256",
"x":"DfjUx4WHBds61vGbqUQhsy3FGX13fAS13QWh2EHIkX8",
"y":"NfqJt9Kp0EA93xq9ysO80DRZ_hCGlISz-pYLgv4RFvg"
}
]
}
}
Figure 13: Example Metadata with a JSON Web Key Set
Figure 14 below is an example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata
configuration including jwks_uri:
{
"issuer":"https://example.com",
"jwks_uri":"https://jwt-vc-issuer.example.com/my_public_keys.jwks"
}
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Figure 14: Example Metadata with a JSON Web Key Set URI
Additional JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration parameters MAY also
be used.
4.3. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Validation
The issuer value returned MUST be identical to the iss value of the
Issuer-signed JWT. If these values are not identical, the data
contained in the response MUST NOT be used.
5. SD-JWT VC Type Metadata
An SD-JWT VC type, i.e., the vct value, is associated with Type
Metadata defining, for example, information about the type and how
credentials are displayed.
This section defines Type Metadata that can be associated with a type
of an SD-JWT VC, as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata
and processing rules. This Type Metadata is intended to be used,
among other things, for the following purposes:
* Developers of Issuers and Verifiers can use the Type Metadata to
understand the semantics of the type and the associated rules.
While in some cases, Issuers are the parties that define types,
this is not always the case. For example, a type can be defined
by a standardization body or a community.
* Verifiers can use the Type Metadata to determine whether a
credential is valid according to the rules of the type. For
example, a Verifier can check whether a credential contains all
required claims and whether the claims are selectively
disclosable.
* Holders can use the metadata to display the credential in a way
that is consistent with the intent of the provider of the Type
Metadata.
Type Metadata can be retrieved as described in Section 5.3.
5.1. Type Metadata Example
All examples in this section are non-normative. This section only
shows excerpts, the full examples can be found in Appendix B.2.
The following in Figure 15 is an example of an SD-JWT VC payload,
containing a vct claim with the value
https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42.
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{
"vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"vct#integrity": "sha256-1odmyxoVQCuQx8SAym8rWHXba41fM/Iv/V1H8VHGN00=",
...
}
Figure 15: Example SD-JWT VC Payload with vct Claim
Type Metadata for the type
https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42 can be
retrieved using various mechanisms as described in Section 5.3. For
this example, the vct value is a URL as defined in Section 5.3.1 and
the Type Metadata document in Figure 16 is retrieved from it:
{
"vct":"https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"name":"Betelgeuse Education Credential - Version 42",
"description":"This is our education credential. Don't panic.",
"extends":"https://galaxy.example.com/galactic-education-credential/v2",
"extends#integrity":"sha256-ilOUJsTultOwLfz7QUcFALaRa3BP/jelX1ds04kB9yU="
}
Figure 16: Example Type Metadata Document
Note: The hash of the Type Metadata document shown in the second
example must be equal to the one in the vct#integrity claim in the
SD-JWT VC payload, 1odmyxoVQCuQx8SAym8rWHXba41fM/Iv/V1H8VHGN00= (see
Section 6 for details).
5.2. Type Metadata Format
The Type Metadata document MUST be a JSON object. The following
properties are defined:
* vct: REQUIRED. The verifiable digital credential type described
by this type metadata document.
* name: OPTIONAL. A human-readable name for the type, intended for
developers reading the JSON document.
* description: OPTIONAL. A human-readable description for the type,
intended for developers reading the JSON document.
* extends: OPTIONAL. A URI of another type that this type extends,
as described in Section 5.4.
* display: An array of objects containing display information for
the type, as described in Section 7. This property is OPTIONAL.
* claims: An array of objects containing claim information for the
type, as described in Section 8. This property is OPTIONAL.
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Additionally, extends#integrity MAY be present as defined in
Section 6.
A Type Metadata document MAY contain additional top level or
subordinate properties. Consumers MUST ignore properties that are
not understood.
An example of a Type Metadata document is shown in Appendix B.2.
5.3. Retrieving Type Metadata
A Consumer retrieving Type Metadata MUST ensure that the vct value in
the SD-JWT VC payload is identical to the vct value in the reference
to the Type Metadata (either in the SD-JWT VC itself or in an extends
property in a Type Metadata document).
The following sections define methods to retrieve Type Metadata.
5.3.1. From a URL in the vct Claim
A URI in the vct claim can be used to express a type. If the type is
a URL using the HTTPS scheme, Type Metadata MAY be retrieved from it.
The Type Metadata is retrieved using the HTTP GET method. A
successful response MUST use an HTTP 200 status code and return a
JSON object as defined in Section 5.2 using the application/json
content type. An error response MUST use the applicable HTTP status
code value.
If the claim vct#integrity is present in the SD-JWT VC, its value
vct#integrity MUST be an "integrity metadata" string as defined in
Section 6.
5.3.2. From a Registry
A Consumer MAY use a registry to retrieve Type Metadata for a SD-JWT
VC type, e.g., if the type is not an HTTPS URL or if the Consumer
does not have access to the URL. A Consumer needs to trust the
registry to provide correct Type Metadata for the type.
The registry MUST provide the Type Metadata in the same format as
described in Section 5.2.
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5.3.3. Using a Defined Retrieval Method
Ecosystems MAY define additional methods for retrieving Type
Metadata. For example, a standardization body or a community MAY
define a service which has to be used to retrieve Type Metadata based
on a URN in the vct claim.
5.3.4. From a Local Cache
A Consumer MAY cache Type Metadata for a SD-JWT VC type. If a hash
for integrity protection is present in the Type Metadata as defined
in Section 6, the Consumer MAY assume that the Type Metadata is
static and can be cached indefinitely. Otherwise, the Consumer MUST
use the Cache-Control header of the HTTP response to determine how
long the metadata can be cached.
5.4. Extending Type Metadata
An SD-JWT VC type can extend another type. The extended type is
identified by the URI in the extends property. Consumers MUST
retrieve and process Type Metadata for the extended type before
processing the Type Metadata for the extending type.
The extended type MAY itself extend another type. This can be used
to create a chain or hierarchy of types. The security considerations
described in Section 9.3 apply in order to avoid problems with
circular dependencies.
Processing details when extending type metadata are described in
Section 7.2 and Section 8.5.
6. Document Integrity
The vct claim in the SD-JWT VC as defined in Section 3.2.2.2 and
various URIs in the Type Metadata MAY be accompanied by a respective
claim suffixed with #integrity, in particular:
* extends as defined in Section 5.4, and
* uri as used in three places in Section 7.1.
The value MUST be an "integrity metadata" string as defined in
Section 3 of [W3C.SRI]. If an integrity property is present for a
particular claim, the Consumer of the respective document MUST verify
the integrity of the retrieved document as defined in Section 3.3.5
of [W3C.SRI].
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7. Display Metadata
The display property is an array containing display information for
the type. The array MUST contain an object for each locale that is
supported by the type. The consuming application MUST use the
language tag it considers most appropriate for the user.
The objects in the array have the following properties:
* locale: A language tag as defined in Section 2 of [RFC5646]. This
property is REQUIRED.
* name: A human-readable name for the type, intended for end users.
This property is REQUIRED.
* description: A human-readable description for the type, intended
for end users. This property is OPTIONAL.
* rendering: An object containing rendering information for the
type, as described in Section 7.1. This property is OPTIONAL.
7.1. Rendering Metadata
The rendering property is an object containing rendering information
for the type. The object MUST contain a property for each rendering
method that is supported by the type. The property name MUST be a
rendering method identifier and the property value MUST be an object
containing the properties defined for the rendering method.
7.1.1. Rendering Method "simple"
The simple rendering method is intended for use in applications that
do not support SVG rendering. The object contains the following
properties:
* logo: An object containing information about the logo to be
displayed for the type, as described in Section 7.1.1.1. This
property is OPTIONAL.
* background_image: An object containing information about the
background image to be displayed for the type, as described in
Section 7.1.1.2. This property is OPTIONAL.
* background_color: An RGB color value as defined in [W3C.CSS-COLOR]
for the background of the credential. This property is OPTIONAL.
* text_color: An RGB color value as defined in [W3C.CSS-COLOR] value
for the text of the credential. This property is OPTIONAL.
7.1.1.1. Logo Metadata
The logo property is an object containing information about the logo
to be displayed for the type. The object contains the following
properties:
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* uri: A URI pointing to the logo image. This property is REQUIRED.
* uri#integrity: An "integrity metadata" string as described in
Section 6. This property is OPTIONAL.
* alt_text: A string containing alternative text for the logo image.
This property is OPTIONAL.
7.1.1.2. Background Image Metadata
The background_image property is an object containing information
about the background image to be displayed for the type. The object
contains the following properties:
* uri: A URI pointing to the background image. This property is
REQUIRED.
* uri#integrity: An "integrity metadata" string as described in
Section 6. This property is OPTIONAL.
7.1.2. Rendering Method "svg_templates"
The svg_templates rendering method is intended for use in
applications that support SVG rendering. svg_templates MUST contain
an array of objects containing information about the SVG templates
available for the type. Each object contains the following
properties:
* uri: A URI pointing to the SVG template. This property is
REQUIRED.
* uri#integrity: An "integrity metadata" string as described in
Section 6. This property is OPTIONAL.
* properties: An object containing properties for the SVG template,
as described in Section 7.1.2.1. This property is REQUIRED if
more than one SVG template is present, otherwise it is OPTIONAL.
7.1.2.1. SVG Template Properties
The properties property is an object containing properties for the
SVG template. Consuming applications MUST use these properties to
find the best SVG template available for display to the user based on
the display properties (landscape/portrait) and user preferences
(color scheme, contrast). The object MUST contain at least one of
the following properties:
* orientation: The orientation for which the SVG template is
optimized, with valid values being portrait and landscape. This
property is OPTIONAL.
* color_scheme: The color scheme for which the SVG template is
optimized, with valid values being light and dark. This property
is OPTIONAL.
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* contrast: The contrast for which the SVG template is optimized,
with valid values being normal and high. This property is
OPTIONAL.
7.1.2.2. SVG Rendering
A consuming application MUST preprocess the SVG template by replacing
placeholders in the SVG template with properly escaped values of the
claims in the credential. The placeholders MUST be defined in the
SVG template using the syntax {{svg_id}}, where svg_id is an
identifier defined in the claim metadata as described in Section 8.
Placeholders MUST only be used in the text content of the SVG
template and MUST NOT be used in any other part of the SVG template,
e.g., in attributes or comments.
A consuming application MUST ensure that all special characters in
the claim values are properly escaped before inserting them into the
SVG template. At least the following characters MUST be escaped:
* & as &
* < as <
* > as >
* " as "
* ' as '
If the svg_id is not present in the claim metadata, the consuming
application SHOULD reject and not render the SVG template. If the
svg_id is present in the claim metadata, but the claim is not present
in the credential, the placeholder MUST be replaced with an empty
string or a string appropriate to indicate that the value is absent.
The non-normative example below in Figure 17 shows a minimal SVG with
one placeholder using the svg_id value address_street_address which
is defined in the example in Appendix B.2.
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
<text x="10" y="20">Street address: {{address_street_address}}</text>
</svg>
Figure 17: Example SVG Template with Placeholder
When rendering the SVG template, the consuming application MUST
ensure that malicious metadata providers or issuers cannot inject
executable code into the SVG template and thereby compromise the
security of the consuming application. The consuming application
MUST NOT execute any code in the SVG template. If code execution
cannot be prevented reliably, the SVG display MUST be sandboxed.
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Furthermore, consuming applications MUST ensure that references to
external resources (images, etc.) from within the SVG cannot be used
to track users or the usage of credentials.
7.2. Extending Display Metadata
When an SD-JWT VC type extends another type as described in
Section 5.4, the display metadata remains valid for the inheriting
type unless that type defines its own display property, in which case
the original display metadata is ignored.
Note that this does not affect the display properties in the claim
metadata. Rules for these are defined in Section 8.5.
8. Claim Metadata
The claims property is an array of objects containing information
about particular claims for displaying and validating the claims.
The array MAY contain an object for each claim that is supported by
the type. Each object contains the following properties:
* path: An array indicating the claim or claims that are being
addressed, as described below. This property is REQUIRED.
* display: An array containing display information for the claim or
claims that are being addressed, as described in Section 8.2.
This property is OPTIONAL.
* mandatory: A boolean indicating that the claim must be present in
the issued credential. This property is OPTIONAL. If omitted,
the default value is false. See Section 8.3 for details.
* sd: A string indicating whether the claim is selectively
disclosable, as described in Section 8.4. This property is
OPTIONAL.
* svg_id: A string defining the ID of the claim for reference in the
SVG template, as described in Section 7.1.2.2. The ID MUST be
unique within the type metadata. It MUST consist of only
alphanumeric characters and underscores and MUST NOT start with a
digit. This property is OPTIONAL.
8.1. Claim Path
The path property MUST be a non-empty array of strings, null values,
or non-negative integers. It is used to select a particular claim in
the credential or a set of claims. A string indicates that the
respective key is to be selected, a null value indicates that all
elements of the currently selected array(s) are to be selected, and a
non-negative integer indicates that the respective index in an array
is to be selected.
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8.1.1. Example
Figure 18 shows a non-normative, reduced example of a credential.
{
"vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"name": "Arthur Dent",
"address": {
"street_address": "42 Market Street",
"city": "Milliways",
"postal_code": "12345"
},
"degrees": [
{
"type": "Bachelor of Science",
"university": "University of Betelgeuse"
},
{
"type": "Master of Science",
"university": "University of Betelgeuse"
}
],
"nationalities": ["British", "Betelgeusian"]
}
Figure 18: Example Credential for Claim Path
The following shows examples of path values and the respective
selected claims in the credential above:
* ["name"]: The claim name with the value Arthur Dent is selected.
* ["address"]: The claim address with its sub-claims as the value is
selected.
* ["address", "street_address"]: The claim street_address with the
value 42 Market Street is selected.
* ["degrees", null, "type"]: All type claims in the degrees array
are selected.
The example in Appendix B.2 shows how the path can be used to address
arrays and their elements.
8.1.2. Processing of path
In detail, the array components of path are processed from left to
right as follows:
1. Select the root element of the credential, i.e., the top-level
JSON object.
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2. Process the path components from left to right:
1. If the path component is a string, select the element in the
respective key in the currently selected element(s). If any
of the currently selected element(s) is not an object, abort
processing and return an error. If the key does not exist in
any element currently selected, remove that element from the
selection.
2. If the path component is null, select all elements of the
currently selected array(s). If any of the currently
selected element(s) is not an array, abort processing and
return an error.
3. If the path component is a non-negative integer, select the
element at the respective index in the currently selected
array(s). If any of the currently selected element(s) is not
an array, abort processing and return an error. If the index
does not exist in a selected array, remove that array from
the selection.
4. If the set of elements currently selected is empty, abort
processing and return an error.
The result of the processing is the set of elements to which the
respective claim metadata applies.
The path property MUST point to the respective claim as if all
selectively disclosable claims were disclosed to a Verifier. That
means that a consuming application which does not have access to all
disclosures may not be able to identify the claim which is being
addressed.
Note: This specification intentionally does not use JSON Pointer
[RFC6901] for selecting claims, as JSON Pointer requires string
parsing and does not support wildcard selection of array elements.
It does not use JSON Path [RFC9535] as that introduces a considerable
complexity and brings in many features which are not needed for the
use case of selecting claims in a credential. There are also
security concerns with some implementations.
8.2. Claim Display Metadata
The display property is an array containing display information for
the claim. The array MUST contain an object for each locale that is
supported by the type. The consuming application MUST use the
language tag it considers most appropriate for the user.
The objects in the array have the following properties:
* locale: A language tag as defined in Section 2 of [RFC5646]. This
property is REQUIRED.
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* label: A human-readable label for the claim, intended for end
users. This property is REQUIRED.
* description: A human-readable description for the claim, intended
for end users. This property is OPTIONAL.
See Figure 29 in Appendix B.2 for an example that includes claim
display metadata.
8.3. Claim Mandatory Metadata
The mandatory property is a boolean indicating that, if set to true,
the claim MUST be included in the credential by the Issuer. If the
value is false or omitted, the claim is considered optional for the
Issuer to include. A claim that is mandatory can nonetheless be
selectively disclosable, as described in Section 8.4.
8.4. Claim Selective Disclosure Metadata
The sd property is a string indicating whether the claim is
selectively disclosable. The following values are defined:
* always: The Issuer MUST make the claim selectively disclosable.
* allowed: The Issuer MAY make the claim selectively disclosable.
* never: The Issuer MUST NOT make the claim selectively disclosable.
If omitted, the default value is allowed. It is RECOMMENDED to use
either always or never to avoid ambiguity.
See Figure 29 in Appendix B.2 for an example that includes claim
selective disclosure metadata.
8.5. Extending Claim Metadata
When an SD-JWT VC type extends another type as described in
Section 5.4, all claim metadata from the extended type MUST be
respected and are inherited by the child type unless it is overridden
by the child type as defined in the following.
If the child type defines claim metadata with the same path as in the
extended type, the child type's properties are combined with those of
the extended type, with the child type's properties taking
precedence. Limitations to this rule are defined for sd and
mandatory in Section 8.5.1.
The contents of properties are never merged (e.g., if the base
display property contains two locale objects and the extending type
contains one, the resulting display property will contain only the
one object defined for the child type).
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Note: The rule for overriding claim metadata is different from the
one for display metadata described in Section 7.2. This ensures that
Consumers can rely on the claim metadata defined in the extended type
while still allowing display customization for the visual
representation of the credential.
8.5.1. Limitations for sd and mandatory
An extending type can specify an sd property for a claim that is
marked as allowed in the extended type (or where sd was omitted),
changing it to either always or never. However, it MUST NOT change a
claim that is marked as always or never in the extended type to a
different value.
Similarly, an extending type can set the mandatory property of a
claim that is optional in the extended type to true, but it MUST NOT
change a claim that is mandatory in the extended type to false.
8.5.2. Example for Extending Type Metadata
The base type metadata document for this example is shown in
Figure 19.
{
"vct": "https://example.com/base-type-metadata",
"claims": [
{
"path": ["name"],
"display": [{"label": "Full Name", "locale": "en"}]
},
{
"path": ["address", "city"],
"display": [{"label": "City", "locale": "en"}]
}
]
}
Figure 19: Example Base Type Metadata Document
The extending type metadata document is shown in Figure 20.
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{
"vct": "https://example.com/custom-type-metadata",
"extends": "https://example.com/base-type-metadata",
"claims": [
{
"path": ["address", "city"],
"display": [{"label": "Town", "locale": "en"}]
},
{
"path": ["nationalities"],
"display": [{"label": "Nationalities", "locale": "en"}]
}
]
}
Figure 20: Example Child Type Metadata Document
In this example, the child type inherits the name claim metadata from
the base type, but overrides the address.city claim metadata with its
own definition. It also adds a new claim metadata for nationalities.
The final effective claim metadata for the child type is shown here
in Figure 21:
{
"claims": [
{
"path": ["name"],
"display": [{"label": "Full Name", "locale": "en"}]
},
{
"path": ["address", "city"],
"display": [{"label": "Town", "locale": "en"}]
},
{
"path": ["nationalities"],
"display": [{"label": "Nationalities", "locale": "en"}]
}
]
}
Figure 21: Effective Claim Metadata for Child Type
9. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations in the SD-JWT specification [RFC9901]
apply to this specification. Additionally, the following security
considerations need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs:
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9.1. Server-Side Request Forgery
The JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration is retrieved from the JWT VC
Issuer by the Holder or Verifier. Similar to other metadata
endpoints, the URL for the retrieval MUST be considered an untrusted
value and could be a vector for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
attacks.
Before making a request to the JWT VC Issuer Metadata endpoint, the
Holder or Verifier MUST validate the URL to ensure that it is a valid
HTTPS URL and that it does not point to internal resources. This
requires, in particular, ensuring that the host part of the URL does
not address an internal service (by IP address or an internal host
name) and that, if an external DNS name is used, the resolved DNS
name does not point to an internal IPv4 or IPv6 address.
When retrieving the metadata, the Holder or Verifier MUST ensure that
the request is made in a time-bound and size-bound manner to prevent
denial of service attacks. The Holder or Verifier MUST also ensure
that the response is a valid JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration
document before processing it.
Additional considerations can be found in [OWASP_SSRF].
9.2. Ecosystem-specific Public Key Verification Methods
When defining ecosystem-specific rules for resolution and
verification of the public key, as outlined in Section 3.5, it is
critical that those rules maintain the integrity of the relationship
between the iss value of the SD-JWT, if present, and the public keys
of the Issuer.
A Verifier MUST ensure that for any given iss value, an attacker
cannot influence the type of verification process used. Otherwise,
an attacker could attempt to make the Verifier use a verification
process not intended by the Issuer, allowing the attacker to
potentially manipulate the verification result to their advantage.
9.3. Circular "extends" Dependencies of Types
A type MUST NOT extend another type that extends (either directly or
with steps in-between) the first type. This would result in a
circular dependency that could lead to infinite recursion when
retrieving and processing the metadata.
Consumers MUST detect such circular dependencies and reject the
credential.
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9.4. Robust Retrieval of Type Metadata
In Section 5.3, various methods for distributing and retrieving
metadata are described. Methods relying on a network connection may
fail due to network issues or unavailability of a network connection
due to offline usage of credentials, temporary server outages, or
denial-of-service attacks on the metadata server.
Consumers SHOULD therefore implement a local cache as described in
Section 5.3.4 if possible. Such a cache MAY be populated with
metadata before the credential is used.
These measures allow the Consumers to continue to function even if
the metadata server is temporarily unavailable and avoid privacy
issues as described in Section 10.4.
9.5. Risks Associated with Textual Information
Some claims in the SD-JWT VC and properties in the Type Metadata,
e.g., display, allows issuers and providers of metadata to specify
human-readable information. These can contain arbitrary textual
information that may be displayed to end users and developers. As
such, any consuming application MUST ensure that maliciously crafted
information cannot be used to compromise the security of the
application or the privacy of the user. To this end, the following
considerations apply:
* The consuming application MUST ensure that the text is properly
escaped before displaying it to the user or transferring it into
other contexts. For example, if the data is displayed in an HTML
document, the text MUST be properly escaped to prevent Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) attacks.
* The consuming application MUST ensure that the display of the user
interface elements cannot be distorted by overly long text or
special characters.
9.6. Credential Type Extension and Issuer Authorization
When processing credentials, it is important to recognize that the
ability to extend or reference an existing credential type (e.g., a
well-known identifier such as urn:ec.eu.x.y.z) does not confer any
implicit authorization to issue credentials of that type or its
extensions. In particular:
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* *Issuer Authorization*: Verifiers and Holders MUST NOT assume that
any issuer who issues a credential extending a known type is
authorized to do so. The mere presence of an extension or
reference to a recognized type (e.g., a national type urn:de.bla
extending a European PID type) does not validate the issuer's
authority.
* *Rogue Issuers*: Attackers may issue credentials with types that
extend or mimic legitimate types (e.g., urn:attacker extending
urn:ec.eu.x.y.z). Such credentials MUST NOT be accepted solely
based on their type hierarchy or extension relationship.
* *Processing Rules*: Implementations MUST verify the issuer's
authorization independently of the credential type or its
extensions. This typically involves checking the issuer's
identity, trust status, and any relevant accreditation or registry
before accepting a credential.
Verifiers and Holders MUST implement explicit checks for issuer
authorization and MUST NOT rely on type extension as a proxy for
trust or legitimacy. Credential acceptance decisions MUST be based
on both the credential type and the verified authority of the issuer.
9.7. Trust in Type Metadata
Type Metadata associated with an SD-JWT VC, e.g., rendering metadata,
is asserted by the Publisher of the Type Metadata and trust in this
metadata depends on the trust relationship between its Publisher and
the Consumer. A Consumer MUST NOT assume that Type Metadata is
accurate or meaningful unless the Publisher is recognized as
authoritative for the type in question.
Ecosystems SHOULD define governance or accreditation mechanisms that
specify which Publishers are authorized to provide Type Metadata for
specific verifiable digital credential types and under what
conditions such metadata can be relied upon.
Consumers SHOULD treat with reduced trust any Type Metadata if the
Publisher is not accredited or otherwise trusted within the
applicable ecosystem.
9.8. Use of Data URIs for Claim Types
The use of data URIs allows embedding of data directly within
credential payloads. Implementations SHOULD treat data URIs as
untrusted input at the processing and rendering layer and apply
appropriate validation and handling. Failure to properly escape,
sanitize or constrain their use can lead to security issues such as
unintended code execution, resource exhaustion, or misuse of embedded
content. Implementations SHOULD restrict the set of accepted media
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types, enforce reasonable size and content limits, and avoid
dereferencing or interpreting data URIs in ways that could execute or
render active content, consistent with their overall security model.
10. Privacy Considerations
The Privacy Considerations in the SD-JWT specification [RFC9901]
apply to this specification. Additionally, the following privacy
considerations need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs.
10.1. Unlinkability
The Privacy Considerations in Section 10.1 of [RFC9901] apply,
especially to the cnf claim.
10.2. Verifiable Digital Credential Type Identifier
Issuers and Holders have to be aware that while this specification
supports selective disclosure of claims of a given SD-JWT VC, the vct
claim is not selectively disclosable. In certain situations this
could lead to unwanted leakage of additional context information.
In general, Issuers are advised to choose vct values following data
minimization principles. For example, government Issuers issuing an
SD-JWT VC to their citizens to enable them to prove their age, might
consider using a vct value that does not allow third-parties to infer
additional personal information about the Holder, e.g., country of
residency or citizenship.
Additionally, Holders have to be informed that, besides the actual
requested claims, the vct information is shared with the Verifier.
10.3. Issuer Phone-Home
A malicious Issuer can choose the Issuer identifier of the SD-JWT VC
to enable tracking the usage behavior of the Holder if the Issuer
identifier is Holder-specific and if the resolution of the key
material to verify the Issuer-signed JWT requires the Verifier to
phone home to the Issuer.
For example, a malicious Issuer could generate a unique value for the
Issuer identifier per Holder, e.g., https://example.com/issuer/
holder-1234 and host the JWT VC Issuer Metadata. The Verifier would
create an HTTP GET request to the Holder-specific well-known URI when
the SD-JWT VC is verified. This would allow the malicious Issuer to
keep track where and how often the SD-JWT VC was used.
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Verifiers are advised to establish trust in an SD-JWT VC by pinning
specific Issuer identifiers and should monitor suspicious behavior
such as frequent rotation of those identifiers. If such behavior is
detected, Verifiers are advised to reject SD-JWT VCs issued by those
Issuers and not to retrieve associated metadata. Holders are
similarly advised to exercise caution with SD-JWT VCs if they contain
unexpected or easily correlatable information in the Issuer
identifier.
Another related concern arises from the use of confirmation methods
in the cnf claim that involve retrieving key material from a remote
source, especially if that source is controlled by the issuer. This
includes, but is not limited to, the use of the x5u parameter in JWKs
(Section 4.6 of [RFC7517]), the jku parameter (Section 3.5 of
[RFC7800]), and cases where a URL is used in the kid parameter
(Section 3.4 of [RFC7800]). Future confirmation methods may also
introduce remote retrieval mechanisms. Issuers are advised not to
issue SD-JWT VCs with such cnf methods, and Verifiers and Holders are
advised not to follow or resolve remote references for key material
in the cnf claim. Only confirmation methods that do not require
remote retrieval of key material SHOULD be supported.
10.4. Privacy-Preserving Retrieval of Type Metadata
In Section 5.3, various methods for distributing and retrieving Type
Metadata are described. For methods which rely on a network
connection to a URL (e.g., provided by an Issuer), the Issuer and
other third parties may be able to track the usage of a credential by
observing requests to the Type Metadata URL.
Consumers SHOULD prefer methods for retrieving Type Metadata that do
not leak information about the usage of a credential to third
parties. The recommendations in Section 9.4 apply.
11. Relationships to Other Documents
This specification defines validation and processing rules for
Verifiable Digital Credentials using JSON payloads and secured by SD-
JWT [RFC9901]. Other specifications exist that define their own
verifiable credential formats; for example, W3C Verifiable Credential
Data Model (VCDM) 2.0 [W3C.VCDM] defines a data model for verifiable
credentials encoded as JSON-LD, and ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021
[ISO.18013-5] defines a representation of digital credentials with
selective disclosure in the mobile document (mdoc) format encoded as
CBOR and secured using COSE while [I-D.ietf-spice-sd-cwt] also
defines a representation of digital credentials with selective
disclosure encoded as CBOR and secured using COSE. This
specification does not utilize the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data
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Model v1.0, v1.1, or v2.0. It also does not utilize CBOR or COSE.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list]
Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status
List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
oauth-status-list-17, 30 January 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
status-list-17>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.
[RFC9901] Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens", RFC 9901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9901>.
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[W3C.CSS-COLOR]
Çelik, T., Lilley, C., and L. D. Baron, "CSS Color Module
Level 3", 18 January 2022,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/css-color-3>.
[W3C.SRI] Akhawe, D., Braun, F., Marier, F., and J. Weinberger,
"Subresource Integrity", 23 June 2016,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/REC-SRI-20160623/>.
12.2. Informative References
[EUDIW.ARF]
Commission, E., "The European Digital Identity Wallet
Architecture and Reference Framework",
<https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-
architecture-and-reference-framework/releases>.
[I-D.ietf-spice-sd-cwt]
Prorock, M., Steele, O., Birkholz, H., and R. Mahy,
"Selective Disclosure CBOR Web Tokens (SD-CWT)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-spice-sd-cwt-06, 13
January 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-spice-sd-cwt-06>.
[IANA.well-known]
IANA, "Well-Known URIs",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris>.
[ISO.18013-5]
ISO/IEC, "ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021", 1 September 2024,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/69084.html>.
[NIST-BLOG.VDCE]
Fisher, B. and R. Galluzzo, "Digital Identities: Getting
to Know the Verifiable Digital Credential Ecosystem", 13
November 2024, <https://www.nist.gov/blogs/cybersecurity-
insights/digital-identities-getting-know-verifiable-
digital-credential-ecosystem>.
[OWASP_SSRF]
OWASP, "Server Side Request Forgery Prevention Cheat
Sheet", <https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/
Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html/>.
[RFC2397] Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2397, August 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2397>.
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[RFC6901] Bryan, P., Ed., Zyp, K., and M. Nottingham, Ed.,
"JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Pointer", RFC 6901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6901, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6901>.
[RFC9535] Gössner, S., Ed., Normington, G., Ed., and C. Bormann,
Ed., "JSONPath: Query Expressions for JSON", RFC 9535,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9535, February 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9535>.
[W3C.VCDM] Sporny, M., Longley, D., Chadwick, D., and O. Steele,
"Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0", 10 February
2024, <https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/>.
Appendix A. IANA Considerations
A.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
* Claim Name: "vct"
* Claim Description: Verifiable digital Credential Type identifier
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 3.2.2.1 of this
specification ]]
* Claim Name: "vct#integrity"
* Claim Description: SD-JWT VC vct claim "integrity metadata" value
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 6 of this specification ]]
A.2. Media Types Registry
A.2.1. application/dc+sd-jwt
The Internet media type for an SD-JWT VC is application/dc+sd-jwt.
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: dc+sd-jwt
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: 8-bit code points; SD-JWT VC values are
encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may
be the empty string) separated by period ('.') and tilde ('~')
characters.
* Security considerations: See Security Considerations in Section 9.
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: [[ this specification ]]
* Applications that use this media type: Applications that issue,
present, and verify SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credentials.
* Additional information:
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- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: Oliver
Terbu oliver.terbu@mattr.global (mailto:oliver.terbu@mattr.global)
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Oliver Terbu oliver.terbu@mattr.global
(mailto:oliver.terbu@mattr.global)
* Change controller: IETF
A.3. Well-Known URI Registry
This specification requests the well-known URI defined in Section 4
in the IANA "Well-Known URIs" registry [IANA.well-known] established
by [RFC5785].
A.3.1. Registry Contents
* URI suffix: jwt-vc-issuer
* Change controller: IETF
* Specification document: [[ Section 4 of this specification ]]
* Related information: (none)
* Status: permanent
Appendix B. Examples
Important: The following examples are not normative and provided for
illustrative purposes only. In particular, neither the structure of
the claims nor the selection of selectively disclosable claims are
normative.
Line breaks have been added for readability.
B.1. Example Person Identification Data (PID) Credential
This example shows how the artifacts defined in this specification
could be used to represent the identity information of a person from
a fictional European country. It leans on the concept of Person
Identification Data (PID) as defined in the "PID Rulebook" in
[EUDIW.ARF], but does not intend to fully comply with that
specification.
Key Binding is applied using the Holder's public key passed in a cnf
claim in the SD-JWT.
The information in Figure 22 about the citizen comprises the input
data used by the Issuer:
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{
"iss": "https://pid-issuer.aendgard.example",
"vct": "urn:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
"given_name": "Astrid",
"family_name": "Holmgren",
"birthdate": "1978-04-10",
"address": {
"street_address": "Sjøgata 12",
"locality": "Viken",
"postal_code": "12001",
"country": "Kingdom of Ændgard"
},
"nationalities": [
"Ændgard"
],
"sex": 2,
"birth_family_name": "Jensen",
"place_of_birth": {
"locality": "Ændholm",
"country": "Kingdom of Ændgard"
},
"age_equal_or_over": {
"12": true,
"14": true,
"16": true,
"18": true,
"21": true,
"65": false
},
"age_in_years": 47,
"age_birth_year": 1978,
"portrait": "
WAQMAAACSfKx9AAAAAXNSR0IB2cksfwAAAARnQU1BAACxjwv8YQUAAAAgY0hSTQA
AeiYAAICEAAD6AAAAgOgAAHUwAADqYAAAOpgAABdwnLpRPAAAAAZQTFRFAAAA///
/pdmf3QAAAFFJREFUCNdNylENgDAQA9ASBJyEWcDBLE0CTpDCpCDhPvexrBwlC/y
8NG3RMunw9Ai5p6/pr/ZzlcAi4WiRN1nlXAesOgheBTSO8JDnND6Z3W+d90fCnTj
jKQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==",
"issuance_date": "2024-01-15",
"expiry_date": "2034-01-15",
"issuing_authority": "Kingdom of Ændgard, Ministry of Interior",
"issuing_country": "ÆG"
}
Figure 22: Citizen's Information
The following in Figure 23 is the issued SD-JWT:
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjJyMDA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.UZ7ib-w0XNmkluwXA_QzkHq2gp_SyOxFtmUICxQkJOL
2UbYiXpMmBNN1Ei22do9w36ej2PRyIz9WMDOXHN2v1w~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2Zy
eU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiQXN0cmlkIl0~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZ
bnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkhvbG1ncmVuIl0~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBH
Ym9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTc4LTA0LTEwIl0~WyJlSThaV205UW5L
UHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwgIlNqXHUwMGY4Z2F0YSAxMiJd
~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlZpa2VuIl0~WyJ
BSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIiwgIjEyMDAxIl0~WyJ
QYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2RvbSBvZiBcdTA
wYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7
Il9zZCI6IFsiNjBCM0N3cTA0aGxQQndzdnNmdks5SlV4dnVMRlViSlFmZ1BCYk9fSDly
TSIsICI4eWpQUjNyOGRPNUhXTG55MWdCZU1KVFBSZ2tCY2h1cTQzcUg4V2xfZjFjIiwg
Ik5hcmQ3NHcyTl85YW5WRW1TbGVjRUpscXgzanhiY3F4dlZ6QnNCRFgweHMiLCAiVS16
RDFESS03WjB6WW94WHF5NUhTVE5VZWdhaFJDSHlkQWVzS09fc0VQYyJdfV0~WyJsa2x4
RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBbIlx1MDBjNm5kZ2Fy
ZCJdXQ~WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgInNleCIsIDJd~WyI1YlBzMUlx
dVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkplbnNlbiJd~WyI
1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlx1MDBjNm5kaG9sbSJ
d~WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2RvbSBvZi
BcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ~WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgInBsYWNlX29
mX2JpcnRoIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIkpET1lLUzB3MENvZm8tSGpaR3ZyZDdIaXJwU2ZpWUR
BTFU2cjhUX0xFMWciLCAib1RacjlFbXk5eG1ycGNmUTVaU1U4c3Z4ZE1ZOHk0WElGXzV
qOVAxdTF5QSJdfV0~WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgIjEyIiwgdHJ1ZV0
~WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJIM28xdXN3UDc
2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFp
BIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5ckRUM3hBIiwgIjIxIiwgdHJ
1ZV0~WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd~WyJlSzVvNX
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BIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgImFnZV9lcXVhbF9vcl9vdmVyIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIj
F0RWl5elBSWU9Lc2Y3U3NZR01nUFpLc09UMWxRWlJ4SFhBMHI1X0J3a2siLCAiQ1ZLbm
x5NVA5MHlKczNFd3R4UWlPdFVjemFYQ1lOQTRJY3pSYW9ock1EZyIsICJhNDQtZzJHcj
hfM0FtSncyWFo4a0kxeTBRel96ZTlpT2NXMlczUkxwWEdnIiwgImdrdnkwRnV2QkJ2aj
BoczJaTnd4Y3FPbGY4bXUyLWtDRTctTmIyUXh1QlUiLCAiaHJZNEhubUY1YjVKd0M5ZV
R6YUZDVWNlSVFBYUlkaHJxVVhRTkNXYmZaSSIsICJ5NlNGclZGUnlxNTBJYlJKdmlUWn
FxalFXejB0TGl1Q21NZU8wS3FhekdJIl19XQ~WyJqN0FEZGIwVVZiMExpMGNpUGNQMGV
3IiwgImFnZV9pbl95ZWFycyIsIDQ3XQ~WyJXcHhKckZ1WDh1U2kycDRodDA5anZ3Iiwg
ImFnZV9iaXJ0aF95ZWFyIiwgMTk3OF0~WyJhdFNtRkFDWU1iSlZLRDA1bzNKZ3RRIiwg
InBvcnRyYWl0IiwgImRhdGE6aW1hZ2UvcG5nO2Jhc2U2NCxpVkJPUncwS0dnb0FBQUFO
U1VoRVVnQUFBQ1FBQUFBV0FRTUFBQUNTZkt4OUFBQUFBWE5TUjBJQjJja3Nmd0FBQUFS
blFVMUJBQUN4and2OFlRVUFBQUFnWTBoU1RRQUFlaVlBQUlDRUFBRDZBQUFBZ09nQUFI
VXdBQURxWUFBQU9wZ0FBQmR3bkxwUlBBQUFBQVpRVEZSRkFBQUEvLy8vcGRtZjNRQUFB
RkZKUkVGVUNOZE55bEVOZ0RBUUE5QVNCSnlFV2NEQkxFMENUcERDcENEaFB2ZXhyQnds
Qy95OE5HM1JNdW53OUFpNXA2L3ByL1p6bGNBaTRXaVJOMW5sWEFlc09naGVCVFNPOEpE
bk5ENlozVytkOTBmQ25UampLUUFBQUFCSlJVNUVya0pnZ2c9PSJd~WyI0S3lSMzJvSVp
0LXprV3ZGcWJVTEtnIiwgImlzc3VhbmNlX2RhdGUiLCAiMjAyNC0wMS0xNSJd~WyJjaE
JDc3loeWgtSjg2SS1hd1FEaUNRIiwgImV4cGlyeV9kYXRlIiwgIjIwMzQtMDEtMTUiXQ
~WyJmbE5QMW5jTXo5TGctYzlxTUl6XzlnIiwgImlzc3VpbmdfYXV0aG9yaXR5IiwgIkt
pbmdkb20gb2YgXHUwMGM2bmRnYXJkLCBNaW5pc3RyeSBvZiBJbnRlcmlvciJd~WyJvdm
9WMXJraF9BTm04NjFxVUFBMkF3IiwgImlzc3VpbmdfY291bnRyeSIsICJcdTAwYzZHIl
0~
Figure 23: Issued SD-JWT
Figure 24 is the payload of that SD-JWT:
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{
"_sd": [
"2r009dzvHuVrWrRXT5kJMmHnqEHHnWe0MLVZw8PATB8",
"3NdDJYRwBqaEIyXCHcn4a5YKJagPgIP0Wkg9AorgAKg",
"5fn6IiXjUPmGQ4mYHxDdt6EjvBQ7gRvGcdEnSCEN8Ek",
"6BzMBk7FGivogbldO75f3NLwjFliCqb7nn1GhgCokrQ",
"90CT8AaBPbn5X8nRXkesju1i0BqhWqZ3wqD4jF-qDGk",
"9nEwUrdeZ6kcRbEj52QH3nOR-oie0_p9tMNIAEuFvMU",
"HTh6Zr2J8aiqpa963cLkuKeQDf9O00FzOHhyjGpVfTg",
"JCp2K2NhH-LE5L0j7ME0LNx-T-px9QFtamSsxmCUCxU",
"LoMGrhlDm_bUWUX1gdhRxTsy4d4zywGzlSVocRSY01M",
"UgUjq5whzQewO59fVNj0f0mqyV8YPXU54sp4kLecwQk",
"Y0H-E3hzKEUnAyri_x9tT9k-j4i65ao9hkeEHNexosI",
"ezCAmaTwI2nPj_1IiB3KZfiEORLeRwhZsMMDMZIJ8kA",
"i0H_-WAHwfEjt8tqQH74uOCWvquY3FwuX-kx4e2RJH8",
"r1GrH46yDV62sezImEjxa6cJSZMT212jrOSHiec9ytM",
"rVj3RLs7K8zdNy7zXz1Cr39Y6rog8ulNozk4F7NCuC0",
"t5kp0HfxMS1eHNCGRzrK9Gi5oTZreg5Ue9lLQIuLvB4"
],
"iss": "https://pid-issuer.aendgard.example",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "urn:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
"_sd_alg": "sha-256",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
}
}
Figure 24: SD-JWT Payload
The digests in the SD-JWT payload reference the following
Disclosures:
*Claim given_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 3NdDJYRwBqaEIyXCHcn4a5YKJagPgIP0Wkg9AorgAKg
* Disclosure:
WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiQXN0
cmlkIl0
* Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "Astrid"]
*Claim family_name*:
Terbu, et al. Expires 9 August 2026 [Page 47]
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* SHA-256 Hash: JCp2K2NhH-LE5L0j7ME0LNx-T-px9QFtamSsxmCUCxU
* Disclosure:
WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkhv
bG1ncmVuIl0
* Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Holmgren"]
*Claim birthdate*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 5fn6IiXjUPmGQ4mYHxDdt6EjvBQ7gRvGcdEnSCEN8Ek
* Disclosure:
WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTc4
LTA0LTEwIl0
* Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "birthdate", "1978-04-10"]
*Claim street_address*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 8yjPR3r8dO5HWLny1gBeMJTPRgkBchuq43qH8Wl_f1c
* Disclosure:
WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwg
IlNqXHUwMGY4Z2F0YSAxMiJd
* Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "street_address",
"Sj\u00f8gata
12"]
*Claim locality*:
* SHA-256 Hash: Nard74w2N_9anVEmSlecEJlqx3jxbcqxvVzBsBDX0xs
* Disclosure:
WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlZpa2Vu
Il0
* Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "locality", "Viken"]
*Claim postal_code*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 60B3Cwq04hlPBwsvsfvK9JUxvuLFUbJQfgPBbO_H9rM
* Disclosure:
WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIiwgIjEy
MDAxIl0
* Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "postal_code", "12001"]
*Claim country*:
* SHA-256 Hash: U-zD1DI-7Z0zYoxXqy5HSTNUegahRCHydAesKO_sEPc
* Disclosure:
WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2Rv
bSBvZiBcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ
* Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "country", "Kingdom of
\u00c6ndgard"]
Terbu, et al. Expires 9 August 2026 [Page 48]
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*Claim address*:
* SHA-256 Hash: i0H_-WAHwfEjt8tqQH74uOCWvquY3FwuX-kx4e2RJH8
* Disclosure:
WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7Il9zZCI6
IFsiNjBCM0N3cTA0aGxQQndzdnNmdks5SlV4dnVMRlViSlFmZ1BCYk9fSDly
TSIsICI4eWpQUjNyOGRPNUhXTG55MWdCZU1KVFBSZ2tCY2h1cTQzcUg4V2xf
ZjFjIiwgIk5hcmQ3NHcyTl85YW5WRW1TbGVjRUpscXgzanhiY3F4dlZ6QnNC
RFgweHMiLCAiVS16RDFESS03WjB6WW94WHF5NUhTVE5VZWdhaFJDSHlkQWVz
S09fc0VQYyJdfV0
* Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "address", {"_sd":
["60B3Cwq04hlPBwsvsfvK9JUxvuLFUbJQfgPBbO_H9rM",
"8yjPR3r8dO5HWLny1gBeMJTPRgkBchuq43qH8Wl_f1c",
"Nard74w2N_9anVEmSlecEJlqx3jxbcqxvVzBsBDX0xs",
"U-zD1DI-7Z0zYoxXqy5HSTNUegahRCHydAesKO_sEPc"]}]
*Claim nationalities*:
* SHA-256 Hash: HTh6Zr2J8aiqpa963cLkuKeQDf9O00FzOHhyjGpVfTg
* Disclosure:
WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBb
Ilx1MDBjNm5kZ2FyZCJdXQ
* Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "nationalities",
["\u00c6ndgard"]]
*Claim sex*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 90CT8AaBPbn5X8nRXkesju1i0BqhWqZ3wqD4jF-qDGk
* Disclosure:
WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgInNleCIsIDJd
* Contents: ["nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA", "sex", 2]
*Claim birth_family_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: t5kp0HfxMS1eHNCGRzrK9Gi5oTZreg5Ue9lLQIuLvB4
* Disclosure:
WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1l
IiwgIkplbnNlbiJd
* Contents: ["5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw", "birth_family_name",
"Jensen"]
*Claim locality*:
* SHA-256 Hash: JDOYKS0w0Cofo-HjZGvrd7HirpSfiYDALU6r8T_LE1g
* Disclosure:
WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlx1MDBj
Nm5kaG9sbSJd
* Contents: ["5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w", "locality", "\u00c6ndholm"]
Terbu, et al. Expires 9 August 2026 [Page 49]
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*Claim country*:
* SHA-256 Hash: oTZr9Emy9xmrpcfQ5ZSU8svxdMY8y4XIF_5j9P1u1yA
* Disclosure:
WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2Rv
bSBvZiBcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ
* Contents: ["y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ", "country", "Kingdom of
\u00c6ndgard"]
*Claim place_of_birth*:
* SHA-256 Hash: r1GrH46yDV62sezImEjxa6cJSZMT212jrOSHiec9ytM
* Disclosure:
WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgInBsYWNlX29mX2JpcnRoIiwg
eyJfc2QiOiBbIkpET1lLUzB3MENvZm8tSGpaR3ZyZDdIaXJwU2ZpWURBTFU2
cjhUX0xFMWciLCAib1RacjlFbXk5eG1ycGNmUTVaU1U4c3Z4ZE1ZOHk0WElG
XzVqOVAxdTF5QSJdfV0
* Contents: ["HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqyOA", "place_of_birth", {"_sd":
["JDOYKS0w0Cofo-HjZGvrd7HirpSfiYDALU6r8T_LE1g",
"oTZr9Emy9xmrpcfQ5ZSU8svxdMY8y4XIF_5j9P1u1yA"]}]
*Claim 12*:
* SHA-256 Hash: gkvy0FuvBBvj0hs2ZNwxcqOlf8mu2-kCE7-Nb2QxuBU
* Disclosure:
WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgIjEyIiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A", "12", true]
*Claim 14*:
* SHA-256 Hash: y6SFrVFRyq50IbRJviTZqqjQWz0tLiuCmMeO0KqazGI
* Disclosure:
WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["kx5kF17V-x0JmwUx9vgvtw", "14", true]
*Claim 16*:
* SHA-256 Hash: hrY4HnmF5b5JwC9eTzaFCUceIQAaIdhrqUXQNCWbfZI
* Disclosure:
WyJIM28xdXN3UDc2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ", "16", true]
*Claim 18*:
* SHA-256 Hash: CVKnly5P90yJs3EwtxQiOtUczaXCYNA4IczRaohrMDg
* Disclosure:
WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["OBKlTVlvLg-AdwqYGbP8ZA", "18", true]
Terbu, et al. Expires 9 August 2026 [Page 50]
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*Claim 21*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 1tEiyzPRYOKsf7SsYGMgPZKsOT1lQZRxHXA0r5_Bwkk
* Disclosure:
WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5ckRUM3hBIiwgIjIxIiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA", "21", true]
*Claim 65*:
* SHA-256 Hash: a44-g2Gr8_3AmJw2XZ8kI1y0Qz_ze9iOcW2W3RLpXGg
* Disclosure:
WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd
* Contents: ["DsmtKNgpV4dAHpjrcaosAw", "65", false]
*Claim age_equal_or_over*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 2r009dzvHuVrWrRXT5kJMmHnqEHHnWe0MLVZw8PATB8
* Disclosure:
WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgImFnZV9lcXVhbF9vcl9vdmVy
IiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIjF0RWl5elBSWU9Lc2Y3U3NZR01nUFpLc09UMWxRWlJ4
SFhBMHI1X0J3a2siLCAiQ1ZLbmx5NVA5MHlKczNFd3R4UWlPdFVjemFYQ1lO
QTRJY3pSYW9ock1EZyIsICJhNDQtZzJHcjhfM0FtSncyWFo4a0kxeTBRel96
ZTlpT2NXMlczUkxwWEdnIiwgImdrdnkwRnV2QkJ2ajBoczJaTnd4Y3FPbGY4
bXUyLWtDRTctTmIyUXh1QlUiLCAiaHJZNEhubUY1YjVKd0M5ZVR6YUZDVWNl
SVFBYUlkaHJxVVhRTkNXYmZaSSIsICJ5NlNGclZGUnlxNTBJYlJKdmlUWnFx
alFXejB0TGl1Q21NZU8wS3FhekdJIl19XQ
* Contents: ["eK5o5pHfgupPpltj1qhAJw", "age_equal_or_over", {"_sd":
["1tEiyzPRYOKsf7SsYGMgPZKsOT1lQZRxHXA0r5_Bwkk",
"CVKnly5P90yJs3EwtxQiOtUczaXCYNA4IczRaohrMDg",
"a44-g2Gr8_3AmJw2XZ8kI1y0Qz_ze9iOcW2W3RLpXGg",
"gkvy0FuvBBvj0hs2ZNwxcqOlf8mu2-kCE7-Nb2QxuBU",
"hrY4HnmF5b5JwC9eTzaFCUceIQAaIdhrqUXQNCWbfZI",
"y6SFrVFRyq50IbRJviTZqqjQWz0tLiuCmMeO0KqazGI"]}]
*Claim age_in_years*:
* SHA-256 Hash: LoMGrhlDm_bUWUX1gdhRxTsy4d4zywGzlSVocRSY01M
* Disclosure:
WyJqN0FEZGIwVVZiMExpMGNpUGNQMGV3IiwgImFnZV9pbl95ZWFycyIsIDQ3
XQ
* Contents: ["j7ADdb0UVb0Li0ciPcP0ew", "age_in_years", 47]
*Claim age_birth_year*:
* SHA-256 Hash: rVj3RLs7K8zdNy7zXz1Cr39Y6rog8ulNozk4F7NCuC0
* Disclosure:
WyJXcHhKckZ1WDh1U2kycDRodDA5anZ3IiwgImFnZV9iaXJ0aF95ZWFyIiwg
MTk3OF0
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* Contents: ["WpxJrFuX8uSi2p4ht09jvw", "age_birth_year", 1978]
*Claim portrait*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 9nEwUrdeZ6kcRbEj52QH3nOR-oie0_p9tMNIAEuFvMU
* Disclosure: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* Contents: ["atSmFACYMbJVKD05o3JgtQ", "portrait", "data:image/
png;base6
4,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAACQAAAAWAQMAAACSfKx9AAAAAXNSR0IB2c
ksfwAAAARnQU1BAACxjwv8YQUAAAAgY0hSTQAAeiYAAICEAAD6AAAAgOgAAH
UwAADqYAAAOpgAABdwnLpRPAAAAAZQTFRFAAAA////pdmf3QAAAFFJREFUCN
dNylENgDAQA9ASBJyEWcDBLE0CTpDCpCDhPvexrBwlC/y8NG3RMunw9Ai5p6
/pr/ZzlcAi4WiRN1nlXAesOgheBTSO8JDnND6Z3W+d90fCnTjjKQAAAABJRU
5ErkJggg=="]
*Claim issuance_date*:
* SHA-256 Hash: ezCAmaTwI2nPj_1IiB3KZfiEORLeRwhZsMMDMZIJ8kA
* Disclosure:
WyI0S3lSMzJvSVp0LXprV3ZGcWJVTEtnIiwgImlzc3VhbmNlX2RhdGUiLCAi
MjAyNC0wMS0xNSJd
* Contents: ["4KyR32oIZt-zkWvFqbULKg", "issuance_date",
"2024-01-15"]
*Claim expiry_date*:
* SHA-256 Hash: Y0H-E3hzKEUnAyri_x9tT9k-j4i65ao9hkeEHNexosI
* Disclosure:
WyJjaEJDc3loeWgtSjg2SS1hd1FEaUNRIiwgImV4cGlyeV9kYXRlIiwgIjIw
MzQtMDEtMTUiXQ
* Contents: ["chBCsyhyh-J86I-awQDiCQ", "expiry_date", "2034-01-15"]
*Claim issuing_authority*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 6BzMBk7FGivogbldO75f3NLwjFliCqb7nn1GhgCokrQ
* Disclosure:
WyJmbE5QMW5jTXo5TGctYzlxTUl6XzlnIiwgImlzc3VpbmdfYXV0aG9yaXR5
IiwgIktpbmdkb20gb2YgXHUwMGM2bmRnYXJkLCBNaW5pc3RyeSBvZiBJbnRl
cmlvciJd
Terbu, et al. Expires 9 August 2026 [Page 52]
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* Contents: ["flNP1ncMz9Lg-c9qMIz_9g", "issuing_authority", "Kingdom
of
\u00c6ndgard, Ministry of Interior"]
*Claim issuing_country*:
* SHA-256 Hash: UgUjq5whzQewO59fVNj0f0mqyV8YPXU54sp4kLecwQk
* Disclosure:
WyJvdm9WMXJraF9BTm04NjFxVUFBMkF3IiwgImlzc3VpbmdfY291bnRyeSIs
ICJcdTAwYzZHIl0
* Contents: ["ovoV1rkh_ANm861qUAA2Aw", "issuing_country", "\u00c6G"]
Figure 25 shows a presentation of the SD-JWT with a Key Binding JWT
that discloses only nationality and the fact that the person is over
18 years old:
Terbu, et al. Expires 9 August 2026 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft SD-JWT VC February 2026
eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjJyMDA
5ZHp2SHVWcldyUlhUNWtKTW1IbnFFSEhuV2UwTUxWWnc4UEFUQjgiLCAiM05kREpZUnd
CcWFFSXlYQ0hjbjRhNVlLSmFnUGdJUDBXa2c5QW9yZ0FLZyIsICI1Zm42SWlYalVQbUd
RNG1ZSHhEZHQ2RWp2QlE3Z1J2R2NkRW5TQ0VOOEVrIiwgIjZCek1CazdGR2l2b2dibGR
PNzVmM05Md2pGbGlDcWI3bm4xR2hnQ29rclEiLCAiOTBDVDhBYUJQYm41WDhuUlhrZXN
qdTFpMEJxaFdxWjN3cUQ0akYtcURHayIsICI5bkV3VXJkZVo2a2NSYkVqNTJRSDNuT1I
tb2llMF9wOXRNTklBRXVGdk1VIiwgIkhUaDZacjJKOGFpcXBhOTYzY0xrdUtlUURmOU8
wMEZ6T0hoeWpHcFZmVGciLCAiSkNwMksyTmhILUxFNUwwajdNRTBMTngtVC1weDlRRnR
hbVNzeG1DVUN4VSIsICJMb01HcmhsRG1fYlVXVVgxZ2RoUnhUc3k0ZDR6eXdHemxTVm9
jUlNZMDFNIiwgIlVnVWpxNXdoelFld081OWZWTmowZjBtcXlWOFlQWFU1NHNwNGtMZWN
3UWsiLCAiWTBILUUzaHpLRVVuQXlyaV94OXRUOWstajRpNjVhbzloa2VFSE5leG9zSSI
sICJlekNBbWFUd0kyblBqXzFJaUIzS1pmaUVPUkxlUndoWnNNTURNWklKOGtBIiwgImk
wSF8tV0FId2ZFanQ4dHFRSDc0dU9DV3ZxdVkzRnd1WC1reDRlMlJKSDgiLCAicjFHckg
0NnlEVjYyc2V6SW1FanhhNmNKU1pNVDIxMmpyT1NIaWVjOXl0TSIsICJyVmozUkxzN0s
4emROeTd6WHoxQ3IzOVk2cm9nOHVsTm96azRGN05DdUMwIiwgInQ1a3AwSGZ4TVMxZUh
OQ0dSenJLOUdpNW9UWnJlZzVVZTlsTFFJdUx2QjQiXSwgImlzcyI6ICJodHRwczovL3B
pZC1pc3N1ZXIuYWVuZGdhcmQuZXhhbXBsZSIsICJpYXQiOiAxNjgzMDAwMDAwLCAiZXh
wIjogMTg4MzAwMDAwMCwgInZjdCI6ICJ1cm46ZXVkaTpwaWQ6YWVuZGdhcmQ6MSIsICJ
fc2RfYWxnIjogInNoYS0yNTYiLCAiY25mIjogeyJqd2siOiB7Imt0eSI6ICJFQyIsICJ
jcnYiOiAiUC0yNTYiLCAieCI6ICJUQ0FFUjE5WnZ1M09IRjRqNFc0dmZTVm9ISVAxSUx
pbERsczd2Q2VHZW1jIiwgInkiOiAiWnhqaVdXYlpNUUdIVldLVlE0aGJTSWlyc1ZmdWV
jQ0U2dDRqVDlGMkhaUSJ9fX0.UZ7ib-w0XNmkluwXA_QzkHq2gp_SyOxFtmUICxQkJOL
2UbYiXpMmBNN1Ei22do9w36ej2PRyIz9WMDOXHN2v1w~WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRq
MXFoQUp3IiwgImFnZV9lcXVhbF9vcl9vdmVyIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIjF0RWl5elBSWU9L
c2Y3U3NZR01nUFpLc09UMWxRWlJ4SFhBMHI1X0J3a2siLCAiQ1ZLbmx5NVA5MHlKczNF
d3R4UWlPdFVjemFYQ1lOQTRJY3pSYW9ock1EZyIsICJhNDQtZzJHcjhfM0FtSncyWFo4
a0kxeTBRel96ZTlpT2NXMlczUkxwWEdnIiwgImdrdnkwRnV2QkJ2ajBoczJaTnd4Y3FP
bGY4bXUyLWtDRTctTmIyUXh1QlUiLCAiaHJZNEhubUY1YjVKd0M5ZVR6YUZDVWNlSVFB
YUlkaHJxVVhRTkNXYmZaSSIsICJ5NlNGclZGUnlxNTBJYlJKdmlUWnFxalFXejB0TGl1
Q21NZU8wS3FhekdJIl19XQ~WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE4Iiwgd
HJ1ZV0~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBbI
lx1MDBjNm5kZ2FyZCJdXQ~eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.e
yJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL
3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3NzAzMTQ3NjAsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogIlJEQktzMjZBO
DBkSjJZUXVBZ2R5YzFDb0ZhOHRyd3YwdjhXN3hOOC11b28ifQ.esY-kzHgNULajYMRkI
XwZYhkWn1qUe1W9EvOdIa9IqfYBQqrr9D-T0dIzoKNeDXK_MTWoNN5J3obWdDg2HEXNg
Figure 25: Presented SD-JWT+KB
Figure 26 is the payload of a corresponding Key Binding JWT:
{
"nonce": "1234567890",
"aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
"iat": 1770314760,
"sd_hash": "RDBKs26A80dJ2YQuAgdyc1CoFa8trwv0v8W7xN8-uoo"
}
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Figure 26: Key Binding JWT Payload
After validation, the Verifier will have the processed SD-JWT payload
in Figure 27 below available for further handling:
{
"iss": "https://pid-issuer.aendgard.example",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "urn:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
},
"age_equal_or_over": {
"18": true
},
"nationalities": [
"Ændgard"
]
}
Figure 27: Processed SD-JWT Payload
B.2. Example Type Metadata
The following example for Type Metadata assumes an SD-JWT VC payload
structured as follows in Figure 28:
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{
"vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"vct#integrity": "sha256-1odmyxoVQCuQx8SAym8rWHXba41fM/Iv/V1H8VHGN00=",
"name": "Zaphod Beeblebrox",
"address": {
"street_address": "42 Galaxy Way",
"city": "Betelgeuse City",
"postal_code": "12345",
"country": "Betelgeuse"
},
"degrees": [
{
"field_of_study": "Intergalactic Politics",
"date_awarded": "2020-05-15"
},
{
"field_of_study": "Space Navigation",
"date_awarded": "2018-06-20"
},
{
"field_of_study": "Quantum Mechanics",
"date_awarded": "2016-07-25"
}
]
}
Figure 28: SD-JWT VC Payload
The Type Metadata for this SD-JWT VC could be defined as follows in
Figure 29:
{
"vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"name": "Betelgeuse Education Credential - First Version",
"description": "This is our first version of the education credential. Don't panic.",
"extends": "https://galaxy.example.com/galactic-education-credential/v2",
"extends#integrity": "sha256-ilOUJsTultOwLfz7QUcFALaRa3BP/jelX1ds04kB9yU=",
"display": [
{
"locale": "en-US",
"name": "Betelgeuse Education Credential",
"description": "An education credential for all carbon-based life forms on Betelgeuse.",
"rendering": {
"simple": {
"logo": {
"uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/education-logo.png",
"uri#integrity": "sha256-LmXfh+9cLlJNXN+TsMk+PmKjZ5t0WRL5ca/xGgX3c1U=",
"alt_text": "Betelgeuse Ministry of Education logo"
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},
"background_image": {
"uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-background.png",
"uri#integrity": "sha256-5sBT7mMLylHLWrrS/qQ8aHpRAxoraWVmWX6eUVMlrrA="
},
"background_color": "#12107c",
"text_color": "#FFFFFF"
},
"svg_templates": [
{
"uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-english.svg",
"uri#integrity": "sha256-I4JcBGO7UfrkOBrsV7ytNJAfGuKLQh+e+Z31mc7iAb4=",
"properties": {
"orientation": "landscape",
"color_scheme": "light",
"contrast": "high"
}
}
]
}
},
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"name": "Betelgeuse-Bildungsnachweis",
"description": "Ein Bildungsnachweis für alle kohlenstoffbasierten Lebensformen auf Betelgeuse.",
"rendering": {
"simple": {
"logo": {
"uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/education-logo-de.png",
"uri#integrity": "sha256-LmXfh+9cLlJNXN+TsMk+PmKjZ5t0WRL5ca/xGgX3c1U=",
"alt_text": "Logo des Betelgeusischen Bildungsministeriums"
},
"background_image": {
"uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-background-de.png",
"uri#integrity": "sha256-9cLlJNXN+TsMk+PmKjZ5t0WRL5ca/xGgX3c1ULmXfh="
},
"background_color": "#12107c",
"text_color": "#FFFFFF"
},
"svg_templates": [
{
"uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-german.svg",
"uri#integrity": "sha256-I4JcBGO7UfrkOBrsV7ytNJAfGuKLQh+e+Z31mc7iAb4=",
"properties": {
"orientation": "landscape",
"color_scheme": "light",
"contrast": "high"
}
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}
]
}
}
],
"claims": [
{
"path": ["name"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Vor- und Nachname",
"description": "Der Name des/der Studierenden"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Name",
"description": "The name of the student"
}
],
"sd": "always",
"mandatory": true
},
{
"path": ["address"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Adresse",
"description": "Adresse zum Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Address",
"description": "Address at the time of graduation"
}
],
"sd": "always"
},
{
"path": ["address", "street_address"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Straße"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
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"label": "Street Address"
}
],
"sd": "always",
"svg_id": "address_street_address"
},
{
"path": ["degrees"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Abschlüsse",
"description": "Abschlüsse des/der Studierenden"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Degrees",
"description": "Degrees earned by the student"
}
],
"sd": "never"
},
{
"path": ["degrees", null],
"sd": "always"
},
{
"path": ["degrees", null, "field_of_study"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Studienfach"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Field of Study"
}
],
"sd": "never"
},
{
"path": ["degrees", null, "date_awarded"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Verleihungsdatum"
},
{
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"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Date Awarded"
}
],
"sd": "always"
}
]
}
Figure 29: Example Type Metadata Document
Note that in this example, there are four definitions affecting the
degrees claim:
1. The degrees array itself is marked as sd: never, meaning the
element degrees cannot be selectively disclosed and will always
exist in the disclosed SD-JWT. Changing this to sd: always would
mean that the degrees array itself is selectively disclosable.
2. Each item in the degrees array (denoted by null in the path) is
marked as sd: always, meaning each degree object will be
selectively disclosed as a whole.
3. The field_of_study property of each degree object is marked as
sd: never, meaning that if the respective degree object is
disclosed, the field_of_study property will always be included
and cannot be hidden.
4. The date_awarded property of each degree object is marked as sd:
always, meaning it can be selectively disclosed.
Appendix C. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Aaron Parecki, Alen Horvat, Andres Uribe,
Andrii Deinega, Annabelle Kennedy, Babis Routis, Christian Bormann,
Dan Moore, Denis Pinkas, George J Padayatti, Giuseppe De Marco, Lukas
J Han, Lukasz Jaromin, Leif Johansson, Michael B. Jones, Mike
Prorock, Mirko Mollik, Nat Sakimura, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pavel
Zarecky, Stefan Charsley, Tim Cappalli, Timo Glastra, Torsten
Lodderstedt, Tobias Looker, and Kristina Yasuda for their
contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the
initial set of implementations.
Appendix D. Document History
-14
* State more explicitly that additional Issuer Signature Mechanisms
can complement or override the defined mechanisms
* Add example of a vct value that is versioned (in the text)
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* Use the three-word term Verifiable Digital Credential as
consistently as possible throughout the document
* Update draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt references to
point to RFC 9901
* More consistent use of application/json content type and 200
status code when retrieving metadata
* Editorial improvements based on review feedback of -13
* Expand the example showing the vct claim
* Number and label the examples/figures
* Fix reference to Subresource Integrity document to point to W3C
Recommendation version
* Move Privacy-Preserving Retrieval of Type Metadata section to
Privacy Considerations where it belongs
* Move RFC 2397 to informative (only mentioned once and behind a
SHOULD)
* Add line break between the two things in the JSON Web Token Claims
Registration section
* Error responses both for JWT VC Issuer Metadata and Type Metadata
retrieval now MUST use appropriate HTTP status codes
* Clarified that if an integrity property is present for a
particular claim/property, the Consumer MUST verify the integrity
of the retrieved document.
* Fixed the description of the claim metadata extension rules to
correctly reflect the intended behavior.
* Added a note explaining the difference in overriding rules between
claim metadata and display metadata when extending types.
* Merged section section 4 into section 3
* Replaced the term wallet with holder for consistency reasons
-13
* Updated svg_template to match pluralised appendix example
-12
* Change lang to locale. While lang is more accurate, locale is
what has traditionally been used in OpenID Connect and later
related specs.
* Remove JSON schema from Type Metadata
* Introduce optional mandatory property for claims
* Explicitly mention that Type Metadata can have additional stuff
that has to be ignored if not understood
* Clarify that an SD-JWT VC doesn't contain a KB-JWT but rather
might have an associated one (which makes it a SD-JWT+KB and Brian
is still not sure about the term or these words, but it's where
we've ended up)
* Remove the requirement to ignore unknown claims, as some
applications may not want to follow this rule
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* Fix cnf claim and JWK references and move them to normative
* List vct as one of the required values in type metadata and ensure
that the use of the document integrity claims is clear
* Remove discussion of status and Status Provider from the
Introduction
* Add a background_image property to the simple rendering aligned
with the definition in OpenID4VCI
* Recommend to use sd=always or sd=never to avoid ambiguity and
introduce rules for sd and mandatory when extending types
* Provide some guidance on versioning via the vct value
* Add security considerations for trust in type metadata
* Require data URIs for non-JSON types
* Require x5c to be in the protected header
* Clarify presentations of SD-JWT VC do not require KB
* Updated/expanded example for Type Metadata
* Be more consistent with style for lists of claims/parameters/
properties
* Update PID example to make clear that it is not normative
* Clarification on processing of display metadata
-11
* Clarify extend support for claim metadata
* Add privacy concerns regarding the use of x5u parameter in JWKs
and similar remote retrieval mechanisms
* Added a section on Credential Type Extension and Issuer
Authorization.
* Fixed an inconsistency to the description of display attribute of
claim metadata.
* add vct#integrity to the list of claims that cannot be selectively
disclosed
* Drop explicit treatment of the glue type metadata document concept
* Editorial updates and fixes.
* State that when the status claim is present and using the
status_list mechanism, the associated Status List Token has to be
a JWT.
* vct datatype is now just a string
-10
* Rename 'Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key Validation' to 'Issuer
Signature Mechanisms' and rework some text accordingly. Provide a
web-based metadata resolution mechanism and an inline x509
mechanism. A DID-based mechanism is not explicitly provided
herein but still possible via profile/extension. Be explicit that
the employed Issuer Signature Mechanism has to be one that is
permitted for the Issuer according to policy. Be more clear that
one permitted Issuer Signature Mechanism is sufficient.
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* Fix [...]#integrity claim values in examples (Subresource
Integrity uses regular base64 encoding and some were wrong length)
-09
* Use SD-JWT KB in place of SD-JWT with Key Binding JWT
* Editorial changes
* Document reasons for not using JSON Pointer or JSON Path (Issue
#267)
* Clarify that private claim names MAY be used
* Update PID Example
* Fix section numbering in a few SD-JWT references
-08
* Fix formatting issue introduced by the reintroduction of the DID
paragraph in -07
-07
* Revert change from previous release that removed explicit mention
of DIDs in the Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key Validation
section
* Remove the requirement to insert a .well-known part for vct URLs
* fix section numbering in SD-JWT references to align with the
latest -14 version
-06
* Update the anticipated media type registration request from
application/vc+sd-jwt to application/dc+sd-jwt
* Tightened the exposition of the Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key
Validation section
* Add the “Status” field for the well-known URI registration per
IANA early review
-05
* Include display and claim type metadata
* Added example for type metadata
* Clarify, add context, or otherwise improved the examples
-04
* update reference to IETF Status List
* Include Type Metadata
* Include schema Type Metadata
* Editorial changes
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* Updated terminology to clarify digital signatures are one way to
secure VCs and presentations
* Rework key resolution/validation for x5c
-03
* Include disclosure of age_equal_or_over/18 in the PID example
-02
* Made specific rules for public verification key validation
conditional
* Finetuned rules for obtaining public verification key
* Editorial changes
* added Brian Campbell as co-author
* Renamed JWT Issuer Metadata to JWT VC Issuer Metadata
* 'iat' is now optional and allowed to be selectively disclosable
* Fix inconstancy in the .well-known path construction
* Added registration request to IANA for the well-known URI
* Fix some formatting and text in the media type and JWT claim
registration requests
* Clarify the optionality of the cnf claim
* Added relationships to other documents
* Added PID example
-01
* Introduce rules for type identifiers (Collision-Resistant Name)
* Rename type to vct
* Removed duplicated and inconsistent requirements on KB-JWT
* Editorial changes
* Added issuer public verification key discovery section.
-00
* Upload as draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-00
* Aligned terminology and descriptions with latest version of SD-JWT
[[ pre Working Group Adoption: ]]
-00
* Initial Version
* Removed W3C VCDM transformation algorithm
* Various editorial changes based on feedback
* Adjusted terminology based on feedback
* Added non-selectively disclosable JWT VC
* Added a note that this is not W3C VCDM
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Authors' Addresses
Oliver Terbu
MATTR
Email: oliver.terbu@mattr.global
Daniel Fett
Authlete Inc.
Email: mail@danielfett.de
Brian Campbell
Ping Identity
Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com
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