OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-06
|
| Document |
Type |
|
Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG)
|
|
Last updated |
|
2018-05-20
|
|
Stream |
|
IETF
|
|
Intended RFC status |
|
(None)
|
|
Formats |
|
plain text
xml
pdf
html
bibtex
|
| Stream |
WG state
|
|
WG Document
|
|
Document shepherd |
|
No shepherd assigned
|
| IESG |
IESG state |
|
I-D Exists
|
|
Consensus Boilerplate |
|
Unknown
|
|
Telechat date |
|
|
|
Responsible AD |
|
(None)
|
|
Send notices to |
|
(None)
|
Open Authentication Protocol T. Lodderstedt, Ed.
Internet-Draft YES.com AG
Intended status: Best Current Practice J. Bradley
Expires: November 21, 2018 Yubico
A. Labunets
Facebook
D. Fett
University of Stuttgart
May 20, 2018
OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-06
Abstract
This document describes best current security practices for OAuth
2.0. It updates and extends the OAuth 2.0 Security Threat Model to
incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was
published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader
application of OAuth 2.0.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 21, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
Lodderstedt, et al. Expires November 21, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Security Topics May 2018
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Protecting redirect-based flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Token Replay Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Attacks and Mitigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Insufficient redirect URI validation . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Attacks on Authorization Code Grant . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Attacks on Implicit Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3. Proposed Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Code or State Leakage from Client or AS via Referrer
Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Proposed Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Attacks through the Browser History . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3.1. Code in Browser History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3.2. Access Token in Browser History . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Mix-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.1. Attack Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.2. Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5. Code Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.5.1. Proposed Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.6. Cross Site Request Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.6.1. Proposed Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.7. Access Token Leakage at the Resource Server . . . . . . . 18
3.7.1. Access Token Phishing by Counterfeit Resource Server 18
3.7.1.1. Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.7.1.2. Sender Constrained Access Tokens . . . . . . . . 19
3.7.1.3. Audience Restricted Access Tokens . . . . . . . . 22
3.7.2. Compromised Resource Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.8. Open Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.8.1. Authorization Server as Open Redirector . . . . . . . 24
3.8.2. Clients as Open Redirector . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.9. TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Show full document text