OAuth 2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-04

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Last updated 2013-07-15
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OAuth                                                          J. Richer
Internet-Draft                                     The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track                                W. Mills
Expires: January 16, 2014                                    Yahoo! Inc.
                                                      H. Tschofenig, Ed.
                                                  Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                                 P. Hunt
                                                      Oracle Corporation
                                                           July 15, 2013

           OAuth 2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens
                  draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-04.txt

Abstract

   This specification describes how to use MAC Tokens in HTTP requests
   to access OAuth 2.0 protected resources.  An OAuth client willing to
   access a protected resource needs to demonstrate possession of a
   crytographic key by using it with a keyed message digest function to
   the request.

   The document also defines a key distribution protocol for obtaining a
   fresh session key.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal

Richer, et al.          Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            OAuth 2.0 MAC Tokens                 July 2013

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Session Key Transport to Client  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  Session Key Transport to Resource Server . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  The Authenticator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.1.  The Authenticator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.2.  MAC Input String . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     5.3.  Keyed Message Digest Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       5.3.1.  hmac-sha-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       5.3.2.  hmac-sha-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.  Verifying the Authenticator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.1.  Timestamp Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.2.  Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     8.1.  Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     8.2.  Offering Confidentiality Protection for Access to
           Protected Resources  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     8.3.  Authentication of Resource Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     8.4.  Plaintext Storage of Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     8.5.  Entropy of Session Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     8.6.  Denial of Service / Resource Exhaustion Attacks  . . . . . 21
     8.7.  Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     8.8.  CSRF Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     8.9.  Protecting HTTP Header Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     9.1.  JSON Web Token Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     9.2.  MAC Token Algorithm Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       9.2.1.  Registration Template  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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