A YANG Data Model and RADIUS Extension for Policy-Based Network Access Control
draft-ietf-opsawg-ucl-acl-13
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Qiufang Ma , Qin Wu , Mohamed Boucadair , Daniel King | ||
| Last updated | 2026-03-30 (Latest revision 2026-03-27) | ||
| Replaces | draft-ma-opsawg-ucl-acl | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
INTDIR Early review
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Ready w/nits
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Associated WG milestone |
|
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| Document shepherd | Chongfeng Xie | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2025-11-26 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
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Has enough positions to pass. |
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| Responsible AD | Mahesh Jethanandani | ||
| Send notices to | xiechf@chinatelecom.cn | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - Actions Needed | |
| IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK |
draft-ietf-opsawg-ucl-acl-13
OPSAWG Q. Ma, Ed.
Internet-Draft Q. Wu
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei
Expires: 28 September 2026 M. Boucadair, Ed.
Orange
D. King
Lancaster University
27 March 2026
A YANG Data Model and RADIUS Extension for Policy-Based Network Access
Control
draft-ietf-opsawg-ucl-acl-13
Abstract
This document defines a YANG data model for policy-based network
access control, which provides enforcement of network access control
policies based on group identity. This YANG data model extends
Access Control Lists (ACLs) with date and time parameters to support
schedule-aware policy enforcement.
Specifically in scenarios where network access is triggered by user
authentication, this document defines a mechanism to ease the
maintenance of the mapping between a user group identifier and a set
of IP/MAC addresses to enforce policy-based network access control.
Moreover, the document defines a Remote Authentication Dial-in User
Service (RADIUS) attribute that is used to communicate the user group
identifier as part of identification and authorization information.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Operations and
Management Area Working Group Working Group mailing list
(opsawg@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/opsawg/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/boucadair/policy-based-network-acl.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 September 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Sample Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Policy-based Network Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Endpoint Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.1. User Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.2. Device Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.3. Application Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Relations Between Different Endpoint Groups . . . . . . . 12
5. The UCL Extension to the ACL Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Module Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. The "ietf-ucl-acl" YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. User Access Control Group ID RADIUS Attribute . . . . . . . . 22
7. RADIUS Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.1. Deployment Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.2. Hardware/Software Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.3. Mapping Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.1. YANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.2. RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.1. YANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.2. RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix A. Examples Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A.1. Configuring the Controller Using Group based ACL . . . . 30
A.2. Configuring a PEP Using Group-based ACL . . . . . . . . . 33
A.3. Configuring PEPs Using Address-based ACLs . . . . . . . . 37
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Introduction
With the increased adoption of remote access technologies (e.g.,
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
policies), enterprises adopted more flexibility related to how,
where, and when employees work and collaborate. However, more
flexibility comes with increased risks. Enabling office flexibility
(e.g., mobility across many access locations) introduces a set of
challenges for large-scale enterprises compared to conventional
network access management approaches. Examples of such challenges
are listed below:
* Endpoints do not have stable IP addresses. For example, Wireless
LAN (WLAN) and VPN clients, as well as back-end Virtual Machine
(VM)-based servers, can move; their IP addresses could change as a
result. This means that relying on IP/transport fields (e.g., the
5-tuple) is inadequate to ensure consistent and efficient security
policy enforcement. IP address-based policies may not be flexible
enough to accommodate endpoints with volatile IP addresses.
* With the massive adoption of teleworking, there is a need to apply
different security policies to the same set of endpoints under
different circumstances (e.g., prevent relay attacks against a
local attachment point to the enterprise network). For example,
network access might be granted based upon criteria such as users'
access location, source network reputation, users' role, time-of-
day, type of network device used (e.g., corporate issued device
versus personal device), device's security posture, etc. This
means that the network needs to recognize the endpoints' identity
and their current context, and map the endpoints to their correct
access grant to the network.
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This document defines a YANG data model (Section 5.2) for policy-
based network access control, which extends the IETF Access Control
Lists (ACLs) module defined in [RFC8519]. This module can be used to
ensure consistent enforcement of ACL policies based on the group
identity. Additionally, the YANG data model defined in the document
also extends ACLs with date and time parameters to support schedule-
aware policy enforcement.
The ACL concept has been generalized to be device-nonspecific, and
can be defined at network/administrative domain level [RFC9899]. To
allow for all ACL applications, the YANG module for policy-based
network ACL defined in Section 5.2 does not limit how it can be used.
Specifically in scenarios where network access is triggered by user
authentication, this document also defines a mechanism to establish a
mapping between (1) the user group identifier (ID) and (2) common IP
packet header fields and other encapsulating packet data (e.g., MAC
address) to execute the policy-based access control. Additionally,
the document defines a Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service
(RADIUS) [RFC2865] attribute that is used to communicate the user
group identifier as part of identification and authorization
information (Section 6).
Although the document cites MAC addresses as an example in some
sections, the document does not make assumptions about which
identifiers are used to trigger ACLs. These examples should not be
considered as recommendations. Readers should be aware that MAC-
based ACLs can be bypassed by flushing out the MAC address. Other
implications related to the change of MAC addresses are discussed in
[RFC9797].
The document does not specify how to map the policy group identifiers
to dedicated fields, Group-Based Policy (GBP) discussed in
Section 6.2.3 of [RFC9638] provides an example of how that may be
achieved.
1.1. Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
Note to the RFC Editor: This section is to be removed prior to
publication.
This document contains placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note
summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC
Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Please apply the following replacements:
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* XXXX --> the assigned RFC number for this document
* 2026-01-12 --> the actual date of the publication of this document
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The meanings of the symbols in tree diagrams are defined in
[RFC8340].
The document uses the following terms defined in [RFC8519]:
* Access Control Entry (ACE)
* Access Control List (ACL)
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
* Endpoint: Refers to an entity which could be an end-user, host
device, or application that actually connects to a network.
* Endpoint group: Refers to a group of endpoints that share common
access control policies.
* User group: A group of end-users who will be assigned the same
network access policy. An end-user is defined as a person.
Refer to Section 4.2.1 for more details.
* device group: A collection of host devices that share a common
access control policies. A host device provides compute,
memory, storage, and networking capabilities and connects to a
network. Host devices may be servers, Internet of Things (IoT)
devices, etc. Refer to Section 4.2.2 for more details.
* Application group: A collection of applications that share a
common access control policies. An application is a software
program used for a specific service. Refer to Section 4.2.3
for more details.
* Endpoint group identifier: An identifier used to represent the
collective identity of an endpoint group. An endpoint group
may include a user group, device group, or application group.
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* User group based Control List (UCL) data model: A YANG data model
for policy-based network access control that specifies an
extension to the "ietf-access-control-list" module [RFC8519].
It allows policy enforcement based on a group identifier, which
can be used both at the network device level and at the
network/administrative domain level.
* Policy: A set of rules to administer, manage, and control access
to network resources [RFC3198].
3. Sample Usage
Access to some networks (e.g., enterprise networks) requires
recognizing the endpoints' identities no matter how, where, and when
they connect to the network resources. Then, the network maps the
(connecting) endpoints to their access authorization rights. Such
rights are defined using local policies. As discussed in Section 1,
because (1) there is a large number of connecting endpoints and (2)
an endpoint may have different source IP addresses in different
network segments, deploying a network access control policy for each
IP address or network segment requires a high overhead. An alternate
approach is to configure endpoint groups to classify users,
enterprise devices and applications and associate ACLs with endpoint
groups so that endpoints in each group can share a group of ACL
rules. This approach greatly reduces the overhead of the
administrators and optimizes the ACL resources.
The network ACLs can be provisioned on devices using specific
mechanisms, such as [RFC8519] or [RFC9899].
Different policies may need to be applied in different contextual
situations. For example, companies may restrict (or grant) employees
access to specific internal or external resources during work hours,
while another policy is adopted during off-hours and weekends. A
network administrator may also require traffic-shaping
(Section 2.3.3.3 of [RFC2475]) and policing (Section 2.3.3.4 of
[RFC2475]) during peak hours in order to not affect other data
services.
4. Policy-based Network Access Control
4.1. Overview
An example architecture of a system that provides real-time and
consistent enforcement of access control policies is shown in
Figure 1. This architecture illustrates a user-centric flow, which
includes the following functional entities and interfaces:
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* A service orchestrator which coordinates the overall service,
including security policies. The service may be connectivity or
any other access to resources that can be hosted and offered by a
network.
* A Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [RFC7149] [RFC7426] controller
which is responsible for maintaining endpoint-group based ACLs and
mapping the endpoint group to the associated attributes
information (e.g., IP/MAC address). An SDN controller also
behaves as a Policy Decision Point (PDP) [RFC3198] and pushes the
required access control policies to relevant Policy Enforcement
Points (PEPs) [RFC3198]. A PDP is also known as "policy server"
[RFC2753]. An SDN controller may interact with an Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) [RFC3539] server or a Network
Access Server (NAS) [RFC7542].
* A NAS entity which handles authentication requests. The NAS
interacts with an AAA server to complete user authentication using
protocols like RADIUS [RFC2865]. When access is granted, the AAA
server provides the group identifier (group ID) to which the user
belongs when the user first logs onto the network. A new RADIUS
attribute is defined in Section 6 for this purpose.
* The AAA server provides a collection of authentication,
authorization, and accounting functions. The AAA server is
responsible for centralized user information management. The AAA
server is preconfigured with user credentials (e.g., username and
password), possible group identities and related user attributes
(users may be divided into different groups based on different
user attributes).
* The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is the central entity which is
responsible for enforcing appropriate access control policies. A
first deployment scenario assumes that the SDN controller maps the
group ID to the related common packet header and delivers IP/MAC
address based ACL policies to the required PEPs. Another
deployment scenario may require that PEPs map incoming packets to
their associated source and/or destination endpoint-group IDs, and
acts upon the endpoint-group ID-based ACL policies (e.g., a group
identifier may be carried in packet headers such as discussed in
Section 6.2.3 of [RFC9638]). Multiple PEPs may be involved in a
network. A PEP exposes a YANG-based interface (e.g., NETCONF
[RFC6241]) to an SDN controller.
Figure 1 provides the overall architecture and procedure for policy-
based access control management.
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.------------.
|Orchestrator|
'------+-----'
Service | (Step 1)
------------------------------------------)-------------
Network |
Step 4 |
.-------. .--------. .--------+--------.
|User #1+--+ | AAA | | SDN Controller |
'-------' | | Server +-----+ PDP |
| '----+---' '--------+--------'
| | |
| | +------+--------+ Step 5
Step 2 | | Step 3 | |
| | | |
| .-+-----------+---------------+-------------.
+--------+ |
| .----------------------. .--------------. |
.-------. | | Network Access Server| |Firewall, etc.| |
|User #2+-----------+ | (NAS) | '--------------' |
'-------' | '----------------------' |
| PEP |
'-------------------------------------------'
Figure 1: An Example Architecture for User Group-based Policy
Management
In reference to Figure 1, the following typical flow is experienced:
Step 1: Administrators (or a service orchestrator) configure an SDN
controller with network-level ACLs using the YANG module defined
in Section 5.2. An example is provided in Appendix A.1.
Step 2: When a user first logs onto the network, they are required
to be authenticated (e.g., using username and password) at the
NAS.
Step 3: The authentication request is then relayed to the AAA server
using a protocol such as RADIUS [RFC2865]. It is assumed that the
AAA server has been appropriately configured to store user
credentials, e.g., username, password, group information, and
other user attributes. This document does not restrict what
authentication method is used. Administrators may refer to, e.g.,
Section 7.4 of [I-D.ietf-radext-deprecating-radius] for
authentication method recommendations.
If the authentication request succeeds, the user is placed in a
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user group with the identifier returned to the NAS as the
authentication result (see Section 6). If the authentication
fails, the user is not assigned any user group, which also means
that the user has no access (i.e., Access-Reject returned); or the
user is assigned a special group with very limited access
permissions for the network (as a function of the local policy).
ACLs are enforced so that flows from that IP address are discarded
(or rate-limited) by the network.
In some implementations, the AAA server can be integrated with an
SDN controller.
Step 4: Either the AAA server or the NAS notifies an SDN controller
of the mapping between the user group ID and related common packet
header attributes (e.g., IP/MAC address). The exact details of
how such notification is performed are out scope of this
specification.
Step 5: Either group or IP/MAC address-based access control policies
are maintained on relevant PEPs under the SDN controller's
management. Whether the PEP enforces the group or IP/MAC address-
based ACL is implementation specific. Both types of ACL policy
may exist on the PEP. Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3 elaborate on
each case.
A similar flow applies to policy management based on other endpoint
group types, such as device or application groups, except that the
mapping between the group ID and related common packet header
attributes (e.g., IP/MAC address) may be maintained on the SDN
controller based on an inventory or an application registry.
Particularly, the use of RADIUS exchanges is not required in such
cases (Section 6).
Section 8 provides additional operational considerations.
4.2. Endpoint Group
4.2.1. User Group
The user group is determined by a set of predefined policy criteria
(e.g., source IP address, geolocation data, time of day, or device
certificate). It uses an identifier (user group ID) to represent the
collective identity of a group of users. Users may be moved to
different user groups if their composite attributes, environment,
and/or local enterprise policy change.
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A user is authenticated, and classified at the AAA server, and
assigned to a user group. A user's group membership may change as
aspects of the user change. For example, if the user group
membership is determined solely by the source IP address, then a
given user's group ID will change when the user is assigned a new IP
address that falls outside of the range of addresses of the previous
user group.
This document does not make any assumption about how user groups are
defined. Such considerations are deployment specific and are out of
scope. However, and for illustration purposes, Table 1 shows an
example of how user group definitions may be characterized. User
groups may share several common criteria. That is, user group
criteria are not mutually exclusive. For example, the policy
criteria of user groups R&D Regular and R&D BYOD may share the same
set of users that belong to the R&D organization, and differ only in
the type of clients (firm-issued clients vs. users' personal
clients). Likewise, the same user may be assigned to different user
groups depending on the time of day or the type of day (e.g.,
weekdays versus weekends), etc.
+============+==========+===================================+
| Group Name | Group ID | Group Description |
+============+==========+===================================+
| R&D | foo-10 | R&D employees |
+------------+----------+-----------------------------------+
| R&D BYOD | foo-11 | Personal devices of R&D employees |
+------------+----------+-----------------------------------+
| Sales | foo-20 | Sales employees |
+------------+----------+-----------------------------------+
| VIP | foo-30 | VIP employees |
+------------+----------+-----------------------------------+
Table 1: User Group Examples
4.2.2. Device Group
The device group ID is an identifier that represents the collective
identity of a group of enterprise end-devices. An enterprise device
could be a server that hosts applications or software that deliver
services to enterprise users. It could also be an enterprise IoT
device that serves a limited purpose, e.g., a printer that allows
users to scan and print. Table 2 shows an example of how device
group definitions may be characterized.
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+==================+==========+===========================+
| Group Name | Group ID | Group Description |
+==================+==========+===========================+
| Workflow | bar-40 | Workflow resource servers |
+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| R&D Resource | bar-50 | R&D resource servers |
+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| Printer Resource | bar-60 | Printer resources |
+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
Table 2: Device Group Example
Users accessing an enterprise device should be strictly controlled.
Matching abstract device group ID instead of specified addresses in
ACL polices helps shield the consequences of address change (e.g.,
back-end VM-based server migration).
4.2.3. Application Group
An application group is a collection of applications that share a
common access control policies. A device may run multiple
applications, and different policies might need to be applied to the
applications and device. A single application may need to run on
multiple devices/VMs/containers, the abstraction of application group
eases the process of application migration. For example, the policy
does not depend on the transport coordinates (i.e., 5-tuple).
Table 3 shows an example of how application group definitions may be
characterized.
+=======================+==========+==========================+
| Group Name | Group ID | Group Description |
+=======================+==========+==========================+
| Audio/Video Streaming | baz-70 | Audio/Video conferencing |
| | | application |
+-----------------------+----------+--------------------------+
| Instant Messaging | baz-80 | Messaging application |
+-----------------------+----------+--------------------------+
| document | baz-90 | Real-time document |
| Collaboration | | editing application |
+-----------------------+----------+--------------------------+
Table 3: Application Group Examples
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4.3. Relations Between Different Endpoint Groups
Policies enforcement can be targeted to different endpoint groups in
different scenarios. For example, when a user connects to the
network and accesses an application hosted on one or multiple
devices, access policies may be applied to different user groups. In
some cases, applications and devices may operate and run without
requiring any user interventions, or they may require user
authentication but access rules do not differentiate between
different users. This enables policies to be applied to the
application or device group. A device group can be used when there
is only one single application running on the device or different
applications running but with the same access control rules. If
there is an application running on different devices/VMs/containers,
it is simpler to apply a single policy to the application group.
5. The UCL Extension to the ACL Module
5.1. Module Overview
This module specifies an extension to the "ietf-access-control-list"
module [RFC8519]. This extension adds endpoint groups so that an
endpoint group identifier can be matched upon, and also enable access
control policy activation based on date and time conditions.
Figure 2 provides the tree structure of the "ietf-ucl-acl" module.
module: ietf-ucl-acl
augment /acl:acls:
+--rw endpoint-groups {ucl:group}?
+--rw endpoint-group* [group-id]
+--rw group-id string
+--rw group-type? identityref
augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches:
+--rw endpoint-group {ucl:match-on-group}?
+--rw source-group-id? group-id-reference
+--rw destination-group-id? group-id-reference
augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace:
+--rw effective-schedule {ucl:schedule}?
+--rw (schedule-type)?
+--:(period)
| +--rw period
| +--rw period-description? string
| +--rw period-start yang:date-and-time
| +--rw time-zone-identifier? sys:timezone-name
| +--rw (period-type)?
| +--:(explicit)
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| | +--rw period-end? yang:date-and-time
| +--:(duration)
| +--rw duration? duration
+--:(recurrence)
+--rw recurrence {schedule:icalendar-recurrence}?
+--rw recurrence-first
| +--rw start-time? yang:date-and-time
| +--rw duration? duration
| +--rw time-zone-identifier? sys:timezone-name
+--rw (recurrence-end)?
| +--:(until)
| | +--rw until? yang:date-and-time
| +--:(count)
| +--rw count? uint32
+--rw recurrence-description? string
+--rw frequency identityref
+--rw interval? uint32
+--rw period* [period-start]
| +--rw period-description? string
| +--rw period-start yang:date-and-time
| +--rw time-zone-identifier? sys:timezone-name
| +--rw (period-type)?
| +--:(explicit)
| | +--rw period-end? yang:date-and-time
| +--:(duration)
| +--rw duration? duration
+--rw bysecond* uint32
+--rw byminute* uint32
+--rw byhour* uint32
+--rw byday* [weekday]
| +--rw direction* int32
| +--rw weekday schedule:weekday
+--rw bymonthday* int32
+--rw byyearday* int32
+--rw byyearweek* int32
+--rw byyearmonth* uint32
+--rw bysetpos* int32
+--rw workweek-start? schedule:weekday
+--rw exception-dates* yang:date-and-time
Figure 2: UCL Extension
The first part of the "ietf-ucl-acl" module augments the "acl" list
in the "ietf-access-control-list" module [RFC8519] with an "endpoint-
groups" container having a list of "endpoint group" inside, each
entry has a "group-id" that uniquely identifies the endpoint group
and a "group-type" parameter to specify the endpoint group type.
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"group-id" is defined as a string rather than unsigned integer
(e.g., uint32) to accommodate deployments which require some
identification hierarchy within a domain. Such a hierarchy is
meant to ease coordination within an administrative domain. There
might be cases where a domain needs to tag packets with the group
they belong to. The tagging does not need to mirror exactly the
"group id" used to populate the policy. How the "group-id" string
is mapped to the tagging or field in the packet header in
encapsulation scenario is outside the scope of this document.
Augmentation may be considered in the future to cover
encapsulation considerations.
The second part of the "ietf-ucl-acl" module augments the "matches"
container in the "ietf-access-control-list" module [RFC8519] so that
a source and/or destination endpoint group index can be referenced as
the match criteria.
The third part of the module augments the "ace" list in the "ietf-
access-control-list" module [RFC8519] with date and time specific
parameters to allow ACE to be activated based on a date/time
condition. Two types of time range are defined, which reuse
"recurrence" and "period" groupings defined in the "ietf-schedule"
YANG module in [RFC9922], respectively.
5.2. The "ietf-ucl-acl" YANG Module
This module imports types and groupings defined in the "ietf-
schedule" module [RFC9922]. It also augments the "ietf-access-
control-list" module (Section 4.1 of [RFC8519]).
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ucl-acl@2026-01-12.yang"
module ietf-ucl-acl {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl";
prefix ucl;
import ietf-access-control-list {
prefix acl;
reference
"RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
Control Lists (ACLs)";
}
import ietf-schedule {
prefix schedule;
reference
"RFC 9922: A Common YANG Data Model for Scheduling";
}
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organization
"IETF OPSWG Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/>
WG List: OPSAWG <mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>
Editor: Qiufang Ma
<mailto:maqiufang1@huawei.com>
Author: Qin Wu
<mailto:bill.wu@huawei.com>
Editor: Mohamed Boucadair
<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Author: Daniel King
<mailto:d.king@lancaster.ac.uk>";
description
"The User group-based Control List (UCL) YANG module augments
the IETF Access Control Lists (ACLs) module and is meant to
ensure consistent enforcement of ACL policies based on
the group identity.
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
All revisions of IETF and IANA published modules can be found
at the YANG Parameters registry group
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/yang-parameters).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2026-01-12 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model and RADIUS Extension for
Policy-based Network Access Control";
}
feature schedule {
description
"Indicates support of schedule-based Access Control
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Entries (ACEs).";
}
feature match-on-group {
description
"Indicates support of matching on endpoint groups.";
}
feature group {
if-feature "ucl:match-on-group";
description
"Indicates support of group-based ACLs.";
}
feature mixed-ipv4-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-ipv4 and ucl:match-on-group";
description
"IPv4 and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-ipv6-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-ipv6 and ucl:match-on-group";
description
"IPv6 and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-ipv4-ipv6-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-ipv4 and acl:match-on-ipv6 and "
+ "ucl:match-on-group";
description
"IPv4, IPv6, and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-eth-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-eth and ucl:match-on-group";
description
"Eth and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-eth-ipv4-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-eth and acl:match-on-ipv4 and "
+ "ucl:match-on-group";
description
"Eth, IPv4, and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-eth-ipv6-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-eth and acl:match-on-ipv6 and "
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+ "ucl:match-on-group";
description
"Eth, IPv6, and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-eth-ipv4-ipv6-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-eth and acl:match-on-ipv4 and "
+ "acl:match-on-ipv6 and ucl:match-on-group";
description
"Eth, IPv4, IPv6, and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
identity group-acl-type {
if-feature "group";
base acl:acl-base;
description
"An ACL that matches based on an endpoint group identity,
which can represent the collective identity of
a group of authenticated users, end-devices, or applications.
An endpoint group identity may be carried in the outer/inner
packet header (e.g., via NVO3 encapsulation), or may not
correspond to any field in the packet header. Matching on
Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-ipv4-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-ipv4-group";
base acl:ipv4-acl-type;
base ucl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the IPv4 header and endpoint group identities, which can
represent the collective identity of a group of authenticated
users, end-devices, or applications. Matching on Layer 4
header fields may also exist in the ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-ipv6-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-ipv6-group";
base acl:ipv6-acl-type;
base ucl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the IPv6 header and endpoint group identities, which can
represent the collective identity of a group of authenticated
users, end-devices, or applications. Matching on Layer 4
header fields may also exist in the ACEs.";
}
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identity mixed-ipv4-ipv6-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-ipv4-ipv6-group";
base acl:ipv4-acl-type;
base acl:ipv6-acl-type;
base ucl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the IPv4 header, IPv6 header, and endpoint group
identities, which can represent the collective identity of a
group of authenticated users, end-devices, or applications.
Matching on Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the
ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-eth-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-eth-group";
base acl:eth-acl-type;
base ucl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the Ethernet header and endpoint group identities,
which can represent the collective identity of a group of
authenticated users, end-devices, or applications. Matching
on Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-eth-ipv4-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-eth-ipv4-group";
base acl:eth-acl-type;
base acl:ipv4-acl-type;
base ucl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the Ethernet header, IPv4 header, and endpoint group
identities, which can represent the collective identity of a
group of authenticated users, end-devices or applications.
Matching on Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the
ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-eth-ipv6-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-eth-ipv6-group";
base acl:eth-acl-type;
base acl:ipv6-acl-type;
base ucl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the Ethernet header, IPv6 header, and endpoint group
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identities, which can represent the collective identity of
a group of authenticated users, end-devices or applications.
Matching on Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the
ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-eth-ipv4-ipv6-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-eth-ipv4-ipv6-group";
base acl:eth-acl-type;
base acl:ipv4-acl-type;
base acl:ipv6-acl-type;
base ucl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the Ethernet header, IPv4 header, IPv6 header, and endpoint
group identities, which can represent the collective identity
of a group of authenticated users, end-devices or
applications. Matching on Layer 4 header fields may also exist
in the ACEs.";
}
identity endpoint-group-type {
description
"Identity for the type of endpoint group.";
}
identity user-group {
base ucl:endpoint-group-type;
description
"Indicates user endpoint group type.";
}
identity device-group {
base ucl:endpoint-group-type;
description
"Indicates device endpoint group type.";
}
identity application-group {
base ucl:endpoint-group-type;
description
"Indicates application endpoint group type.";
}
typedef group-id-reference {
type leafref {
path "/acl:acls/ucl:endpoint-groups"
+ "/ucl:endpoint-group/ucl:group-id";
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}
description
"Defines a reference to a group identifier.";
}
augment "/acl:acls" {
if-feature "ucl:group";
description
"Adds a container for endpoint group definition.";
container endpoint-groups {
description
"Defines a container for the endpoint group list.";
list endpoint-group {
key "group-id";
description
"Definition of the endpoint group list.";
leaf group-id {
type string {
length "1..64";
}
description
"The endpoint group identifier that uniquely identifies
an endpoint group.";
}
leaf group-type {
type identityref {
base endpoint-group-type;
}
description
"Specifies the endpoint group type.";
}
}
}
}
augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches" {
if-feature "ucl:match-on-group";
description
"Specifies how a source and/or destination endpoint group
index can be referenced as the match criteria in the ACEs.";
container endpoint-group {
when "derived-from-or-self(/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:type, "
+ "'ucl:group-acl-type')";
description
"Adds new match types.";
leaf source-group-id {
type group-id-reference;
description
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"The matched source endpoint group ID.";
}
leaf destination-group-id {
type group-id-reference;
description
"The matched destination endpoint group identifier.";
}
}
}
augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace" {
if-feature "ucl:schedule";
description
"Adds schedule parameters to allow the ACE to take effect
based on date and time.";
container effective-schedule {
description
"Defines when the access control entry rules
are applied based on date and time condition.
If it is not configured, the access control entry
is immediately and always applied.";
choice schedule-type {
description
"Choice based on the type of the time range.";
container period {
description
"The ACE is applied based on a precise period of
time.";
uses schedule:period-of-time;
}
container recurrence {
if-feature "schedule:icalendar-recurrence";
description
"The ACE is applied based on a recurrence rule.";
uses schedule:icalendar-recurrence;
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
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6. User Access Control Group ID RADIUS Attribute
This section defines a User-Access-Group-ID RADIUS attribute which is
designed for user-centric access control scenarios where network
access is triggered by user authentication and used to indicate the
user group ID to be used by the NAS. For other endpoint group types,
such as device group or application group, the identifiers are
typically pre-provisioned on the SDN controller based on an inventory
or an application registry.
The User-Access-Group-ID RADIUS attribute is defined with a globally
unique name. The definition of the attribute follows the guidelines
in Section 2.7.1 of [RFC6929]. When the User-Access-Group-ID RADIUS
attribute is present in the RADIUS Access-Accept, the system applies
the related access control to the users after the user authenticates.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute is of type "string" as defined in
Section 3.5 of [RFC8044].
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute MAY appear in a RADIUS Access-
Accept packet. It MAY also appear in a RADIUS Access-Request packet
as a hint to the RADIUS server to indicate a preference. However,
the server is not required to honor such a preference. If more than
one instance of the User-Access-Group-ID Attribute appears in a
RADIUS Access-Accept packet, this means that the user is a member of
many groups.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute MAY appear in a RADIUS CoA-Request
packet.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute MAY appear in a RADIUS Accounting-
Request packet. Specifically, this may be used by a NAS to
acknowledge that the attribute was received in the RADIUS Access-
Request and the NAS is enforcing that policy.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute MUST NOT appear in any other
RADIUS packet.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute is structured as follows:
Type
TBA1
Length
This field indicates the total length, in octets, of all fields of
this attribute, including the Type, Length, Extended-Type, and the
"Value".
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The Length MUST be at most 67 octets. The maximum length is 67
octets to accommodate the maximum group ID of 64 octets plus one
octet for Type, one octet for Length, and one octet for Extended-
Length.
Data Type
string (Section 3.5 of [RFC8044])
Value
This field contains the user group ID.
7. RADIUS Attributes
Table 4 provides a guide as what type of RADIUS packets that may
contain User-Access-Group-ID Attribute, and in what quantity.
+================+=========+=========+===========+==============+
| Access-Request | Access- | Access- | Access- | Attribute |
| | Accept | Reject | Challenge | |
+================+=========+=========+===========+==============+
| 0+ | 0+ | 0 | 0 | User-Access- |
| | | | | Group-ID |
+----------------+---------+---------+-----------+--------------+
| Accounting- | CoA- | CoA-ACK | CoA-NACK | Attribute |
| Request | Request | | | |
+----------------+---------+---------+-----------+--------------+
| 0+ | 0+ | 0 | 0 | User-Access- |
| | | | | Group-ID |
+----------------+---------+---------+-----------+--------------+
Table 4: Table of Attributes
Notation for Table 4:
0 This attribute MUST NOT be present in packet.
0+ Zero or more instances of this attribute MAY be present in
packet.
8. Operational Considerations
8.1. Deployment Options
The UCL model can be implemented in different ways.
In some cases, the UCL data model is implemented at the network/
administrative domain level with an SDN controller maintaining the
dynamical mapping from endpoint group ID to IP/transport fields
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(e.g., the 5-tuple) and programing the PEPs with IP address/5-tuple
based ACLs. In such cases, PEPs do not require to implement specific
logic (including hardware) compared to the enforcement of
conventional ACLs.
It is possible for the UCL data model to be implemented at the device
level. While it eliminates the need for an SDN controller to
interact frequently with the PEPs for reasons like the user's context
of network connection change or VM/application migration, dedicated
hardware/software support might be needed for PEPs to understand the
endpoint group identifier. In scenarios where the NAS behaves as the
PEP which acquires the source and/or destination endpoint group ID
from the AAA server, ACL policy enforcement based on the group
identity without being encapsulated into packet headers might affect
the forwarding performance. Implementations need to evaluate the
operational tradeoff (flexibility brought to the network vs. the
complexity of implementation) carefully. Such assessment is out of
scope for this document.
8.2. Hardware/Software Implications
Some devices may not have built-in capabilities to enforce group-
based match policies. Hardware or software upgrades may be required
to support such feature by involved PEPs.
8.3. Mapping Consistency
The specification requires that adequate setup is put in place to map
a Group ID to packets fields, typically managed by a controller.
Special care should be taken to ensure that such mapping is
appropriately enforced when distinct mechanisms (RADIUS, etc.) are
supported in network.
9. Security Considerations
9.1. YANG
This section is modeled after the template described in Section 3.7
of [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis].
The "ietf-ucl-acl" YANG module defines a data model that is designed
to be accessed via YANG-based management protocols such as the
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241] and RESTCONF
[RFC8040]. These YANG-based management protocols (1) have to use a
secure transport layer (e.g., Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4252], TLS
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis], and QUIC [RFC9000]) and (2) have to use
mutual authentication.
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The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., "config true", which is the
default). All writable data nodes are likely to be sensitive or
vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g.,
edit-config) and delete operations to these data nodes without proper
protection or authentication can have a negative effect on network
operations. The following subtrees and data nodes have particular
sensitivities/vulnerabilities:
* /acl:acls/ucl:endpoint-groups/ucl:endpoint-group: This list
specifies all the endpoint group entries. Unauthorized write
access to this list can allow intruders to modify the entries
so as to forge an endpoint group that does not exist or
maliciously delete an existing endpoint group, which could be
used to craft an attack.
* /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches/ucl:endpoint-
group: This subtree specifies a source and/or endpoint group
index as match criteria in the ACEs. Unauthorized write access
to this data node may allow intruders to modify the group
identity so as to permit access that should not be permitted,
or deny access that should be permitted.
* /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/ucl:effective-schedule: It
specifies the secheduling of ACLs. Unauthorized write access
to this data node may allow intruders to alter it. This may
lead to service disruption or unavailability. Strict access
control must be implemented for write operations on this
subtree to ensure that only authorized users can modify it.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. Specifically, the following
subtrees and data nodes have particular sensitivities/
vulnerabilities:
* /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/ucl:effective-schedule: It
specifies when the access control entry rules are applied. An
unauthorized read access of the list will allow the attacker to
determine which rules are applied, to better craft an attack.
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9.2. RADIUS
RADIUS-related security considerations are discussed in [RFC2865].
An effort to deprecating insecure practices in RADIUS is provided in
[I-D.ietf-radext-deprecating-radius].
This document targets deployments where a trusted relationship is in
place between the RADIUS client and server with communication
optionally secured by IPsec or Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[RFC6614][I-D.ietf-radext-radiusdtls-bis].
10. IANA Considerations
10.1. YANG
This document registers the following URIs in the "IETF XML Registry"
[RFC3688].
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers the following YANG modules in the "YANG
Module Names" registry [RFC6020].
name: ietf-ucl-acl
prefix: ucl
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl
maintained by IANA? N
reference: RFC XXXX
10.2. RADIUS
This document requests IANA to assign a new RADIUS attribute type in
the 241-245 range from the IANA registry "Radius Attribute Types"
[RADIUS-Types]:
+=======+======================+===========+===============+
| Value | Description | Data Type | Reference |
+=======+======================+===========+===============+
| TBA1 | User-Access-Group-ID | string | This-Document |
+-------+----------------------+-----------+---------------+
Table 5: RADIUS Attribute
11. References
11.1. Normative References
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2865>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3688>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6020>.
[RFC6929] DeKok, A. and A. Lior, "Remote Authentication Dial In User
Service (RADIUS) Protocol Extensions", RFC 6929,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6929, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6929>.
[RFC8044] DeKok, A., "Data Types in RADIUS", RFC 8044,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8044, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8044>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8341>.
[RFC8519] Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
"YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)",
RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8519>.
[RFC9922] Ma, Q., Ed., Wu, Q., Boucadair, M., Ed., and D. King, "A
Common YANG Data Model for Scheduling", RFC 9922,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9922, March 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9922>.
11.2. Informative References
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[I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis]
Bierman, A., Boucadair, M., and Q. Wu, "Guidelines for
Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data
Models", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netmod-rfc8407bis-28, 5 June 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-
rfc8407bis-28>.
[I-D.ietf-radext-deprecating-radius]
DeKok, A., "Deprecating Insecure Practices in RADIUS",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-radext-
deprecating-radius-09, 15 March 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-radext-
deprecating-radius-09>.
[I-D.ietf-radext-radiusdtls-bis]
Rieckers, J., Cullen, M., and S. Winter, "RadSec: RADIUS
over Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-radext-radiusdtls-bis-15, 23 February 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-radext-
radiusdtls-bis-15>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-14, 13 September 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-14>.
[I-D.smith-vxlan-group-policy]
Smith, M. and L. Kreeger, "VXLAN Group Policy Option",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-smith-vxlan-group-
policy-05, 22 October 2018,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-smith-vxlan-
group-policy-05>.
[I-D.yizhou-anima-ip-to-access-control-groups]
Li, Y., Shen, L., and Y. Zhou, "Autonomic IP Address To
Access Control Group ID Mapping", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-yizhou-anima-ip-to-access-control-
groups-02, 15 November 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yizhou-anima-
ip-to-access-control-groups-02>.
[I-D.you-i2nsf-user-group-based-policy]
You, J., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Boucadair, M., Li, Y.,
Strassner, J., and S. Majee, "User-group-based Security
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Policy for Service Layer", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-you-i2nsf-user-group-based-policy-02, 8 July
2016, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-you-
i2nsf-user-group-based-policy-02>.
[RADIUS-Types]
IANA, "RADIUS Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types>.
[RFC2475] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.,
and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
Services", RFC 2475, DOI 10.17487/RFC2475, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2475>.
[RFC2753] Yavatkar, R., Pendarakis, D., and R. Guerin, "A Framework
for Policy-based Admission Control", RFC 2753,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2753, January 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2753>.
[RFC3198] Westerinen, A., Schnizlein, J., Strassner, J., Scherling,
M., Quinn, B., Herzog, S., Huynh, A., Carlson, M., Perry,
J., and S. Waldbusser, "Terminology for Policy-Based
Management", RFC 3198, DOI 10.17487/RFC3198, November
2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3198>.
[RFC3539] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and
Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3539, June 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3539>.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4252>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
[RFC6614] Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS",
RFC 6614, DOI 10.17487/RFC6614, May 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6614>.
[RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined
Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider
Environment", RFC 7149, DOI 10.17487/RFC7149, March 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7149>.
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[RFC7426] Haleplidis, E., Ed., Pentikousis, K., Ed., Denazis, S.,
Hadi Salim, J., Meyer, D., and O. Koufopavlou, "Software-
Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture
Terminology", RFC 7426, DOI 10.17487/RFC7426, January
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7426>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7542>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8040>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8340>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.
[RFC9638] Boutros, S. and D. Eastlake 3rd, Ed., "Network
Virtualization over Layer 3 (NVO3) Encapsulation
Considerations", RFC 9638, DOI 10.17487/RFC9638, September
2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9638>.
[RFC9797] Henry, J. and Y. Lee, "Randomized and Changing Media
Access Control (MAC) Addresses: Context, Network Impacts,
and Use Cases", RFC 9797, DOI 10.17487/RFC9797, June 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9797>.
[RFC9899] Gonzalez de Dios, O., Barguil, S., Boucadair, M., and Q.
Wu, "Extensions to the YANG Data Model for Access Control
Lists (ACLs)", RFC 9899, DOI 10.17487/RFC9899, December
2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9899>.
Appendix A. Examples Usage
A.1. Configuring the Controller Using Group based ACL
Let's consider an organization that would like to manage the access
of R&D employees that bring personally owned devices (BYOD) into the
workplace.
The access requirements are as follows:
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* Permit traffic from R&D BYOD of employees, destined to R&D
employees' devices every work day from 8:00:00 to 18:00:00 UTC,
starting in January 1st, 2026.
* Deny traffic from R&D BYOD of employees, destined to finance
servers located in the enterprise DC network starting at 8:30:00
of January 20, 2026 with an offset of -08:00 from UTC (Pacific
Standard Time) and ending at 18:00:00 in Pacific Standard Time on
December 31, 2026.
The example shown in Figure 3 illustrates the configuration of an SDN
controller using the group-based ACL:
{
"ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
"ietf-ucl-acl:endpoint-groups": {
"endpoint-group": [
{
"group-id": "R&D",
"group-type": "ietf-ucl-acl:user-group"
},
{
"group-id": "R&D BYOD",
"group-type": "ietf-ucl-acl:user-group"
},
{
"group-id": "finance server",
"group-type": "ietf-ucl-acl:device-group"
}
]
},
"acl": [
{
"name": "sample-group-acl",
"type": "ietf-ucl-acl:group-acl-type",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "rule1",
"matches": {
"ietf-ucl-acl:endpoint-group": {
"source-group-id": "R&D BYOD",
"destination-group-id": "R&D"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:accept"
},
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"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"recurrence": {
"recurrence-first": {
"start-time": "2026-01-01T08:00:00Z",
"duration": "PT10:00:00"
},
"frequency": "ietf-schedule:daily",
"byday": [
{
"weekday": "monday"
},
{
"weekday": "tuesday"
},
{
"weekday": "wednesday"
},
{
"weekday": "thursday"
},
{
"weekday": "friday"
}
]
}
}
},
{
"name": "rule2",
"matches": {
"ietf-ucl-acl:endpoint-group": {
"source-group-id": "R&D BYOD",
"destination-group-id": "finance server"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:reject"
},
"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"period": {
"period-start": "2026-01-20T08:30:00-08:00",
"period-end": "2026-12-31T18:00:00-08:00"
}
}
}
]
}
}
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]
}
}
Figure 3: Example of UCL Configuration
A.2. Configuring a PEP Using Group-based ACL
This section illustrates an example to configure a PEP using the
group-based ACL.
The PEP which enforces group-based ACL may acquire group identities
from the AAA server if working as a NAS authenticating both the
source endpoint and the destination endpoint users. Another case for
a PEP enforcing a group-based ACL is to obtain the group identity of
the source endpoint directly from the packet field
[I-D.smith-vxlan-group-policy].
Assume the mapping between device group ID and IP addresses is
predefined or acquired via device authentication. Figure 4 shows the
ACL configuration delivered from the controller to the PEP. This
example is consistent with the example presented in Appendix A.1.
The examples in this section do not intend to be exhaustive. In
particular, explicit IP addresses ("destination-ipv4-network" or
"destination-ipv6-network") are provided only for one single rule to
illustrate how the mapping between a group ID and IP addresses is
translated into an ACL rule entry.
{
"ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
"ietf-ucl-acl:endpoint-groups": {
"endpoint-group": [
{
"group-id": "R&D",
"group-type": "ietf-ucl-acl:user-group"
},
{
"group-id": "R&D BYOD",
"group-type": "ietf-ucl-acl:user-group"
}
]
},
"acl": [
{
"name": "sample-ucl-ipv4",
"type": "ietf-ucl-acl:mixed-ipv4-group-type",
"aces": {
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"ace": [
{
"name": "rule1",
"matches": {
"ietf-ucl-acl:endpoint-group": {
"source-group-id": "R&D BYOD",
"destination-group-id": "R&D"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:accept"
},
"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"recurrence": {
"recurrence-first": {
"start-time": "2026-01-01T08:00:00Z",
"duration": "PT10:00:00"
},
"frequency": "ietf-schedule:daily",
"byday": [
{
"weekday": "monday"
},
{
"weekday": "tuesday"
},
{
"weekday": "wednesday"
},
{
"weekday": "thursday"
},
{
"weekday": "friday"
}
]
}
}
},
{
"name": "rule2",
"matches": {
"ietf-ucl-acl:endpoint-group": {
"source-group-id": "R&D BYOD"
},
"ipv4": {
"destination-ipv4-network": "203.0.113.1/24"
}
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},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:reject"
},
"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"period": {
"period-start": "2026-01-20T08:30:00-08:00",
"period-end": "2026-12-31T18:00:00-08:00"
}
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 4: Example of PEP Configuration
Figure 5 shows an example of the same policy but with a destination
IPv6 prefix.
{
"ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
"ietf-ucl-acl:endpoint-groups": {
"endpoint-group": [
{
"group-id": "R&D",
"group-type": "ietf-ucl-acl:user-group"
},
{
"group-id": "R&D BYOD",
"group-type": "ietf-ucl-acl:user-group"
}
]
},
"acl": [
{
"name": "sample-ucl-ipv6",
"type": "ietf-ucl-acl:mixed-ipv6-group-type",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "rule1",
"matches": {
"ietf-ucl-acl:endpoint-group": {
"source-group-id": "R&D BYOD",
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"destination-group-id": "R&D"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:accept"
},
"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"recurrence": {
"recurrence-first": {
"start-time": "2026-01-01T08:00:00Z",
"duration": "PT10:00:00"
},
"frequency": "ietf-schedule:daily",
"byday": [
{
"weekday": "monday"
},
{
"weekday": "tuesday"
},
{
"weekday": "wednesday"
},
{
"weekday": "thursday"
},
{
"weekday": "friday"
}
]
}
}
},
{
"name": "rule2",
"matches": {
"ietf-ucl-acl:endpoint-group": {
"source-group-id": "R&D BYOD"
},
"ipv6": {
"destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/64"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:reject"
},
"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"period": {
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"period-start": "2026-01-20T08:30:00-08:00",
"period-end": "2026-12-31T18:00:00-08:00"
}
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 5: Example of PEP Configuration (ipv6)
A.3. Configuring PEPs Using Address-based ACLs
The section describes an example of configuring a PEP using IP
address based ACL. IP address based access control policies could be
applied to the PEP that may not understand the group information,
e.g., firewall.
Assume an employee in the R&D department accesses the network
wirelessly from a non-corporate laptop. The SDN controller
associates the user group to which the employee belongs with the user
address according to step 1 to 4 in Section 4.1.
Assume the mapping between device group ID and IP addresses is
predefined or acquired via device authentication. Figure 6 shows an
IPv4 address based ACL configuration delivered from the controller to
the PEP. This example is consistent with the example presented in
Appendix A.1.
{
"ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
"acl": [
{
"name": "sample-acl-ipv4",
"type": "ietf-access-control-list:ipv4-acl-type",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "rule1",
"matches": {
"ipv4": {
"destination-ipv4-network": "192.168.2.1/24",
"source-ipv4-network": "192.168.1.1/24"
}
},
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"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:accept"
},
"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"recurrence": {
"recurrence-first": {
"start-time": "2026-01-01T08:00:00Z",
"duration": "PT10:00:00"
},
"frequency": "ietf-schedule:daily",
"byday": [
{
"weekday": "monday"
},
{
"weekday": "tuesday"
},
{
"weekday": "wednesday"
},
{
"weekday": "thursday"
},
{
"weekday": "friday"
}
]
}
}
},
{
"name": "rule2",
"matches": {
"ipv4": {
"destination-ipv4-network": "203.0.113.1/24",
"source-ipv4-network": "192.168.1.1/24"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:reject"
},
"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"period": {
"period-start": "2026-01-20T08:30:00-08:00",
"period-end": "2026-12-31T18:00:00-08:00"
}
}
}
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]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 6: Example of PEP Configuration
Figure 7 shows an example of the same policy but with a destination
IPv6 prefix.
{
"ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
"acl": [
{
"name": "sample-acl-ipv6",
"type": "ietf-access-control-list:ipv6-acl-type",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "rule1",
"matches": {
"ipv6": {
"destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8::1/64",
"source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8::2:1/64"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:accept"
},
"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"recurrence": {
"recurrence-first": {
"start-time": "2026-01-01T08:00:00Z",
"duration": "PT10:00:00"
},
"frequency": "ietf-schedule:daily",
"byday": [
{
"weekday": "monday"
},
{
"weekday": "tuesday"
},
{
"weekday": "wednesday"
},
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{
"weekday": "thursday"
},
{
"weekday": "friday"
}
]
}
}
},
{
"name": "rule2",
"matches": {
"ipv6": {
"destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/64",
"source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8::2:1/64"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "ietf-access-control-list:reject"
},
"ietf-ucl-acl:effective-schedule": {
"period": {
"period-start": "2026-01-20T08:30:00-08:00",
"period-end": "2026-12-31T18:00:00-08:00"
}
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 7: Example of PEP Configuration (IPv6)
Acknowledgments
This work has benefited from the discussions of User-group-based
Security Policy over the years. In particular,
[I-D.you-i2nsf-user-group-based-policy] and
[I-D.yizhou-anima-ip-to-access-control-groups] provided mechanisms to
establish a mapping between the IP address/prefix of users and access
control group IDs.
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Jianjie You, Myo Zarny, Christian Jacquenet, Mohamed Boucadair, and
Yizhou Li contributed to an earlier version of
[I-D.you-i2nsf-user-group-based-policy]. We would like to thank the
authors of that Internet-Draft on modern network access control
mechanisms for material that assisted in thinking about this
document.
Thanks to Joe Clarke, Bill Fenner, Benoît Claise, Rob Wilton, David
Somers-Harris, Alan Dekok, Heikki Vatiainen, Wen Xiang, Wei Wang,
Hongwei Li, and Jensen Zhang for their review and comments.
Thanks to Dhruv Dhody for the OPSDIR review, Alexander Pelov for
INTDIR review, Valery Smyslov for the SECDIR review, and Acee Lindem
for the YANGDOCTORS review.
Thanks to Mahesh Jethanandani for the AD review.
Authors' Addresses
Qiufang Ma (editor)
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Jiangsu
210012
China
Email: maqiufang1@huawei.com
Qin Wu
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Jiangsu
210012
China
Email: bill.wu@huawei.com
Mohamed Boucadair (editor)
Orange
35000 Rennes
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Daniel King
Lancaster University
United Kingdom
Email: d.king@lancaster.ac.uk
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