Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets-02
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Operational Security Capabilities for F. Gont
IP Network Infrastructure (opsec) SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Internet-Draft W. Liu
Intended status: Informational Huawei Technologies
Expires: July 1, 2013 December 28, 2012
Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets-02
Abstract
This document discusses the security implications of native IPv6
support and IPv6 transition/co-existence technologies on "IPv4-only"
networks, and describes possible mitigations for the aforementioned
issues.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 1, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Gont & Liu Expires July 1, 2013 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Sec. Impl. of IPv6 on IPv4 networks December 2012
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Security Implications of Native IPv6 Support . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Filtering Native IPv6 Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Security Implications of Tunneling Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Filtering 6in4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Filtering 6over4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Filtering 6rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. Filtering 6to4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5. Filtering ISATAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.6. Filtering Teredo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.7. Filtering Tunnel Broker with Tunnel Setup Protocol
(TSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Additional Considerations when Filtering IPv6 Traffic . . . . 13
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Summary of filtering rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Gont & Liu Expires July 1, 2013 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Sec. Impl. of IPv6 on IPv4 networks December 2012
1. Introduction
Most general-purpose operating systems implement and enable by
default native IPv6 [RFC2460] support and a number of transition/
co-existence technologies. In those cases in which the corresponding
devices are deployed on networks that are assumed to be IPv4-only,
native IPv6 support and/or IPv6 transition/co-existence technologies
could be leveraged by local or remote attackers for a number of
(illegitimate) purposes. For example,
o A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) might be prepared to
detect attack patterns for IPv4 traffic, but might be unable to
detect the same attack patterns when a transition/co-existence
technology is leveraged for that purpose.
o An IPv4 firewall might enforce a specific security policy in IPv4,
but might be unable to enforce the same policy in IPv6.
o Some transition/co-existence mechanisms might cause an internal
host with otherwise limited IPv4 connectivity to become globally
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