OSPF Traffic Engineering (TE) Metric Extensions
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 09 and is now closed.
(Adrian Farrel) Yes
(Jari Arkko) No Objection
Comment (2015-01-07 for -10)
Thank you for doing this work. It is very important and I can clearly see the use cases. I do have some comments though. I think it would be useful to specify explicitly what the IEEE floating point number format variant is being used. I assume binary32. (Also noted in the Gen-ART review.) I am a bit surprised by the A bit design. Would it be useful to add some rationale for why this approach has been taken? As I read the document I find it difficult to understand why the bit carries extra value for the receiver. It does signal an exceptional condition, but at the same time, any real action (e.g., Step B in Section 3) seems to be something that should be based on the calculation of the actual bandwidths and delays rather than the flag itself. Or did I misunderstand this? Also, it would be useful to specify what information must be understood in the network for the A bit usage. Do all nodes have to the same understanding of the threshold throughout the network? Or just the sending node? Finally, I would have preferred to see some defaults for the various configurable values, and some discussion of the requirements for the values. Again, do the measurement period for instance have to be aligned across a network, or not? A section on management considerations might be appropriate.
(Richard Barnes) No Objection
Benoit Claise No Objection
Comment (2015-01-08 for -10)
From an OPS point of view, I'm mainly interested in what is out of scope, as written in the writeup: "There has been much discusson as to how these metrics would be collected and how they will be used. These topics were deemed to to be out of scope". So I'll wait for a companion document. I agree with Alissa and Stephen that the following paragraph is confusing: "While this document does not specify how the performance information should be obtained, the measurement of delay SHOULD NOT vary significantly based upon the offered traffic load. Thus, queuing delays and/or loss SHOULD NOT be included in any dynamic delay measurement."
Alissa Cooper No Objection
Comment (2015-01-06 for -10)
= Section 1 = "While this document does not specify how the performance information should be obtained, the measurement of delay SHOULD NOT vary significantly based upon the offered traffic load. Thus, queuing delays and/or loss SHOULD NOT be included in any dynamic delay measurement." Agree with Stephen's comment here -- this is confusing. I'm not sure normative language makes a whole lot of sense here at all if "the measurement" means "the quantity you actually measure" as opposed to "the quantity that you report after measuring." Also, how would loss be reported in a delay measurement? (I can imagine ways, but they seem contrived.) = Section 4.2.7 = "Implementations MAY also permit the configuration of an offset value (in microseconds) to be added to the measured delay value to advertise operator specific delay constraints." Do I understand correctly that there is no way specified to communicate this offset value? If this is a matter for local configuration, it seems a bit odd to use normative language and describe it in the definition of the sub-TLV. = Section 4.4.5 = "When set to a value of all 1s (2^24 - 1), the link packet loss has not been measured." I noted that in the case of delay, the way to signal that delay has not been measured is to not send or withdraw the sub-TLV, whereas for loss it is to send a specific value. Why do this differently for different measurements? = Section 7 = I agree with Barry's comments here.
Spencer Dawkins No Objection
(Stephen Farrell) No Objection
Comment (2015-01-05 for -10)
These are mainly nits or questions, other than the first. That would have been a discuss if I knew of a specific threat, but since this is just a general concern, it's not a discuss. I'd appreciate a bit of a chat about it though. - I'd have thought that these TLVs would be sent more often than others, and that (if enormous amounts of money are in play) then use of OSPF authentication might be more likely needed (or some equivalent security mechanisms). I'd even speculate that if enormous amounts of money are in play, then confidentiality may become a requirement (since if I can observe say A bit settings then that might give me insight into traffic levels - sort of a lights burning at night in central bank implies interest-rate change attack). Can you say why none of that needs to be mentioned at all? Was any of that considered by the WG? (Can you send a relevant link to the archive?) - intro: "extremely large amounts of money" aren't usually explicit motivations for protocol features and I hope that that continues to be the case. I'd encourage you to remove that phrase. Similarly, "faster" is a fine requirement but "fast than the competition" is not, so a bit more wordsmithing might be good. (Those are, I think, defensible points as we ought not over-specialise our requirements, but to be honest I'd also be happier if protocol development was not explicitly motivated soley by increasing already-enormous amounts of money.) - intro: saying the "measurement of delay SHOULD NOT vary significantly based upon the offered traffic load" is odd. Clearly the delay experienced can vary based on the load, so I'm not sure what you're saying. And nor is it clear why this is a SHOULD NOT, as opposed to a MUST NOT. Maybe you need to explain that some more? - section 3: Doesn't the A bit definition assume that both senders and receivers know the thresholds (or enough about those). That seems a bit odd to me, but I expect you've thought it through. Same thing with the averaging period I guess (though section 7 does specify a 30s default as a SHOULD). Or am I missing that one could calculate those from the various TLVs that are defined? (I think I'm also not understanding bullet point 4 in section 5 which may be related.) - section 3: I don't get what "cannot be used for fail-over purposes" means. I think you mean "ought not" since a receiver can do what they want in any case. - The security considerations of RFC 3630, from 2003, is 11 lines long. Has nothing affected OSPF security in the last decade+ that would be worth noting here? - In one response to the secdir review,  path shortening attacks were mentioned - I'm not clear myself if that's a deal here, but is text on that needed? Some text that was suggested is "users of the lsas described in this document should be aware of how they might be used in path shortening and other routing attacks."  https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg05354.html
(Brian Haberman) No Objection
Comment (2015-01-06 for -10)
I agree with Stephen that the specified use cases seem to warrant a stronger recommendation to provide authentication and confidentiality. The tools are available, so why are they not being recommended in this instance?
(Joel Jaeggli) No Objection
(Barry Leiba) No Objection
Comment (2014-12-29 for -09)
A couple of minor, non-blocking comments, just looking for a little clarification: -- Section 7 -- I can't imagine that the "SHOULD" in the first paragraph is an appropriate 2119 key word: no one can tell whether or not care was taken, so this can't be a protocol issue. Please just say "Therefore it is important to set these values carefully." For the remaining "SHOULD"s, "SHOULD NOT", and "RECOMMENDED" in this section: remembering that "SHOULD" means that "there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but the full implications must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing a different course," how can someone reading this understand and weigh those implications? I can't: I have no idea why these recommendations are being made, and what the implications are of making different choices. Can you help me here? Or are these just recommended values, in the lower-case, plain English sense?