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Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Framework

The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 5193.
Authors Rafael Marin-Lopez , Prakash Jayaraman , Alper E. Yegin , Mohan Parthasarathy , Yoshihiro Ohba
Last updated 2015-10-14 (Latest revision 2007-09-06)
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status Informational
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state (None)
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Became RFC 5193 (Informational)
Action Holders
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD Mark Townsley
Send notices to (None)
PANA Working Group                                          P. Jayaraman
Internet-Draft                                                   Net.Com
Intended status: Informational                                  R. Lopez
Expires: March 9, 2008                                   Univ. of Murcia
                                                           Y. Ohba (Ed.)
                                                        M. Parthasarathy
                                                                A. Yegin
                                                       September 6, 2007

Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Framework

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

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   This document defines the general PANA framework functional elements,
   high-level call flow, and deployment environments.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Specification of Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  General PANA Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Call Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 17

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1.  Introduction

   PANA (Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access) is a
   link-layer agnostic network access authentication protocol that runs
   between a client that wants to gain access to the network and a
   server on the network side.  PANA defines a new EAP [RFC3748] lower
   layer that uses IP between the protocol end points.

   The motivation to define such a protocol and the requirements are
   described in [RFC4058].  Protocol details are documented in
   [I-D.ietf-pana-pana].  Upon following a successful PANA
   authentication, per-data-packet security can be achieved by using
   physical security, link-layer ciphering, or IPsec
   [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec].  The server implementation of PANA may or may
   not be co-located with the entity enforcing the per-packet access
   control function.  When the server for PANA and per-packet access
   control entities are separate, a protocol (e.g.,
   [I-D.ietf-ancp-protocol]) may be used to carry information between
   the two nodes.

   PANA is intended to be used in any access network regardless of the
   underlying security.  For example, the network might be physically
   secured, or secured by means of cryptographic mechanisms after the
   successful client-network authentication.  While mandatory to
   implement behavior for a PANA deployment is the integrity of PANA
   messages when the EAP method produces MSK, there is no mandatory to
   implement support for network security either at the link-layer or

   This document defines the general framework for describing how these
   various PANA and other network access authentication elements
   interact with each other, especially considering the two basic types
   of deployment environments.

1.1.  Specification of Requirements

   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
   of the specification.  These words are often capitalized.  The key
   "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
   are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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2.  General PANA Framework

   PANA is designed to facilitate authentication and authorization of
   clients in access networks.  PANA is an EAP [RFC3748] lower-layer
   that carries EAP authentication methods encapsulated inside EAP
   between a client node and a server in the access network.  While PANA
   enables the authentication process between the two entities, it is
   only a part of an overall AAA (Authentication, Authorization and
   Accounting) and access control framework.  A AAA and access control
   framework using PANA is comprised of four functional entities.

   Figure 1 illustrates these functional entities and the interfaces
   (protocols, APIs) among them.

          +-----+       PANA        +-----+     LDAP, API, etc. +-----+
          | PaC |<----------------->| PAA |<------------------->| AS  |
          +-----+                   +-----+                     +-----+
             ^                         ^
             |                         |
             |         +-----+         |
     IKE,    +-------->| EP  |<--------+ ANCP, API, etc.
     4-way handshake,  +-----+
     etc.                 .
                     Data traffic

                      Figure 1: PANA Functional Model

   PANA Client (PaC):

      The PaC is the client implementation of PANA.  This entity resides
      on the node that is requesting network access.  PaCs can be end
      hosts, such as laptops, PDAs, cell phones, desktop PCs, or routers
      that are connected to a network via a wired or wireless interface.
      A PaC is responsible for requesting network access and engaging in
      the authentication process using PANA.

   PANA Authentication Agent (PAA):

      The PAA is the server implementation of PANA.  A PAA is in charge
      of interfacing with the PaCs for authenticating and authorizing
      them for the network access service.

      The PAA consults an authentication server in order to verify the

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      credentials and rights of a PaC.  If the authentication server
      resides on the same node as the PAA, an API is sufficient for this
      interaction.  When they are separated (a much more common case in
      public access networks), a protocol needs to run between the two.
      AAA protocols like RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter [RFC3588] are
      commonly used for this purpose.

      The PAA is also responsible for updating the access control state
      (i.e., filters) depending on the creation and deletion of the
      authorization state.  The PAA communicates the updated state to
      the Enforcement Points in the network.  If the PAA and EP are
      residing on the same node, an API is sufficient for this
      communication.  Otherwise, a protocol is required to carry the
      authorized client attributes from the PAA to the EP.

      The PAA resides on a node that is typically called a NAS (network
      access server) in the access network.  For example on a BRAS
      (Broadband Remote Access Server) [DSL] in DSL networks, or PDSN
      (Packet Data Serving Node) [3GPP2] in 3GPP2 networks.  The PAA may
      be one or more IP hops away from the PaCs.

   Authentication Server (AS):

      The server implementation that is in charge of verifying the
      credentials of a PaC that is requesting the network access
      service.  The AS receives requests from the PAA on behalf of the
      PaCs, and responds with the result of verification together with
      the authorization parameters (e.g., allowed bandwidth, IP
      configuration, etc).  This is the server that terminates the EAP
      and the EAP methods.  The AS might be hosted on the same node as
      the PAA, on a dedicated node on the access network, or on a
      central server somewhere in the Internet.

   Enforcement Point (EP):

      The access control implementation that is in charge of allowing
      access (data traffic) of authorized clients while preventing
      access by others.  An EP learns the attributes of the authorized
      clients from the PAA.

      The EP uses non-cryptographic or cryptographic filters to
      selectively allow and discard data packets.  These filters may be
      applied at the link-layer or the IP-layer [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec].
      When cryptographic access control is used, a secure association
      protocol ([RFC3748]) needs to run between the PaC and EP.  After
      completion of the secure association protocol, link or network
      layer per-packet security (for example TKIP, IPsec ESP) is enabled
      for integrity protection, data origin authentication, replay

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      protection and optionally confidentiality protection.

      An EP is located between the access network (the topology within
      reach of any client) and the accessed network (the topology within
      reach of only authorized clients).  It must be located
      strategically in a local area network to minimize the access of
      unauthorized clients.  It is recommended but not mandated that the
      EP be on-path between the PaC and the PAA for the aforementioned
      reason.  For example, the EP can be hosted on the switch that is
      directly connected to the clients in a wired network.  That way
      the EP can drop unauthorized packets before they reach any other
      client node or beyond the local area network.

   Some of the entities may be co-located depending on the deployment
   scenario.  For example, the PAA and EP would be on the same node
   (BRAS) in DSL networks.  In that case a simple API is sufficient
   between the PAA and EP.  In small enterprise deployments the PAA and
   AS may be hosted on the same node (access router) that eliminates the
   need for a protocol run between the two.  The decision to co-locate
   these entities or otherwise, and their precise location in the
   network topology are deployment decisions that are out of the scope
   of this document.

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3.  Call Flow

   Figure 2 illustrates the signaling flow for authorizing a client for
   network access.

                  PaC             EP               PAA              AS
                   |               |                |                |
      IP address ->|               |                |                |
      config.      |       PANA    |                |      AAA       |
                   |               |  Provisioning  |                |
      (Optional)   |               |<-------------->|                |
      IP address ->|               |                |                |
      reconfig.    |   Sec.Assoc.  |                |                |
                   |<------------->|                |                |
                   |               |                |                |
                   |  Data traffic |                |                |
                   |<----------------->             |                |
                   |               |                |                |

                       Figure 2: PANA Signaling Flow

   The EP on the access network allows general data traffic from any
   authorized PaC, whereas it allows only limited type of traffic (e.g.,
   PANA, DHCP, router discovery, etc.) for the unauthorized PaCs.  This
   ensures that the newly attached clients have the minimum access
   service to engage in PANA and get authorized for the unlimited

   The PaC dynamically or statically configures an IP address prior to
   running PANA.  After the successful PANA authentication, depending on
   the deployment scenario the PaC may need to re-configure its IP
   address or configure additional IP address(es).  For example, a link-
   local IPv6 address may be used for PANA and the PaC may be allowed to
   configure additional global IPv6 address(es) upon successful
   authentication.  Another example: A PaC may be limited to use a IPv4
   link-local address during PANA, and allowed to reconfigure its
   interface with a non-link-local IPv4 address after the
   authentication.  General-purpose applications cannot use the
   interface until PANA authentication succeeds and appropriate IP
   address configuration takes place.

   An initially unauthorized PaC starts the PANA authentication by
   discovering the PAA, followed by the EAP exchange over PANA.  The PAA
   interacts with the AS during this process.  Upon receiving the
   authentication and authorization result from the AS, the PAA informs
   the PaC about the result of its network access request.

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   If the PaC is authorized to gain the access to the network, the PAA
   also sends the PaC-specific attributes (e.g., IP address,
   cryptographic keys, etc.) to the EP by using another protocol.  The
   EP uses this information to alter its filters for allowing data
   traffic from and to the PaC to pass through.

   In case cryptographic access control needs to be enabled after the
   PANA authentication, a secure association protocol runs between the
   PaC and the EP.  Dynamic parameters required for that protocol (e.g.,
   endpoint identity, shared secret) are derived from successful PANA
   authentication; these parameters are used to authenticate the PaC to
   the EP and vice-versa as part of creating the security association.
   For example, see [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] for how it is done for IKE
   [RFC2409] [RFC4306] based on using a key-generating EAP method for
   PANA between the PaC and PAA.  The secure association protocol
   exchange produces the required security associations between the PaC
   and the EP to enable cryptographic data traffic protection.  Per-
   packet cryptographic data traffic protection introduces additional
   per-packet overhead but the overhead exists only between the PaC and
   EP and will not affect communications beyond the EP.

   Finally, filters that are installed at the EP allow general purpose
   data traffic to flow between the PaC and the intranet/Internet.

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4.  Environments

   PANA can be used on any network environment whether there is a lower-
   layer secure channel between the PaC and the EP prior to PANA, or one
   has to be enabled upon successful PANA authentication.

   With regard to network access authentication two types of networks
   need to be considered:

   a. Networks where a secure channel is already available prior to
   running PANA

      This type of network is characterized by the existence of
      protection against spoofing and eavesdropping.  Nevertheless, user
      authentication and authorization is required for network

      One example is a DSL network where the lower-layer security is
      provided by physical means (a.1).  Physical protection of the
      network wiring ensures that practically there is only one client
      that can send and receive IP packets on the link.  Another example
      is a cdma2000 network where the lower-layer security is provided
      by means of cryptographic protection (a.2).  By the time the
      client requests access to the network-layer services, it is
      already authenticated and authorized for accessing the radio
      channel, and link-layer ciphering is enabled.

      The presence of a secure channel before PANA exchange eliminates
      the need for executing a secure association protocol after PANA.
      The PANA session can be associated with the communication channel
      it was carried over.  Also, the choice of EAP authentication
      method depends on the presence of this security during PANA run.

   b. Networks where a secure channel is created after running PANA

      These are the networks where there is no lower-layer protection
      prior to running PANA.  A successful PANA authentication enables
      generation of cryptographic keys that are used with a secure
      association protocol to enable per-packet cryptographic

      PANA authentication is run on an insecure channel that is
      vulnerable to eavesdropping and spoofing.  The choice of EAP
      method must be resilient to the possible attacks associated with
      such an environment.  Furthermore, the EAP method must be able to
      create cryptographic keys that will later be used by the secure
      association protocol.

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      Whether to use a link-layer per-packet security (b.1) or a network
      layer security (b.2) is a deployment decision and outside the
      scope of this document.  This decision also dictates the choice of
      the secure association protocol.  If link-layer protection is
      used, the protocol would be link-layer specific.  If IP-layer
      protection is used, the secure association protocol would be IKE
      and the per-packet security would be provided by IPsec AH/ESP
      regardless of the underlying link-layer technology.

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5.  Security Considerations

   Security is discussed throughout this document.  For protocol-
   specific security considerations, refer to [RFC4016] and

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6.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

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7.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Bernard Aboba, Yacine El Mghazli, Randy
   Turner, Hannes Tschofenig, Lionel Morand, Mark Townsley, Jari Arkko,
   Pekka Savola, Tom Yu, Joel Halpern, Lakshminath Dondeti, David Black,
   and IEEE 802.11 Working Group for their valuable comments.

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8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

   [RFC4016]  Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
              and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security
              Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005.

              Forsberg, D., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
              Network Access (PANA)", draft-ietf-pana-pana-17 (work in
              progress), June 2007.

              Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access
              Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress),
              July 2005.

   [RFC4058]  Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang,
              "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access
              (PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005.

   [DSL]      DSL Forum Architecture and Transport Working Group, "DSL
              Forum TR-059 DSL Evolution - Architecture Requirements for
              the Support of QoS-Enabled IP Services", September 2003.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, June 2000.

   [RFC3588]  Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
              Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

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              Wadhwa, S., "Protocol for Access Node Control Mechanism in
              Broadband Networks", draft-ietf-ancp-protocol-01 (work in
              progress), July 2007.

   [3GPP2]    3rd Generation Partnership Project 2, "cdma2000 Wireless
              IP Network Standard", 3GPP2 P.S0001-B/v2.0,
              September 2004.

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Authors' Addresses

   Prakash Jayaraman
   Network Equipment Technologies, Inc.
   6900 Paseo Padre Parkway
   Fremont, CA  94555

   Phone: +1 510 574 2305

   Rafa Marin Lopez
   University of Murcia
   30071 Murcia


   Yoshihiro Ohba
   Toshiba America Research, Inc.
   1 Telcordia Drive
   Piscateway, NJ  08854

   Phone: +1 732 699 5365

   Mohan Parthasarathy
   313 Fairchild Drive
   Mountain View, CA  94043

   Phone: +1 408 734 8820

   Alper E. Yegin
   Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology

   Phone: +90 533 348 2402

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