Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks
draft-ietf-opsec-v6-21

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OPSEC                                                     E. Vyncke, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Informational                           K. Chittimaneni
Expires: May 6, 2020                                              WeWork
                                                                 M. Kaeo
                                                    Double Shot Security
                                                                  E. Rey
                                                                    ERNW
                                                        November 3, 2019

         Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks
                         draft-ietf-opsec-v6-21

Abstract

   Knowledge and experience on how to operate IPv4 securely is
   available: whether it is the Internet or an enterprise internal
   network.  However, IPv6 presents some new security challenges.  RFC
   4942 describes the security issues in the protocol but network
   managers also need a more practical, operations-minded document to
   enumerate advantages and/or disadvantages of certain choices.

   This document analyzes the operational security issues in several
   places of a network (enterprises, service providers and residential
   users) and proposes technical and procedural mitigations techniques.
   Some very specific places of a network such as the Internet of Things
   are not discussed in this document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2020.

Vyncke, et al.             Expires May 6, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 OPsec IPv6                  November 2019

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Generic Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Addressing Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  Use of ULAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.2.  Point-to-Point Links  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.3.  Loopback Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.4.  Statically Configured Addresses . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.5.  Temporary Addresses - Privacy Extensions for SLAAC  .   6
       2.1.6.  DHCP/DNS Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.7.  Using a /64 per host  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.8.  Privacy consideration of Addresses  . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Extension Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.2.1.  Order and Repetition of Extension Headers . . . . . .   8
       2.2.2.  Hop-by-Hop Options Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.2.3.  Fragment Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.2.4.  IP Security Extension Header  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.3.  Link-Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.1.  ND/RA Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.3.2.  RA/NA Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.3.3.  Securing DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.3.4.  3GPP Link-Layer Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.3.5.  SeND and CGA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.4.  Control Plane Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.4.1.  Control Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.4.2.  Management Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.4.3.  Packet Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16