Network Reconnaissance in IPv6 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-04
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (opsec WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Fernando Gont , Tim Chown | ||
| Last updated | 2014-12-16 (Latest revision 2014-06-14) | ||
| Replaces | draft-gont-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
plain text
htmlized
pdfized
bibtex
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| Reviews |
SECDIR Last Call review
(of
-07)
Has Nits
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| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | Gunter Van de Velde | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-04.txt
Abstract
IPv6 offers a much larger address space than that of its IPv4 counterpart. An IPv6 subnet of size /64 can (in theory) accommodate approximately 1.844 * 10^19 hosts, thus resulting in a much lower host density (#hosts/#addresses) than is typical in IPv4 networks, where a site typically has 65,000 or less unique addresses. As a result, it is widely assumed that it would take a tremendous effort to perform address scanning attacks against IPv6 networks, and therefore brute-force IPv6 address scanning attacks have been considered unfeasible. This document updates RFC 5157, which first discussed this assumption, by providing further analysis on how traditional address scanning techniques apply to IPv6 networks, and exploring some additional techniques that can be employed for IPv6 network reconnaissance. In doing so, this document formally obsoletes RFC 5157.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)