Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols
draft-ietf-pkix-ipki3cmp-09

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Document Type RFC Internet-Draft (pkix WG)
Authors Stephen Farrell  , Carlisle Adams 
Last updated 2013-03-02 (latest revision 1999-01-12)
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Internet Draft                           C. Adams (Entrust Technologies)
PKIX Working Group                                      S. Farrell (SSE)
draft-ietf-pkix-ipki3cmp-09.txt
Expires in 6 months                                            Nov. 1998

                  Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                      Certificate Management Protocols

Status of this Memo 

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working 
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Abstract 

This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) Certificate Management Protocols. Protocol messages are defined 
for all relevant aspects of certificate creation and management.  Note 
that "certificate" in this document refers to an X.509v3 Certificate as 
defined in [COR95, X509-AM].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", 
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase, 
as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Introduction

The layout of this document is as follows:

- Section 1 contains an overview of PKI management;
- Section 2 contains discussion of assumptions and restrictions;
- Section 3 contains data structures used for PKI management messages;
- Section 4 defines the functions that are to be carried out in PKI 
  management by conforming implementations;
- Section 5 describes a simple protocol for transporting PKI messages;
- the Appendices specify profiles for conforming implementations and 
  provide an ASN.1 module containing the syntax for all messages 
  defined in this specification.
 
Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 1]

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1 PKI Management Overview 

  The PKI must be structured to be consistent with the types of 
individuals who must administer it.  Providing such administrators with 
unbounded choices not only complicates the software required but also 
increases the chances that a subtle mistake by an administrator or 
software developer will result in broader compromise. Similarly, 
restricting administrators with cumbersome mechanisms will cause them  
not to use the PKI. 

  Management protocols are REQUIRED to support on-line interactions 
between Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) components.  For example, a 
management protocol might be used between a Certification Authority 
(CA) and a client system with which a key pair is associated, or between 
two CAs that issue cross-certificates for each other. 

1.1 PKI Management Model 

Before specifying particular message formats and procedures we first 
define the entities involved in PKI management and their interactions 
(in terms of the PKI management functions required).  We then group 
these functions in order to accommodate different identifiable types of 
end entities. 

1.2 Definitions of PKI Entities 

  The entities involved in PKI management include the end entity (i.e.,  
the entity to be named in the subject field of a certificate) and the 
certification authority (i.e., the entity named in the issuer field of a 
certificate). A registration authority MAY also be involved in PKI 
management. 

1.2.1 Subjects and End Entities 

The term "subject" is used here to refer to the entity named in the 
subject field of a certificate; when we wish to distinguish the tools 
and/or software used by the subject (e.g., a local certificate management 
module) we will use the term "subject equipment". In general, the term
"end entity" (EE) rather than subject is preferred in order to avoid 
confusion with the field name.

It is important to note that the end entities here will include not only 
human users of applications, but also applications themselves (e.g., for 
IP security). This factor influences the protocols which the PKI 
management operations use; for example, application software is far more 
likely to know exactly which certificate extensions are required than 
are human users. PKI management entities are also end entities in the 
sense that they are sometimes named in the subject field of a 
certificate or cross-certificate. Where appropriate, the term "end- 
entity" will be used to refer to end entities who are not PKI management 
entities. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 2]

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All end entities require secure local access to some information -- at a 
minimum, their own name and private key, the name of a CA which is 
directly trusted by this entity and that CA's public key (or a 
fingerprint of the public key where a self-certified version is 
available elsewhere). Implementations MAY use secure local storage for 
more than this minimum (e.g., the end entity's own certificate or 
application-specific information). The form of storage will also vary -- 
from files to tamper-resistant cryptographic tokens.  Such local trusted 
storage is referred to here as the end entity's Personal Security 
Environment (PSE). 

Though PSE formats are beyond the scope of this document (they are very 
dependent on equipment, et cetera), a generic interchange format for 
PSEs is defined here - a certification response message MAY be used.

1.2.2 Certification Authority 

The certification authority (CA) may or may not actually be a real 
"third party" from the end entity's point of view. Quite often, the CA 
will actually belong to the same organization as the end entities it 
supports. 

Again, we use the term CA to refer to the entity named in the issuer 
field of a certificate; when it is necessary to distinguish the software 
or hardware tools used by the CA we use the term "CA equipment". 

The CA equipment will often include both an "off-line" component and an 
"on-line" component, with the CA private key only available to the "off-
line" component. This is, however, a matter for implementers (though it 
is also relevant as a policy issue).

We use the term "root CA" to indicate a CA that is directly trusted by 
an end entity; that is, securely acquiring the value of a root CA public 
key requires some out-of-band step(s). This term is not meant to imply 
that a root CA is necessarily at the top of any hierarchy, simply that 
the CA in question is trusted directly.

A "subordinate CA" is one that is not a root CA for the end entity in 
question. Often, a subordinate CA will not be a root CA for any entity 
but this is not mandatory.

1.2.3 Registration Authority 

In addition to end-entities and CAs, many environments call for the 
existence of a Registration Authority (RA) separate from the 
Certification Authority. The functions which the registration authority 
may carry out will vary from case to case but MAY include personal 
authentication, token distribution, revocation reporting, name 
assignment, key generation, archival of key pairs, et cetera. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 3]

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This document views the RA as an OPTIONAL component - when it is not 
present the CA is assumed to be able to carry out the RA's functions so 
that the PKI management protocols are the same from the end-entity's 
point of view. 

Again, we distinguish, where necessary, between the RA and the tools 
used (the "RA equipment"). 

Note that an RA is itself an end entity. We further assume that all RAs 
are in fact certified end entities and that RAs have private keys that 
are usable for signing. How a particular CA equipment identifies some 
end entities as RAs is an implementation issue (i.e., this document 
specifies no special RA certification operation). We do not mandate that 
the RA is certified by the CA with which it is interacting at the moment 
(so one RA may work with more than one CA whilst only being certified 
once). 

In some circumstances end entities will communicate directly with a CA 
even where an RA is present. For example, for initial registration 
and/or certification the subject may use its RA, but communicate 
directly with the CA in order to refresh its certificate. 

1.3 PKI Management Requirements 

The protocols given here meet the following requirements on PKI 
management. 

  1. PKI management must conform to the ISO 9594-8 standard and the 
associated amendments (certificate extensions) 

  2. PKI management must conform to the other parts of this series. 

  3. It must be possible to regularly update any key pair without 
affecting any other key pair.

  4. The use of confidentiality in PKI management protocols must be kept 
to a minimum in order to ease regulatory problems.

  5. PKI management protocols must allow the use of different industry-
standard cryptographic algorithms, (specifically including RSA, DSA, 
MD5, SHA-1) -- this means that any given CA, RA, or end entity may, in 
principle, use whichever algorithms suit it for its own key pair(s). 

  6. PKI management protocols must not preclude the generation of key 
pairs by the end-entity concerned, by an RA, or by a CA -- key 
generation may also occur elsewhere, but for the purposes of PKI 
management we can regard key generation as occurring wherever the key is 
first present at an end entity, RA, or CA. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 4]

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  7. PKI management protocols must support the publication of 
certificates by the end-entity concerned, by an RA, or by a CA.  
Different implementations and different environments may choose any 
of the above approaches. 

  8. PKI management protocols must support the production of Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs) by allowing certified end entities to make 
requests for the revocation of certificates - this must be done in such 
a way that the denial-of-service attacks which are possible are not made 
simpler. 

  9. PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of 
"transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, http, TCP/IP and 
ftp. 

  10. Final authority for certification creation rests with the CA; no 
RA or end-entity equipment can assume that any certificate issued by a 
CA will contain what was requested -- a CA may alter certificate field 
values or may add, delete or alter extensions according to its operating 
policy. In other words, all PKI entities (end-entities, RAs, and CAs) 
must be capable of handling responses to requests for certificates in 
which the actual certificate issued is different from that requested  
(for example, a CA may shorten the validity period requested). Note that
policy may dictate that the CA must not publish or otherwise distribute
the certificate until the requesting entity has reviewed and accepted
the newly-created certificate (typically through use of the PKIConfirm
message).

  11. A graceful, scheduled change-over from one non-compromised CA key 
pair to the next (CA key update) must be supported (note that if the 
CA key is compromised, re-initialization must be performed for all 
entities in the domain of that CA). An end entity whose PSE contains 
the new CA public key (following a CA key update) must also be able 
to verify certificates verifiable using the old public key. End 
entities who directly trust the old CA key pair must also be able to 
verify certificates signed using the new CA private key.  (Required for 
situations where the old CA public key is "hardwired" into the end 
entity's cryptographic equipment). 

  12. The Functions of an RA may, in some implementations or  
environments, be carried out by the CA itself. The protocols must be 
designed so that end entities will use the same protocol (but, of 
course, not the same key!) regardless of whether the communication is 
with an RA or CA. 

  13. Where an end entity requests a certificate containing a given 
public key value, the end entity must be ready to demonstrate 
possession of the corresponding private key value. This may be 
accomplished in various ways, depending on the type of certification 
request. See Section 2.3, "Proof of Possession of Private Key", for 
details of the in-band methods defined for the PKIX-CMP (i.e., 
Certificate Management Protocol) messages.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 5]

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PKI Management Operations 

  The following diagram shows the relationship between the entities 
defined above in terms of the PKI management operations. The letters in 
the diagram indicate "protocols" in the sense that a defined set of PKI 
management messages can be sent along each of the lettered lines. 

      +---+     cert. publish        +------------+      j
      |   |  <---------------------  | End Entity | <------- 
      | C |             g            +------------+      "out-of-band"
      |   |                            | ^                loading
      | e |                            | |      initial 
      | r |                          a | | b     registration/ 
      | t |                            | |       certification 
      |   |                            | |      key pair recovery 
      | / |                            | |      key pair update 
      |   |                            | |      certificate update 
      | C |  PKI "USERS"               V |      revocation request 
      | R | -------------------+-+-----+-+------+-+------------------- 
      | L |  PKI MANAGEMENT    | ^              | ^ 
      |   |    ENTITIES      a | | b          a | | b 
      |   |                    V |              | | 
      | R |             g   +------+    d       | | 
      | e |   <------------ | RA   | <-----+    | | 
      | p |      cert.      |      | ----+ |    | | 
      | o |       publish   +------+   c | |    | | 
      | s |                              | |    | | 
      | i |                              V |    V | 
      | t |          g                 +------------+   i 
      | o |   <------------------------|     CA     |-------> 
      | r |          h                 +------------+  "out-of-band" 
      | y |      cert. publish              | ^         publication 
      |   |      CRL publish                | | 
      +---+                                 | |    cross-certification 
                                          e | | f  cross-certificate 
                                            | |       update 
                                            | | 
                                            V | 
                                          +------+ 
                                          | CA-2 | 
                                          +------+ 

                           Figure 1 - PKI Entities 

At a high level the set of operations for which management messages are 
defined can be grouped as follows.

  1 CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are 
required (e.g., production of initial CRLs, export of CA public 
key).

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 6]

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  2 End entity initialization: this includes importing a root CA  
public key and requesting information about the options  
supported by a PKI management entity.
 
  3 Certification: various operations result in the creation of new 
certificates:
 
  3.1 initial registration/certification: This is the process whereby 
an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or RA, prior to the CA 
issuing a certificate or certificates for that end entity. The end 
result of this process (when it is successful) is that a CA issues a 
certificate for an end entity's public key, and returns that 
certificate to the end entity and/or posts that certificate in a 
public repository. This process may, and typically will, involve 
multiple "steps", possibly including an initialization of the end 
entity's equipment. For example, the end entity's equipment must be 
securely initialized with the public key of a CA, to be used in 
validating certificate paths.  Furthermore, an end entity typically 
needs to be initialized with its own key pair(s).
 
  3.2 key pair update:  Every key pair needs to be updated regularly  
(i.e., replaced with a new key pair), and a new certificate needs to 
be issued. 
 
  3.3 certificate update: As certificates expire they may be 
"refreshed" if nothing relevant in the environment has changed. 
 
  3.4 CA key pair update: As with end entities, CA key pairs need to 
be updated regularly; however, different mechanisms are required. 
 
  3.5 cross-certification request:  One CA requests issuance of a 
cross-certificate from another CA.  For the purposes of this standard, 
the following terms are defined.  A "cross-certificate" is a 
certificate in which the subject CA and the issuer CA are distinct and 
SubjectPublicKeyInfo contains a verification key (i.e., the certificate 
has been issued for the subject CA's signing key pair).  When it is 
necessary to distinguish more finely, the following terms may be used: 
a cross-certificate is called an "inter-domain cross-certificate" if 
the subject and issuer CAs belong to different administrative domains; 
it is called an "intra-domain cross-certificate" otherwise.

Notes:

Note 1. The above definition of "cross-certificate" aligns with the 
defined term "CA-certificate" in X.509.  Note that this term is not to 
be confused with the X.500 "cACertificate" attribute type, which is 
unrelated.

Note 2. In many environments the term "cross-certificate", unless 
further qualified, will be understood to be synonymous with 
"inter-domain cross-certificate" as defined above.

Note 3. Issuance of cross-certificates may be, but is not necessarily, 
mutual; that is, two CAs may issue cross-certificates for each other.
 
Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 7]

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  3.6 cross-certificate update: Similar to a normal certificate update 
but involving a cross-certificate. 
 
  4 Certificate/CRL discovery operations: some PKI management 
operations result in the publication of certificates or CRLs:

  4.1 certificate publication: Having gone to the trouble of producing 
a certificate, some means for publishing it is needed.  The "means" 
defined in PKIX MAY involve the messages specified in Sections 
3.3.13 - 3.3.16, or MAY involve other methods (LDAP, for example) as 
described in the "Operational Protocols" documents of the PKIX series 
of specifications.

  4.2 CRL publication: As for certificate publication. 
 
  5 Recovery operations: some PKI management operations are used when 
an end entity has "lost" its PSE:
 
  5.1 key pair recovery:  As an option, user client key materials 
(e.g., a user's private key used for decryption purposes) MAY be backed 
up by a CA, an RA, or a key backup system associated with a CA or RA.  
If an entity needs to recover these backed up key materials (e.g., as a 
result of a forgotten password or a lost key chain file), a  protocol 
exchange may be needed to support such recovery. 
 
  6 Revocation operations: some PKI operations result in the creation 
of new CRL entries and/or new CRLs:
 
  6.1 revocation request:  An authorized person advises a CA of an 
abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation. 
 
  7 PSE operations: whilst the definition of PSE operations (e.g., 
moving a PSE, changing a PIN, etc.) are beyond the scope of this 
specification, we do define a PKIMessage (CertRepMessage) which can form 
the basis of such operations.

Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the 
above operations.  For all operations there are off-line methods of 
achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate use 
of on-line protocols.  For example, when hardware tokens are used, many 
of the operations MAY be achieved as part of the physical token 
delivery. 

Later sections define a set of standard messages supporting the above 
operations.  The protocols for conveying these exchanges in different 
environments (file based, on-line, E-mail, and WWW) is also 
specified. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 8]

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2. Assumptions and restrictions

2.1 End entity initialization

The first step for an end entity in dealing with PKI management 
entities is to request information about the PKI functions supported and 
to securely acquire a copy of the relevant root CA public key(s).

2.2 Initial registration/certification

There are many schemes that can be used to achieve initial registration 
and certification of end entities. No one method is suitable for all 
situations due to the range of policies which a CA may implement and the 
variation in the types of end entity which can occur.

We can however, classify the initial registration / certification 
schemes that are supported by this specification. Note that the word 
"initial", above, is crucial - we are dealing with the situation where 
the end entity in question has had no previous contact with the PKI. 
Where the end entity already possesses certified keys then some 
simplifications/alternatives are possible.

Having classified the schemes that are supported by this specification 
we can then specify some as mandatory and some as optional. The goal is 
that the mandatory schemes cover a sufficient number of the cases which 
will arise in real use, whilst the optional schemes are available for 
special cases which arise less frequently. In this way we achieve a 
balance between flexibility and ease of implementation.

We will now describe the classification of initial registration / 
certification schemes.

2.2.1 Criteria used

2.2.1.1 Initiation of registration / certification

In terms of the PKI messages which are produced we can regard the 
initiation of the initial registration / certification exchanges as 
occurring wherever the first PKI message relating to the end entity is 
produced. Note that the real-world initiation of the registration / 
certification procedure may occur elsewhere (e.g., a personnel 
department may telephone an RA operator).

The possible locations are at the end entity, an RA, or a CA.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 9]

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2.2.1.2 End entity message origin authentication

The on-line messages produced by the end entity that requires a 
certificate may be authenticated or not. The requirement here is to 
authenticate the origin of any messages from the end entity to the PKI 
(CA/RA).

In this specification, such authentication is achieved by the PKI 
(CA/RA) issuing the end entity with a secret value (initial 
authentication key) and reference value (used to identify the 
transaction) via some out-of-band means. The initial authentication key 
can then be used to protect relevant PKI messages.

We can thus classify the initial registration/certification scheme 
according to whether or not the on-line end entity -> PKI messages are 
authenticated or not.

Note 1: We do not discuss the authentication of the PKI -> end entity 
messages here as this is always REQUIRED. In any case, it can be 
achieved simply once the root-CA public key has been installed at the 
end entity?s equipment or it can be based on the initial authentication 
key.

Note 2: An initial registration / certification procedure can be secure 
where the messages from the end entity are authenticated via some out-
of-band means (e.g., a subsequent visit).

2.2.1.3 Location of key generation

In this specification, "key generation" is regarded as occurring 
wherever either the public or private component of a key pair first 
occurs in a PKIMessage. Note that this does not preclude a centralized 
key generation service - the actual key pair MAY have been generated 
elsewhere and transported to the end entity, RA, or CA using a 
(proprietary or standardized) key generation request/response protocol 
(outside the scope of this specification).

There are thus three possibilities for the location of "key 
generation":  the end entity, an RA, or a CA.

2.2.1.4 Confirmation of successful certification

Following the creation of an initial certificate for an end entity, 
additional assurance can be gained by having the end entity explicitly 
confirm successful receipt of the message containing (or indicating the 
creation of) the certificate. Naturally, this confirmation message must 
be protected (based on the initial authentication key or other means).

This gives two further possibilities: confirmed or not.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 10]

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2.2.2 Mandatory schemes

The criteria above allow for a large number of initial registration / 
certification schemes. This specification mandates that conforming CA 
equipment, RA equipment, and EE equipment MUST support the second 
scheme listed below. Any entity MAY additionally support other schemes,
if desired.

2.2.2.1 Centralized scheme

In terms of the classification above, this scheme is, in some ways, 
the simplest possible, where:

- initiation occurs at the certifying CA;
- no on-line message authentication is required;
- "key generation" occurs at the certifying CA (see Section 2.2.1.3);
- no confirmation message is required.

In terms of message flow, this scheme means that the only message 
required is sent from the CA to the end entity. The message must contain 
the entire PSE for the end entity. Some out-of-band means must be 
provided to allow the end entity to authenticate the message received
and decrypt any encrypted values.

2.2.2.2 Basic authenticated scheme

In terms of the classification above, this scheme is where:

- initiation occurs at the end entity;
- message authentication is REQUIRED;
- "key generation" occurs at the end entity (see Section 2.2.1.3);
- a confirmation message is REQUIRED.

In terms of message flow, the basic authenticated scheme is as follows:

      End entity                                          RA/CA
      ==========                                      =============
           out-of-band distribution of Initial Authentication
           Key (IAK) and reference value (RA/CA -> EE)
      Key generation
      Creation of certification request
      Protect request with IAK
                    -->>--certification request-->>--
                                                     verify request
                                                     process request
                                                     create response
                    --<<--certification response--<<--
      handle response
      create confirmation
                    -->>--confirmation message-->>--
                                                     verify confirmation

(Where verification of the confirmation message fails, the RA/CA MUST 
revoke the newly issued certificate if it has been published or 
otherwise made available.)
Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 11]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

2.3 Proof of Possession (POP) of Private Key

In order to prevent certain attacks and to allow a CA/RA to properly 
check the validity of the binding between an end entity and a key pair, 
the PKI management operations specified here make it possible for an end 
entity to prove that it has possession of (i.e., is able to use) the 
private key corresponding to the public key for which a certificate is 
requested.  A given CA/RA is free to choose how to enforce POP (e.g., 
out-of-band procedural means versus PKIX-CMP in-band messages) in its 
certification exchanges (i.e., this may be a policy issue).  However, 
it is REQUIRED that CAs/RAs MUST enforce POP by some means because there 
are currently many non-PKIX operational protocols in use (various 
electronic mail protocols are one example) that do not explicitly check 
the binding between the end entity and the private key.  Until 
operational protocols that do verify the binding (for signature, 
encryption, and key agreement key pairs) exist, and are ubiquitous, this 
binding can only be assumed to have been verified by the CA/RA.  
Therefore, if the binding is not verified by the CA/RA, certificates in 
the Internet Public-Key Infrastructure end up being somewhat less 
meaningful.

POP is accomplished in different ways depending upon the type of key for 
which a certificate is requested. If a key can be used for multiple 
purposes (e.g., an RSA key) then any appropriate method MAY be used 
(e.g., a key which may be used for signing, as well as other purposes, 
SHOULD NOT be sent to the CA/RA in order to prove possession).

This specification explicitly allows for cases where an end entity 
supplies the relevant proof to an RA and the RA subsequently attests to 
the CA that the required proof has been received (and validated!). For 
example, an end entity wishing to have a signing key certified could 
send the appropriate signature to the RA which then simply notifies the 
relevant CA that the end entity has supplied the required proof. Of 
course, such a situation may be disallowed by some policies (e.g., CAs
may be the only entities permitted to verify POP during certification).

2.3.1 Signature Keys

For signature keys, the end entity can sign a value to prove possession 
of the private key.

2.3.2 Encryption Keys

For encryption keys, the end entity can provide the private key to the 
CA/RA, or can be required to decrypt a value in order to prove 
possession of the private key (see Section 3.2.8). Decrypting a value 
can be achieved either directly or indirectly. 

The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to which  
an immediate response by the EE is required.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 12]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

The indirect method is to issue a certificate which is encrypted for the 
end entity (and have the end entity demonstrate its ability to decrypt 
this certificate in the confirmation message). This allows a CA to issue 
a certificate in a form which can only be used by the intended end 
entity.

This specification encourages use of the indirect method because this 
requires no extra messages to be sent (i.e., the proof can be 
demonstrated using the {request, response, confirmation} triple of 
messages).

2.3.3 Key Agreement Keys

For key agreement keys, the end entity and the PKI management entity 
(i.e., CA or RA) must establish a shared secret key in order to prove 
that the end entity has possession of the private key.

Note that this need not impose any restrictions on the keys that can be 
certified by a given CA -- in particular, for Diffie-Hellman keys the 
end entity may freely choose its algorithm parameters -- provided that 
the CA can generate a short-term (or one-time) key pair with the 
appropriate parameters when necessary.

2.4 Root CA key update

This discussion only applies to CAs that are a root CA for some end 
entity.

The basis of the procedure described here is that the CA protects its 
new public key using its previous private key and vice versa. Thus when 
a CA updates its key pair it must generate two extra cACertificate 
attribute values if certificates are made available using an X.500 
directory (for a total of four:  OldWithOld; OldWithNew; NewWithOld;
and NewWithNew). 

When a CA changes its key pair those entities who have acquired the old 
CA public key via "out-of-band" means are most affected. It is these end 
entities who will need access to the new CA public key protected with 
the old CA private key. However, they will only require this for a 
limited period (until they have acquired the new CA public key via the 
"out-of-band" mechanism). This will typically be easily achieved when 
these end entities' certificates expire. 

The data structure used to protect the new and old CA public keys is a 
standard certificate (which may also contain extensions). There are no 
new data structures required. 
 

Note 1. This scheme does not make use of any of the X.509 v3 extensions 
as it must be able to work even for version 1 certificates. The presence 
of the KeyIdentifier extension would make for efficiency improvements. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 13]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

Note 2. While the scheme could be generalized to cover cases where the 
CA updates its key pair more than once during the validity period of 
one of its end entities' certificates, this generalization seems of 
dubious value. Not having this generalization simply means that the 
validity period of a CA key pair must be greater than the validity 
period of any certificate issued by that CA using that key pair. 

Note 3.This scheme forces end entities to acquire the new CA public key 
on the expiry of the last certificate they owned that was signed with 
the old CA private key (via the "out-of-band" means).  Certificate 
and/or key update operations occurring at other times do not necessarily 
require this (depending on the end entity's equipment). 

2.4.1 CA Operator actions 

  To change the key of the CA, the CA operator does the following: 

  1.Generate a new key pair; 

  2.Create a certificate containing the old CA public key signed with 
    the new private key (the "old with new" certificate); 

  3.Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed with 
    the old private key (the "new with old" certificate); 

  4.Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed with 
    the new private key (the "new with new" certificate); 

  5.Publish these new certificates via the directory and/or other means 
    (perhaps using a CAKeyUpdAnn message); 

  6.Export the new CA public key so that end entities may acquire it 
    using the "out-of-band" mechanism (if required). 

The old CA private key is then no longer required. The old CA public key 
will however remain in use for some time. The time when the old CA 
public key is no longer required (other than for non-repudiation) will 
be when all end entities of this CA have securely acquired the new CA  
public key. 

The "old with new" certificate must have a validity period starting at 
the generation time of the old key pair and ending at the expiry date of 
the old public key. 

The "new with old" certificate must have a validity period starting at 
the generation time of the new key pair and ending at the time by which 
all end entities of this CA will securely possess the new CA public key
(at the latest, the expiry date of the old public key). 

The "new with new" certificate must have a validity period starting at 
the generation time of the new key pair and ending at the time by which 
the CA will next update its key pair. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 14]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

2.4.2 Verifying Certificates. 

Normally when verifying a signature, the verifier verifies (among other 
things) the certificate containing the public key of the signer. 
However, once a CA is allowed to update its key there are a range of new 
possibilities. These are shown in the table below. 

            Repository contains NEW     Repository contains only OLD 
              and OLD public keys        public key (due to, e.g., 
                                          delay in publication) 

               PSE      PSE Contains  PSE Contains    PSE Contains 
            Contains     OLD public    NEW public      OLD public 
           NEW public       key            key            key 
               key 

Signer's   Case 1:      Case 3:       Case 5:        Case 7: 
certifi-   This is      In this case  Although the   In this case 
cate is    the          the verifier  CA operator    the CA 
protected  standard     must access   has not        operator  has 
using NEW  case where   the           updated the    not updated 
public     the          directory in  directory the  the directory 
key        verifier     order to get  verifier can   and so the 
           can          the value of  verify the     verification 
           directly     the NEW       certificate    will FAIL 
           verify the   public key    directly - 
           certificate                this is thus 
           without                    the same as 
           using the                  case 1. 
           directory 
 
Signer's   Case 2:      Case 4:       Case 6:        Case 8: 
certifi-   In this      In this case  The verifier   Although the 
cate is    case the     the verifier  thinks this    CA operator 
protected  verifier     can directly  is the         has not 
using OLD  must         verify the    situation of   updated the 
public     access the   certificate   case 2 and     directory the 
key        directory    without       will access    verifier can 
           in order     using the     the            verify the 
           to get the   directory     directory;     certificate 
           value of                   however, the   directly - 
           the OLD                    verification   this is thus 
           public key                 will FAIL      the same as 
                                                     case 4. 

2.4.2.1 Verification in cases 1, 4, 5 and 8. 

In these cases the verifier has a local copy of the CA public key which 
can be used to verify the certificate directly. This is the same as the 
situation where no key change has occurred. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 15]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

Note that case 8 may arise between the time when the CA operator has 
generated the new key pair and the time when the CA operator stores the 
updated attributes in the directory. Case 5 can only arise if the CA 
operator has issued both the signer's and verifier's certificates during 
this "gap" (the CA operator SHOULD avoid this as it leads to the failure 
cases described below). 

2.4.2.2 Verification in case 2. 

In case 2 the verifier must get access to the old public key of the CA. 
The verifier does the following: 

  1. Look up the caCertificate attribute in the directory and pick the 
OldWithNew certificate (determined based on validity periods); 
  2. Verify that this is correct using the new CA key (which the 
verifier has locally); 
  3. If correct, check the signer's certificate using the old CA key. 

Case 2 will arise when the CA operator has issued the signer's 
certificate, then changed key and then issued the verifier's 
certificate, so it is quite a typical case. 

2.4.2.3 Verification in case 3. 

In case 3 the verifier must get access to the new public key of the CA. 
The verifier does the following: 

  1. Look up the CACertificate attribute in the directory and pick the 
NewWithOld certificate (determined based on validity periods);  
  2. Verify that this is correct using the old CA key (which the verifier 
has stored locally); 
  3.If correct, check the signer's certificate using the new CA key. 

Case 3 will arise when the CA operator has issued the verifier's 
certificate, then changed key and then issued the signer's certificate, 
so it is also quite a typical case. 

2.4.2.4 Failure of verification in case 6. 

In this case the CA has issued the verifier's PSE containing the new key 
without updating the directory attributes. This means that the verifier 
has no means to get a trustworthy version of the CA's old key and so 
verification fails. 

Note that the failure is the CA operator's fault. 

2.4.2.5 Failure of verification in case 7. 

In this case the CA has issued the signer's certificate protected with 
the new key without updating the directory attributes. This means that 
the verifier has no means to get a trustworthy version of the CA's new 
key and so verification fails. 

Note that the failure is again the CA operator's fault. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 16]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

2.4.3 Revocation - Change of CA key 

As we saw above the verification of a certificate becomes more complex 
once the CA is allowed to change its key. This is also true for 
revocation checks as the CA may have signed the CRL using a newer 
private key than the one that is within the user's PSE. 

The analysis of the alternatives is as for certificate verification. 

3. Data Structures 

This section contains descriptions of the data structures required for 
PKI management messages. Section 4 describes constraints on their values 
and the sequence of events for each of the various PKI management 
operations. Section 5 describes how these may be encapsulated in various 
transport mechanisms. 

3.1 Overall PKI Message 

All of the messages used in this specification for the purposes of PKI 
management use the following structure:

  PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
      header           PKIHeader, 
      body             PKIBody, 
      protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
      extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL
  }

The PKIHeader contains information which is common to many PKI messages.

The PKIBody contains message-specific information.

The PKIProtection, when used, contains bits that protect the PKI 
message.

The extraCerts field can contain certificates that may be useful to the 
recipient. For example, this can be used by a CA or RA to present an end 
entity with certificates that it needs to verify its own new certificate 
(if, for example, the CA that issued the end entity?s certificate is not 
a root CA for the end entity).  Note that this field does not 
necessarily contain a certification path - the recipient may have to 
sort, select from, or otherwise process the extra certificates in order 
to use them.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 17]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.1.1 PKI Message Header 

All PKI messages require some header information for addressing and 
transaction identification. Some of this information will also be 
present in a transport-specific envelope; however, if the PKI message is 
protected then this information is also protected (i.e., we make no 
assumption about secure transport). 

The following data structure is used to contain this information: 

  PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { 
      pvno                INTEGER     { ietf-version2 (1) }, 
      sender              GeneralName, 
      -- identifies the sender
      recipient           GeneralName, 
      -- identifies the intended recipient
      messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL, 
      -- time of production of this message (used when sender
      -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., 
      -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
      protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL, 
      -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
      senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
      recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
      -- to identify specific keys used for protection
      transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL, 
      -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in 
      -- corresponding request, response and confirmation messages
      senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL, 
      recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL, 
      -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce 
      -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce 
      -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by 
      -- the intended recipient of this message 
      freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
      -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions 
      -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
      generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 
                             InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
      -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
      -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
  }

  PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String 
      -- text encoded as UTF-8 String (note:  each UTF8String SHOULD
      -- include an RFC 1766 language tag to indicate the language 
      -- of the contained text)

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 18]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

The pvno field is fixed (at one) for this version of this 
specification.

The sender field contains the name of the sender of the PKIMessage. This 
name (in conjunction with senderKID, if supplied) should be usable to 
verify the protection on the message.  If nothing about the sender is 
known to the sending entity (e.g., in the init. req. message, where the
end entity may not know its own Distinguished Name (DN), e-mail name, 
IP address, etc.), then the "sender" field MUST contain a "NULL" value; 
that is, the SEQUENCE OF relative distinguished names is of zero length.  
In such a case the senderKID field MUST hold an identifier (i.e., a 
reference number) which indicates to the receiver the appropriate shared 
secret information to use to verify the message.

The recipient field contains the name of the recipient of the 
PKIMessage. This name (in conjunction with recipKID, if supplied) should 
be usable to verify the protection on the message.

The protectionAlg field specifies the algorithm used to protect the 
message. If no protection bits are supplied (note that PKIProtection 
is OPTIONAL) then this field MUST be omitted; if protection bits are 
supplied then this field MUST be supplied.

senderKID and recipKID are usable to indicate which keys have been used 
to protect the message (recipKID will normally only be required where 
protection of the message uses Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys).

The transactionID field within the message header MAY be used to allow 
the recipient of a response message to correlate this with a previously 
issued request. For example, in the case of an RA there may be many 
requests "outstanding" at a given moment.

The senderNonce and recipNonce fields protect the PKIMessage against 
replay attacks.

The messageTime field contains the time at which the sender created the 
message. This may be useful to allow end entities to correct their local 
time to be consistent with the time on a central system.

The freeText field may be used to send a human-readable message to the 
recipient (in any number of languages).  The first language used in this
sequence indicates the desired language for replies.

The generalInfo field may be used to send machine-processable additional
data to the recipient.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 19]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.1.2 PKI Message Body 

  PKIBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements 
      ir      [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
      ip      [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response
      cr      [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
      cp      [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
      p10cr   [4]  CertificationRequest,   --PKCS #10 Cert. Req.
        -- the PKCS #10 certification request (see [PKCS10])
      popdecc [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
      popdecr [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
      kur     [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
      kup     [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
      krr     [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
      krp     [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
      rr      [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
      rp      [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
      ccr     [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
      ccp     [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
      ckuann  [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
      cann    [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.
      rann    [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
      crlann  [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement
      conf    [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation 
      nested  [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
      genm    [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
      genp    [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
      error   [23] ErrorMsgContent         --Error Message
  }

The specific types are described in Section 3.3 below.

3.1.3 PKI Message Protection 

Some PKI messages will be protected for integrity. (Note that if an 
asymmetric algorithm is used to protect a message and the relevant 
public component has been certified already, then the origin of message 
can also be authenticated.  On the other hand, if the public component 
is uncertified then the message origin cannot be automatically 
authenticated, but may be authenticated via out-of-band means.) 

When protection is applied the following structure is used: 

  PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING 

The input to the calculation of PKIProtection is the DER encoding 
of the following data structure: 

  ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { 
      header    PKIHeader, 
      body      PKIBody
  }

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 20]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

There MAY be cases in which the PKIProtection BIT STRING is deliberately 
not used to protect a message (i.e., this OPTIONAL field is omitted) 
because other protection, external to PKIX, will instead be applied.  
Such a choice is explicitly allowed in this specification.  Examples of 
such external protection include PKCS #7 [PKCS7] and Security Multiparts 
[RFC1847] encapsulation of the PKIMessage (or simply the PKIBody 
(omitting the CHOICE tag), if the relevant PKIHeader information is 
securely carried in the external mechanism); specification of external 
protection using PKCS #7 will be provided in a separate document.  It is 
noted, however, that many such external mechanisms require that the end 
entity already possesses a public-key certificate, and/or a unique 
Distinguished Name, and/or other such infrastructure-related information.  
Thus, they may not be appropriate for initial registration, key-recovery, 
or any other process with "boot-strapping" characteristics.  For those 
cases it may be necessary that the PKIProtection parameter be used.  In 
the future, if/when external mechanisms are modified to accommodate 
boot-strapping scenarios, the use of PKIProtection may become rare or 
non-existent.

Depending on the circumstances the PKIProtection bits may contain a 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) or signature. Only the following cases 
can occur:

- shared secret information

In this case the sender and recipient share secret information 
(established via out-of-band means or from a previous PKI management 
operation).  PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the
protectionAlg will be the following:

  PasswordBasedMac ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER --{1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
  PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
      salt                OCTET STRING,
      owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
      -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
      iterationCount      INTEGER,
      -- number of times the OWF is applied
      mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
      -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
  }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])

In the above protectionAlg the salt value is appended to the shared 
secret input. The OWF is then applied iterationCount times, where the 
salted secret is the input to the first iteration and, for each 
successive iteration, the input is set to be the output of the previous 
iteration. The output of the final iteration (called "BASEKEY" for ease 
of reference, with a size of "H") is what is used to form the symmetric 
key. If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key and K <= H, then the most 
significant K bits of BASEKEY are used. If K > H, then all of BASEKEY is 
used for the most significant H bits of the key, OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is 
used for the next most significant H bits of the key, OWF("2" || 
BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H bits of the key, and so 
on, until all K bits have been derived. [Here "N" is the ASCII byte 
encoding the number N and "||" represents concatenation.]

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 21]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

- DH key pairs

Where the sender and receiver possess Diffie-Hellman certificates with 
compatible DH parameters, then in order to protect the message the end 
entity must generate a symmetric key based on its private DH key value 
and the DH public key of the recipient of the PKI message. 
PKIProtection will contain a MAC value keyed with this derived
symmetric key and the protectionAlg will be the following:

  DHBasedMac ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER --{1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}

  DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
      owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
      -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
      mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
      -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
  }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])

In the above protectionAlg OWF is applied to the result of the Diffie-
Hellman computation. The OWF output (called "BASEKEY" for ease of 
reference, with a size of "H") is what is used to form the symmetric 
key. If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key and K <= H, then the most 
significant K bits of BASEKEY are used. If K > H, then all of BASEKEY is 
used for the most significant H bits of the key, OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is 
used for the next most significant H bits of the key, OWF("2" || 
BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H bits of the key, and so 
on, until all K bits have been derived. [Here "N" is the ASCII byte 
encoding the number N and "||" represents concatenation.]

- signature

Where the sender possesses a signature key pair it may simply sign the 
PKI message. PKIProtection will contain the signature value and the 
protectionAlg will be an AlgorithmIdentifier for a digital signature 
(e.g., md5WithRSAEncryption or dsaWithSha-1). 

- multiple protection

In cases where an end entity sends a protected PKI message to an RA, the 
RA MAY forward that message to a CA, attaching its own protection (which 
MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and 
certificates shared between the RA and the CA). This is accomplished by 
nesting the entire message sent by the end entity within a new PKI 
message. The structure used is as follows.

  NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessage

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 22]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.2 Common Data Structures 

Before specifying the specific types that may be placed in a PKIBody we 
define some data structures that are used in more than one case. 

3.2.1 Requested Certificate Contents 

Various PKI management messages require that the originator of the 
message indicate some of the fields that are required to be present in 
a certificate. The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or RA to 
specify as much as it wishes about the certificate it requires. 
CertTemplate is identical to a Certificate but with all fields optional. 

Note that even if the originator completely specifies the contents of a 
certificate it requires, a CA is free to modify fields within the 
certificate actually issued. 

See [CRMF] for CertTemplate syntax.

3.2.2 Encrypted Values 

Where encrypted values (restricted, in this specification, to be either 
private keys or certificates) are sent in PKI messages the 
EncryptedValue data structure is used. 

See [CRMF] for EncryptedValue syntax.

Use of this data structure requires that the creator and intended 
recipient respectively be able to encrypt and decrypt. Typically, this 
will mean that the sender and recipient have, or are able to generate, a 
shared secret key. 

If the recipient of the PKIMessage already possesses a private key 
usable for decryption, then the encSymmKey field MAY contain a session 
key encrypted using the recipient's public key. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 23]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.2.3 Status codes and Failure Information for PKI messages 

All response messages will include some status information. The 
following values are defined. 
   
  PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { 
      granted                (0), 
      -- you got exactly what you asked for 
      grantedWithMods        (1), 
      -- you got something like what you asked for; the 
      -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences 
      rejection              (2), 
      -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
      waiting                (3), 
      -- the request body part has not yet been processed, 
      -- expect to hear more later 
      revocationWarning      (4), 
      -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is 
      -- imminent 
      revocationNotification (5), 
      -- notification that a revocation has occurred 
      keyUpdateWarning       (6)
      -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in 
      -- the key update request message
  }

Responders may use the following syntax to provide more information 
about failure cases. 

  PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { 
  -- since we can fail in more than one way! 
  -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
      badAlg           (0), 
      -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
      badMessageCheck  (1), 
      -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
      badRequest       (2),     
      -- transaction not permitted or supported
      badTime          (3),     
      -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
      -- as defined by local policy
      badCertId        (4), 
      -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
      badDataFormat    (5),
      -- the data submitted has the wrong format
      wrongAuthority   (6),
      -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the 
      -- one creating the response token
      incorrectData    (7),
      -- the requester's data is incorrect (used for notary services)
      missingTimeStamp (8),
      -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there (by policy)
      badPOP           (9)
      -- the proof-of-possession failed
  }
Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 24]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

  PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      status        PKIStatus, 
      statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
      failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL
  }

3.2.4 Certificate Identification 

In order to identify particular certificates the CertId data structure 
is used. 

See [CRMF] for CertId syntax.

3.2.5 "Out-of-band" root CA public key 

Each root CA must be able to publish its current public key via some 
"out-of-band" means. While such mechanisms are beyond the scope of this 
document, we define data structures which can support such mechanisms. 

There are generally two methods available: either the CA directly 
publishes its self-signed certificate; or this information is available 
via the Directory (or equivalent) and the CA publishes a hash of this 
value to allow verification of its integrity before use. 

  OOBCert ::= Certificate 

The fields within this certificate are restricted as follows:

- The certificate MUST be self-signed  (i.e., the signature must be 
  verifiable using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field);
- The subject and issuer fields MUST be identical;
- If the subject field is NULL then both subjectAltNames and 
  issuerAltNames extensions MUST be present and have exactly the same 
  value;
- The values of all other extensions must be suitable for a self-signed
  certificate (e.g., key identifiers for subject and issuer must be the 
  same).

  OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { 
      hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL, 
      certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL, 
      hashVal         BIT STRING
      -- hashVal is calculated over the self-signed 
      -- certificate with the identifier certID. 
  }

The intention of the hash value is that anyone who has securely 
received the hash value (via the out-of-band means) can verify a self-
signed certificate for that CA.  

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 25]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.2.6 Archive Options

Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to archive a private key 
value using the PKIArchiveOptions structure

See [CRMF] for PKIArchiveOptions syntax.

3.2.7 Publication Information

Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to publish a certificate 
using the PKIPublicationInfo structure. 

See [CRMF] for PKIPublicationInfo syntax.

3.2.8  Proof-of-Possession Structures

If the certification request is for a signing key pair (i.e., a request 
for a verification certificate), then the proof of possession of the 
private signing key is demonstrated through use of the POPOSigningKey 
structure.

See [CRMF] for POPOSigningKey syntax, but note that POPOSigningKeyInput 
has the following semantic stipulations in this specification.

  POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
      authInfo            CHOICE {
          sender              [0] GeneralName,
          -- from PKIHeader (used only if an authenticated identity
          -- has been established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a
          -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate))
          publicKeyMAC        [1] PKMACValue
          -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for
          -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC
          -- (using the protectionAlg AlgId from PKIHeader) on the
          -- DER-encoded value of publicKey
      },
      publicKey           SubjectPublicKeyInfo    -- from CertTemplate
  }

On the other hand, if the certification request is for an encryption key 
pair (i.e., a request for an encryption certificate), then the proof of 
possession of the private decryption key may be demonstrated in one of 
three ways. 

  1) By the inclusion of the private key (encrypted) in the CertRequest
(in the PKIArchiveOptions control structure).

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 26]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

  2) By having the CA return not the certificate, but an encrypted 
certificate (i.e., the certificate encrypted under a randomly-generated 
symmetric key, and the symmetric key encrypted under the public key for 
which the certification request is being made) -- this is the "indirect"
method mentioned previously in Section 2.3.2.  The end entity proves 
knowledge of the private decryption key to the CA by MACing the 
PKIConfirm message using a key derived from this symmetric key.  [Note 
that if more than one CertReqMsg is included in the PKIMessage, then 
the CA uses a different symmetric key for each CertReqMsg and the 
MAC uses a key derived from the concatenation of all these keys.]  The 
MACing procedure uses the PasswordBasedMac AlgId defined in Section 3.1.

  3) By having the end entity engage in a challenge-response protocol 
(using the messages POPODecKeyChall and POPODecKeyResp; see below) 
between CertReqMessages and CertRepMessage -- this is the "direct" method
mentioned previously in Section 2.3.2.  [This method would typically 
be used in an environment in which an RA verifies POP and then makes a 
certification request to the CA on behalf of the end entity.  In such a 
scenario, the CA trusts the RA to have done POP correctly before the RA  
requests a certificate for the end entity.]  The complete protocol then 
looks as follows (note that req' does not necessarily encapsulate req as 
a nested message):
                     EE            RA            CA
                      ---- req ---->
                      <--- chall ---
                      ---- resp --->
                                    ---- req' --->
                                    <--- rep -----
                                    ---- conf --->
                      <--- rep -----
                      ---- conf --->

This protocol is obviously much longer than the 3-way exchange given in 
choice (2) above, but allows a local Registration Authority to be 
involved and has the property that the certificate itself is not 
actually created until the proof of possession is complete.

If the cert. request is for a key agreement key (KAK) pair, then the 
POP can use any of the 3 ways described above for enc. key pairs, with
the following changes:  (1) the parenthetical text of bullet 2) is
replaced with "(i.e., the certificate encrypted under the symmetric key
derived from the CA's private KAK and the public key for which the 
certification request is being made)"; (2) the first parenthetical text
of the challenge field of "Challenge" below is replaced with "(using 
PreferredSymmAlg (see Appendix B6) and a symmetric key derived from
the CA's private KAK and the public key for which the certification 
request is being made)".  Alternatively, the POP can use the 
POPOSigningKey structure given in [CRMF] (where the alg field is 
DHBasedMAC and the signature field is the MAC) as a fourth alternative 
for demonstrating POP if the CA already has a D-H certificate that is 
known to the EE.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 27]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

The challenge-response messages for proof of possession of a private 
decryption key are specified as follows (see [MvOV97, p.404] for 
details).  Note that this challenge-response exchange is associated with 
the preceding cert. request message (and subsequent cert. response and 
confirmation messages) by the nonces used in the PKIHeader and by the 
protection (MACing or signing) applied to the PKIMessage.

  POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
  -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the 
  -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). 

  Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
      owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
      -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in any 
      -- subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if omitted, 
      -- then the owf used in the immediately preceding Challenge is 
      -- to be used).
      witness             OCTET STRING,
      -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a 
      -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
      -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
      challenge           OCTET STRING
      -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. 
      -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as 
      --   Rand ::= SEQUENCE { 
      --      int      INTEGER, 
      --       - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
      --      sender   GeneralName 
      --       - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) 
      --   }
  }

  POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
  -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the 
  -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).  The
  -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the 
  -- corresponding Challenge.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 28]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.3 Operation-Specific Data Structures 

3.3.1 Initialization Request 

An Initialization request message contains as the PKIBody an 
CertReqMessages data structure which specifies the requested 
certificate(s).  Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity 
are the template fields which may be supplied for each certificate 
requested (see Appendix B profiles for further information).  This 
message is intended to be used for entities first initializing into 
the PKI.

See [CRMF] for CertReqMessages syntax.

3.3.2 Initialization Response 

An Initialization response message contains as the PKIBody an 
CertRepMessage data structure which has for each certificate requested 
a PKIStatusInfo field, a subject certificate, and possibly a private 
key (normally encrypted with a session key, which is itself encrypted 
with the protocolEncKey).  

See Section 3.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax.

3.3.3 Registration/Certification Request 

A Registration/Certification request message contains as the PKIBody a 
CertReqMessages data structure which specifies the requested 
certificates.  This message is intended to be used for existing PKI 
entities who wish to obtain additional certificates.

See [CRMF] for CertReqMessages syntax.

Alternatively, the PKIBody MAY be a CertificationRequest (this 
structure is fully specified by the ASN.1 structure 
CertificationRequest given in [PKCS10]).  This structure may be 
required for certificate requests for signing key pairs when 
interoperation with legacy systems is desired, but its use is strongly 
discouraged whenever not absolutely necessary.

3.3.4 Registration/Certification Response 

A registration response message contains as the PKIBody a 
CertRepMessage data structure which has a status value for each 
certificate requested, and optionally has a CA public key, failure 
information, a subject certificate, and an encrypted private key. 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 29]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

  CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
      caPubs          [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL, 
      response            SEQUENCE OF CertResponse 
  }

  CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { 
      certReqId           INTEGER,
      -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
      -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
      -- corresponding request)
      status              PKIStatusInfo, 
      certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
      rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
      -- analogous to the id-regInfo-asciiPairs OCTET STRING defined
      -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
  }

  CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { 
      certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
      privateKey      [0] EncryptedValue      OPTIONAL,
      publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL 
  }

  CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
      certificate     [0] Certificate,
      encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedValue
  }

Only one of the failInfo (in PKIStatusInfo) and certificate (in 
CertifiedKeyPair) fields can be present in each CertResponse (depending 
on the status). For some status values (e.g., waiting) neither of the 
optional fields will be present. 

Given an EncryptedCert and the relevant decryption key the certificate 
may be obtained. The purpose of this is to allow a CA to return the 
value of a certificate, but with the constraint that only the intended 
recipient can obtain the actual certificate. The benefit of this 
approach is that a CA may reply with a certificate even in the absence 
of a proof that the requester is the end entity which can use the 
relevant private key (note that the proof is not obtained until the 
PKIConfirm message is received by the CA). Thus the CA will not have to 
revoke that certificate in the event that something goes wrong with the 
proof of possession.

3.3.5 Key update request content 

For key update requests the CertReqMessages syntax is used.  Typically, 
SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity are the template fields which 
may be supplied for each key to be updated.  This message is intended 
to be used to request updates to existing (non-revoked and non-expired)
certificates.

See [CRMF] for CertReqMessages syntax.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 30]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.3.6 Key Update response content 

For key update responses the CertRepMessage syntax is used.  The 
response is identical to the initialization response.

See Section 3.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax.

3.3.7 Key Recovery Request content 

For key recovery requests the syntax used is identical to the 
initialization request CertReqMessages.  Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo 
and KeyId are the template fields which may be used to supply a 
signature public key for which a certificate is required (see Appendix B 
profiles for further information).

See [CRMF] for CertReqMessages syntax.

3.3.8 Key recovery response content 

For key recovery responses the following syntax is used.  For some 
status values (e.g., waiting) none of the optional fields will be 
present.

  KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
      status          PKIStatusInfo,
      newSigCert  [0] Certificate                   OPTIONAL, 
      caCerts     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 
                                   Certificate      OPTIONAL,
      keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 
                                   CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
  }

3.3.9 Revocation Request Content 

When requesting revocation of a certificate (or several certificates) 
the following data structure is used. The name of the requester is 
present in the PKIHeader structure. 

  RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

  RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { 
      certDetails         CertTemplate, 
      -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about 
      -- the cert. for which revocation is requested 
      -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
      revocationReason    ReasonFlags      OPTIONAL, 
      -- the reason that revocation is requested
      badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime  OPTIONAL, 
      -- indicates best knowledge of sender 
      crlEntryDetails     Extensions       OPTIONAL
      -- requested crlEntryExtensions 
  }

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 31]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.3.10 Revocation Response Content 

The response to the above message. If produced, this is sent to the 
requester of the revocation. (A separate revocation announcement message 
MAY be sent to the subject of the certificate for which revocation was 
requested.) 

  RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
      status        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, 
      -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
      revCerts  [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, 
      -- IDs for which revocation was requested (same order as status)
      crls      [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList  OPTIONAL 
      -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) 
  }

3.3.11 Cross certification request content 

Cross certification requests use the same syntax (CertReqMessages) as 
for normal certification requests with the restriction that the key 
pair MUST have been generated by the requesting CA and the private key 
MUST NOT be sent to the responding CA. 

See [CRMF] for CertReqMessages syntax.

3.3.12 Cross certification response content 

Cross certification responses use the same syntax (CertRepMessage) as 
for normal certification responses with the restriction that no 
encrypted private key can be sent.

See Section 3.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax.

3.3.13 CA Key Update Announcement content 

When a CA updates its own key pair the following data structure MAY be 
used to announce this event.

  CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
      oldWithNew          Certificate, -- old pub signed with new priv 
      newWithOld          Certificate, -- new pub signed with old priv 
      newWithNew          Certificate  -- new pub signed with new priv 
  }

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 32]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.3.14 Certificate Announcement 

This structure MAY be used to announce the existence of certificates. 

Note that this message is intended to be used for those cases (if any)
where there is no pre-existing method for publication of certificates; 
it is not intended to be used where, for example, X.500 is the 
method for publication of certificates. 

  CertAnnContent ::= Certificate 

3.3.15 Revocation Announcement 

When a CA has revoked, or is about to revoke, a particular certificate 
it MAY issue an announcement of this (possibly upcoming) event. 

  RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
      status              PKIStatus, 
      certId              CertId, 
      willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime, 
      badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime, 
      crlDetails          Extensions  OPTIONAL 
      -- extra CRL details(e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) 
  }

A CA MAY use such an announcement to warn (or notify) a subject that its 
certificate is about to be (or has been) revoked. This would typically 
be used where the request for revocation did not come from the subject 
concerned.

The willBeRevokedAt field contains the time at which a new entry will be 
added to the relevant CRLs.

3.3.16 CRL Announcement 

When a CA issues a new CRL (or set of CRLs) the following data structure 
MAY be used to announce this event. 

  CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList 

3.3.17 PKI Confirmation content 

This data structure is used in three-way protocols as the final 
PKIMessage. Its content is the same in all cases - actually there is no 
content since the PKIHeader carries all the required information. 

  PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 33]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

3.3.18 PKI General Message content

  InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
      infoType               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
      infoValue              ANY DEFINED BY infoType  OPTIONAL
  }
  -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited to:
  --  { CAProtEncCert    = {id-it 1}, Certificate                     }
  --  { SignKeyPairTypes = {id-it 2}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier }
  --  { EncKeyPairTypes  = {id-it 3}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier }
  --  { PreferredSymmAlg = {id-it 4}, AlgorithmIdentifier             }
  --  { CAKeyUpdateInfo  = {id-it 5}, CAKeyUpdAnnContent              }
  --  { CurrentCRL       = {id-it 6}, CertificateList                 }
  -- where {id-it} = {id-pkix 4} = {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4} 
  -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
  -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
  -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for 
  -- specific environments.

  GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
  -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
  -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will typically
  -- be omitted for some of the examples given above.  The receiver is 
  -- free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does not recognize.
  -- If sent from EE to CA, the empty set indicates that the CA may send 
  -- any/all information that it wishes.

3.3.19 PKI General Response content

  GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
  -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does 
  -- not recognize.

3.3.20 Error Message content

  ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
      errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
      -- implementation-specific error codes
      errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
      -- implementation-specific error details
  }

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 34]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

4. Mandatory PKI Management functions

The PKI management functions outlined in Section 1 above are described 
in this section.

This section deals with functions that are "mandatory" in the sense
that all end entity and CA/RA implementations MUST be able to provide
the functionality described (perhaps via one of the transport mechanisms 
defined in Section 5). This part is effectively the profile of the PKI 
management functionality that MUST be supported.

Note that not all PKI management functions result in the creation of a 
PKI message.

4.1 Root CA initialization

[See Section 1.2.2 for this document's definition of "root CA".]

A newly created root CA must produce a "self-certificate" which is a 
Certificate structure with the profile defined for the "newWithNew" 
certificate issued following a root CA key update.

In  order to make the CA's self certificate useful to end entities that 
do not acquire the self certificate via "out-of-band" means, the CA 
must also produce a fingerprint for its public key.  End entities that 
acquire this fingerprint securely via some "out-of-band" means can then 
verify the CA's self-certificate and hence the other attributes 
contained therein.

The data structure used to carry the fingerprint is the OOBCertHash.

4.2 Root CA key update

CA keys (as all other keys) have a finite lifetime and will have to be 
updated on a periodic basis.  The certificates NewWithNew, NewWithOld, 
and OldWithNew (see Section 2.4.1) are issued by the CA to aid existing 
end entities who hold the current self-signed CA certificate 
(OldWithOld) to transition securely to the new self-signed CA 
certificate (NewWithNew), and to aid new end entities who will hold 
NewWithNew to acquire OldWithOld securely for verification of existing 
data.

4.3 Subordinate CA initialization

[See Section 1.2.2 for this document's definition of "subordinate CA".]

>From the perspective of PKI management protocols the initialization of a 
subordinate CA is the same as the initialization of an end entity. The 
only difference is that the subordinate CA must also produce an initial 
revocation list.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 35]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

4.4 CRL production

Before issuing any certificates a newly established CA (which issues 
CRLs) must produce "empty" versions of each CRL which is to be 
periodically produced.

4.5 PKI information request

When a PKI entity (CA, RA, or EE) wishes to acquire information about 
the current status of a CA it MAY send that CA a request for such 
information.

The CA must respond to the request by providing (at least) all of the 
information requested by the requester.  If some of the information 
cannot be provided then an error must be conveyed to the requester.

If PKIMessages are used to request and supply this PKI information,
then the request must be the GenMsg message, the response must be the 
GenRep message, and the error must be the Error message.  These 
messages are protected using a MAC based on shared secret information 
(i.e., PasswordBasedMAC) or any other authenticated means (if the end 
entity has an existing certificate).

4.6 Cross certification

The requester CA is the CA that will become the subject of the cross-
certificate; the responder CA will become the issuer of the cross-
certificate. 

The requester CA must be "up and running" before initiating the cross-
certification operation. 

4.6.1 One-way request-response scheme: 

The cross-certification scheme is essentially a one way operation; that 
is, when successful, this operation results in the creation of one new 
cross-certificate. If the requirement is that cross-certificates be 
created in "both directions" then each CA in turn must initiate a cross-
certification operation (or use another scheme). 

This scheme is suitable where the two CAs in question can already verify 
each other?s signatures (they have some common points of trust) or where 
there is an out-of-band verification of the origin of the certification 
request.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 36]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

Detailed Description: 

Cross certification is initiated at one CA known as the responder.  The 
CA administrator for the responder identifies the CA it wants to cross 
certify and the responder CA equipment generates an authorization code. 
The responder CA administrator passes this authorization code by out-of-
band means to the requester CA administrator. The requester CA 
administrator enters the authorization code at the requester CA in order 
to initiate the on-line exchange. 

The authorization code is used for authentication and integrity 
purposes. This is done by generating a symmetric key based on the 
authorization code and using the symmetric key for generating Message 
Authentication Codes (MACs) on all messages exchanged. 

The requester CA initiates the exchange by generating a random number 
(requester random number). The requester CA then sends to the responder 
CA the cross certification request (ccr) message. The fields in this 
message are protected from modification with a MAC based on the 
authorization code. 

Upon receipt of the ccr message, the responder CA checks the protocol 
version, saves the requester random number, generates its own random 
number (responder random number) and validates the MAC. It then 
generates (and archives, if desired) a new requester certificate that 
contains the requester CA public key and is signed with the responder 
CA signature private key. The responder CA responds with the cross 
certification response (ccp) message. The fields in this message are 
protected from modification with a MAC based on the authorization code. 

Upon receipt of the ccp message,  the requester CA checks that its own 
system time is close to the responder CA system time, checks the 
received random numbers and validates the MAC.  The requester CA 
responds with the PKIConfirm message. The fields in this message are 
protected from modification with a MAC based on the authorization code.  
The requester CA writes the requester certificate to the Repository.

Upon receipt of the PKIConfirm message, the responder CA checks the 
random numbers and validates the MAC. 

Notes: 

1.The ccr message must contain a "complete" certification request, that 
  is, all fields (including, e.g., a BasicConstraints extension) must be 
  specified by the requester CA.
2.The ccp message SHOULD contain the verification certificate of the 
  responder CA - if present, the requester CA must then verify this 
  certificate (for example, via the "out-of-band" mechanism). 

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 37]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

4.7 End entity initialization

As with CAs, end entities must be initialized. Initialization of end 
entities requires at least two steps:

      - acquisition of PKI information
      - out-of-band verification of one root-CA public key

(other possible steps include the retrieval of trust condition 
information and/or out-of-band verification of other CA public keys).

4.7.1 Acquisition of PKI information

The information REQUIRED is:

- the current root-CA public key
- (if the certifying CA is not a root-CA) the certification path from 
the root CA to the certifying CA together with appropriate revocation 
lists
- the algorithms and algorithm parameters which the certifying CA 
supports for each relevant usage

Additional information could be required (e.g., supported extensions
or CA policy information) in order to produce a certification request 
which will be successful. However, for simplicity we do not mandate that 
the end entity acquires this information via the PKI messages. The end 
result is simply that some certification requests may fail (e.g., if the 
end entity wants to generate its own encryption key but the CA doesn?t 
allow that).

The required information MAY be acquired as described in Section 4.5.

4.7.2 Out-of-Band Verification of Root-CA Key

An end entity must securely possess the public key of its root CA. One 
method to achieve this is to provide the end entity with the CA?s self-
certificate fingerprint via some secure "out-of-band" means. The end 
entity can then securely use the CA?s self-certificate.

See Section 4.1 for further details.

4.8 Certificate Request

An initialized end entity MAY request a certificate at any time (as part 
of an update procedure, or for any other purpose).  This request will be 
made using the certification request (cr) message.  If the end entity 
already possesses a signing key pair (with a corresponding verification 
certificate), then this cr message will typically be protected by the 
entity's digital signature.  The CA returns the new certificate (if the 
request is successful) in a CertRepMessage.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 38]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

4.9 Key Update

When a key pair is due to expire the relevant end entity MAY request 
a key update - that is, it MAY request that the CA issue a new 
certificate for a new key pair.  The request is made using a key update 
request (kur) message.  If the end entity already possesses a signing 
key pair (with a corresponding verification certificate), then this 
message will typically be protected by the entity's digital signature.  
The CA returns the new certificate (if the request is successful) in a 
key update response (kup) message, which is syntactically identical to 
a CertRepMessage.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 39]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

5. Transports 

The transport protocols specified below allow end entities, RAs and CAs 
to pass PKI messages between them. There is no requirement for specific 
security mechanisms to be applied at this level if the PKI messages are 
suitably protected (that is, if the OPTIONAL PKIProtection parameter is 
used as specified for each message).

5.1 File based protocol

A file containing a PKI message MUST contain only the DER encoding of 
one PKI message, i.e., there MUST be no extraneous header or trailer 
information in the file.

Such files can be used to transport PKI messages using, e.g., FTP. 

5.2 Direct TCP-Based Management Protocol 

The following simple TCP-based protocol is to be used for transport 
of PKI messages. This protocol is suitable for cases where an end entity 
(or an RA) initiates a transaction and can poll to pick up the results. 

If a transaction is initiated by a PKI entity (RA or CA) then an end 
entity must either supply a listener process or be supplied with a 
polling reference (see below) in order to allow it to pick up the PKI 
message from the PKI management component.

The protocol basically assumes a listener process on an RA or CA which 
can accept PKI messages on a well-defined port (port number 829). 
Typically an initiator binds to this port and submits the initial PKI 
message for a given transaction ID. The responder replies with a PKI 
message and/or with a reference number to be used later when polling for 
the actual PKI message response. 

If a number of PKI response messages are to be produced for a given 
request (say if some part of the request is handled more quickly than 
another) then a new polling reference is also returned.

When the final PKI response message has been picked up by the initiator 
then no new polling reference is supplied.

The initiator of a transaction sends a "direct TCP-based PKI message" 
to the recipient. The recipient responds with a similar message.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 40]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

A "direct TCP-based PKI message" consists of:

      length (32-bits), flag (8-bits), value (defined below)

The length field contains the number of octets of the remainder of the 
message (i.e., number of octets of "value" plus one).  All 32-bit values
in this protocol are specified to be in network byte order.

 Message name   flag     value 

 msgReq         ?00?H    DER-encoded PKI message           
   -- PKI message 
 pollRep        ?01?H    polling reference (32 bits),      
                         time-to-check-back (32 bits)      
   -- poll response where no PKI message response ready; use polling
   -- reference value (and estimated time value) for later polling
 pollReq        ?02?H    polling reference (32 bits)       
   -- request for a PKI message response to initial message
 negPollRep     ?03?H    ?00?H                             
   -- no further polling responses (i.e., transaction complete)
 partialMsgRep  ?04?H    next polling reference (32 bits), 
                         time-to-check-back (32 bits),     
                         DER-encoded PKI message           
   -- partial response to initial message plus new polling reference 
   -- (and estimated time value) to use to get next part of response
 finalMsgRep    ?05?H    DER-encoded PKI message           
   -- final (and possibly sole) response to initial message
 errorMsgRep    ?06?H    human readable error message      
   -- produced when an error is detected (e.g., a polling reference is
   -- received which doesn?t exist or is finished with)

Where a PKIConfirm message is to be transported (always from the 
initiator to the responder) then a msgReq message is sent and a 
negPollRep is returned.

The sequence of messages which can occur is then:

a) end entity sends msgReq and receives one of pollRep, negPollRep, 
partialMsgRep or finalMsgRep in response.
b) end entity sends pollReq message and receives one of negPollRep, 
partialMsgRep, finalMsgRep or errorMsgRep in response.

The "time-to-check-back" parameter is a 32-bit integer, defined to be 
the number of seconds which have elapsed since midnight, January 1, 
1970, coordinated universal time.  It provides an estimate of the time 
that the end entity should send its next pollReq.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 41]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

5.3 Management Protocol via E-mail 

This subsection specifies a means for conveying ASN.1-encoded messages 
for the protocol exchanges described in Section 4 via Internet mail. 

A simple MIME object is specified as follows.

   Content-Type: application/pkixcmp
   Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

   <<the ASN.1 DER-encoded PKIX-CMP message, base64-encoded>>

This MIME object can be sent and received using common MIME processing 
engines and provides a simple Internet mail transport for PKIX-CMP 
messages.  Implementations MAY wish to also recognize and use the 
"application/x-pkixcmp" MIME type (specified in earlier versions of 
this document) in order to support backward compatibility wherever 
applicable.

5.4 Management Protocol via HTTP 

This subsection specifies a means for conveying ASN.1-encoded messages 
for the protocol exchanges described in Section 4 via the HyperText 
Transfer Protocol. 

A simple MIME object is specified as follows.

   Content-Type: application/pkixcmp

   <<the ASN.1 DER-encoded PKIX-CMP message>>

This MIME object can be sent and received using common HTTP processing 
engines over WWW links and provides a simple browser-server transport 
for PKIX-CMP messages.  Implementations MAY wish to also recognize and 
use the "application/x-pkixcmp" MIME type (specified in earlier 
versions of this document) in order to support backward compatibility 
wherever applicable.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 42]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 

This entire memo is about security mechanisms. 

One cryptographic consideration is worth explicitly spelling out. In 
the protocols specified above, when an end entity is required to 
prove possession of a decryption key, it is effectively challenged 
to decrypt something (its own certificate). This scheme (and many 
others!) could be vulnerable to an attack if the possessor of the 
decryption key in question could be fooled into decrypting an 
arbitrary challenge and returning the cleartext to an attacker. 
Although in this specification a number of other failures in 
security are required in order for this attack to succeed, it is 
conceivable that some future services (e.g., notary, trusted time) 
could potentially be vulnerable to such attacks. For this reason we 
re-iterate the general rule that implementations should be very 
careful about decrypting arbitrary "ciphertext" and revealing 
recovered "plaintext" since such a practice can lead to serious 
security vulnerabilities.

Note also that exposing a private key to the CA/RA as a proof-of-
possession technique can carry some security risks (depending upon
whether or not the CA/RA can be trusted to handle such material
appropriately).  Implementers are advised to exercise caution in 
selecting and using this particular POP mechanism.

References

   [COR95]   ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 21, Technical Corrigendum 2 to ISO/IEC
             9594-8: 1990 & 1993 (1995:E), July 1995.

   [CRMF]    M. Myers, C. Adams, D. Solo, D. Kemp, "Certificate Request
             Message Format", Internet Draft 
             draft-ietf-pkix-crmf-0x.txt (work in progress).

   [MvOV97]  A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone, "Handbook of 
             Applied Cryptography", CRC Press, 1997.

   [PKCS7]   RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards 
             (PKCS)", RSA Data Security Inc., Redwood City, California, 
             November 1993 Release.

   [PKCS10]  RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards 
             (PKCS)", RSA Data Security Inc., Redwood City, California, 
             November 1993 Release.

   [PKCS11]  RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards -
             PKCS #11:  Cryptographic token interface standard", RSA 
             Data Security Inc., Redwood City, California, April 28, 
             1995.

   [RFC1847] J. Galvin, S. Murphy, S. Crocker, N. Freed, "Security 
             Multiparts for MIME:  Multipart/Signed and Multipart/
             Encrypted", Internet Request for Comments 1847, October
             1995.
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   [RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC:  Keyed Hashing
             for Message Authentication", Internet Request for Comments
             2104, February, 1997.

   [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
             Requirement Levels", Internet Request for Comments 2119 
             (Best Current Practice: BCP 14), March, 1997.

   [RFC2202] P. Cheng, R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and 
             HMAC-SHA-1", Internet Request for Comments 2202, 
             September 1997.

   [X509-AM] ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 21, Draft Amendments DAM 4 to ISO/IEC
             9594-2, DAM 2 to ISO/IEC 9594-6, DAM 1 to ISO/IEC 9594-7,
             and DAM 1 to ISO/IEC 9594-8 on Certificate Extensions,
             1 December, 1996.

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of various members
of the PKIX Working Group.  Many of these contributions significantly 
clarified and improved the utility of this specification.

Authors' Addresses 

   Carlisle Adams 
   Entrust Technologies 
   750 Heron Road, Suite E08, 
   Ottawa, Ontario 
   Canada K1V 1A7 
   cadams@entrust.com 

   Stephen Farrell 
   Software and Systems Engineering Ltd. 
   Fitzwilliam Court 
   Leeson Close 
   Dublin 2 
   IRELAND 
   stephen.farrell@sse.ie 

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APPENDIX A: Reasons for the presence of RAs

The reasons which justify the presence of an RA can be split into those 
which are due to technical factors and those which are organizational in 
nature. Technical reasons include the following. 

  -If hardware tokens are in use, then not all end entities will have 
   the equipment needed to initialize these; the RA equipment can include 
   the necessary functionality (this may also be a matter of policy). 

  -Some end entities may not have the capability to publish 
   certificates; again, the RA may be suitably placed for this. 

  -The RA will be able to issue signed revocation requests on behalf of 
   end entities associated with it, whereas the end entity may not be able 
   to do this (if the key pair is completely lost). 

Some of the organizational reasons which argue for the presence of an 
RA are the following. 

  -It may be more cost effective to concentrate functionality in the RA 
   equipment than to supply functionality to all end entities  (especially 
   if special token initialization equipment is to be used). 

  -Establishing RAs within an organization can reduce the number of CAs 
   required, which is sometimes desirable. 

  -RAs may be better placed to identify people with their "electronic" 
   names, especially if the CA is physically remote from the end entity. 

  -For many applications there will already be in place some 
   administrative structure so that candidates for the role of RA are easy 
   to find (which may not be true of the CA). 

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Appendix B. PKI Management Message Profiles.

This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages which 
MUST be supported by conforming implementations (see Section 4).

Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management 
operations are provided:

- root CA key update
- information request/response
- cross-certification request/response (1-way)
- initial registration/certification
     - basic authenticated scheme
- certificate request
- key update

<<Later versions of this document may extend the above to include 
profiles for the operations listed below (along with other operations,
if desired).>>

- revocation request
- certificate publication
- CRL publication

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B1. General Rules for interpretation of these profiles.

 1.Where OPTIONAL or DEFAULT fields are not mentioned in individual 
   profiles, they SHOULD be absent from the relevant message (i.e., a
   receiver can validly reject a message containing such fields as
   being syntactically incorrect). 
   Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value 
   (e.g., pvno).
 2.Where structures occur in more than one message, they are 
   separately profiled as appropriate.
 3.The algorithmIdentifiers from PKIMessage structures are profiled 
   separately.
 4.A "special" X.500 DN is called the "NULL-DN"; this means a DN 
   containing a zero-length SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedNames 
   (its DER encoding is then ?3000?H).
 5.Where a GeneralName is required for a field but no suitable 
   value is available (e.g., an end entity produces a request before 
   knowing its name) then the GeneralName is to be an X.500 NULL-DN 
   (i.e., the Name field of the CHOICE is to contain a NULL-DN). 
   This special value can be called a "NULL-GeneralName".
 6.Where a profile omits to specify the value for a GeneralName 
   then the NULL-GeneralName value is to be present in the relevant 
   PKIMessage field. This occurs with the sender field of the 
   PKIHeader for some messages.
 7.Where any ambiguity arises due to naming of fields, the profile 
   names these using a "dot" notation (e.g., "certTemplate.subject" 
   means the subject field within a field called certTemplate).
 8.Where a "SEQUENCE OF types" is part of a message, a zero-based 
   array notation is used to describe fields within the SEQUENCE OF 
   (e.g., crm[0].certReq.certTemplate.subject refers to a 
   subfield of the first CertReqMsg contained in a request message).
 9.All PKI message exchanges in Sections B7-B10 require a PKIConfirm 
   message to be sent by the initiating entity.  This message is not 
   included in some of the profiles given since its body is NULL and
   its header contents are clear from the context.  Any authenticated 
   means can be used for the protectionAlg (e.g., password-based MAC, 
   if shared secret information is known, or signature).

B2. Algorithm Use Profile

The following table contains definitions of algorithm uses within PKI 
management protocols.

The columns in the table are:

Name:      an identifier used for message profiles
Use:       description of where and for what the algorithm is used
Mandatory: an AlgorithmIdentifier which MUST be supported by 
           conforming implementations
Others:    alternatives to the mandatory AlgorithmIdentifier
 

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 Name           Use                        Mandatory        Others

 MSG_SIG_ALG    Protection of PKI          DSA/SHA-1        RSA/MD5...
                messages using signature                        
 MSG_MAC_ALG    protection of PKI          PasswordBasedMac HMAC,
                messages using MACing                       X9.9...
 SYM_PENC_ALG   symmetric encryption of    3-DES (3-key-    RC5,
                an end entity?s private    EDE, CBC mode)   CAST-128...
                key where symmetric                             
                key is distributed                              
                out-of-band                                     
 PROT_ENC_ALG   asymmetric algorithm       D-H              RSA
                used for encryption of                          
                (symmetric keys for                             
                encryption of) private                          
                keys transported in                             
                PKIMessages                                     
 PROT_SYM_ALG   symmetric encryption       3-DES (3-key-    RC5,
                algorithm used for         EDE, CBC mode)   CAST-128...
                encryption of private                           
                key bits (a key of this                         
                type is encrypted using                         
                PROT_ENC_ALG)                                   

Mandatory AlgorithmIdentifiers and Specifications:

DSA/SHA-1:  
  AlgId:  {1 2 840 10040 4 3};
  NIST, FIPS PUB 186: Digital Signature Standard, 1994;
  Public Modulus size:  1024 bits.

PasswordBasedMac:  
  {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}, with SHA-1 {1 3 14 3 2 26} as the owf 
    parameter and HMAC-SHA1 {1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 2} as the mac parameter;
  (this specification), along with 
  NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard, April 1995;
  H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC:  Keyed-Hashing for Message
    Authentication", Internet Request for Comments 2104, February 1997.

3-DES:  
  {1 2 840 113549 3 7};
  (used in RSA's BSAFE and in S/MIME).

D-H:  
  AlgId:  {1 2 840 10046 2 1};
  ANSI X9.42;
  Public Modulus Size:  1024 bits.
  DHParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
    prime INTEGER, -- p
    base  INTEGER  -- g
  }

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B3. "Self-signed" certificates

Profile of how a Certificate structure may be "self-signed". These 
structures are used for distribution of "root" CA public keys. This can 
occur in one of three ways (see Section 2.4 above for a description of 
the use of these structures):

 Type          Function

 newWithNew    a true "self-signed" certificate; the contained public 
               key MUST be usable to verify the signature (though this 
               provides only integrity and no authentication whatsoever)
 oldWithNew    previous root CA public key signed with new private key
 newWithOld    new root CA public key signed with previous private key

<<Such certificates (including relevant extensions) must contain
"sensible" values for all fields.  For example, when present 
subjectAltName MUST be identical to issuerAltName, and when present 
keyIdentifiers must contain appropriate values, et cetera.>>

B4. Proof of Possession Profile

POP fields for use (in signature field of pop field of ProofOfPossession
structure) when proving possession of a private signing key which 
corresponds to a public verification key for which a certificate has 
been requested.

 Field               Value         Comment

 algorithmIdentifier MSG_SIG_ALG   only signature protection is 
                                   allowed for this proof
 signature           present       bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG

<<Proof of possession of a private decryption key which corresponds to a 
public encryption key for which a certificate has been requested does 
not use this profile; instead the method given in protectionAlg for 
PKIConfirm in Section B8 is used.>>

Not every CA/RA will do Proof-of-Possession (of signing key, decryption 
key, or key agreement key) in the PKIX-CMP in-band certification request 
protocol (how POP is done MAY ultimately be a policy issue which is
made explicit for any given CA in its publicized Policy OID and 
Certification Practice Statement).  However, this specification MANDATES
that CA/RA entities MUST do POP (by some means) as part of the 
certification process.  All end entities MUST be prepared to provide POP 
(i.e., these components of the PKIX-CMP protocol MUST be supported).

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B5. Root CA Key Update

A root CA updates its key pair. It then produces a CA key update 
announcement message which can be made available (via one of the 
transport mechanisms) to the relevant end entities.  A PKIConfirm 
message is NOT REQUIRED from the end entities.

ckuann message:

 Field        Value                        Comment

 sender       CA name                      responding CA name 
 body         ckuann(CAKeyUpdAnnContent)
 oldWithNew   present                      see Section B3 above
 newWithOld   present                      see Section B3 above
 newWithNew   present                      see Section B3 above
 extraCerts   optionally present           can be used to "publish" 
                                           certificates (e.g., 
                                           certificates signed using 
                                           the new private key)

B6. PKI Information request/response

The end entity sends general message to the PKI requesting details which 
will be required for later PKI management operations.  RA/CA responds 
with general response. If an RA generates the response then it will 
simply forward the equivalent message which it previously received from 
the CA, with the possible addition of the certificates to the extraCerts 
fields of the PKIMessage.  A PKIConfirm message is NOT REQUIRED from the 
end entity.

Message Flows:

Step#   End entity                                    PKI

  1     format genm 
  2                      ->      genm      ->
  3                                                   handle genm
  4                                                   produce genp
  5                      <-      genp      <-
  6     handle genp 

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genm:

Field               Value 

recipient           CA name                      
  -- the name of the CA as contained in issuerAltName extensions or 
  -- issuer fields within certificates 
protectionAlg       MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG   
  -- any authenticated protection alg.
SenderKID           present if required          
  -- must be present if required for verification of message protection
freeText            any valid value
body                genr (GenReqContent)
GenMsgContent       empty SEQUENCE                    
  -- all relevant information requested
protection          present                      
  -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG
                                                 

genp:

Field                Value 

sender               CA name                           
  -- name of the CA which produced the message
protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG        
  -- any authenticated protection alg.
senderKID            present if required               
  -- must be present if required for verification of message protection
body                 genp (GenRepContent) 
CAProtEncCert        present (object identifier one     
                     of PROT_ENC_ALG), with relevant   
                     value                             
  -- to be used if end entity needs to encrypt information for the CA 
  -- (e.g., private key for recovery purposes)
SignKeyPairTypes     present, with relevant value      
  -- the set of signature algorithm identifiers which this CA will 
  -- certify for subject public keys
EncKeyPairTypes      present, with relevant value      
  -- the set of encryption/key agreement algorithm identifiers which 
  -- this CA will certify for subject public keys
PreferredSymmAlg     present (object identifier one     
                     of PROT_SYM_ALG) , with relevant   
                     value                             
  -- the symmetric algorithm which this CA expects to be used in later 
  -- PKI messages (for encryption)
CAKeyUpdateInfo      optionally present, with           
                     relevant value                    
  -- the CA MAY provide information about a relevant root CA key pair 
  -- using this field (note that this does not imply that the responding 
  -- CA is the root CA in question)
CurrentCRL           optionally present, with relevant value      
  -- the CA MAY provide a copy of a complete CRL (i.e., fullest possible 
  -- one)

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protection           present                           
  -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG
extraCerts           optionally present                
  -- can be used to send some certificates to the end entity. An RA MAY 
  -- add its certificate here.

B7. Cross certification request/response (1-way)

Creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e., not two at once). The 
requesting CA MAY choose who is responsible for publication of the 
cross-certificate created by the responding CA through use of the 
PKIPublicationInfo control.

Preconditions:

1. Responding CA can verify the origin of the request (possibly 
requiring out-of-band means) before processing the request.
2. Requesting CA can authenticate the authenticity of the origin of the 
response (possibly requiring out-of-band means) before processing the 
response

Message Flows:

Step#   Requesting CA                                  Responding CA
  1     format ccr 
  2                        ->       ccr       -> 
  3                                                     handle ccr
  4                                                     produce ccp
  5                        <-       ccp       <- 
  6     handle ccp 
  7     format conf 
  8                        ->       conf      -> 
  9                                                     handle conf

ccr:
Field                 Value 

sender                Requesting CA name               
  -- the name of the CA who produced the message
recipient             Responding CA name               
  -- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate
messageTime           time of production of message    
  -- current time at requesting CA
protectionAlg         MSG_SIG_ALG                      
  -- only signature protection is allowed for this request
senderKID             present if required              
  -- must be present if required for verification of message protection
transactionID         present                          
  -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to requesting CA. 
  -- [If already in use at responding CA then a rejection message 
  -- MUST be produced by responding CA]

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senderNonce           present                          
  -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
freeText              any valid value 
body                  ccr (CertReqMessages)         
                      only one CertReqMsg         
                      allowed                          
  -- if multiple cross certificates are required they MUST be packaged 
  -- in separate PKIMessages
certTemplate          present                          
  -- details follow
version               v1 or v3                         
  -- <<v3 STRONGLY RECOMMENDED>>
signingAlg            present                          
  -- the requesting CA must know in advance with which algorithm it 
  -- wishes the certificate to be signed
subject               present                          
  -- may be NULL-DN only if subjectAltNames extension value proposed
validity              present                          
  -- MUST be completely specified (i.e., both fields present)
issuer                present                          
  -- may be NULL-DN only if issuerAltNames extension value proposed
publicKey             present                          
  -- the key to be certified (which must be for a signing algorithm)
extensions            optionally present               
  -- a requesting CA must propose values for all extensions which it 
  -- requires to be in the cross-certificate

POPOSigningKey        present                          
  -- see "Proof of possession profile" (Section B4)

protection            present                          
  -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG
extraCerts            optionally present               
  -- MAY contain any additional certificates that requester wishes 
  -- to include

ccp:
Field                 Value 

sender                Responding CA name               
  -- the name of the CA who produced the message
recipient             Requesting CA name               
  -- the name of the CA who asked for production of a certificate
messageTime           time of production of message    
  -- current time at responding CA
protectionAlg         MSG_SIG_ALG                      
  -- only signature protection is allowed for this message
senderKID             present if required              
  -- must be present if required for verification of message 
  -- protection
recipKID              present if required 

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transactionID         present                          
  -- value from corresponding ccr message
senderNonce           present                          
  -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
recipNonce            present                          
  -- senderNonce from corresponding ccr message
freeText              any valid value 
body                  ccp (CertRepMessage)         
                      only one CertResponse allowed    
  -- if multiple cross certificates are required they MUST be packaged 
  -- in separate PKIMessages
response              present 
status                present 
PKIStatusInfo.status  present                          
  -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is one of:
  --   granted, or 
  --   grantedWithMods,
  -- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be present and failInfo MUST be absent
failInfo              present depending on             
                      PKIStatusInfo.status             
  -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is:
  --   rejection
  -- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be absent and failInfo MUST be present 
  -- and contain appropriate bit settings

certifiedKeyPair      present depending on 
                      PKIStatusInfo.status 
certificate           present depending on              
                      certifiedKeyPair                 
  -- content of actual certificate must be examined by requesting CA 
  -- before publication

protection            present                          
  -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG
extraCerts            optionally present               
  -- MAY contain any additional certificates that responder wishes 
  -- to include

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B8. Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme)

An (uninitialized) end entity requests a (first) certificate from a CA. 
When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate, the end 
entity replies with a confirmation. All messages are authenticated.

This scheme allows the end entity to request certification of a locally-
generated public key (typically a signature key). The end entity MAY 
also choose to request the centralized generation and certification of 
another key pair (typically an encryption key pair).

Certification may only be requested for one locally generated public key 
(for more, use separate PKIMessages).

The end entity MUST support proof-of-possession of the private key 
associated with the locally-generated public key.

Preconditions:

 1.The end entity can authenticate the CA?s signature based on out-of-
band means
 2.The end entity and the CA share a symmetric MACing key

Message flow:

Step#    End entity                                    PKI
  1      format ir 
  2                         ->      ir       -> 
  3                                                    handle ir
  4                                                    format ip
  5                         <-      ip       <- 
  6      handle ip 
  7      format conf 
  8                         ->      conf     -> 
  9                                                    handle conf

For this profile, we mandate that the end entity MUST include all 
(i.e., one or two) CertReqMsg in a single PKIMessage and that the 
PKI (CA) MUST produce a single response PKIMessage which contains 
the complete response (i.e., including the OPTIONAL second key pair, 
if it was requested and if centralized key generation is supported). 
For simplicity, we also mandate that this message MUST be the final 
one (i.e., no use of "waiting" status value).

ir:
Field                Value 

recipient            CA name                           
  -- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate
protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG                       
  -- only MAC protection is allowed for this request, based on 
  -- initial authentication key

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senderKID            referenceNum                      
  -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued to 
  -- the end entity (together with the MACing key)
transactionID        present                           
  -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to end entity. 
  -- [If already in use at the CA then a rejection message MUST be 
  -- produced by the CA]
senderNonce          present                           
  -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
freeText             any valid value 
body                 ir (CertReqMessages)                
                     only one or two CertReqMsg  
                     are allowed                       
  -- if more certificates are required requests MUST be packaged in 
  -- separate PKIMessages
CertReqMsg           one or two present                
  -- see below for details, note: crm[0] means the first (which MUST 
  -- be present), crm[1] means the second (which is OPTIONAL, and used 
  -- to ask for a centrally-generated key)

crm[0].certReq.      fixed value of zero 
   certReqId              
  -- this is the index of the template within the message
crm[0].certReq       present                            
   certTemplate                                        
  -- MUST include subject public key value, otherwise unconstrained
crm[0].pop...        optionally present if public key   
   POPOSigningKey    from crm[0].certReq.certTemplate is      
                     a signing key                       
  -- proof of possession MAY be required in this exchange (see Section 
  -- B4 for details)
crm[0].certReq.      optionally present                 
   controls.archiveOptions                                      
  -- the end entity MAY request that the locally-generated private key 
  -- be archived
crm[0].certReq.      optionally present                 
   controls.publicationInfo                                     
  -- the end entity MAY ask for publication of resulting cert.

crm[1].certReq       fixed value of one                 
   certReqId                                           
  -- the index of the template within the message
crm[1].certReq       present        
   certTemplate      
  -- MUST NOT include actual public key bits, otherwise unconstrained 
  -- (e.g., the names need not be the same as in crm[0])
crm[0].certReq.      present [object identifier MUST be PROT_ENC_ALG]
   controls.protocolEncKey  
  -- if centralized key generation is supported by this CA, this 
  -- short-term asymmetric encryption key (generated by the end entity) 
  -- will be used by the CA to encrypt (a symmetric key used to encrypt) 
  -- a private key generated by the CA on behalf of the end entity

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crm[1].certReq.      optionally present
   controls.archiveOptions
crm[1].certReq.      optionally present
   controls.publicationInfo    
protection           present                           
  -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG

ip:
Field                Value 

sender               CA name                           
  -- the name of the CA who produced the message
messageTime          present                           
  -- time at which CA produced message
protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG                       
  -- only MAC protection is allowed for this response
recipKID             referenceNum                      
  -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued to the 
  -- end entity (together with the MACing key)
transactionID        present                           
  -- value from corresponding ir message
senderNonce          present                           
  -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
recipNonce           present                           
  -- value from senderNonce in corresponding ir message
freeText             any valid value 
body                 ir (CertRepMessage)                
                     contains exactly one response      
                     for each request                  
  -- The PKI (CA) responds to either one or two requests as appropriate. 
  -- crc[0] denotes the first (always present); crc[1] denotes the 
  -- second (only present if the ir message contained two requests and
  -- if the CA supports centralized key generation).
crc[0].              fixed value of zero                
   certReqId                                           
  -- MUST contain the response to the first request in the corresponding 
  -- ir message
crc[0].status.       present, positive values allowed:
   status               "granted", "grantedWithMods"
                     negative values allowed:
                        "rejection" 
crc[0].status.       present if and only if 
   failInfo          crc[0].status.status is "rejection" 
crc[0].              present if and only if 
   certifiedKeyPair  crc[0].status.status is 
                        "granted" or "grantedWithMods" 
certificate          present unless end entity?s public 
                     key is an encryption key and POP 
                     is done in this in-band exchange 
encryptedCert        present if and only if end entity?s 
                     public key is an encryption key and
                     POP done in this in-band exchange 

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publicationInfo      optionally present                
  -- indicates where certificate has been published (present at 
  -- discretion of CA)
crc[1].              fixed value of one                 
   certReqId                                           
  -- MUST contain the response to the second request in the 
  -- corresponding ir message
crc[1].status.       present, positive values allowed:
   status               "granted", "grantedWithMods"
                     negative values allowed:
                        "rejection" 
crc[1].status.       present if and only if 
   failInfo          crc[0].status.status is "rejection" 
crc[1].              present if and only if 
   certifiedKeyPair  crc[0].status.status is "granted" 
                     or "grantedWithMods" 
certificate          present 
privateKey           present 
publicationInfo      optionally present                
  -- indicates where certificate has been published (present at 
  -- discretion of CA)
protection           present                           
  -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG
extraCerts           optionally present                
  -- the CA MAY provide additional certificates to the end entity

conf:
Field                Value 

recipient            CA name                           
  -- the name of the CA who was asked to produce a certificate
transactionID        present                           
  -- value from corresponding ir and ip messages
senderNonce          present                           
  -- value from recipNonce in corresponding ir message
recipNonce           present                           
  -- value from senderNonce in corresponding ip message
protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG                       
  -- only MAC protection is allowed for this message.  The MAC is 
  -- based on the initial authentication key if only a signing key 
  -- pair has been sent in ir for certification, or if POP is not 
  -- done in this in-band exchange.  Otherwise, the MAC is based on 
  -- a key derived from the symmetric key used to decrypt the 
  -- returned encryptedCert.
senderKID            referenceNum                      
  -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued to the 
  -- end entity (together with the MACing key)
body                 conf (PKIConfirmContent)          
  -- this is an ASN.1 NULL
protection           present                           
  -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 58]

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B9. Certificate Request

An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (for any 
reason). When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate, 
the end entity replies with a confirmation. All messages are 
authenticated.

The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in Section B8
with the following exceptions:

 - protectionAlg may be MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG in request, response,
   and confirm messages (the determination in the confirm message being 
   dependent upon POP considerations for key-encipherment and key- 
   agreement certificate requests);
 - senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message 
   verification;
 - body is cr or cp;
 - protocolEncKey is not present;
 - protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg field.

B10. Key Update Request

An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (to update
the key pair and corresponding certificate that it already possesses). 
When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate, the end 
entity replies with a confirmation. All messages are authenticated.

The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in Section B8
with the following exceptions:

 - protectionAlg may be MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG in request, response,
   and confirm messages (the determination in the confirm message being 
   dependent upon POP considerations for key-encipherment and key- 
   agreement certificate requests);
 - senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message 
   verification;
 - body is kur or kup;
 - protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg field.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 59]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

Appendix C: "Compilable" ASN.1 Module using 1988 Syntax

-- Note that tagging is EXPLICIT in this module.
-- Note that additional syntax appears in [CRMF].

  PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
      header           PKIHeader, 
      body             PKIBody, 
      protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
      extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL
  }

  PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { 
      pvno                INTEGER     { ietf-version2 (1) }, 
      sender              GeneralName, 
      -- identifies the sender
      recipient           GeneralName, 
      -- identifies the intended recipient
      messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL, 
      -- time of production of this message (used when sender
      -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., 
      -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
      protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL, 
      -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
      senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
      recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
      -- to identify specific keys used for protection
      transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL, 
      -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in 
      -- corresponding request, response and confirmation messages
      senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL, 
      recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL, 
      -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce 
      -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce 
      -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by 
      -- the intended recipient of this message 
      freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
      -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions 
      -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
      generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 
                             InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
      -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
      -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
  }

  PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String 
      -- text encoded as UTF-8 String (note:  each UTF8String SHOULD
      -- include an RFC 1766 language tag to indicate the language 
      -- of the contained text)

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 60]

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  PKIBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements 
      ir      [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
      ip      [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response
      cr      [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
      cp      [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
      p10cr   [4]  CertificationRequest,   --imported from [PKCS10] 
      popdecc [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
      popdecr [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
      kur     [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
      kup     [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
      krr     [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
      krp     [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
      rr      [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
      rp      [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
      ccr     [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
      ccp     [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
      ckuann  [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
      cann    [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.
      rann    [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
      crlann  [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement
      conf    [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation 
      nested  [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
      genm    [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
      genp    [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
      error   [23] ErrorMsgContent         --Error Message
  }

  PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING 

  ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { 
      header    PKIHeader, 
      body      PKIBody
  }

  PasswordBasedMac ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER --{1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}

  PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
      salt                OCTET STRING,
      owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
      -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
      iterationCount      INTEGER,
      -- number of times the OWF is applied
      mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
      -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
  }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])

  DHBasedMac ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER --{1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}

  DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
      owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
      -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
      mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
      -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
  }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 61]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

  NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessage

  PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { 
      granted                (0), 
      -- you got exactly what you asked for 
      grantedWithMods        (1), 
      -- you got something like what you asked for; the 
      -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences 
      rejection              (2), 
      -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
      waiting                (3), 
      -- the request body part has not yet been processed, 
      -- expect to hear more later 
      revocationWarning      (4), 
      -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is 
      -- imminent 
      revocationNotification (5), 
      -- notification that a revocation has occurred 
      keyUpdateWarning       (6)
      -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in 
      -- CertReqMsg
  }

  PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { 
  -- since we can fail in more than one way! 
  -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
      badAlg           (0), 
      -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
      badMessageCheck  (1), 
      -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
      badRequest       (2),     
      -- transaction not permitted or supported
      badTime          (3),     
      -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
      -- as defined by local policy
      badCertId        (4), 
      -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
      badDataFormat    (5),
      -- the data submitted has the wrong format
      wrongAuthority   (6),
      -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the 
      -- one creating the response token
      incorrectData    (7),
      -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
      missingTimeStamp (8),
      -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there (by policy)
      badPOP           (9)
      -- the proof-of-possession failed
  }

  PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      status        PKIStatus, 
      statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
      failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL
  }
Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 62]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

  OOBCert ::= Certificate 

  OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { 
      hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL, 
      certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL, 
      hashVal         BIT STRING
      -- hashVal is calculated over DER encoding of the 
      -- subjectPublicKey field of the corresponding cert. 
  }

  POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
  -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the 
  -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). 

  Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
      owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
      -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in any 
      -- subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if omitted, 
      -- then the owf used in the immediately preceding Challenge is 
      -- to be used).
      witness             OCTET STRING,
      -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a 
      -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
      -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
      challenge           OCTET STRING
      -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. 
      -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as 
      --   Rand ::= SEQUENCE { 
      --      int      INTEGER, 
      --       - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
      --      sender   GeneralName 
      --       - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) 
      --   }
  }

  POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
  -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the 
  -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).  The
  -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the 
  -- corresponding Challenge.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 63]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

  CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
      caPubs       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL, 
      response         SEQUENCE OF CertResponse 
  }

  CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { 
      certReqId           INTEGER,
      -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
      -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
      -- corresponding request)
      status              PKIStatusInfo, 
      certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
      rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
      -- analogous to the id-regInfo-asciiPairs OCTET STRING defined
      -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
  }

  CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { 
      certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
      privateKey      [0] EncryptedValue      OPTIONAL,
      publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL 
  }

  CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
      certificate     [0] Certificate,
      encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedValue
  }

  KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
      status                  PKIStatusInfo,
      newSigCert          [0] Certificate                   OPTIONAL, 
      caCerts             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 
                                          Certificate       OPTIONAL,
      keyPairHist         [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 
                                          CertifiedKeyPair  OPTIONAL
  }

  RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

  RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { 
      certDetails         CertTemplate, 
      -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about 
      -- the cert. for which revocation is requested 
      -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
      revocationReason    ReasonFlags      OPTIONAL, 
      -- the reason that revocation is requested
      badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime  OPTIONAL, 
      -- indicates best knowledge of sender 
      crlEntryDetails     Extensions       OPTIONAL
      -- requested crlEntryExtensions 
  }

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 64]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

  RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
      status       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, 
      -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
      revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, 
      -- IDs for which revocation was requested (same order as status) 
      crls     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList  OPTIONAL 
      -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) 
  }

  CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
      oldWithNew          Certificate, -- old pub signed with new priv 
      newWithOld          Certificate, -- new pub signed with old priv 
      newWithNew          Certificate  -- new pub signed with new priv 
  }

  CertAnnContent ::= Certificate 

  RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
      status              PKIStatus, 
      certId              CertId, 
      willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime, 
      badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime, 
      crlDetails          Extensions  OPTIONAL 
      -- extra CRL details(e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) 
}

  CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList 

  PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL 

  InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
      infoType               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
      infoValue              ANY DEFINED BY infoType  OPTIONAL
  }
  -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited to:
  --  { CAProtEncCert    = {id-it 1}, Certificate                     }
  --  { SignKeyPairTypes = {id-it 2}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier }
  --  { EncKeyPairTypes  = {id-it 3}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier }
  --  { PreferredSymmAlg = {id-it 4}, AlgorithmIdentifier             }
  --  { CAKeyUpdateInfo  = {id-it 5}, CAKeyUpdAnnContent              }
  --  { CurrentCRL       = {id-it 6}, CertificateList                 }
  -- where {id-it} = {id-pkix 4} = {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4} 
  -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
  -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
  -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for 
  -- specific environments.

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 65]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

  GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
  -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
  -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will typically
  -- be omitted for some of the examples given above.  The receiver is 
  -- free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does not recognize.
  -- If sent from EE to CA, the empty set indicates that the CA may send 
  -- any/all information that it wishes.

  GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
  -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does 
  -- not recognize.

  ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
      errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
      -- implementation-specific error codes
      errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
      -- implementation-specific error details
  }

-- The following definition is provided for compatibility reasons with 
-- 1988 and 1993 ASN.1 compilers which allow the use of UNIVERSAL class
-- tags (not a part of formal ASN.1); 1997 and subsequent compilers 
-- SHOULD comment out this line.

UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 66]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Nov. 1998

Appendix D: Registration of MIME Type for Section 5

To: ietf-types@iana.org
Subject: Registration of MIME media type application/pkixcmp

MIME media type name: application

MIME subtype name: pkixcmp

Required parameters: -

Optional parameters: -

Encoding considerations: 
Content may contain arbitrary octet values (the ASN.1 DER encoding of 
a PKI message, as defined in the IETF PKIX Working Group 
specifications).  base64 encoding is required for MIME e-mail; no
encoding is necessary for HTTP.

Security considerations:
This MIME type may be used to transport Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)
messages between PKI entities.  These messages are defined by the IETF
PKIX Working Group and are used to establish and maintain an Internet
X.509 PKI.  There is no requirement for specific security mechanisms to
be applied at this level if the PKI messages themselves are protected
as defined in the PKIX specifications.

Interoperability considerations: -

Published specification: this document

Applications which use this media type:
Applications using certificate management, operational, or ancillary 
protocols (as defined by the IETF PKIX Working Group) to send PKI
messages via E-Mail or HTTP.

Additional information:

  Magic number (s): -
  File extension (s): ".PKI"
  Macintosh File Type Code (s): -

Person and email address to contact for further information:
Carlisle Adams, cadams@entrust.com

Intended usage: COMMON

Author/Change controller: Carlisle Adams

Adams, Farrell                                                 [Page 67]