Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets-06
| The information below is for an old version of the document | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (opsec WG) | |
| Authors | Fernando Gont , Will LIU | ||
| Last updated | 2013-12-04 (latest revision 2013-11-26) | ||
| Replaces | draft-gont-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
| Formats | pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Warren Kumari | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2013-03-20) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::AD Followup | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
Needs a YES. |
||
| Responsible AD | Joel Jaeggli | ||
| Send notices to | opsec-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets@tools.ietf.org | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed | |
opsec wg F. Gont
Internet-Draft SI6 Networks/UTN-FRH
Intended status: Informational W. Liu
Expires: May 30, 2014 Huawei Technologies
November 26, 2013
Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets-06
Abstract
This document discusses the security implications of native IPv6
support and IPv6 transition/co-existence technologies on "IPv4-only"
networks, and describes possible mitigations for the aforementioned
issues.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 30, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Gont & Liu Expires May 30, 2014 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Sec. Impl. of IPv6 on IPv4 networks November 2013
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Security Implications of Native IPv6 Support . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Filtering Native IPv6 Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Security Implications of Tunneling Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Filtering 6in4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Filtering 6over4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Filtering 6rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Filtering 6to4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Filtering ISATAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.6. Filtering Teredo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.7. Filtering Tunnel Broker with Tunnel Setup Protocol (TSP) 11
3.8. Filtering AYIYA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Additional Considerations when Filtering IPv6 Traffic . . . . 11
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Summary of filtering rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
Most general-purpose operating systems implement and enable native
IPv6 [RFC2460] support and a number of transition/co-existence
technologies by default. Support of IPv6 by all nodes is intended to
become best current practice [RFC6540]. Some enterprise networks
might, however, choose to delay active use of IPv6.
This document describes operational practices for enterprise networks
to prevent security exposure resulting from unplanned use of IPv6 on
such networks. This document is only applicable to enterprise
networks: networks where the network operator is not providing a
general-purpose internet, but rather a business-specific network.
The solutions proposed here are not practical for home networks, nor
are they appropriate for provider networks such as ISPs, mobile
providers, Wifi hotspot providers or any other public internet
service.
In scenarios in which IPv6-enabled devices are deployed on enterprise
networks that are intended to be IPv4-only, native IPv6 support and/
or IPv6 transition/co-existence technologies could be leveraged by
local or remote attackers for a number of (illegitimate) purposes.
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