Security Extension for OSPFv2 when using Manual Key Management
draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-03

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (ospf WG)
Last updated 2012-10-22
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OSPF Working Group                                             M. Bhatia
Internet-Draft                                            Alcatel-Lucent
Intended status: Standards Track                              S. Hartman
Expires: April 25, 2013                                Painless Security
                                                                D. Zhang
                                           Huawei Technologies co., LTD.
                                                               A. Lindem
                                                                Ericsson
                                                        October 22, 2012

     Security Extension for OSPFv2 when using Manual Key Management
          draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-03

Abstract

   The current OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as defined
   in the OSPF standards is vulnerable to both inter-session and intra-
   session replay attacks when its uses manual keying.  Additionally,
   the existing cryptographic authentication schemes do not cover the IP
   header.  This omission can be exploited to carry out various types of
   attacks.

   This draft proposes changes to the authentication sequence number
   mechanism that will protect OSPFv2 from both inter-session and intra-
   session replay attacks when its using manual keys for securing its
   protocol packets.  Additionally, we also describe some changes in the
   cryptographic hash computation so that we eliminate most attacks that
   result because OSPFv2 does not protect the IP header.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2013.

Copyright Notice

Bhatia, et al.           Expires April 25, 2013                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         OSPF Manual Key Management           October 2012

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Replay Protection using Extended Sequence Numbers  . . . . . .  4
   3.  OSPF Packet Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  OSPF Packet Key Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  Key Selection for Unicast OSPF Packet Transmission . . . .  7
     4.2.  Key Selection for Multicast OSPF Packet Transmission . . .  7
     4.3.  Key Selection for OSPF Packet Reception  . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Mechanism to secure the IP header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Bhatia, et al.           Expires April 25, 2013                 [Page 2]
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1.  Introduction

   The OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as described in
   [[RFC2328]] uses per-packet sequence numbers to provide protection
   against replay attacks.  The sequence numbers increase monotonically
   so that the attempts to replay the stale packets can be thwarted.
   The sequence number values are maintained as a part of adjacency
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