Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-v6-24

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (opsec WG)
Authors √Čric Vyncke  , Chittimaneni Kk  , Merike Kaeo  , Enno Rey 
Last updated 2021-02-12
Replaces draft-vyncke-opsec-v6
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
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Reviews
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Gyan Mishra
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2019-11-08)
IESG IESG state Waiting for Writeup
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(None)
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Responsible AD Warren Kumari
Send notices to Gyan Mishra <hayabusagsm@gmail.com>
IANA IANA review state Version Changed - Review Needed
OPSEC                                                          E. Vyncke
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Informational                           K. Chittimaneni
Expires: August 16, 2021                                          WeWork
                                                                 M. Kaeo
                                                    Double Shot Security
                                                                  E. Rey
                                                                    ERNW
                                                       February 12, 2021

         Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks
                         draft-ietf-opsec-v6-24

Abstract

   Knowledge and experience on how to operate IPv4 securely is
   available: whether it is the Internet or an enterprise internal
   network.  However, IPv6 presents some new security challenges.  RFC
   4942 describes the security issues in the protocol, but network
   managers also need a more practical, operations-minded document to
   enumerate advantages and/or disadvantages of certain choices.

   This document analyzes the operational security issues associated
   with several types of network and proposes technical and procedural
   mitigation techniques.  This document is only applicable to managed
   networks, such as enterprise building networks.  The recommendations
   in this document are not applicable to residential user cases, even
   in cases where a Service Provider may be managing the home gateway.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 16, 2021.

Vyncke, et al.           Expires August 16, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 OPsec IPv6                  February 2021

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Generic Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Addressing Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  Use of ULAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.2.  Point-to-Point Links  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.3.  Loopback Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.4.  Stable Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.5.  Temporary Addresses for SLAAC . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.6.  DHCP and DNS Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.7.  Using a /64 per host  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.1.8.  Privacy consideration of Addresses  . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.2.  Extension Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.2.1.  Order and Repetition of Extension Headers . . . . . .   9
       2.2.2.  Hop-by-Hop Options Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.2.3.  Fragment Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.2.4.  IP Security Extension Header  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.3.  Link-Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.3.1.  Neighbor Solicitation Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.3.2.  Router and Neighbor Advertisements Filtering  . . . .  11
       2.3.3.  Securing DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.3.4.  3GPP Link-Layer Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.3.5.  Impact of Multicast Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.3.6.  SeND and CGA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.4.  Control Plane Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
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