Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-v6-11
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Active Internet-Draft (opsec WG)
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2017-04-12
(latest revision 2017-04-11)
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draft-vyncke-opsec-v6
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Informational
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OPSEC K. Chittimaneni
Internet-Draft Dropbox Inc.
Intended status: Informational M. Kaeo
Expires: October 13, 2017 Double Shot Security
E. Vyncke, Ed.
Cisco
April 11, 2017
Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-v6-11
Abstract
Knowledge and experience on how to operate IPv4 securely is
available: whether it is the Internet or an enterprise internal
network. However, IPv6 presents some new security challenges. RFC
4942 describes the security issues in the protocol but network
managers also need a more practical, operations-minded document to
enumerate advantages and/or disadvantages of certain choices.
This document analyzes the operational security issues in all places
of a network (enterprises, service providers and residential users)
and proposes technical and procedural mitigations techniques.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 13, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Chittimaneni, et al. Expires October 13, 2017 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft OPsec IPv6 April 2017
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Generic Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Addressing Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Statically Configured Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Use of ULAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.3. Point-to-Point Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.4. Temporary Addresses - Privacy Extensions for SLAAC . 6
2.1.5. Privacy consideration of Addresses . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.6. DHCP/DNS Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Extension Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1. Order and Repetition of Extension Headers . . . . . . 8
2.2.2. Hop-by-Hop Extension Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.3. Fragmentation Extension Header . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.4. IP Security Extension Header . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Link-Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1. SeND and CGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2. Securing DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.3. ND/RA Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.4. ND/RA Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.5. 3GPP Link-Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. Control Plane Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1. Control Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.2. Management Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.3. Packet Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5. Routing Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.1. Authenticating Neighbors/Peers . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.2. Securing Routing Updates Between Peers . . . . . . . 17
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