Ballot for draft-ietf-oauth-status-list

Discuss

Roman Danyliw

Yes

Deb Cooley

No Objection

Andy Newton
Éric Vyncke
Erik Kline
Gorry Fairhurst
Gunter Van de Velde
Jim Guichard
Ketan Talaulikar
Mike Bishop
Mohamed Boucadair
Orie Steele

No Record

Mahesh Jethanandani
Paul Wouters

Summary: Has a DISCUSS. Has enough positions to pass once DISCUSS positions are resolved.

Roman Danyliw
Discuss
Discuss (2026-01-06 for -15) Sent
** For the OAUTH WG Chairs and responsible AD: this document appears to be describing new mechanisms for CWT and ISO mdoc; and a new sub-registry for CWT.   I could use help understanding how this fits into the defined scope in OAUTH WG charter given that the status-list work isn’t explicitly named and CWT and mdoc aren’t directly tied to “increasing interoperability of OAuth deployments and to improve security [in OAuth deployments].”

** Section 6.3.2
   ISO mdoc [ISO.mdoc] may utilize the Status List mechanism by
   introducing the status parameter in the Mobile Security Object (MSO)
   as specified in Section 9.1.2 of [ISO.mdoc].  The status parameter
   contains the Status CBOR structure as described in Section 6.3.
   It is RECOMMENDED to use status for the label of the field that
   contains the Status CBOR structure.

Interpretting and implementing this text seems to require understanding the [ISO.mdoc] specification.  Please make this a normative reference.

** Section 11.5
   Reasonable values for both claims highly depend on the use-case
   requirements and clients SHOULD be configured with lower/upper bounds
   for these values that fit their respective use-cases.

What is the interoperable way to access the “lower/upper bound … that fit their respective use-cases”.  Perhaps s/SHOULD/should/

** Section 11.6
   Implementers SHOULD only use MACs to
   secure the integrity of Status List Tokens if they fully understand
   the risks of MACs when compared to digital signatures and especially
   the requirements of their use-case scenarios.

What is the interoperable way to assess if an implementor “fully understand[s] the risks of MACs”?  Perhaps s/SHOULD/should/

** Sections 14.2, 14.4, and 14.5 establish new registries with a Specification-Required allocation policy.  This policy includes a review/approval by a Designated Expert (DE).  The current text is clear on where and when to send such requests, but it doesn’t provide any guidance to the DE on deciding how to process it.  Could this please be added.
Comment (2026-01-06 for -15) Sent
I support Andy Newton and Mike Bishop’s DISCUSS positions.

** Section 1.2
   Modern
   approaches use accumulator-based revocation registries and Zero-
   Knowledge-Proofs to accommodate for this privacy gap, but face
   scalability issues again. 

-- Consider how this text might age in a long-lived document.

-- Consider if “modern approaches” is the right characterization (if so, what does this mean?).  Are these schemes (e.g., accumulator-based schemes) widely deployed?

** Section 1.3
   *  the specification shall favor a simple and easy-to-understand
      concept
…
   *  the specification shall be optimized to support the most common
      use cases and avoid unnecessary complexity of corner cases

-- How is “easy-to-understand” being judged? 
-- What are these use cases?
-- Consider if this text is needed

** Section 11.2
   A Status List Token in the JWT format SHOULD follow the security
   considerations of [RFC7519] and the best current practices of
   [RFC8725].
   A Status List Token in the CWT format SHOULD follow the security
   considerations of [RFC8392].

Is there any further guidance that can be given on when it is appropriate to ignore these security considerations or best practices?
Deb Cooley
Yes
Andy Newton
(was Discuss) No Objection
Comment (2026-01-23 for -15) Sent
Thank you for the discussion and addressing my concerns. And thanks again for the work on this document.
Éric Vyncke
No Objection
Comment (2026-01-05 for -14) Sent
Thanks for the work done in this document even if I wonder why it is a OAUTH WG document as its potential scope is broader than OAuth... and while OAUTH charter inclues `guidance on encoding state
information`, it rather seems to indicate a BCP or an operational informational document.

Is there a reason why the media type registration is linked to an author rather than to the I-D ?

Med Boucadair has valid points about the use of RECOMMENDED/SHOULD in the I-D.
Erik Kline
No Objection
Gorry Fairhurst
No Objection
Gunter Van de Velde
No Objection
Jim Guichard
No Objection
Ketan Talaulikar
No Objection
Comment (2025-12-22 for -14) Sent
Thanks to the authors and the WG for their work on this document.

I have a couple of comments/queries to share:

1) [IANA.JOSE] is cited as a normative reference without any reference to it.

2) I am not sure if the multiple IANA registries listed as references are normative. Please check if they are more suited as informative.
Mike Bishop
(was Discuss) No Objection
Comment (2026-01-28 for -16) Sent
Thank you for addressing my previous DISCUSS and COMMENTs.
Mohamed Boucadair
No Objection
Comment (2025-12-18 for -14) Sent
Hi Tobias, Paul, and Christian, 

Thank you for the effort put into this document. 

# Overall, the document is well-organized and various pieces are adequately grafted together. Some cross referencing would be even better to link some of goals to how these are actually addressed in the current design, especially for the following ones:

CURRENT:
   *  the specification shall favor a simple and easy-to-understand
      concept

   *  the specification shall be easy, fast and secure to implement in
      all major programming languages

   *  the specification shall be optimized to support the most common
      use cases and avoid unnecessary complexity of corner cases

   *  the Status List shall scale up to millions of tokens to support
      large-scale government or enterprise use cases

   *  the Status List shall enable caching policies and offline support
 
# The implementation section (which is actually an Operational Consideration section per RFC5706) is really great. Thanks.

# The use of SHOULD through the document is worth checking. There are clearly cases where it is not trivial if this is a nice-to-have or why a stronger level isn't used, e.g., loop detection or the following: 

   *  ttl: RECOMMENDED.  The ttl (time to live) claim, if present, MUST
      specify the maximum amount of time, in seconds, that the Status
      List Token can be cached by a consumer before a fresh copy SHOULD
      be retrieved.  

There many such occurrences that I’m not listing here, but I’d request you double check through.

# I tagged some few nits when reviewing the document that I will send you in a PR.

Cheers,
Med
Orie Steele
(was Discuss) No Objection
Comment (2026-01-30 for -16) Sent
Authors have merged several PRs which address my DISCUSS and Comments here:
https://github.com/oauth-wg/draft-ietf-oauth-status-list/pulls

I'm sure these will make their way into the drafts soon, so am clearing the discuss.

## Comments

### Public?

```
216	   Status Provider, who serves the Status List Token on a public,
217	   resolvable endpoint.  The Relying Party or the Holder may fetch the
```

Perhaps you mean simply accessible to the verifier? 
I'm not sure if public precludes .internal, or other non public internet resources.

### SD-JWT

```
827	   SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (Section 3.2.2.2 of [SD-JWT.VC])
```

Is there a reason that SD-JWT VC is mentioned throughout this document instead of SD-JWT by itself?

### Why not MUST?

```
1113	   most common Status Type values.  Applications SHOULD use registered
1114	   values for statuses if they have the correct semantics.  Additional
```

Under which circumstances, can this SHOULD be ignored? 
Which use cases would encourage a different value from one in the registry to be used with the exact same semantics?


### Which .well-known

```
1387	   The Issuer MAY link to the Status List Aggregation URI in metadata
1388	   that can be provided by different means like .well-known metadata as
1389	   is used commonly in OAuth and OpenID Connect, or within Issuer
1390	   certificates or trust lists (such as VICAL as defined in Annex C of
```

It would be better to explicitly name the .well-known URIs than to refer to them like this.
The current normative requirement is ambiguous.


### One time use reference tokens

```
1704	   To avoid privacy risks of colluding Relying Parties, it is
1705	   RECOMMENDED that Issuers provide the ability to issue batches of one-
1706	   time-use Referenced Tokens, enabling Holders to use in a single
1707	   interaction with a Relying Party before discarding.  See Section 13.2
```

Is the index of and URL of the status information allowed to be the same for these single use tokens?

```
1723	   interacted with the same Holder.  It is therefore recommended to use
1724	   Status Lists for Referenced Token formats that have similar
1725	   unlinkability properties.
```

I don't undertand what "similar unlinkability properties" means.

### APPLICATION_SPECIFIC

Are there really 0 references to provide for these application specific registrations?
Are they in use today? or anticipated to be be used ever?
Are the reserved for experimentation, or reservered because of existing deployments?

## Nits

### Media type point of contact

```
2349	   *  Person & email address to contact for further information: Paul
2350	      Bastian, paul.bastian@posteo.de
```

While this has been common, I think it is better to direct the point of contact for media types reserved by a working group to the working group list itself.
Mahesh Jethanandani
No Record
Paul Wouters
No Record