Finding and Using Geofeed Data
draft-ietf-opsawg-9092-update-03

Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                              IIJ & Arrcus
Obsoletes: 9092 (if approved)                                 M. Candela
Intended status: Standards Track                                     NTT
Expires: 23 March 2024                                         W. Kumari
                                                                  Google
                                                              R. Housley
                                                          Vigil Security
                                                       20 September 2023

                     Finding and Using Geofeed Data
                    draft-ietf-opsawg-9092-update-03

Abstract

   This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
   Specification Language inetnum: class to refer specifically to
   geofeed data files and describes an optional scheme that uses the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure to authenticate the geofeed
   datafiles.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 March 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights

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   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  inetnum: Class  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Fetching Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Authenticating Geofeed Data (Optional)  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25

1.  Introduction

   Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to
   customize those services based on the geographic location of the user
   of the service.  This is often done using the source IP address used
   to contact the service, which may not point to a user, see [RFC6269],
   Section 14 in particular.  Also, infrastructure and other services
   might wish to publish the locale of their services.  [RFC8805]
   defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP
   addresses, but it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed
   data given an IP address.

   This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
   Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2725] inetnum: class to refer
   specifically to geofeed data files and how to prudently use them.  In
   all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed
   [RFC4012].

   The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and
   certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database
   classes.

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   An optional utterly awesome but slightly complex means for
   authenticating geofeed data is also defined in Section 5.

   This document obsoletes [RFC9092].  Changes from [RFC9092] include
   the following:

   *  RIPE has implemented the geofeed: attribute.
   *  Allow, but discourage, an inetnum: to have both a geofeed remarks:
      attribute and a geofeed: attribute.
   *  Geofeed file only UTF-8 CSV.
   *  Stress that authenticating geofeed data is optional.
   *  IP Address Delegation extensions must not use "inherit".
   *  If geofeed data are present, ignore geographic location hints in
      other data.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Geofeed Files

   Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805].  They provide a facility
   for an IP address resource "owner" to associate those IP addresses to
   geographic locales.

   Per [RFC8805], geofeed files consist of CSVs (Comma Separated Values)
   in UTF-8 text format; not HTML, richtext, or other formats.

   Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address
   to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data.  In
   Section 3, this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed
   [RFC8805] file given an IP address.

   Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale
   and high granularity can be quite large.  The size of a file can be
   even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many
   prefixes, if dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc.

   Geofeed data do have privacy considerations (see Section 7); this
   process makes bulk access to those data easier.

   This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly
   authenticate the data in the geofeed files.

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3.  inetnum: Class

   The original RPSL specifications starting with [RIPE81], [RIPE181],
   and a trail of subsequent documents were written by the RIPE
   community.  The IETF standardized RPSL in [RFC2622] and [RFC4012].
   Since then, it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the
   Regional Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE [RIPE-DB].
   Currently, change control effectively lies in the operator community.

   The RPSL, and [RFC2725] and [RFC4012] used by the Regional Internet
   Registries (RIRs), specify the inetnum: database class.  Each of
   these objects describes an IP address range and its attributes.  The
   inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on the address space.

   Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed:
   attribute in the inetnum: class.  Absent implementation of the
   geofeed: attribute in a particular RIR database, this document
   defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute, which contains an
   HTTPS URL of a geofeed file.  The format of the inetnum: geofeed
   remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ",
   where the token "Geofeed " MUST be case sensitive, followed by a URL
   that will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single geofeed [RFC8805]
   file.

       inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
       remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed

   While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant
   parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum:
   class MUST be "geofeed:" and MUST be followed by a single URL that
   will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single geofeed [RFC8805] file.

       inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
       geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed

   The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication, integrity,
   and confidentiality for the fetched geofeed file.  However, the
   WebPKI can not provide authentication of IP address space assignment.
   In contrast, the RPKI (see [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP
   space assignment; see optional authentication in Section 5.

   Until all producers of inetnum: objects, i.e., the RIRs, state that
   they have migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers
   looking at inetnum: objects to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to
   consume both the remarks: and geofeed: forms.

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   The migration not only implies that the RIRs support the geofeed:
   attribute, but that all registrants have migrated any inetnum:
   objects from remarks: to geofeed: attributes.

   Any particular inetnum: object SHOULD have, at most, one geofeed
   reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it
   is implemented.  If there is more than one, the geofeed: attribute
   SHOULD be used.

   For inetnum:s covering the same address range, or an inetnum: with
   both remarks: and geofeed: attributes, a signed geofeed file SHOULD
   be preferred over an unsigned file.

   If a geofeed file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP address
   space, there are likely to be geofeed references from multiple
   inetnum: objects.  Files with geofeed references from multiple
   inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing procedure in
   Section 5.

   An unsigned, and only an unsigned, geofeed file MAY be referenced by
   multiple inetnum:s and MAY contain prefixes from more than one
   registry.

   When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects
   that have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on the
   inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be
   preferred.

   As inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, geofeed references SHOULD be at
   the lowest applicable inetnum: object covering the relevant address
   ranges in the referenced geofeed file.  When fetching, the most
   specific inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used.

   It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than
   the inetnum: that refers to them.  For example, an INETNUM object for
   an address range P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been
   subdivided into one or more longer prefixes.

4.  Fetching Geofeed Data

   This document is to provides a guideline for how interested parties
   should fetch and read geofeed files.

   Historically, before geofeed files, this was done in varied ways, at
   the discretion of the implementer, often without consistent
   authentication, where data were mostly imported from email without
   formal authorisation or validation.

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   To minimize the load on RIRs' WHOIS [RFC3912] services, the RIR's FTP
   [RFC0959] services SHOULD be used for large-scale access to gather
   geofeed URLs.  This uses efficient bulk access instead of fetching
   via brute-force search through the IP space.

   When an inetnum: with a geofeed file reference is identified, the
   file MUST be downloaded using HTTPS.

   When reading data from the geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside
   the referring inetnum: object's address range.  This is to avoid
   importing data about ranges not under the control of the operator.
   If geofeed files are fetched, other location information from the
   inetnum: MUST be ignored.

   Given an address range of interest, the most specific inetnum: object
   with a geofeed reference MUST be used to fetch the geofeed file.  For
   example, if the fetching party finds the following inetnum: objects:

       inetnum: 192.0.2.0/12 # example
       remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_1

       inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
       remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_2

   and the file geofeed_1 contains geolocation data about 192.0.2.0/29,
   this MUST be discarded because 192.0.2.0/24 is within the more
   specific inetnum: covering the address range and that inetnum: has a
   geofeed reference.

   If an inetnum: object has both remarks: with geofeed data and also
   has a geofeed: attribute, the geofeed: attribute SHOULD be used and
   the remarks: ignored.

   Hints in inetnum:s such as country:, geoloc:, etc. tend to be
   administrative, and not deployment specific.  Consider large,
   possibly global, providers with headquarters very far from most of
   their deployments.  Therefore, if geofeed data are specified, either
   as a geofeed: attribute or in a geofeed remarks: attribute, other
   geographic hints such as country:, geoloc:, DNS geoloc RRsets, etc.,
   for that address range MUST be ignored.

   There is open-source code to traverse the RPSL data across all of the
   RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them
   [GEOFEED-FINDER].  It implements the steps above and of all the
   Operational Considerations described in Section 6, including caching.
   It produces a single geofeed file, merging all the geofeed files
   found.  This open-source code can be run daily by a cronjob, and the
   output file can be directly used.

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5.  Authenticating Geofeed Data (Optional)

   The question arises whether a particular geofeed [RFC8805] data set
   is valid, i.e., is authorized by the "owner" of the IP address space
   and is authoritative in some sense.  The inetnum: that points to the
   geofeed [RFC8805] file provides some assurance.  Unfortunately, the
   RPSL in some repositories is weakly authenticated at best.  An
   approach where RPSL was signed per [RFC7909] would be good, except it
   would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair
   number of them.

   A single optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed
   [RFC8805] file.  It is a digest of the main body of the file signed
   by the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for a covering
   address range.  One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI
   certificate with the signature of the geofeed text.

   The canonicalization procedure converts the data from their internal
   character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding,
   and the <CRLF> sequence MUST be used to denote the end of a line of
   text.  A blank line is represented solely by the <CRLF> sequence.
   For robustness, any non-printable characters MUST NOT be changed by
   canonicalization.  Trailing blank lines MUST NOT appear at the end of
   the file.  That is, the file must not end with multiple consecutive
   <CRLF> sequences.  Any end-of-file marker used by an operating system
   is not considered to be part of the file content.  When present, such
   end-of-file markers MUST NOT be processed by the digital signature
   algorithm.

   Should the authenticator be syntactically incorrect per the above,
   the authenticator is invalid.

   Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file
   canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652]
   would be used to create a detached DER-encoded signature that is then
   padded BASE64 encoded (as per Section 4 of [RFC4648]) and line
   wrapped to 72 or fewer characters.  The same digest algorithm MUST be
   used for calculating the message digest on content being signed,
   which is the geofeed file, and for calculating the message digest on
   the SignerInfo SignedAttributes [RFC8933].  The message digest
   algorithm identifier MUST appear in both the SignedData
   DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo
   DigestAlgorithmIdentifier [RFC5652].

   The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes
   on the geofeed file it signs.  The certificate MUST NOT include the
   Autonomous System Identifier Delegation certificate extension
   [RFC3779].

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   An address range A "covers" address range B if the range of B is
   identical to or a subset of A.  "Address range" is used here because
   inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on Classless
   Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [RFC4632] prefix boundaries, while those
   of the lines in a geofeed file do.

   As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the
   signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's
   address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData
   certificates field.

   The CA MUST sign only one Geofeed with each generated private key and
   MUST generate a new key pair for each new version of the Geofeed.  An
   associated EE certificate used in this fashion is termed a "one-time-
   use" EE certificate (see Section 3 of [RFC6487]).

   Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and
   getting the department that controls the private key (which might be
   trapped in a Hardware Security Module (HSM)) to sign the CMS blob is
   left as an exercise for the implementor.  On the other hand,
   verifying the signature requires no complexity; the certificate,
   which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key.
   The trust anchors for the RIRs are expected to already be available
   to the party performing signature validation.  Validation of the CMS
   signature on the geofeed file involves:

   1.  Obtaining the signer's certificate from the CMS SignedData
       CertificateSet [RFC5652].  The certificate SubjectKeyIdentifier
       extension [RFC5280] MUST match the SubjectKeyIdentifier in the
       CMS SignerInfo SignerIdentifier [RFC5652].  If the key
       identifiers do not match, then validation MUST fail.

       Validation of the signer's certificate MUST ensure that it is
       part of the current [RFC6486] manifest and that the resources are
       covered by the RPKI certificate.

   2.  Constructing the certification path for the signer's certificate.
       All of the needed certificates are expected to be readily
       available in the RPKI repository.  The certification path MUST be
       valid according to the validation algorithm in [RFC5280] and the
       additional checks specified in [RFC3779] associated with the IP
       Address Delegation certificate extension and the Autonomous
       System Identifier Delegation certificate extension.  If
       certification path validation is unsuccessful, then validation
       MUST fail.

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   3.  Validating the CMS SignedData as specified in [RFC5652] using the
       public key from the validated signer's certificate.  If the
       signature validation is unsuccessful, then validation MUST fail.

   4.  Verifying that the IP Address Delegation certificate extension
       [RFC3779] covers all of the address ranges of the geofeed file.
       If all of the address ranges are not covered, then validation
       MUST fail.

   All of these steps MUST be successful to consider the geofeed file
   signature as valid.

   As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the
   signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's
   address range is included in the CMS SignedData certificates field
   [RFC5652].

   An IP Address Delegation extension using "inherit" would complicate
   processing.  The implementation would have to build the certification
   path from the end-entity to the trust anchor, then validate the path
   from the trust anchor to the end-entity, and then the parameter would
   have to be remembered when the validated public key was used to
   validate a signature on a CMS object.  Having to remember things from
   certification path validation for use with CMS object processing is
   too hard.  And, the certificates do not get that much bigger by
   repeating the information.

   Therefore an extension using "inherit" MUST NOT be used.  This is
   consistent with other RPKI signed objects.

   Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and
   getting the department with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to
   sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor.  On the
   other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the
   certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the
   needed public key.

   The appendix MUST be hidden as a series of "#" comments at the end of
   the geofeed file.  The following is a cryptographically incorrect,
   albeit simple, example.  A correct and full example is in Appendix A.

       # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
       # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
       # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
       ...
       # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa
       # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk=
       # End Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255

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   The signature does not cover the signature lines.

   The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:" MUST be
   present following the model as shown.  Their IP address range MUST
   match that of the inetnum: URL followed to the file.

   [RFC9323] describes and provides code for a CMS profile for a general
   purpose listing of checksums (a "checklist") for use with the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  It provides usable,
   albeit complex, code to sign geofeed files.

   [RPKI-RTA] describes a CMS profile for a general purpose Resource
   Tagged Attestation (RTA) based on the RPKI.  While this is expected
   to become applicable in the long run, for the purposes of this
   document, a self-signed root trust anchor is used.

6.  Operational Considerations

   To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to
   register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with
   their Regional Internet Registry (RIR) or National Internet Registry
   (NIR) and/or any provider Local Internet Registry (LIR) that has
   assigned address ranges to them.  RIRs/NIRs provide means for
   assignees to create and maintain inetnum: objects.  They also provide
   means of assigning or sub-assigning IP address resources and allowing
   the assignee to create WHOIS data, including inetnum: objects,
   thereby referring to geofeed files.

   The geofeed files MUST be published via and fetched using HTTPS
   [RFC2818].

   When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside the
   referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range.

   If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 5, then
   multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the
   consumer MUST use only lines in the geofeed file where the prefix is
   covered by the address range of the inetnum: object's URL it has
   followed.

   If the geofeed file is signed, and the signer's certificate changes,
   the signature in the geofeed file MUST be updated.

   It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose.  To
   dedicate a signing private key for signing a geofeed file, an RPKI
   Certification Authority (CA) may issue a subordinate certificate
   exclusively for the purpose shown in Appendix A.

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   Harvesting and publishing aggregated geofeed data outside of the RPSL
   model should be avoided as it can have the effect that more specifics
   from one aggregatee could undesirably affect the less specifics of a
   different aggregatee.  The validation model in Section Section 5
   handles this issue within the RPSL model.

   Currently, geolocation providers have bulk WHOIS data access at all
   the RIRs.  An anonymized version of such data is openly available for
   all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization.  However, for
   users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved
   with extra RDAP effort.  There is open-source code to pass over such
   data across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process
   them [GEOFEED-FINDER].

   To prevent undue load on RPSL and geofeed servers, entity-fetching
   geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do frequent real-time
   lookups.  Section 3.4 of [RFC8805] suggests use of the HTTP Expires
   header [RFC7234] to signal when geofeed data should be refetched.  As
   the data change very infrequently, in the absence of such an HTTP
   Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more frequently than
   weekly.  It would be polite not to fetch at magic times such as
   midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others
   are likely to do the same.

7.  Privacy Considerations

   [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP
   address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an
   individual user.  Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy
   guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this
   exposure of the user.  In publishing pointers to geofeed files as
   described in this document, the operator should be aware of this
   exposure in geofeed data and be cautious.  All the privacy
   considerations of Section 4 of [RFC8805] apply to this document.

   Where [RFC8805] provided the ability to publish location data, this
   document makes bulk access to those data readily available.  This is
   a goal, not an accident.

8.  Implementation Status

   Currently, the geofeed: attribute in inetnum objects has been
   implemented in the RIPE and APNIC databases.

   Registrants in databases which do not yet support the geofeed:
   attribute are using the remarks:, or equivalent, attribute.

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   Currently, the registry data published by ARIN are not the same RPSL
   as that of the other registries (see [RFC7485] for a survey of the
   WHOIS Tower of Babel); therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP
   [RFC0959], WHOIS [RFC3912], the Registration Data Access Protocol
   (RDAP) [RFC9082], etc., the "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated
   as "inetnum", and the "Comment" attribute must be treated as
   "remarks".

   [rpki-client] can be used to authenticate a signed geofeed file.

9.  Security Considerations

   It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use
   other sources to cross-validate the data.  All the security
   considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well.

   The consumer of geofeed data SHOULD fetch and process the data
   themselves.  Importing datasets produced and/or processed by a third-
   party places ill-advised trust in the third-party.

   As mentioned in Section 5, some RPSL repositories have weak, if any,
   authentication.  This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to
   malicious geofeed files.  Section 5 suggests an unfortunately complex
   method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI.

   For example, if an inetnum: for a wide address range (e.g., a /16)
   points to an RPKI-signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could
   publish an unsigned equal or narrower (e.g., a /24) inetnum: in a
   WHOIS registry that has weak authorization, abusing the rule that the
   most-specific inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used.

   If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied, but
   of course that is not happening anytime soon.

   The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers
   due to too-frequent queries.  Usually, they throttle by the querying
   IP address or block.  Similar defenses will likely need to be
   deployed by geofeed file servers.

10.  IANA Considerations

   There are no new actions needed by the IANA.

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11.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue, George
   Michaelson for the first and substantial external review, and Erik
   Kline who was too shy to agree to coauthorship.  Additionally, we
   express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno
   Schepers; Flavio Luciani; Eric Dugas; and Kevin Pack.  Also, thanks
   to the following geolocation providers who are consuming geofeeds
   with this described solution: Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), Ben
   Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat (bigdatacloud.com).  For an
   amazing number of helpful reviews, we thank Job Snijders, who also
   found an ASN.1 'inherit' issue; Adrian Farrel; Antonio Prado;
   Francesca Palombini; Jean-Michel Combes (INTDIR); John Scudder; Kyle
   Rose (SECDIR); Martin Duke; Murray Kucherawy; Paul Kyzivat (GENART);
   Rob Wilton; Roman Danyliw; and Ties de Kock.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2622]  Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D.,
              Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra,
              "Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2622>.

   [RFC2725]  Villamizar, C., Alaettinoglu, C., Meyer, D., and S.
              Murphy, "Routing Policy System Security", RFC 2725,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2725, December 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2725>.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.

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   [RFC4012]  Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky,
              "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation
              (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4012>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

   [RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8805]  Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W.
              Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation
              Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.

   [RFC8933]  Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
              (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.

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12.2.  Informative References

   [GEOFEED-FINDER]
              "geofeed-finder", commit 5f557a4, June 2021,
              <https://github.com/massimocandela/geofeed-finder>.

   [INET6NUM] RIPE NCC, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", October
              2019, <https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
              asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-documentation/
              rpsl-object-types/4-2-descriptions-of-primary-
              objects/4-2-3-description-of-the-inet6num-object>.

   [INETNUM]  RIPE NCC, "Description of the INETNUM Object", June 2020,
              <https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
              asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-documentation/
              rpsl-object-types/4-2-descriptions-of-primary-
              objects/4-2-4-description-of-the-inetnum-object>.

   [RFC0959]  Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
              STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.

   [RFC3912]  Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912>.

   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.

   [RFC5485]  Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft
              Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5485>.

   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Ed., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and
              P. Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6269, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6269>.

   [RFC7234]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
              RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.

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   [RFC7485]  Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin,
              "Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects",
              RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7485>.

   [RFC7909]  Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy
              Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public
              Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7909>.

   [RFC9082]  Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
              Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.

   [RFC9092]  Bush, R., Candela, M., Kumari, W., and R. Housley,
              "Finding and Using Geofeed Data", RFC 9092,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9092, July 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9092>.

   [RFC9323]  Snijders, J., Harrison, T., and B. Maddison, "A Profile
              for RPKI Signed Checklists (RSCs)", RFC 9323,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9323, November 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9323>.

   [RIPE-DB]  RIPE NCC, "RIPE Database Documentation",
              <https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
              asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-
              documentation>.

   [RIPE181]  RIPE NCC, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In A
              Routing Registry", October 1994,
              <https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-181>.

   [RIPE81]   RIPE NCC, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In The
              RIPE Database", February 1993,
              <https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-081>.

   [rpki-client]
              Snijders, J., "Example on how to use rpki-client to
              authenticate a signed Geofeed", September 2023,
              <https://sobornost.net/~job/
              using_geofeed_authenticators.txt>.

   [RPKI-RTA] Michaelson, G. G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels,
              T., and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged
              Attestations (RTAs)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,

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              draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00, 21 January 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
              rpki-rta-00>.

Appendix A.  Example

   This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CRL
   signed by the trust anchor, a CA certificate subordinate to the trust
   anchor, a CRL signed by the CA, an end-entity certificate subordinate
   to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a detached signature.

   The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate.  As
   usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4
   address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers.

   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
   BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5
   MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
   AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ
   0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH
   XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe
   g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb
   O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq
   jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd
   BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU
   GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw
   GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI
   KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4
   YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u
   ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4
   YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD
   AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN
   BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe
   xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH
   cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM
   Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA
   rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a
   x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA==
   -----END CERTIFICATE-----

   The CRL issued by the trust anchor.

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       -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
       MIIBjjB4AgEBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEX
       DTIzMDkyMDE4MDkxMVoXDTIzMTAyMDE4MDkxMVqgLzAtMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMC9
       Ul2+0niyFuyzo0OV0gYLmQgyMAoGA1UdFAQDAgEBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB
       AQALdNwYgIPHVauhT9yGV2Oj28aj6yI8X/xQz53Gh7zqz4AfKSA3rmFUiQiPnLiA
       oO+oI83tzoTwxwVRdGpzc8ZhZ5yCwAQYZdiGteagLFi1zghWbRNWH/m7q/ypw1xd
       GZs3ow6b29OMr9ue/5s++bWMQ6oHh24cVB5S9kX3v7N0OeE0/SGcKtaeT+WE5SWC
       hudIB52s5NPcKu1SEnn/D8JLGoadxatmFEGMfRX2Wo9dcntcyCr/MPl6ZhvM9tsF
       Oxoom7RRnAfz+AWwptYrCkvKFdk974UCe9Bq2Bq3xuhrLs1kT6+yy0U9y7hyJYK/
       Dq9IJ9RuBsQagykwbwLbzlTr
       -----END X509 CRL-----

   The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor.  This certificate
   grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two
   AS numbers (64496 and 64497).

   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   MIIFCjCCA/KgAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDLYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
   BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MjAxNjQ5MjhaFw0yNDA5
   MTkxNjQ5MjhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG
   QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc
   zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7
   6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo
   j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ
   liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n
   YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE
   TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIyMIICLjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R
   4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUwL1SXb7SeLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwDwYD
   VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr
   BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u
   ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz
   Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v
   cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr
   BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu
   bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz
   Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF
   hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH
   AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwIQYIKwYBBQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAK
   AgMA+/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAGgn+1s4Vbp5CIPVtDG+gSjgU
   kUCnUdFK8kE6cHtcwo/RGah2QBEhtUXk7U19OvEjvsGbXKhhVfGkvJV6/rxXxnTF
   M+D+//Ef5Lvsxbxc85UDmhT5YDaDkuS9ClSEedZsN9/4bNzOve/JYB0Xj8GnLFH8
   OJo38poa5o2veqcmuwNtsAa/hAKRgDAWGD/gMsNZd83zVBgvIVasYDYXyapClD/x
   e3YCyWDJBJoJkFCoRB+Fb8lMAUFYx988S+BZGWA4VKGMUtPvdCtDwQak6c4PTziH
   /10Tc9Jxst1F0nCdmfFyMWRHNw3e5y8pmEc3WwzihGhuuOvdLzVdoEMRSwQ+/g==
   -----END CERTIFICATE-----

   The CRL issued by the CA.

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   -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
   MIIBrTCBlgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAzMTEwLwYDVQQDEygzQUNFMkNFRjRG
   QjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyFw0yMzA5MjAxODIzNTBaFw0y
   MzEwMjAxODIzNTBaoC8wLTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ6zizvT7IbfRHj4YTvweKXs3eG
   QjAKBgNVHRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAiiqMfYMxDTKYosc77UM0
   qzLuVsik3QHRMZI1YC/WVMNnuNrppjKr5e9lrfHF92XX4nO7odJk9TuCT+xpn6of
   /E5XQMh0btrgRO4lFS8SBqhD32++j65EWeOVHxwwiVIw0Nq9l+5kNa3a5Rfvr03d
   /c2DvgIUmrhQkJqUEYH0009oTsx2cFNIURhgpwdXulCcaPVO8QnKE0Vz7JwmuQJH
   U1vj8wB7rbW9gszbimInb1WNjR8cGL/USnDBTtoc1GSjQyhPck/UGyh5zgrmbS5R
   HpDVvN3FM6f8nfuz8qNy7TC8umV8IUzkJ+3+bxlUnyPUV9VNuQOQJHIgWzciA0cS
   XQ==
   -----END X509 CRL-----

   The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA.  This certificate
   grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24).
   Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data
   signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the end-entity
   certificate.

   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   MIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu0wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
   BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC
   Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjAxNjQ5MjhaFw0yNDA3MTYxNjQ5MjhaMDMxMTAvBgNV
   BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi
   MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW
   yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c
   K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm
   BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp
   tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog
   qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB
   AAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j
   BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1Ud
   IAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9y
   cGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNF
   MTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmwwbAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUF
   BzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF
   RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcB
   BwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAD6JvdAdo
   vWT72DHKaK4Bw5Yv88g2pPHxWo+sckYyVZzr3yy29JItOHOWXv9WHcsi1mCEmqkn
   JMjcCaj5RuHpR3s8EWyi5qomGOsE42w8aBpqfef9rapjW/O7o1p5LDm9qh/arw8O
   VNU9+fnVBdbGJSVoDZScDyX+uitGeE9/dzktNeFV4bLivs/9CTXTy9eQ9RKMLkvh
   a5sNwNMrSS79ps9+nvFvg3Ynbkc6JGYAQgZ8K0RfQwx37Vn/AmsfvKIJWf4HzMg3
   eHQp/BZbbZCbr4FEy2wQhkFqXk5F1xQj91+rlyXpdbhcvbM3SyIhiWBkinVJSA/C
   g1oJqaiTsNaoGw==
   -----END CERTIFICATE-----

   The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail.  For
   brevity, the other two certificates are not.

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      0 1110: SEQUENCE {
      4  830:  SEQUENCE {
      8    3:   [0] {
     10    1:    INTEGER 2
            :     }
     13   20:   INTEGER
            :    27 AD 39 40 83 D7 F2 B5 B9 9B 86 70 C7 75 B2 B9
            :    6E E1 66 ED
     35   13:   SEQUENCE {
     37    9:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :     sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
     48    0:    NULL
            :     }
     50   51:   SEQUENCE {
     52   49:    SET {
     54   47:     SEQUENCE {
     56    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
     61   40:      PrintableString
            :       '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642'
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
    103   30:   SEQUENCE {
    105   13:    UTCTime 20/09/2023 16:49:28 GMT
    120   13:    UTCTime 16/07/2024 16:49:28 GMT
            :     }
    135   51:   SEQUENCE {
    137   49:    SET {
    139   47:     SEQUENCE {
    141    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
    146   40:      PrintableString
            :       '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187'
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
    188  290:   SEQUENCE {
    192   13:    SEQUENCE {
    194    9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :      rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
    205    0:     NULL
            :      }
    207  271:    BIT STRING, encapsulates {
    212  266:     SEQUENCE {
    216  257:      INTEGER
            :      00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8
            :      40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65
            :      B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE
            :      57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13

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            :      74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37
            :      9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE
            :      E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED
            :      95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89
            :      F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E
            :      16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19
            :      BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65
            :      88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28
            :      6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9
            :      67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A
            :      78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41
            :      FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C
            :      EB
    477    3:      INTEGER 65537
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
    482  352:   [3] {
    486  348:    SEQUENCE {
    490   29:     SEQUENCE {
    492    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
    497   22:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    499   20:       OCTET STRING
            :      91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB
            :      F0 53 A1 87
            :        }
            :       }
    521   31:     SEQUENCE {
    523    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
    528   24:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    530   22:       SEQUENCE {
    532   20:        [0]
            :      3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97
            :      B3 77 86 42
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    554   14:     SEQUENCE {
    556    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
    561    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    564    4:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    566    2:       BIT STRING 7 unused bits
            :        '1'B (bit 0)
            :        }
            :       }
    570   24:     SEQUENCE {

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    572    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
    577    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    580   14:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    582   12:       SEQUENCE {
    584   10:        SEQUENCE {
    586    8:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :          resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2)
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    596   97:     SEQUENCE {
    598    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
    603   90:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    605   88:       SEQUENCE {
    607   86:        SEQUENCE {
    609   84:         [0] {
    611   82:          [0] {
    613   80:           [6]
            :          'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
            :          '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl'
            :            }
            :           }
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    695  108:     SEQUENCE {
    697    8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
    707   96:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    709   94:       SEQUENCE {
    711   92:        SEQUENCE {
    713    8:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :          caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
    723   80:         [6]
            :          'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
            :          '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer'
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    805   31:     SEQUENCE {
    807    8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7)
    817    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    820   16:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {

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    822   14:       SEQUENCE {
    824   12:        SEQUENCE {
    826    2:         OCTET STRING 00 01
    830    6:         SEQUENCE {
    832    4:          BIT STRING
            :           '010000000000000000000011'B
            :           }
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
            :    }
    838   13:  SEQUENCE {
    840    9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :    sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
    851    0:   NULL
            :    }
    853  257:  BIT STRING
            :   0F A2 6F 74 07 68 BD 64 FB D8 31 CA 68 AE 01 C3
            :   96 2F F3 C8 36 A4 F1 F1 5A 8F AC 72 46 32 55 9C
            :   EB DF 2C B6 F4 92 2D 38 73 96 5E FF 56 1D CB 22
            :   D6 60 84 9A A9 27 24 C8 DC 09 A8 F9 46 E1 E9 47
            :   7B 3C 11 6C A2 E6 AA 26 18 EB 04 E3 6C 3C 68 1A
            :   6A 7D E7 FD AD AA 63 5B F3 BB A3 5A 79 2C 39 BD
            :   AA 1F DA AF 0F 0E 54 D5 3D F9 F9 D5 05 D6 C6 25
            :   25 68 0D 94 9C 0F 25 FE BA 2B 46 78 4F 7F 77 39
            :   2D 35 E1 55 E1 B2 E2 BE CF FD 09 35 D3 CB D7 90
            :   F5 12 8C 2E 4B E1 6B 9B 0D C0 D3 2B 49 2E FD A6
            :   CF 7E 9E F1 6F 83 76 27 6E 47 3A 24 66 00 42 06
            :   7C 2B 44 5F 43 0C 77 ED 59 FF 02 6B 1F BC A2 09
            :   59 FE 07 CC C8 37 78 74 29 FC 16 5B 6D 90 9B AF
            :   81 44 CB 6C 10 86 41 6A 5E 4E 45 D7 14 23 F7 5F
            :   AB 97 25 E9 75 B8 5C BD B3 37 4B 22 21 89 60 64
            :   8A 75 49 48 0F C2 83 5A 09 A9 A8 93 B0 D6 A8 1B
            :   }

   To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity
   private key is provided.  For brevity, the other two private keys are
   not.

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   -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
   MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW
   /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP
   Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1
   zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/
   eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm
   gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo
   18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio
   pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z
   ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ
   mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651
   IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF
   t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt
   MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M
   Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg
   26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l
   nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm
   FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6
   O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo
   Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz
   vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc
   DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf
   taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc
   PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ
   E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV
   iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y=
   -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

   Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF),
   yields the following detached CMS signature.

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   # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24
   # MIIGTgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGPzCCBjsCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
   # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggRoMIIEZDCCA0ygAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
   # wwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR
   # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MTYyMTAzMjhaFw0yNDA3MTIy
   # MTAzMjhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM
   # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT
   # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg
   # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm
   # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha
   # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG
   # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ
   # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggFuMIIBajAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R
   # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI
   # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg
   # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ
   # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5
   # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5
   # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0
   # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMB8GCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBAwD
   # jAMBAIAATAGAwQAwAACMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAIdkoBMQydWkkaE91z
   # FTX6xIzzDhllfDR5bgw8C2XrAkTiWlMce+/A794a7j3+fIAyDrQ1fjgPLof6I7x
   # MaiqyNtb+5GqXNk+sHwjg6AnInZV2Xgz2X6lJdtNck25zGwfj/RZ8BxO+UUzP0J
   # UOCTAaCed2KOVF9qWfmXeZ2HPvZVD+01G0PNKdDGKzBmtWKzXsWVk00fvm+xaDs
   # /sBTf28O907AUM+2ipuFYfWYc2mPaT3C4uK0udl3/FhUzH6loqs/c1jIsL3mWd8
   # iR2eAwBa+rsp9sc3wbnPCjFOuFZKN85nnXzrbJ6dFjqNix9Z2it7TCmU89Jltre
   # Rt5Q1xX+mMYIBqjCCAaYCAQOAFJFGUqO9UcFEJgGYiJ9cRavwU6GHMAsGCWCGSA
   # FlAwQCAaBrMBoGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzENBgsqhkiG9w0BCRABLzAcBgkqhkiG9w0BC
   # QUxDxcNMjMwOTE2MjEwMzI4WjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgK+LynlLxySDbBNGE
   # MFDMaKOPKqzlPoj7hW0EfKl9wRYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAm1SGhxyTWRb
   # jf+ewdePchggMKR8zY7FRy+Z5ietrNaWkF2ZgqluVmm3mRDpQDeqTYrcTcBdR3o
   # szs89XxWNf81Afs1mBcUdgPHxcghJNoVsDFmcPd+LEFikOtGjaFCwS2meF3RYaM
   # 51jKer8SObP9nqV1JdPYzaArIpzhjHUA1wktTblEmg9lEOJPqALMI9uL7ngcKaE
   # w4omrcNSBXt9vqge/I5wG7q9tMw2RRcYXTj1XG6nSm7bo9L4JQfBrsubaANmGO9
   # NEAZeHyTQq7TzO9w7KBsB3Cg8qRhCzAY8bznt+r1DVPpQj4EHUBizYUMQRCxD5o
   # IUjEELzssfleF8pQ==
   # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24

Authors' Addresses

   Randy Bush
   IIJ & Arrcus
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
   United States of America
   Email: randy@psg.com

Bush, et al.              Expires 23 March 2024                [Page 25]
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   Massimo Candela
   NTT
   Veemweg 23
   3771 MT Barneveld
   Netherlands
   Email: massimo@ntt.net

   Warren Kumari
   Google
   1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
   Mountain View, CA 94043
   United States of America
   Email: warren@kumari.net

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   516 Dranesville Road
   Herndon, VA 20170
   United States of America
   Email: housley@vigilsec.com

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