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Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile
draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-06

The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 3739.
Authors Stefan Santesson , Magnus Nyström , Tim Polk
Last updated 2020-01-21 (Latest revision 2004-03-03)
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draft-ietf-pkix-sonof3039-06
PKIX Working Group                              S. Santesson (Microsoft)
INTERNET-DRAFT                                 M. Nystrom (RSA Security)
Expires August 2004                                       T. Polk (NIST)
                                                           February 2004

               Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
                     Qualified Certificates Profile
                   <draft-ietf-pkix-sonOf3039-06.txt>

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
   groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document forms a certificate profile, based on RFC 3280, for
   identity certificates issued to natural persons.

   The profile defines specific conventions for certificates that are
   qualified within a defined legal framework, named Qualified
   Certificates. The profile does however not define any legal
   requirements for such Qualified Certificates.

   The goal of this document is to define a certificate profile that
   supports issuance of Qualified Certificates independent of local
   legal requirements.  The profile is however not limited to Qualified
   Certificates and further profiling may facilitate specific local
   needs.

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   Table of Contents

   1  Introduction ................................................    3
   1.1   Changes since RFC 3039 ...................................    3
   1.2   Definitions ..............................................    4
   2  Requirements and Assumptions ................................    4
   2.1  Properties ................................................    5
   2.2  Statement of Purpose ......................................    5
   2.3  Policy Issues .............................................    6
   2.4  Uniqueness of names .......................................    6
   3  Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile ..............    6
   3.1  Basic Certificate Fields ..................................    6
   3.1.1  Issuer ..................................................    7
   3.1.2  Subject .................................................    7
   3.2  Certificate Extensions ....................................    9
   3.2.1  Subject Alternative Name ................................    9
   3.2.2  Subject Directory Attributes ............................    9
   3.2.3  Certificate Policies ....................................   11
   3.2.4  Key Usage ...............................................   11
   3.2.5  Biometric Information ...................................   11
   3.2.6  Qualified Certificate Statements ........................   13
   4  Security Considerations .....................................   16
   5  References ..................................................   17
   6  Intellectual Property Rights ................................   18

   A  ASN.1 definitions ...........................................   19
   A.1  1988 ASN.1 Module (Normative)..............................   19
   A.2  1997 ASN.1 Module (Informative)............................   21
   B  A Note on Attributes ........................................   25
   C  Example Certificate .........................................   25
   C.1  ASN.1 Structure ...........................................   26
   C.1.1 Extensions ...............................................   26
   C.1.2 The certificate ..........................................   27
   C.2  ASN.1 Dump ................................................   29
   C.3  DER-encoding ..............................................   32
   C.4  CA's public key ...........................................   33
   Authors' Addresses .............................................   33
   Full Copyright Statement .......................................   34

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1  Introduction

   This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509
   Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet.  It is based on RFC
   3280, which defines underlying certificate formats and semantics
   needed for a full implementation of this standard.

   This profile includes specific mechanisms intended for use with
   Qualified Certificates.  The term Qualified Certificates and the
   assumptions that affects the scope of this document are discussed in
   Section 2.

   Section 3 defines requirements on certificate information content.
   This specification provides profiles for two certificate fields:
   issuer and subject; it also provides profiles for four certificate
   extensions defined in RFC 3280: subject alternate name, subject
   directory attributes, certificate policies and key usage; and it
   defines two additional extensions: biometric information and
   qualified certificate statements. The certificate extensions are
   presented in the 1997 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), but in
   conformance with RFC 3280 the 1988 ASN.1 module in Appendix A
   contains all normative definitions (the 1997 module in Appendix A is
   informative).

   In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to
   clarify the security context in which the standard may be utilized.
   Section 5 contains the references.

   Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 [X.680] structures that are
   not already defined in RFC 3280.  Appendix B contains a note on
   attributes.  Appendix C contains an example certificate.  Appendix D
   contains authors' addresses and Appendix E contains the IETF
   Copyright Statement.

1.1  Changes since RFC 3039

   This specification obsoletes RFC 3039.  This specification differs
   from RFC 3039 in the following basic areas:

      * Some editorial clarifications has been made to introductory
      sections to clarify that this profile is generally applicable to a
      broad type of certificates even if its prime purpose is to
      facilitate issuance of Qualified Certificates.

      * To align with RFC 3280, support for domainComponent and title
      attributes in subject names are included, and postalAddress is no
      longer supported.

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      * To align with actual usage, support for the title attribute in
      the subject directory attributes extension is no longer supported.

      * To better facilitate broad applicability of this profile some
      constraints on key usage settings in the key usage extension have
      been removed.

      * A new qc-Statement reflecting this second version of the profile
      has been defined in Section 3.2.6.1. This profile obsoletes RFC
      3039 but the qc-statement reflecting compliance with RFC 3039 is
      also defined for backwards compatibility.

1.2  Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

2  Requirements and Assumptions

   The term "Qualified Certificate" is used by the European Directive on
   Electronic Signature [EU-ESDIR] to refer to a specific type of
   certificates, with appliance in European electronic signature
   legislation. This specification is intended to support this class of
   certificates, but its scope is not limited to this application.

   Within this standard the term "Qualified Certificate" is used
   generally, describing a certificate whose primary purpose is to
   identify a person with high level of assurance, where the certificate
   meets some qualification requirements defined by an applicable legal
   framework, such as the European Directive on Electronic Signature
   [EU-ESDIR]. The actual mechanisms that decide whether a certificate
   should or should not be considered to be a "Qualified Certificate" in
   regard to any legislation are outside the scope of this standard.

   Harmonization in the field of identity certificates issued to natural
   persons, in particular Qualified Certificates, is essential within
   several aspects that fall outside the scope of RFC 3280.  The most
   important aspects that affect the scope of this specification are:

   -  Definition of names and identity information in order to identify
      the associated subject in a uniform way.

   -  Definition of information which identifies the CA and the
      jurisdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular
      certificate.

   -  Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified

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      Certificates.

   -  Definition of information structure for storage of biometric
      information.

   -  Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements
      with relevance for Qualified Certificates.

   -  Requirements for critical extensions.

2.1  Properties

   This profile accommodates profiling needs for Qualified Certificates
   based on the assumptions that:

   -  Qualified Certificates are issued by a CA that makes a statement
      that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified
      Certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2.

   -  The Qualified Certificate indicates a certificate policy
      consistent with liabilities, practices and procedures undertaken
      by the CA, as discussed in Section 2.3.

   -  The Qualified Certificate is issued to a natural person (living
      human being).

   -  The Qualified Certificate contains a name which may be either
      based on the real name of the subject or a pseudonym.

2.2  Statement of Purpose

   This profile defines conventions to declare within a certificate that
   it serves the purpose of being a Qualified Certificate. This enables
   the CA to explicitly define this intent.

   The function of this declaration is thus to assist any concerned
   entity in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting
   signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate.

   This profile defines two complementary ways to include this
   information:

   -  As information defined by a certificate policy included in the
      certificate policies extension, and

   -  As a statement included in the Qualified Certificates Statements
      extension.

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2.3  Policy Issues

   Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to
   be understood and used.  It is however outside the scope of this
   profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern
   services that issue or utilize certificates according to this
   profile.

   It is however an underlying assumption in this profile that a
   responsible issuing CA will undertake to follow a certificate policy
   that is consistent with its liabilities, practices and procedures.

2.4  Uniqueness of names

   Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a
   representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that
   identifies a particular object from among the set of all objects. The
   distinguished name MUST be unique for each subject entity certified
   by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field, during the whole
   life time of the CA.

3  Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile

   This section defines certificate profiling conventions.  The profile
   is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 3280 which in turn
   is based on the X.509 version 3 format.  For full implementation of
   this section implementers are REQUIRED to consult the underlying
   formats and semantics defined in RFC 3280.

   ASN.1 definitions relevant for this section that are not supplied by
   RFC 3280 are supplied in Appendix A.

3.1  Basic Certificate Fields

   This section provides additional details regarding the contents of
   two fields in the basic certificate.  These fields are the issuer and
   subject fields.

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3.1.1  Issuer

   The issuer field SHALL identify the organization responsible for
   issuing the certificate.  The name SHOULD be an officially registered
   name of the organization.

   The distinguished name of the issuer SHALL be specified using an
   appropriate subset of the following attributes:

         domainComponent;
         countryName;
         stateOrProvinceName;
         organizationName;
         localityName; and
         serialNumber.

   Additional attributes MAY be present but they SHOULD NOT be necessary
   to identify the issuing organization.

   A relying party MAY have to consult associated certificate policies
   and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to determine the semantics of name
   fields.

3.1.2  Subject

   The subject field of a certificate compliant with this profile SHALL
   contain a distinguished name of the subject (see 2.4 for definition
   of distinguished name).

   The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the
   following attributes:

      domainComponent;
      countryName;
      commonName;
      surname;
      givenName;
      pseudonym;
      serialNumber;
      title;
      organizationName;
      organizationalUnitName;
      stateOrProvinceName; and
      localityName.

   Other attributes MAY also be present; however, the use of other
   attributes MUST NOT be necessary to distinguish one subject name from
   another subject name.  That is, the attributes listed above are

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   sufficient to ensure unique subject names.

   Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of
   the following:

      Choice   I:  commonName
      Choice  II:  givenName
      Choice III:  pseudonym

      The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in
      which other attributes are to be understood.  The country
      attribute does not necessarily indicate the subject's country of
      citizenship or country of residence, nor does it have to indicate
      the country of issuance.

   Note: Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName
   in the DIT.  In cases where the subject name, as specified in the
   subject field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the
   countryName attribute SHOULD always be present.

      The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name
      of the subject.  This MAY be in the subject's preferred
      presentation format, or a format preferred by the CA, or some
      other format. Pseudonyms, nicknames and names with spelling other
      than defined by the registered name MAY be used.  To understand
      the nature of the name presented in commonName, complying
      applications MAY have to examine present values of the givenName
      and surname attributes, or the pseudonym attribute.

   Note: Many client implementations presuppose the presence of the
   commonName attribute value in the subject field and use this value to
   display the subject's name regardless of present givenName, surname
   or pseudonym attribute values.

      The surname and givenName attribute types SHALL be used in the
      subject field if neither the commonName attribute nor the
      pseudonym attribute is present. In cases where the subject only
      has a givenName the surname attribute SHALL be omitted.

      The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a
      pseudonym of the subject.  Use of the pseudonym attribute MUST NOT
      be combined with use of any of the attributes surname and/or
      givenName.

      The serialNumber attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to
      differentiate between names where the subject field would
      otherwise be identical.  This attribute has no defined semantics
      beyond ensuring uniqueness of subject names.  It MAY contain a

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      number or code assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a
      government or civil authority.  It is the CA's responsibility to
      ensure that the serialNumber is sufficient to resolve any subject
      name collisions.

      The title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a
      designated position or function of the subject within the
      organization specified by present organizational attributes in the
      subject field.  The association between the title, the subject and
      the organization is beyond the scope of this document.

      The organizationName and the organizationalUnitName attribute
      types SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and relevant
      information of an organization with which the subject is
      associated. The type of association between the organization and
      the subject is beyond the scope of this document.

      The stateOrProvinceName and the localityName attribute types
      SHALL, when present, be used to store geographical information
      with which the subject is associated.  If an organizationName
      value also is present then the stateOrProvinceName and
      localityName attribute values SHALL be associated with the
      specified organization.  The type of association between the
      stateOrProvinceName and the localityName and either the subject or
      the organizationName is beyond the scope of this document.

   Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes
   named in this section.

3.2  Certificate Extensions

   This section provides additional details regarding the contents of
   four certificate extensions defined in RFC 3280: Subject Alternative
   Name, Subject directory attributes, Certificate policies and Key
   usage. This section also defines two additional extensions: biometric
   information and qualified certificate statements.

3.2.1  Subject Alternative Name

   If the subjectAltName extension is present and it contains a
   directoryName name, then the directoryName MUST follow the
   conventions specified in section 3.1.2 of this profile.

3.2.2  Subject Directory Attributes

   The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension MAY contain additional
   attributes, associated with the subject, as complement to present
   information in the subject field and the subject alternative name

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   extension.

   Attributes suitable for storage in this extension are attributes,
   which are not part of the subject's distinguished name, but which MAY
   still be useful for other purposes (e.g., authorization).

   This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.

   Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the following
   attributes:

      dateOfBirth;
      placeOfBirth;
      gender;
      countryOfCitizenship; and
      countryOfResidence.

   Other attributes MAY be included according to local definitions.

   The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of
   the date of birth of the subject.  The manner in which the date of
   birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
   document. The date of birth is defined in the GeneralizedTime format
   and SHOULD specify GMT 12.00.00 (noon) down to the granularity of
   seconds in order to prevent accidental change of date due to time
   zone adjustments. For example, a birth date of September 27, 1959 is
   encoded as "19590927120000Z". Compliant certificate parsing
   applications SHOULD ignore any time data and just present the
   contained date without any time zone adjustments.

   The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of
   the place of birth of the subject.  The manner in which the place of
   birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
   document.

   The gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the
   gender of the subject.  For females the value "F" (or "f") and for
   males the value "M" (or "m") have to be used.  The manner in which
   the gender is associated with the subject is outside the scope of
   this document.

   The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain the
   identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed countries of
   citizenship at the time that the certificate was issued. If more than
   one country of citizenship is specified, then each country of
   citizenship SHOULD be specified through a separate, single-valued
   countryOfCitizenship attribute. Determination of citizenship is a
   matter of law and is outside the scope of this document.

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   The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the
   value of at least one country in which the subject is resident.  If
   more than one country of residence is specified, then each country of
   residence SHOULD be specified through a separate, single-valued
   countryOfResidence attribute. Determination of residence is a matter
   of law and is outside the scope of this document.

3.2.3 Certificate Policies

   The certificate policies extension SHALL contain the identifier of at
   least one certificate policy which reflects the practices and
   procedures undertaken by the CA.  The certificate policy extension
   MAY be marked critical.

   Information provided by the issuer stating the purpose of the
   certificate as discussed in Section 2.2 SHOULD be evident through
   indicated policies.

   The certificate policies extension MUST include all policy
   information needed for certification path validation. If policy
   information is included in the QCStatements extension (see 3.2.6),
   then this information SHOULD also be defined by indicated policies.

   Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in
   RFC 3280.

3.2.4  Key Usage

   The key usage extension SHALL be present. Key usage settings SHALL be
   set in accordance with RFC 3280 definitions. Further requirements on
   key usage settings MAY be defined by local policy and/or local legal
   requirements.

   The key usage extension SHOULD be marked critical.

3.2.5  Biometric Information

   This section defines an extension for storage of biometric
   information.  Biometric information is stored in the form of a hash
   of a biometric template.

   The purpose of this extension is to provide means for authentication
   of biometric information.  The biometric information that corresponds
   to the stored hash is not stored in this extension, but the extension
   MAY include an URI (sourceDataUri) referencing a file containing this
   information.

   If included, the URI MUST use the HTTP scheme (http://) [HTTP/1.1] or

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   the HTTPS scheme (https://) [RFC 2818]. Since the fact that
   identifying data is being checked may itself be sensitive
   information, those deploying this mechanism may also wish to consider
   using URIs which cannot be easily tied by outsiders to the identities
   of those whose information is being retrieved.

   Use of the URI option presumes that data encoding format of the file
   content is determined through means outside the scope of this
   specification, such as file naming conventions and metadata inside
   the file. Use of this URI option does not imply that it is the only
   way to access this information.

   It is RECOMMENDED that biometric information in this extension be
   limited to information types suitable for human verification, i.e.,
   where the decision of whether the information is an accurate
   representation of the subject is naturally performed by a person.
   This implies a usage where the biometric information is represented
   by, for example, a graphical image displayed to the relying party,
   which MAY be used by the relying party to enhance identification of
   the subject.

   This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.

      biometricInfo  EXTENSION ::= {
          SYNTAX             BiometricSyntax
          IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-biometricInfo }

      id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {id-pe 2}

      BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

      BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
          typeOfBiometricData  TypeOfBiometricData,
          hashAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
          biometricDataHash    OCTET STRING,
          sourceDataUri        IA5String OPTIONAL }

      TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
          predefinedBiometricType    PredefinedBiometricType,
          biometricDataID            OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

      PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
          handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)

   The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify
   that the source picture is in the form of a displayable graphical
   image of the subject.  The hash of the graphical image SHALL be
   calculated over the whole referenced image file.

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   The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present,
   SHALL identify that the source data is in the form of a displayable
   graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature.  The hash of
   the graphical image SHALL be calculated over the whole referenced
   image file.

3.2.6  Qualified Certificate Statements

   This section defines an extension for inclusion of statements
   defining explicit properties of the certificate.

   A statement suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be a
   statement by the issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified
   Certificate in accordance with a particular legal system (as
   discussed in Section 2.2).

   Other statements suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be
   statements related to the applicable legal jurisdiction within which
   the certificate is issued.  As an example this MAY include a maximum
   reliance limit for the certificate indicating restrictions on CA's
   liability.

   Each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement
   and MAY also include optional qualifying data contained in the
   statementInfo parameter.

   If the statementInfo parameter is included then the object identifier
   of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define the
   semantics of this parameter.  If the object identifier does not
   define the semantics, a relying party may have to consult a relevant
   certificate policy or CPS to determine the exact semantics.

   This extension may be critical or non-critical.  If the extension is
   critical, this means that all statements included in the extension
   are regarded as critical.

      qcStatements  EXTENSION ::= {
          SYNTAX             QCStatements
          IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-qcStatements }

      -- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and
      -- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all
      -- statements must be critical or all statements must be
      -- non-critical.

      id-pe-qcStatements     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }

      QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement

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      QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
          statementId   QC-STATEMENT.&Id({SupportedStatements}),
          statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
          ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }

      SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1,...}

3.2.6.1 Predefined Statements

   The certificate statement (id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1), identifies
   conformance with requirements defined in the obsoleted RFC 3039
   (Version 1). This statement is thus provided for identification of
   old certificates issued in conformance with RFC 3039. This statement
   MUST NOT be included in certificates issued in accordance with this
   profile.

   This profile includes a new qualified certificate statement
   (identified by the OID id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2), identifying
   conformance with requirements defined in this profile.  This
   Qualified Certificate profile is referred to as version 2 while RFC
   3039 is referred to as version 1.

      qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
          IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 }
      --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements
      --  defined in RFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement may
      --  optionally contain additional semantics information as
      --  specified below.

      qcStatement-2 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
          IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 }
      --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements
      --  defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
      --  (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain
      --  additional semantics information as specified below.

      SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
          semanticsIdentifier        OBJECT IDENTIFIER   OPTIONAL,
          nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities
                                                          OPTIONAL }
          (WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
           WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})

      NameRegistrationAuthorities ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
          GeneralName

   The SementicsInformation component identified by id-qcs-
   pkixQCSyntax-v1 MAY contain a semantics identifier and MAY identify

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   one or more name registration authorities.

   The semanticsIdentifier component, if present, SHALL contain an OID,
   defining semantics for attributes and names in basic certificate
   fields and certificate extensions.  The OID may define semantics for
   all, or for a subgroup of all present attributes and/or names.

   The NameRegistrationAuthorities component, if present, SHALL contain
   a name of one or more name registration authorities, responsible for
   registration of attributes or names associated with the subject.  The
   association between an identified name registration authority and
   present attributes MAY be defined by a semantics identifier OID, by a
   certificate policy (or CPS) or some other implicit factors.

   If a value of type SemanticsInformation is present in a QCStatement
   where the statementID component is set to id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v1 or
   id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v2, then at least one of the semanticsIdentifier
   or nameRegistrationAuthorities fields must be present, as indicated.
   Note that the statementInfo component need not be present in a
   QCStatement value even if the statementID component is set to id-qcs-
   pkix-QCSyntax-v1 or id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v2.

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4  Security Considerations

   The legal value of a digital signature that is validated with a
   Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy
   governing the use of the associated private key.  Both the private
   key holder as well as the relying party should make sure that the
   private key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key
   holder.

   Since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for
   involved parties, certain conditions should exist before CAs issue
   certificates as Qualified Certificates.  The associated private keys
   must be unique for the subject, and must be maintained under the
   subject's sole control.  That is, a CA should not issue a qualified
   certificate if the means to use the private key is not protected
   against unintended usage.  This implies that the CA has some
   knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module.

   The CA must further verify that the public key contained in the
   certificate is legitimately representing the subject.

   CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions
   indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless these conditions
   are met.

   Combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate
   extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications
   depending on the context in which the certificate is to be used.
   Applications validating electronic signatures based on such
   certificates should determine whether the present key usage
   combination is appropriate for their use.

   The ability to compare two qualified certificates to determine if
   they represent the same physical entity is dependent on the semantics
   of the subjects' names.  The semantics of a particular attribute may
   be different for different issuers.  Comparing names without
   knowledge of the semantics of names in these particular certificates
   may provide misleading results.

   This specification is a profile of RFC 3280.  The security
   considerations section of that document applies to this specification
   as well.

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5  References

   Normative references

   [RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC 2247] S. Kille, M. Wahl, A. Grimstad, R. Huber and S.
              Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished
              Names", RFC 2247, January 1998.

   [RFC 2818] E. Rescorla, "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000

   [RFC 2985] M. Nystrom and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              November 2000.

   [RFC 3280] R. Housley, W. Polk, W. Ford, and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              April 2002.

   [X.509]    ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2000) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2001,
              Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
              The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
              frameworks

   [X.520]    ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-6:2001,
              Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
              The Directory: Selected Attribute Types, 2001.

   [X.680]    ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002),
              Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One,
              2002.

   [ISO 3166] ISO 3166-1:1997, Codes for the representation of names
              of countries, 1997.

   [HTTP/1.1] R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk,
              L. Masinter, P. Leach and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   Informative references

   [X.501]    ITU-T recommendation X.501 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:2001,
              Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
              The Directory: Models, 2001.

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   [EU-ESDIR] Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of
              the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework
              for electronic signatures, 1999.

   [RFC 2253] Wahl, M., Kille, S., and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory
              Access Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of
              Distinguished Names," RFC 2253, December 1997.

6  Intellectual Property Rights

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
   has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the
   IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
   standards related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of
   claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
   licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
   obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
   proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
   be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Executive
   Director.

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A  ASN.1 definitions

   As in RFC 3280, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants
   of the ASN.1 syntax.

   Appendix A.1 is in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros. However,
   since the module imports type definitions from modules in RFC 3280
   which are not completely in the 1988 syntax, the same comments as in
   RFC 3280 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e., Appendix A.1
   may be parsed by an 1988 ASN.1-parser by removing the definitions for
   the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them in RFC 3280's 1988
   modules.

   Appendix A.2 is in the 1997 syntax.

   In case of discrepancies between these modules, the 1988 module is
   the normative one.

A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module (Normative)

   PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-qualified-cert(31) }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL --

   IMPORTS

   GeneralName
       FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-pkix1-implicit(19)}

   AlgorithmIdentifier, DirectoryString, AttributeType, id-pkix, id-pe
       FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-pkix1-explicit(18)};

   -- Locally defined OIDs

   -- Arc for QC personal data attributes
   id-pda  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }

   -- Arc for QC statements

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   id-qcs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }

   -- Personal data attributes

   id-pda-dateOfBirth          AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }
   DateOfBirth ::=             GeneralizedTime

   id-pda-placeOfBirth         AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }
   PlaceOfBirth ::=            DirectoryString

   id-pda-gender               AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }
   Gender ::=                  PrintableString (SIZE(1))
                               -- "M", "F", "m" or "f"

   id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }
   CountryOfCitizenship ::=    PrintableString (SIZE (2))
                               -- ISO 3166 Country Code

   id-pda-countryOfResidence   AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }
   CountryOfResidence ::=      PrintableString (SIZE (2))
                               -- ISO 3166 Country Code

   -- Certificate extensions

   -- Biometric info extension

   id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {id-pe 2}

   BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

   BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
       typeOfBiometricData  TypeOfBiometricData,
       hashAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
       biometricDataHash    OCTET STRING,
       sourceDataUri        IA5String OPTIONAL }

   TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
       predefinedBiometricType   PredefinedBiometricType,
       biometricDataOid          OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

   PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
       picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)}
       (picture|handwritten-signature)

   -- QC Statements Extension
   -- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and
   -- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all
   -- statements must be critical or all statements must be

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   -- non-critical.

   id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}

   QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement

   QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
       statementId        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
       statementInfo      ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}

   -- QC statements
   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
   --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements
   --  defined in RFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement may
   --  optionally contain additional semantics information as specified
   --  below.

   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 2 }
   --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements
   --  defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
   --  (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain
   --  additional semantics information as specified below.

   SemanticsInformation  ::= SEQUENCE {
       semanticsIndentifier        OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
       nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
       } -- At least one field shall be present

   NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

   END

A.2 1997 ASN.1  Module (Informative)

   PKIXqualified97 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-qualified-cert-97(35) }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL --

   IMPORTS

   informationFramework, certificateExtensions, selectedAttributeTypes,
       authenticationFramework, upperBounds, id-at

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       FROM UsefulDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)
       usefulDefinitions(0) 3 }

   ub-name
       FROM UpperBounds upperBounds

   GeneralName
       FROM CertificateExtensions certificateExtensions

   ATTRIBUTE, AttributeType
       FROM InformationFramework informationFramework

   DirectoryString
       FROM SelectedAttributeTypes selectedAttributeTypes

   AlgorithmIdentifier, Extension, EXTENSION
       FROM AuthenticationFramework authenticationFramework

   id-pkix, id-pe
       FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-pkix1-explicit(18) };

   -- Locally defined OIDs

   -- Arc for QC personal data attributes
   id-pda  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }

   -- Arc for QC statements
   id-qcs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }

   -- Personal data attributes

   id-pda-dateOfBirth          AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }
   id-pda-placeOfBirth         AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }
   id-pda-gender               AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }
   id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }
   id-pda-countryOfResidence   AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }

   -- Certificate extensions

   id-pe-biometricInfo         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 2 }
   id-pe-qcStatements          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }

   -- QC statements

   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 2 }

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   -- Personal data attributes

   dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
       WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime
       ID          id-pda-dateOfBirth }

   placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
      WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-name}
      ID          id-pda-placeOfBirth }

   gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {
       WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f"))
       ID          id-pda-gender }

   countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {
       WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
           (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
       ID          id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }

   countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= {
       WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
           (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
       ID          id-pda-countryOfResidence }

   -- Certificate extensions

   -- Biometric info extension

   biometricInfo  EXTENSION ::= {
       SYNTAX             BiometricSyntax
       IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-biometricInfo }

   BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

   BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
       typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
       hashAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,
       biometricDataHash   OCTET STRING,
       sourceDataUri       IA5String OPTIONAL,
       ... -- For future extensions -- }

   TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
       predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
       biometricDataOid        OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

   PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
       picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)}
       (picture|handwritten-signature,...)

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   -- QC Statements Extension
   -- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and
   -- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all
   -- statements must be critical or all statements must be
   -- non-critical.

   qcStatements  EXTENSION ::= {
       SYNTAX        QCStatements
       IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }

   QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement

   QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
       statementId   QC-STATEMENT.&id({SupportedStatements}),
       statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
       ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }

   QC-STATEMENT ::= CLASS {
       &id   OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
       &Type OPTIONAL }
       WITH SYNTAX {
       [SYNTAX &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id }

   qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
       IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1}
       --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements
       --  defined in RFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement
       --  may optionally contain additional semantics information
       --  as specified below.

   qcStatement-2 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
       IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2}
       --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements
       --  defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
       --  (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain
       --  additional semantics information as specified below.

   SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
       semanticsIdentifier         OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
       nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
       }(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
         WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})

   NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

   -- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
   -- set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs.
   SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= {

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       qcStatement-1 |
       qcStatement-2 , ... -- For future extensions -- }

   END

B  A Note on Attributes

   This document defines several new attributes, both for use in the
   subject field of issued certificates and in the
   subjectDirectoryAttributes extension.  A complete definition of these
   new attributes (including matching rules), along with object classes
   to support them in LDAP-accessible directories, can be found in [PKCS
   9].

C  Example Certificate

   This section contains the ASN.1 structure, an ASN.1 dump, and the
   DER-encoding of a certificate issued in conformance with this
   profile.  The example has been developed with the help of the OSS
   ASN.1 compiler.  The certificate has the following characteristics:

      1.  The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash
          algorithm
      2.  The issuer's distinguished name is (using the syntax specified
          in [RFC 2253]):
          O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
      3.  The subject's distinguished name is (using the syntax specified
          in [RFC 2253]): GN=Petra+SN=Barzin, O=GMD
          - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
      4.  The certificate was issued on 1 February, 2004 and will expire on
          1 February, 2008
      5.  The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key
      6.  The certificate includes a critical key usage extension
          exclusively indicating non-repudiation
      7.  The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier
          extension indicating the practices and procedures undertaken
          by the issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1).  The
          certificate policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust,
          Germany.
      8.  The certificate includes a subject directory attributes
          extension containing the following attributes:
          date of birth:         October, 14th 1971
          place of birth:        Darmstadt
          country of citizenship:Germany
          gender:                Female
      9.  The certificate includes a qualified statement certificate
          extension indicating that the naming registration authority's
          name as "municipality@darmstadt.de".

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      10. The certificate includes, in conformance with RFC 3280, an
          authority key identifier extension.

C.1 ASN.1 Structure

C.1.1 Extensions

   Since extensions are DER-encoded already when placed in the structure
   to be signed, they are for clarity shown here in the value notation
   defined in [X.680].

C.1.1.1 The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension
   certSubjDirAttrs AttributesSyntax ::= {
       {
           type id-pda-countryOfCitizenship,
           values {
               PrintableString : "DE"
           }
       },
       {
           type id-pda-gender,
           values {
               PrintableString : "F"
           }
       },
       {
           type id-pda-dateOfBirth,
           values {
               GeneralizedTime : "197110141200Z"
           }
       },
       {
           type id-pda-placeOfBirth,
           values {
               DirectoryString : utf8String : "Darmstadt"
           }
       }
   }

C.1.1.2 The keyUsage extension
   certKeyUsage KeyUsage ::= {nonRepudiation}

C.1.1.3 The certificatePolicies extension

   certCertificatePolicies CertificatePoliciesSyntax ::= {
       {
           policyIdentifier {1 3 36 8 1 1}
       }

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   }

C.1.1.4 The qcStatements extension

   certQCStatement QCStatements ::= {
       {
           statementId   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2,
           statementInfo SemanticsInformation : {
               nameRegistrationAuthorities {
                   rfc822Name : "municipality@darmstadt.de"
               }
           }
       }
   }

C.1.1.5 The authorityKeyIdentifier extension

   certAKI AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= {
       keyIdentifier '000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
   }

C.1.2 The certificate

   The signed portion of the certificate is shown here in the value
   notation defined in [X.680].  Note that extension values are already
   DER encoded in this structure.  Some values have been truncated for
   readability purposes.

   certCertInfo CertificateInfo ::= {
     version v3,
     serialNumber 1234567890,
     signature
     {
       algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 },
       parameters RSAParams : NULL
     },
     issuer rdnSequence :
       {
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 6 },
             value PrintableString : "DE"
           }
         },
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 10 },
             value UTF8String :

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               "GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
           }
         }
       },
     validity
     {
       notBefore utcTime : "040201100000Z",
       notAfter utcTime :  "080201100000Z"
     },
     subject rdnSequence :
       {
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 6 },
             value PrintableString : "DE"
           }
         },
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 10 },
             value UTF8String :
               "GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
           }
         },
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 4 },
             value UTF8String : "Barzin"
           },
           {
             type { 2 5 4 42 },
             value UTF8String : "Petra"
           }
         }
       },
     subjectPublicKeyInfo
     {
       algorithm
       {
         algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 },
         parameters RSAParams : NULL
       },
       subjectPublicKey '30818902818100DCE74CD5...0203010001'H
     },
     extensions
     {
       {
         extnId { 2 5 29 9 },  -- subjectDirectoryAttributes

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         extnValue '305B301006082B0601050507090...7374616474'H
       },
       {
         extnId { 2 5 29 15 }, -- keyUsage
         critical TRUE,
         extnValue '03020640'H
       },
       {
         extnId { 2 5 29 32 }, -- certificatePolicies
         extnValue '3009300706052B24080101'H
       },
       {
         extnId { 2 5 29 35 }, -- authorityKeyIdentifier
         extnValue '30168014000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
       },
       {
         extnId { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }, -- qcStatements
         extnValue '302B302906082B06010505070B0...4742E6465 'H
       }
     }
   }

C.2 ASN.1 dump

   This section contains an ASN.1 dump of the signed portion of the
   certificate.  Some values have been truncated for readability
   purposes.

   CertificateInfo SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 633
     version : tag = [0] constructed; length = 3
       Version INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2] primitive; length = 1
         2
     serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2]
     primitive; length = 4
       1234567890
     signature AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
     constructed; length = 13
       algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
       primitive; length = 9
         { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
       parameters OpenType
         NULL
     issuer Name CHOICE
       rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
       constructed; length = 72
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 11
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]

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           constructed; length = 9
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
             primitive; length = 3
               { 2 5 4 6 } -- id-at-countryName
             value PrintableString
               "DE"
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 57
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 55
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
             primitive; length = 3
               { 2 5 4 10 } -- id-at-organizationName
             value UTF8String
               "GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
     validity Validity SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
     constructed; length = 30
       notBefore Time CHOICE
         utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
           040201100000Z
       notAfter Time CHOICE
         utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
           080201100000Z
     subject Name CHOICE
       rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
       constructed; length = 101
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 11
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 9
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
             primitive; length = 3
               { 2 5 4 6 } -- id-at-countryName
             value PrintableString
               "DE"
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 55
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 53
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
             primitive; length = 3
               { 2 5 4 10 } -- id-at-organizationName
             value UTF8String
               "GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 29
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 13

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             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
             primitive; length = 3
               { 2 5 4 4 } -- id-at-surname
             value UTF8String
               "Barzin"
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 12
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
             primitive; length = 3
               { 2 5 4 42 } -- id-at-givenName
             value UTF8String
               "Petra"
     subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE:
     tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 159
       algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
       constructed; length = 13
         algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
         primitive; length = 9
           { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 } -- rsaEncryption
         parameters OpenType
           NULL
       subjectPublicKey BIT STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 3]
       primitive; length = 141
         0x0030818902818100dce74cd5a1d55aeb01cf5ecc20f3c3fca787...
     extensions : tag = [3] constructed; length = 233
       Extensions SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
       constructed; length = 230
         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
         constructed; length = 100
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
           primitive; length = 3
             { 2 5 29 9 } -- id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
           primitive; length = 93
             0x305b301006082b06010505070904310413024445300f06082...
         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
         constructed; length = 14
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
             primitive; length = 3
             { 2 5 29 15 } -- id-ce-keyUsage
           critical BOOLEAN: tag = [UNIVERSAL 1] primitive; length = 1
             TRUE
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
           primitive; length = 4
             0x03020640
         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
         constructed; length = 18
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]

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           primitive; length = 3
             { 2 5 29 32 } -- id-ce-certificatePolicies
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
           primitive; length = 11
             0x3009300706052b24080101
         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
         constructed; length = 31
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
           primitive; length = 3
             { 2 5 29 35 } -- id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
           primitive; length = 24
             0x30168014000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0ffedcba98
         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
         constructed; length = 57
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
           primitive; length = 8
             { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 } -- id-pe-qcStatements
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
           primitive; length = 45
             0x302b302906082b06010505070b02301d301b81196d756e696...

C.3 DER-encoding

   This section contains the full, DER-encoded certificate, in hex.

   30820310 30820279 A0030201 02020449 9602D230 0D06092A 864886F7 0D010105
   05003048 310B3009 06035504 06130244 45313930 37060355 040A0C30 474D4420
   2D20466F 72736368 756E6773 7A656E74 72756D20 496E666F 726D6174 696F6E73
   74656368 6E696B20 476D6248 301E170D 30343032 30313130 30303030 5A170D30
   38303230 31313030 3030305A 3065310B 30090603 55040613 02444531 37303506
   0355040A 0C2E474D 4420466F 72736368 756E6773 7A656E74 72756D20 496E666F
   726D6174 696F6E73 74656368 6E696B20 476D6248 311D300C 06035504 2A0C0550
   65747261 300D0603 5504040C 06426172 7A696E30 819F300D 06092A86 4886F70D
   01010105 0003818D 00308189 02818100 DCE74CD5 A1D55AEB 01CF5ECC 20F3C3FC
   A787CFCB 571A21AA 8A20AD5D FF015130 DE724E5E D3F95392 E7BB16C4 A71D0F31
   B3A9926A 8F08EA00 FDC3A8F2 BB016DEC A3B9411B A2599A2A 8CB655C6 DFEA25BF
   EDDC73B5 94FAA0EF E595C612 A6AE5B8C 7F0CA19C EC4FE7AB 60546768 4BB2387D
   5F2F7EBD BC3EF0A6 04F6B404 01176925 02030100 01A381E9 3081E630 64060355
   1D09045D 305B3010 06082B06 01050507 09043104 13024445 300F0608 2B060105
   05070903 31031301 46301D06 082B0601 05050709 01311118 0F313937 31313031
   34313230 3030305A 30170608 2B060105 05070902 310B0C09 4461726D 73746164
   74300E06 03551D0F 0101FF04 04030206 40301206 03551D20 040B3009 30070605
   2B240801 01301F06 03551D23 04183016 80140001 02030405 06070809 0A0B0C0D
   0E0FFEDC BA983039 06082B06 01050507 0103042D 302B3029 06082B06 01050507
   0B02301D 301B8119 6D756E69 63697061 6C697479 40646172 6D737461 64742E64
   65300D06 092A8648 86F70D01 01050500 03818100 8F8C80BB B2D86B75 F4E21F82
   EFE0F20F 6C558890 A6E73118 8359B9C7 8CE71C92 0C66C600 53FBC924 825090F2

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   95B08826 EAF3FF1F 5917C80B B4836129 CFE5563E 78592B5B B0F9ACB5 2915F0F2
   BC36991F 21436520 E9064761 D932D871 F71FFEBD AD648FA7 CF3C1BC0 96F112D4
   B882B39F E1A16A90 AE1A80B8 A9676518 B5AA7E97

C.4 CA's public RSA key

   This section contains the DER-encoded public RSA key of the CA who
   signed the example certificate.  It is included with the purpose of
   simplifying verifications of the example certificate.

   30818902818100c88f4bdb66f713ba3dd7a9069880e888d4321acb53cda7fcdf
   da89b834e25430b956d46a438baa6798035af30db378424e00a8296b012b1b24
   f9cf0b3f83be116cd8a36957dc3f54cbd7c58a10c380b3dfa15bd2922ea8660f
   96e1603d81357c0442ad607c5161d083d919fd5307c1c3fa6dfead0e6410999e
   8b8a8411d525dd0203010001

Authors' Addresses

   Stefan Santesson
   Microsoft Denmark
   Tuborg Boulevard 12
   DK-2900 Hellerup
   Denmark

   EMail: stefans@microsoft.com

   Tim Polk
   NIST
   Building 820, Room 426
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA

   EMail: wpolk@nist.gov

   Magnus Nystrom
   RSA Security
   Box 10704
   S-121 29 Stockholm
   Sweden

   EMail: magnus@rsasecurity.com

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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
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   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  In addition, the
   ASN.1 modules presented in Appendices A and B may be used in whole or
   in part without inclusion of the copyright notice.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
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   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This
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   FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
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   OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

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