Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets-03
The information below is for an old version of the document | |||
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Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (opsec WG) | |
Authors | Fernando Gont , Will LIU | ||
Last updated | 2013-04-25 (latest revision 2013-02-22) | ||
Replaces | draft-gont-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
Formats | pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Warren Kumari | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2013-03-20) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Waiting for AD Go-Ahead::Revised I-D Needed | |
Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date |
Needs a YES. |
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Responsible AD | Joel Jaeggli | ||
Send notices to | opsec-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets@tools.ietf.org | ||
IANA | IANA review state | IANA - Review Needed |
Operational Security Capabilities for F. Gont IP Network Infrastructure (opsec) SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Internet-Draft W. Liu Intended status: Informational Huawei Technologies Expires: August 26, 2013 February 22, 2013 Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets-03 Abstract This document discusses the security implications of native IPv6 support and IPv6 transition/co-existence technologies on "IPv4-only" networks, and describes possible mitigations for the aforementioned issues. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on August 26, 2013. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Gont & Liu Expires August 26, 2013 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Sec. Impl. of IPv6 on IPv4 networks February 2013 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Security Implications of Native IPv6 Support . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Filtering Native IPv6 Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Security Implications of Tunneling Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Filtering 6in4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Filtering 6over4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Filtering 6rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4. Filtering 6to4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.5. Filtering ISATAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.6. Filtering Teredo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.7. Filtering Tunnel Broker with Tunnel Setup Protocol (TSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.8. Filtering AYIYA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Additional Considerations when Filtering IPv6 Traffic . . . . 14 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix A. Summary of filtering rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Gont & Liu Expires August 26, 2013 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Sec. Impl. of IPv6 on IPv4 networks February 2013 1. Introduction Most general-purpose operating systems implement and enable native IPv6 [RFC2460] support and a number of transition/co-existence technologies by default. For cases in which the corresponding devices are deployed on networks that are assumed to be IPv4-only, native IPv6 support and/or IPv6 transition/co-existence technologies could be leveraged by local or remote attackers for a number of (illegitimate) purposes. For example, o A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) might be prepared to detect attack patterns for IPv4 traffic, but might be unable to detect the same attack patterns when a transition/co-existence technology is leveraged for that purpose. o An IPv4 firewall might enforce a specific security policy in IPv4, but might be unable to enforce the same policy in IPv6. o A NIDS or firewall might support both IPv4 and IPv6, but might beShow full document text