Merkle Tree Certificates
draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-04
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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| Authors | David Benjamin , Devon O'Brien , Bas Westerbaan , Luke Valenta , Filippo Valsorda | ||
| Last updated | 2026-05-24 (Latest revision 2026-04-20) | ||
| Replaces | draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-04
PKI, Logs, And Tree Signatures D. Benjamin
Internet-Draft Google LLC
Intended status: Standards Track D. O'Brien
Expires: 25 November 2026 Apple Inc.
B. E. Westerbaan
L. Valenta
Cloudflare
F. Valsorda
Geomys
24 May 2026
Merkle Tree Certificates
draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-04
Abstract
This document describes Merkle Tree certificates, a new form of X.509
certificates which integrate public logging of the certificate, in
the style of Certificate Transparency. The integrated design reduces
logging overhead in the face of both shorter-lived certificates and
large post-quantum signature algorithms, while still achieving
comparable security properties to existing X.509 constructions and
Certificate Transparency. Merkle Tree certificates additionally
admit an optional size optimization that avoids signatures
altogether, at the cost of only applying to up-to-date relying
parties and older certificates.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-
plants-wg.github.io/merkle-tree-certs/draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-
certs.html. Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-
certs/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the PKI, Logs, And Tree
Signatures Working Group mailing list (mailto:plants@ietf.org), which
is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/plants.
Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/plants/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ietf-plants-wg/merkle-tree-certs.
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Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 November 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Terminology and Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Subtrees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Definition of a Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Example Subtrees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Subtree Inclusion Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3.1. Example Subtree Inclusion Proofs . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3.2. Evaluating a Subtree Inclusion Proof . . . . . . . . 15
4.3.3. Verifying a Subtree Inclusion Proof . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4. Subtree Consistency Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4.1. Generating a Subtree Consistency Proof . . . . . . . 17
4.4.2. Example Subtree Consistency Proofs . . . . . . . . . 18
4.4.3. Verifying a Subtree Consistency Proof . . . . . . . . 20
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4.5. Arbitrary Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Certification Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1. Certification Authority Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2. Issuance Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.1. Log Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2.2. Publishing Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.2.3. Log Pruning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.3. Cosigners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3.1. Signature Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3.2. Signature Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3.3. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.4. Certification Authority Cosigners . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.5. Representing Certification Authorities . . . . . . . . . 37
6. Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1. Certificate Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.2. Standalone Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.3. Landmark-Relative Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.3.1. Landmark Tree Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.3.2. Allocating Landmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.3.3. Publishing Landmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.3.4. Constructing Landmark-Relative Certificates . . . . . 45
6.4. Size Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7. Relying Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.1. Relying Party Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.2. Verifying Certificate Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.3. Trusted Cosigners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.4. Trusted Subtrees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.5. Revoked Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8. Use in TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.1. Standalone Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.2. Landmark-Relative Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.2.1. Single-Log Landmark Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.2.2. Timestamped Landmark Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9. ACME Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
10. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
10.1. Operational Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
10.1.1. Certification Authority Costs . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10.1.2. Cosigner Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10.1.3. Monitor Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.2. Choosing Cosigners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.3. Log Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.4. Certificate Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12.1. Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12.2. Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
12.3. Public Key Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
12.4. Non-Repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
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12.5. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
12.6. Certificate Malleability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
12.7. Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
12.8. Signature Domain Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13.1. Module Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13.2. Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13.3. Certificate Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
13.4. Relative Distinguished Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . 71
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Appendix B. Merkle Tree Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
B.1. Binary Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
B.2. Inclusion Proof Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
B.3. Consistency Proof Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
B.4. Consistency Proof Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Change log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-00 . . . . . . . . . 85
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-01 . . . . . . . . . 86
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-02 . . . . . . . . . 86
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-03 . . . . . . . . . 86
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-04 . . . . . . . . . 86
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-05 . . . . . . . . . 87
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-06 . . . . . . . . . 87
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-07 . . . . . . . . . 87
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-08 . . . . . . . . . 87
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-09 . . . . . . . . . 88
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-10 . . . . . . . . . 88
Since draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-00 . . . . . . . . . 88
Since draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-01 . . . . . . . . . 88
Since draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-02 . . . . . . . . . 88
Since draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-03 . . . . . . . . . 88
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
1. Introduction
In Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) that use Certificate
Transparency (CT) [RFC6962] for a public logging requirement, an
authenticating party must present Signed Certificate Timestamps
(SCTs) alongside certificates. CT policies often require two or more
SCTs per certificate [APPLE-CT] [CHROME-CT], each of which carries a
signature. These signatures are in addition to those in the
certificate chain itself.
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Current signature schemes can use as few as 32 bytes per key and 64
bytes per signature [RFC8032], but post-quantum replacements are much
larger. For example, ML-DSA-44 [FIPS204] uses 1,312 bytes per public
key and 2,420 bytes per signature. ML-DSA-65 uses 1,952 bytes per
public key and 3,309 bytes per signature. Even with a directly-
trusted intermediate (Section 7.5 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]), two SCTs and a leaf certificate
signature adds 7,260 bytes of authentication overhead with ML-DSA-44
and 9,927 bytes with ML-DSA-65.
This increased overhead additionally impacts CT logs themselves.
Most of a log's costs scale with the total storage size of the log.
Each log entry contains both a public key, and a signature from the
CA. With larger public keys and signatures, the size of each log
entry will grow.
Additionally, as PKIs transition to shorter-lived certificates
[CABF-153] [CABF-SC081], the number of entries in the log will grow.
This document introduces Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs), a new form
of X.509 certificate that integrates logging with certificate
issuance. Each CA maintains logs of everything it issues, signing
views of its logs to assert it has issued the contents. The CA
signature is combined with cosignatures from other parties who verify
correct operation and optionally mirror the logs. These signatures,
together with an inclusion proof for an individual entry, constitute
a certificate.
This achieves the following:
* Log entries do not scale with public key and signature sizes.
Entries replace public keys with hashes and do not contain
signatures, while preserving non-repudiability (Section 12.4).
* To bound growth, long-expired entries can be pruned from logs and
mirrors without interrupting existing clients. This allows log
sizes to scale by retention policies, not the lifetime of the log,
even as certificate lifetimes decrease.
* After a processing delay, authenticating parties can obtain a
second "landmark-relative" certificate for the same log entry.
This second certificate is an optional size optimization that
avoids the need for any signatures, assuming an up-to-date client
that has some predistributed log information.
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Section 3 gives an overview of the system. Section 4 describes a
Merkle Tree primitive used by this system. Section 5.2 describes the
log structure. Finally, Section 6 and Section 7 describe how to
construct and consume a Merkle Tree certificate.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document additionally uses the TLS presentation language defined
in Section 3 of [RFC8446], as well as the notation defined in
Section 2.1.1 of [RFC9162]. It extends the numeric types defined in
Section 3.3 of [RFC8446] with a big-endian, 48-bit integer:
uint8 uint48[6];
U+ followed by four hexadecimal characters denotes a Unicode
codepoint, to be encoded in UTF-8 [RFC3629]. 0x followed by two
hexadecimal characters denotes a byte value in the 0-255 range.
[start, end), where start <= end, denotes the half-open interval
containing integers x such that start <= x < end.
Given a non-negative integer n,
* LSB(n) refers to the least-significant bit of n's binary
representation. Equivalently, it is the remainder when n is
divided by 2.
* BIT_WIDTH(n) refers to the smallest number of bits needed to
represent n. BIT_WIDTH(0) is zero.
* POPCOUNT(n) refers to the number of set bits in n's binary
representation.
* BIT_CEIL(n) refers to the smallest power of 2 that is greater or
equal to n.
To _left-shift_ a non-negative integer n is to shift each bit in its
binary representation to one upper position. Equivalently, it is n
times 2. Given non-negative integers a and b, a << b refers to a
left-shifted b times.
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To _right-shift_ a non-negative integer n is to shift each bit in its
binary representation to one lower position, discarding the least-
significant bit. Equivalently, it is the floor of n divided by 2.
Given non-negative integers a and b, a >> b refers to a right-shifted
b times.
Given two non-negative integers a and b, a & b refers to the non-
negative integer such that each bit position is set if the
corresponding bit is set in both a and b, and unset otherwise. This
is commonly referred to as the bitwise AND operator.
2.1. Terminology and Roles
This document discusses the following roles:
Authenticating party: The party that authenticates itself in the
protocol. In TLS, this is the side sending the Certificate and
CertificateVerify message.
Certification authority (CA): The service that issues certificates
to the authenticating party, after performing some validation
process on the certificate contents.
Relying party: The party to whom the authenticating party presents
its identity. In TLS, this is the side receiving the Certificate
and CertificateVerify message.
Monitor: Parties who watch logs for certificates of interest,
analogous to the role in Section 8.2 of [RFC9162].
Issuance log: A log, maintained by the CA, containing certification
statements issued by that CA. A CA operates some number of
issuance logs, which together contain all statements issued by
that CA.
Cosigner: A service that signs views of an issuance log, to assert
correct operation and other properties about the entries.
Additionally, there are several terms used throughout this document
to describe this proposal. This section provides an overview. They
will be further defined and discussed in detail throughout the
document.
Checkpoint: A description of the complete state of the log at some
time.
Entry: An individual element of the log, describing information
which the CA has validated and certified.
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Subtree: A smaller Merkle Tree over a portion of the log, defined by
an interior node of some snapshot of the log. Subtrees can be
efficiently shown to be consistent with the whole log.
Inclusion proof: A sequence of hashes that efficiently proves some
entry is contained in some checkpoint or subtree.
Consistency proof: A sequence of hashes that efficiently proves a
checkpoint or subtree is contained within another checkpoint.
Cosignature: A signature from either the CA or other cosigner, over
some checkpoint or subtree.
Landmark: One of an infrequent subset of tree sizes that can be used
to predistribute trusted subtrees to relying parties for landmark-
relative certificates.
Landmark subtree: A subtree determined by a landmark. Landmark
subtrees are common points of reference between relying parties
and landmark-relative certificates.
Standalone certificate: A certificate containing an inclusion proof
to some subtree, and several cosignatures over that subtree.
Landmark-relative certificate: An optimized certificate containing
an inclusion proof to a landmark subtree, and no signatures.
Directly-signed certificate: A certificate issued using the
existing, non-MTC construction, where the TBSCertificate is passed
directly to the private key's signing operation.
3. Overview
In Certificate Transparency, a CA first certifies information by
signing it, then submits the resulting certificate (or
precertificate) to logs for logging. Merkle Tree Certificates invert
this process: the CA certifies information by logging it, then
submits the log to cosigners to verify log operation. A certificate
is assembled from the result and proves the information is in the
CA's log.
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+-- Certification Authority ---+ +-- Authenticating Party ----+
| | | |
| 2. Validate request <---+----+-- 1. Request certificate |
| | | | issuance |
| | | | |
| V | | |
| | | |
| 3. Add to issuance log | | |
| +---[ CA cosign ] | | |
| / \ ----+----+-> 5. Download certificates |
| / \ | | |
| / \ | | * tbscert |
| +-------+ | | = = = inclusion proof |
| * * * * tbscert entries | | [ CA ] cosignatures |
| | | [ mirror ] |
+------------------------------+ +-----------------------------+
/ | \
/ | \ 4. Submit log to cosigners
V V V for cosignatures
+-- Mirrors, other cosigners --+ +-- Monitors -----------------+
| | | |
| +---[ CA cosign ] +-+ | |
| / \ [ mirror cosign ] | | | |
| / \ | | | |
| / \ <-+-+--+-- 6. Monitor CA operation |
| +-------+ | | | |
| * * * * | | +-----------------------------+
+-+----------------------------+ |
| ...quorum of cosigners... |
+------------------------------+
Figure 1: A diagram of the MTC issuance architecture, detailed below
Merkle Tree Certificates are issued as follows. Figure 1 depicts
this process.
1. The authenticating party requests a certificate, e.g. over ACME
[RFC8555]
2. The CA validates each incoming issuance request, e.g. with ACME
challenges. From there, the process differs.
3. The CA operates a series of append-only _issuance logs_
(Section 5.2). Unlike a CT log, these logs only contain entries
added by the CA:
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a. The CA adds a TBSCertificateLogEntry (Section 5.2.1,
abbreviated "tbscert entries" in the diagram) to an issuance
log, describing the information it is certifying.
b. The CA signs a _checkpoint_, which describes the current
state of the log. A signed checkpoint certifies that the CA
issued _every_ entry in the Merkle Tree (Section 5.4).
c. The CA additionally signs _subtrees_ (Section 4) that
together contain certificates added since the last checkpoint
(Section 4.5). This is an optimization to reduce inclusion
proof sizes. A signed subtree certifies that the CA has
issued _every_ entry in the subtree.
4. The CA submits the new log state to _cosigners_. Cosigners
validate the log is append-only and optionally provide additional
services, such as mirroring its contents. They cosign the CA's
checkpoints and subtrees.
5. The CA now has enough information to construct a certificate and
give it to the authenticating party. A certificate contains:
* The TBSCertificate being certified
* An inclusion proof from the TBSCertificate to some subtree
* Cosignatures from the CA and cosigners on the subtree
6. As in Certificate Transparency, monitors observe the CA's
issuance logs to ensure the CA is operated correctly.
A certificate with cosignatures is known as a _standalone
certificate_. Analogous to X.509 trust anchors and trusted CT logs,
relying parties are configured with trusted cosigners (Section 7.3)
that allow them to accept Merkle Tree certificates. The inclusion
proof proves the TBSCertificate is part of some subtree, and
cosignatures from trusted cosigners prove the subtree was certified
by the CA and available to monitors. Where CT logs entire
certificates, the issuance log's entries are smaller
TBSCertificateLogEntry (Section 5.2.1) structures, which do not scale
with public key or signature size.
This same issuance process also produces a _landmark-relative
certificate_. This is an optional, optimized certificate that avoids
all cosignatures, including the CA signature. Landmark-relative
certificates are available after a short period of time and usable
with up-to-date relying parties.
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+-- Certification Authority -----+
| | +-- Update Channel --+
| /\ | | |
| / \ 1. Allocate landmarks -+--+----------------+ |
| +----+ | | | | |
+--------------------------+-----+ +----------------+---+
| |
2. Make landmark-relative | 3. Distribute |
cert | landmarks |
V |
+-- Authenticating Party --------+ |
| | |
| landmark-relative cert | V
| tbscert | +-- Up-to-date RP -----+
| inclusion proof to landmark -+->| landmark hashes |
| | | trusted cosigners |
| | +----------------------+
| standalone cert |
| tbscert | +-- Unupdated RP ------+
| inclusion proof | | (stale or no hashes) |
| cosignatures ------------+->| trusted cosigners |
| | +----------------------+
+--------------------------------+
4. Select certificate by RP
Figure 2: A diagram of landmark-relative certificate construction
and usage, detailed below
Landmark-relative certificates are constructed and used as follows.
Figure 2 depicts this process.
1. Periodically, the tree size of the CA's most recent checkpoint is
designated as a _landmark_. This determines _landmark subtrees_,
which are common points of reference between relying parties and
landmark-relative certificates.
2. Once some landmark includes the TBSCertificate, the landmark-
relative certificate is constructed with:
* The TBSCertificate being certified
* An inclusion proof from the TBSCertificate to a landmark
subtree
3. In the background, landmark subtrees are predistributed to
relying parties, with cosignatures checked against relying party
requirements. This occurs periodically in the background,
separate from the application protocol.
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4. During the application protocol, such as TLS [RFC8446], if the
relying party already supports the landmark subtree, the
authenticating party can present the landmark-relative
certificate. Otherwise, it presents a standalone certificate.
The authenticating party may also select between several
landmark-relative certificates, as described in Section 10.4.
4. Subtrees
This section extends the Merkle Tree definition in Section 2.1 of
[RFC9162] by defining a _subtree_ of a Merkle Tree. A subtree is
itself a Merkle Tree, built over an interval of entries from the
original tree. Section 4.1 defines a subtree formally, including the
constraints on those intervals.
As with Merkle Trees, a subtree inclusion proof, defined in
Section 4.3, can prove an entry is contained in some subtree.
Subtrees, and thus their inclusion proofs, are smaller than those of
the original tree, so this document uses subtree inclusion proofs as
a certificate size optimization.
Not all intervals can form subtrees. Subtrees are limited to
intervals that can be efficiently proven consistent with the original
tree, using subtree consistency proofs defined in Section 4.4.
However, every interval of a Merkle Tree can be efficiently covered
by two subtrees. Section 4.5 describes how to determine these
subtrees.
4.1. Definition of a Subtree
Given an ordered list of n inputs, D_n = {d[0], d[1], ..., d[n-1]},
Section 2.1.1 of [RFC9162] defines the Merkle Tree via the Merkle
Tree Hash MTH(D_n).
A _subtree_ of this Merkle Tree is itself a Merkle Tree, defined by
MTH(D[start:end]). start and end are integers such that:
* 0 <= start < end <= n
* start is a multiple of BIT_CEIL(end - start)
Note that, if start is zero, the second condition is always true.
In the context of a single Merkle Tree, the subtree defined by start
and end is denoted by half-open interval [start, end). It contains
the entries whose indices are in that half-open interval.
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The _size_ of the subtree is end - start. If the subtree's size is a
power of two, it is said to be _full_, otherwise it is said to be
_partial_.
If a subtree is full, then it is directly contained in the tree of
hash operations in MTH(D_n) for n >= end.
If a subtree is partial, it is directly contained in MTH(D_n) only if
n = end.
4.2. Example Subtrees
Figure 3 shows the subtrees [4, 8) and [8, 13):
+--------+
| [4, 8) |
+--------+
/ \
+-----+ +-----+
|[4,6)| |[6,8)|
+-----+ +-----+
/ \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
|4| |5| |6| |7|
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
+----------------+
| [8, 13) |
+----------------+
/ |
+---------+ |
| [8, 12) | |
+---------+ |
/ \ |
+------+ +-------+ |
|[8,10)| |[10,12)| |
+------+ +-------+ |
/ \ / \ |
+-+ +-+ +--+ +--+ +--+
|8| |9| |10| |11| |12|
+-+ +-+ +--+ +--+ +--+
Figure 3: Two example subtrees, one full and one partial
Both subtrees are directly contained in a Merkle Tree of size 13,
depicted in Figure 4. [4, 8) is contained (marked with double lines)
because, although n (13) is not end (8), the subtree is full. [8, 13)
is contained (marked with wavy lines) because n (13) is end (13).
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+-----------------------------+
| [0, 13) |
+-----------------------------+
/ \
+----------------+ +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
| [0, 8) | | [8, 13) |
+----------------+ +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
/ \ / |
+--------+ +========+ +~~~~~~~~~+ |
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | | [8, 12) | |
+--------+ +========+ +~~~~~~~~~+ |
/ \ / \ / \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +=====+ +=====+ +~~~~~~+ +~~~~~~~+ |
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |[6,8)| |[8,10)| |[10,12)| |
+-----+ +-----+ +=====+ +=====+ +~~~~~~+ +~~~~~~~+ |
/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ |
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +~+ +~+ +~~+ +~~+ +~~+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| |7| |8| |9| |10| |11| |12|
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +~+ +~+ +~~+ +~~+ +~~+
Figure 4: A Merkle Tree of size 13
In contrast, [8, 13) is not directly contained in a Merkle Tree of
size 14, depicted in Figure 5. However, the subtree is still
computed over consistent elements.
+-----------------------------+
| [0, 14) |
+-----------------------------+
/ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
| [0, 8) | | [8, 14) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
/ \ / |
+--------+ +--------+ +~~~~~~~~~+ |
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | | [8, 12) | |
+--------+ +--------+ +~~~~~~~~~+ |
/ \ / \ / \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~~+ +~~~~~~~+ +-------+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |[6,8)| |[8,10)| |[10,12)| |[12,14)|
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~~+ +~~~~~~~+ +-------+
/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +~+ +~+ +~~+ +~~+ +~~+ +--+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| |7| |8| |9| |10| |11| |12| |13|
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +~+ +~+ +~~+ +~~+ +~~+ +--+
Figure 5: A Merkle Tree of size 14
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4.3. Subtree Inclusion Proofs
Subtrees are Merkle Trees, so entries can be proven to be contained
in the subtree. A subtree inclusion proof for entry index of the
subtree [start, end) is a Merkle inclusion proof, as defined in
Section 2.1.3.1 of [RFC9162], where m is index - start and the tree
inputs are D[start:end].
Subtree inclusion proofs contain a sequence of nodes that are
sufficient to reconstruct the subtree hash, MTH(D[start:end]), out of
the hash for entry index, MTH({d[index]}), thus demonstrating that
the subtree hash contains the entry's hash.
4.3.1. Example Subtree Inclusion Proofs
The inclusion proof for entry 10 of subtree [8, 13) contains the
hashes MTH({d[11]}), MTH(D[8:10]), and MTH({d[12]}), depicted in
Figure 6. MTH({d[10]}) is not part of the proof because the verifier
is assumed to already know its value.
+----------------+
| [8, 13) |
+----------------+
/ |
+---------+ |
| [8, 12) | |
+---------+ |
/ \ |
+======+ +-------+ |
|[8,10)| |[10,12)| |
+======+ +-------+ |
/ \ / \ |
+-+ +-+ +~~+ +==+ +==+
|8| |9| |10| |11| |12|
+-+ +-+ +~~+ +==+ +==+
Figure 6: An example subtree inclusion proof
4.3.2. Evaluating a Subtree Inclusion Proof
Given a subtree inclusion proof, inclusion_proof, for entry index,
with hash entry_hash, of a subtree [start, end), the subtree
inclusion proof can be _evaluated_ to compute the expected subtree
hash:
1. Check that [start, end) is a valid subtree (Section 4.1), and
that start <= index < end. If either do not hold, fail proof
evaluation.
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2. Set fn to index - start and sn to end - start - 1.
3. Set r to entry_hash.
4. For each value p in the inclusion_proof array:
1. If sn is 0, then stop the iteration and fail proof
evaluation.
2. If LSB(fn) is set, or if fn is equal to sn, then:
1. Set r to HASH(0x01 || p || r).
2. Until LSB(fn) is set, right-shift fn and sn equally.
Otherwise:
1. Set r to HASH(0x01 || r || p).
3. Finally, right-shift both fn and sn one time.
5. If sn is not zero, fail proof evaluation.
6. Return r as the expected subtree hash.
This is the same as the procedure in Section 2.1.3.2 of [RFC9162],
where leaf_index is index - start, tree_size is end - start, and r is
returned instead of compared with root_hash.
Appendix B.2 explains this procedure in more detail.
4.3.3. Verifying a Subtree Inclusion Proof
Given a subtree inclusion proof, inclusion_proof, for entry index,
with hash entry_hash, of a subtree [start, end) with hash
subtree_hash, the subtree inclusion proof can be _verified_ to verify
the described entry is contained in the subtree:
1. Let expected_subtree_hash be the result of evaluating the
inclusion proof as described Section 4.3.2. If evaluation fails,
fail the proof verification.
2. If subtree_hash is equal to expected_subtree_hash, the entry is
contained in the subtree. Otherwise, fail the proof
verification.
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4.4. Subtree Consistency Proofs
A subtree [start, end) can be efficiently proven to be consistent
with the full Merkle Tree. That is, given MTH(D[start:end]) and
MTH(D_n), the proof demonstrates that the input D[start:end] to the
subtree hash was equal to the corresponding elements of the input D_n
to the Merkle Tree hash.
Subtree consistency proofs contain sufficient nodes to reconstruct
both the subtree hash, MTH(D[start:end]), and the full tree hash,
MTH(D_n), in such a way that every input to the subtree hash was also
incorporated into the full tree hash.
4.4.1. Generating a Subtree Consistency Proof
The subtree consistency proof, SUBTREE_PROOF(start, end, D_n) is
defined similarly to Section 2.1.4.1 of [RFC9162], in terms of a
helper function that tracks whether the subtree hash is known:
SUBTREE_PROOF(start, end, D_n) =
SUBTREE_SUBPROOF(start, end, D_n, true)
If start = 0 and end = n, the subtree is the root:
SUBTREE_SUBPROOF(0, n, D_n, true) = {}
SUBTREE_SUBPROOF(0, n, D_n, false) = {MTH(D_n)}
Otherwise, n > 1. Let k be the largest power of two smaller than n.
The consistency proof is defined recursively as:
* If end <= k, the subtree is on the left of k. The proof proves
consistency with the left child and includes the right child:
SUBTREE_SUBPROOF(start, end, D_n, b) =
SUBTREE_SUBPROOF(start, end, D[0:k], b) : MTH(D[k:n])
* If k <= start, the subtree is on the right of k. The proof proves
consistency with the right child and includes the left child.
SUBTREE_SUBPROOF(start, end, D_n, b) =
SUBTREE_SUBPROOF(start - k, end - k, D[k:n], b) : MTH(D[0:k])
* Otherwise, start < k < end, which implies start = 0. The proof
proves consistency with the right child and includes the left
child.
SUBTREE_SUBPROOF(0, end, D_n, b) =
SUBTREE_SUBPROOF(0, end - k, D[k:n], false) : MTH(D[0:k])
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When start is zero, this computes a Merkle consistency proof:
SUBTREE_PROOF(0, end, D_n) = PROOF(end, D_n)
When end = start + 1, this computes a Merkle inclusion proof:
SUBTREE_PROOF(start, start + 1, D_n) = PATH(start, D_n)
Appendix B.3 explains the structure of a subtree consistency proof in
more detail.
4.4.2. Example Subtree Consistency Proofs
The subtree consistency proof for [4, 8) and a tree of size 14
contains MTH(D[0:4]) and MTH(D[8:14]), depicted in Figure 7. The
verifier is assumed to know the subtree hash, so there is no need to
include MTH(D[4:8]) itself in the consistency proof.
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+~~~~~~~~+
| [4, 8) |
+~~~~~~~~+
/ \
+-----+ +-----+
|[4,6)| |[6,8)|
+-----+ +-----+
/ \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
|4| |5| |6| |7|
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
+-----------------------------+
| [0, 14) |
+-----------------------------+
/ \
+----------------+ +================+
| [0, 8) | | [8, 14) |
+----------------+ +================+
/ \ / |
+========+ +~~~~~~~~+ +---------+ |
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | | [8, 12) | |
+========+ +~~~~~~~~+ +---------+ |
/ \ / \ / \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ +-------+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |[6,8)| |[8,10)| |[10,12)| |[12,14)|
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ +-------+
/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +--+ +--+ +--+ +--+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| |7| |8| |9| |10| |11| |12| |13|
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +--+ +--+ +--+ +--+
Figure 7: An example subtree consistency proof for a subtree that
is directly contained in the full tree
The subtree consistency proof for [8, 13) and a tree of size 14
contains MTH({d[12]}), MTH({d[13]}), MTH(D[8:12]), and MTH(D[0:8]),
depicted in Figure 8. [8, 13) is not directly contained in the tree,
so the proof must include sufficient nodes to reconstruct both
hashes.
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+----------------+
| [8, 13) |
+----------------+
/ |
+=========+ |
| [8, 12) | |
+=========+ |
/ \ |
+------+ +-------+ |
|[8,10)| |[10,12)| |
+------+ +-------+ |
/ \ / \ |
+-+ +-+ +--+ +--+ +==+
|8| |9| |10| |11| |12|
+-+ +-+ +--+ +--+ +==+
+-----------------------------+
| [0, 14) |
+-----------------------------+
/ \
+================+ +----------------+
| [0, 8) | | [8, 14) |
+================+ +----------------+
/ \ / |
+--------+ +--------+ +=========+ |
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | | [8, 12) | |
+--------+ +--------+ +=========+ |
/ \ / \ / \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ +-------+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |[6,8)| |[8,10)| |[10,12)| |[12,14)|
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ +-------+
/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +--+ +--+ +==+ +==+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| |7| |8| |9| |10| |11| |12| |13|
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +--+ +--+ +==+ +==+
Figure 8: An example subtree consistency proof for a subtree that
is not directly contained in the full tree
4.4.3. Verifying a Subtree Consistency Proof
The following procedure can be used to verify a subtree consistency
proof.
Given a Merkle Tree over n elements, a subtree defined by [start,
end), a consistency proof proof, a subtree hash node_hash, and a root
hash root_hash:
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1. Check that [start, end) is a valid subtree (Section 4.1), and
that end <= n. If either do not hold, fail proof verification.
These checks imply 0 <= start < end <= n.
2. Set fn to start, sn to end - 1, and tn to n - 1.
3. If sn is tn, then:
1. Until fn is sn, right-shift fn, sn, and tn equally.
4. Otherwise:
1. Until fn is sn or LSB(sn) is not set, right-shift fn, sn, and
tn equally.
5. If fn is sn, set fr and sr to node_hash.
6. Otherwise:
1. If proof is an empty array, stop and fail verification.
2. Remove the first value of the proof array and set fr and sr
to the removed value.
7. For each value c in the proof array:
1. If tn is 0, then stop the iteration and fail the proof
verification.
2. If LSB(sn) is set, or if sn is equal to tn, then:
1. If fn < sn, set fr to HASH(0x01 || c || fr).
2. Set sr to HASH(0x01 || c || sr).
3. Until LSB(sn) is set, right-shift fn, sn, and tn equally.
3. Otherwise:
1. Set sr to HASH(0x01 || sr || c).
4. Right-shift fn, sn, and tn once more.
8. Compare tn to 0, fr to node_hash, and sr to root_hash. If any
are not equal, fail the proof verification. If all are equal,
accept the proof.
Appendix B.4 explains this procedure in more detail.
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4.5. Arbitrary Intervals
Not all [start, end) intervals of a Merkle Tree are valid subtrees.
This section describes how, for any start < end, to determine up to
two subtrees that efficiently cover the interval. The subtrees are
determined by the following procedure:
1. If end - start is one, return a single subtree, [start, end).
2. Otherwise, run the following to return a pair of subtrees:
1. Let last be end - 1, the last index in [start, end).
2. Let split be the bit index of the most significant bit where
start and last differ. Bits are numbered from the least
significant bit, starting at zero. split is the height at
which start and last's paths in the tree diverge.
3. Let mid be last with the least significant split bits set to
zero. mid is the leftmost leaf node in the above divergence
point's right branch.
4. Within the least significant split bits of left, let b be the
bit index of the most significant bit with value zero, if
any:
1. If there is such a bit, let left_split be b + 1.
2. Otherwise, let left_split be zero.
left_split is the height of the lowest common ancestor of the
nodes in [start, mid).
5. Let left_start be start with the least significant left_split
bits set to zero. left_start is the above lowest common
ancestor's leftmost leaf node.
6. Return the subtrees [left_start, mid) and [mid, end).
When the procedure returns a single subtree, the subtree is [start,
start+1). When it returns two subtrees, left and right, the subtrees
satisfy the following properties:
* left.end = right.start. That is, the two subtrees cover adjacent
intervals.
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* left.start <= start and end = right.end. That is, the two
subtrees together cover the entire target interval, possibly with
some extra entries before start left, but not after end.
* left.end - left.start < 2 * (end - start) and right.end -
right.start <= end - start. That is, the two subtrees efficiently
cover the interval.
* left is full, while right may be partial.
The following Python code implements this procedure:
def find_subtrees(start, end):
""" Returns a list of one or two subtrees that efficiently
cover [start, end). """
assert start < end
if end - start == 1:
return [(start, end),]
last = end - 1
# Find where start and last's tree paths diverge. The two
# subtrees will be on either side of the split.
split = (start ^ last).bit_length() - 1
mask = (1 << split) - 1
mid = last & ~mask
# Maximize the left endpoint. This is just before start's
# path leaves the right edge of its new subtree.
left_split = (~start & mask).bit_length()
left_start = start & ~((1 << left_split) - 1)
return [(left_start, mid), (mid, end)]
Figure 9 shows the subtrees which cover [5, 13) in a Merkle Tree of
13 elements. The two subtrees selected are [4, 8) and [8, 13). Note
that the subtrees cover a slightly larger interval than [5, 13).
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+-----------------------------+
| [0, 13) |
+-----------------------------+
/ \
+----------------+ +================+
| [0, 8) | | [8, 13) |
+----------------+ +================+
/ \ / |
+--------+ +========+ +---------+ |
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | | [8, 12) | |
+--------+ +========+ +---------+ |
/ \ / \ / \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ |
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |[6,8)| |[8,10)| |[10,12)| |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ |
/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ |
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +==+ +==+ +==+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| |7| |8| |9| |10| |11| |12|
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +==+ +==+ +==+
Figure 9: An example selection of subtrees to cover an interval
Two subtrees are needed because a single subtree may not be able to
efficiently cover an interval. Figure 10 shows the smallest subtree
that contains [7, 9) in a 9-element tree. The smallest single
subtree that contains the interval is [0, 9) but this is the entire
tree. Using two subtrees, the interval can be described by [7, 8)
and [8, 9).
+===================+
| [0, 9) |
+===================+
/ |
+----------------+ |
| [0, 8) | |
+----------------+ |
/ \ |
+--------+ +--------+ |
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | |
+--------+ +--------+ |
/ \ / \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ |
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |[6,8)| |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ |
/ \ / \ / \ / \ |
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +=+ +=+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| |7| |8|
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +=+ +=+
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Figure 10: An example showing an inefficient choice of a single
subtree
5. Certification Authorities
A CA consists of the following components:
* A CA ID (Section 5.1), which uniquely identifies the CA.
* A collision-resistant cryptographic hash function, used by the
CA's issuance logs. SHA-256 [SHS] is RECOMMENDED. Throughout
this document, this hash function is referred to as HASH, and the
size of its output in bytes is referred to as HASH_SIZE.
* A series of issuance logs (Section 5.2), which contain all
statements the CA has certified.
* A CA cosigner (Section 5.4), which signs subtrees of issuance logs
to certify their contents.
* Optionally, a landmark sequence per log (Section 6.3.1), to
support optimized landmark-relative certificates.
Section 5.5 defines an X.509 certificate representation of a CA.
5.1. Certification Authority Identifiers
Each Merkle Tree Certificate CA has a _CA ID_ to identify it. This
CA ID is a trust anchor ID [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids].
Once allocated, the ID's entire object identifier (OID) arc is
reserved by this protocol. Given a CA ID whose OID representation is
caID, this document allocates the following OIDs:
* For each positive integer N, the OID {caID logs(0) N} represents
the issuance log N (Section 5.2).
* For each positive integer N and L, the OID {caID landmarks(1) N L}
represents landmark L (Section 6.3.1) of issuance log N. These
OIDs may be used as trust anchor IDs, as described in Section 8.2.
These OIDs are used when it is necessary to identify an individual
landmark, e.g. as in the retry mechanism described Section 4.3 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids].
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* For each positive integer N and L, the OID {caID landmarkGroups(2)
N L} represents a trust anchor group (Section 5 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]) containing landmark L of log N
and earlier landmarks of that log, as defined in Section 8.2.1.
These OIDs may be used to advertise a series of landmarks at once.
Future extensions to this protocol MAY define further allocations.
A CA ID determines a PKIX distinguished name (Section 4.1.2.4 of
[RFC5280]) that can be used in the issuer or subject field of an
X.509 TBSCertificate. This distinguished name has a single relative
distinguished name, which has a single attribute. The attribute has
type id-rdna-trustAnchorID, defined below:
id-rdna-trustAnchorID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) rdna(25) TBD }
The attribute's value is a RELATIVE-OID containing the trust anchor
ID's ASN.1 representation. For example, the distinguished name for a
CA with ID 32473.1 would be represented in syntax of [RFC4514] as:
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.25.TBD=#0d0481fd5901
For initial experimentation, early implementations of this design
will:
1. Use UTF8String to represent the attribute's value rather than
RELATIVE-OID. The UTF8String contains trust anchor ID's ASCII
representation, e.g. 32473.1.
2. Use the OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.44363.47.1 instead of id-rdna-
trustAnchorID.
For example, the distinguished name for a CA with ID 32473.1 would be
represented in syntax of [RFC4514] as:
1.3.6.1.4.1.44363.47.1=#0c0733323437332e31
5.2. Issuance Logs
A CA operates a series of issuance logs, each identified by a
positive integer _log number_. Log numbers are numbered consecutively
starting from 1. Each log number MUST be at most 65535 (2^16-1).
Each issuance log has a _log ID_, which is a trust anchor ID
constructed by concatenating the following OID components:
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* The CA ID (Section 5.1)
* The constant 0
* The log number of the log
A log ID specifies both the CA and the log number in a single ID.
Each issuance log describes an append-only sequence of _entries_
(Section 5.2.1), identified consecutively by an index value, starting
from zero. Each entry is an assertion that the CA has certified.
The entries in the issuance log are represented as a Merkle Tree,
described in Section 2.1 of [RFC9162].
Each log additionally maintains a _minimum index_ value, which is the
index of the first log entry which is available. See Section 5.2.3.
This value changes over the lifetime of the log.
Unlike [RFC6962] and [RFC9162], an issuance log does not have a
public submission interface. The log only contains entries which the
log operator, i.e. the CA, chose to add. As entries are added, the
Merkle Tree is updated to be computed over the new sequence.
A snapshot of the log is known as a _checkpoint_. A checkpoint is
identified by its _tree size_, that is the number of elements
committed to the log at the time. Its contents can be described by
the Merkle Tree Hash (Section 2.1.1 of [RFC9162]) of entries zero
through tree_size - 1.
5.2.1. Log Entries
Each entry in the log is a MerkleTreeCertEntry, defined with the TLS
presentation syntax below. A MerkleTreeCertEntry describes
certificate information that the CA has validated and certified.
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struct {} Empty;
enum { (2^16-1) } MerkleTreeCertEntryExtensionType;
struct {
ExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
} MerkleTreeCertEntryExtension;
enum {
null_entry(0), tbs_cert_entry(1), (2^16-1)
} MerkleTreeCertEntryType;
struct {
MerkleTreeCertEntryExtension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
MerkleTreeCertEntryType type;
select (type) {
case null_entry: Empty;
case tbs_cert_entry: opaque tbs_cert_entry_data[N];
/* May be extended with future types. */
}
} MerkleTreeCertEntry;
Field extensions is the list of tag-length-value extensions
associated with the log entry. The extensions list MUST be appear in
ascending order by extension_type and MUST NOT contain two extensions
with the same extension_type.
When type is null_entry, the entry does not represent any
information. Entries at any index in the log MAY have type
null_entry.
When type is tbs_cert_entry, N is the number of bytes needed to
consume the rest of the input. A MerkleTreeCertEntry is expected to
be decoded in contexts where the total length of the entry is known.
tbs_cert_entry_data contains the contents octets (i.e. excluding the
initial identifier and length octets) of the DER [X.690] encoding of
a TBSCertificateLogEntry, defined below. Equivalently,
tbs_cert_entry_data contains the DER encodings of each field of the
TBSCertificateLogEntry, concatenated. This construction allows a
single-pass implementation in Section 7.2.
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TBSCertificateLogEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
issuer Name,
validity Validity,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY,
{PublicKeyAlgorithms}},
subjectPublicKeyInfoHash OCTET STRING,
issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions{{CertExtensions}}
OPTIONAL
}
The fields of a TBSCertificateLogEntry are defined as follows:
* version, validity, subject, issuerUniqueID, subjectUniqueID, and
extensions have the same semantics as the corresponding
TBSCertificate fields, defined in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC5280].
* issuer is the CA ID as a PKIX distinguished name, as described in
Section 5.1.
* subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm describes the algorithm of the subject's
public key. It is constructed identically to the algorithm field
of a SubjectPublicKeyInfo (Section 4.1.2.7 of [RFC5280]).
* subjectPublicKeyInfoHash contains the hash of subject's public
key, encoded as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The hash uses the CA's
hash function (Section 5) and is computed over the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo's DER [X.690] encoding.
Note the subject's public key algorithm is incorporated into both
subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm and subjectPublicKeyInfoHash.
MerkleTreeCertEntry is an extensible structure. Future documents may
define new values for MerkleTreeCertEntryType or
MerkleTreeCertEntryExtensionType, with corresponding semantics. See
Section 5.4 and Section 12.5 for additional discussion.
A MerkleTreeCertEntry's size SHOULD NOT exceed 65535 (2^16-1) bytes.
Doing so may exceed size limits in common log-serving protocols, such
as [TLOG-TILES]. TBSCertificateLogEntry does not include signatures
and hashes public keys, so post-quantum algorithms do not contribute
to this size.
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5.2.2. Publishing Logs
This protocol aims to enable monitors to detect misissued
certificates by observing the issuance log. See Section 12.2.
This document does not prescribe a particular method of observing the
issuance log. The access protocols do not affect certificate
interoperability, and different applications may have different
needs. For example, a PKI that authenticates public services might
publicly serve issuance logs, while a PKI that authenticates a single
organization's intranet services might keep the log private to the
organization. Relying parties SHOULD define log serving
requirements, including the allowed protocols and expected
availability, as part of their policies on which CAs to support. See
also Section 10.3.
For example, a log ecosystem could use [TLOG-TILES] to serve logs.
[TLOG-TILES] improves on [RFC6962] and [RFC9162] by exposing the log
as a collection of cacheable, immutable "tiles". This works well
with a variety of common HTTP [RFC9110] serving architectures. It
also allows log clients to request arbitrary tree nodes, so log
clients can fetch the structures described in Section 4.
5.2.3. Log Pruning
Over time, an issuance log's entries will expire and likely be
replaced as certificates are renewed. As this happens, the total
size of the log grows, even if the unexpired subset remains fixed.
To mitigate this, issuance logs MAY be _pruned_, as described in this
section.
Pruning makes some prefix of the log unavailable, without changing
the tree structure. It may be used to reduce the serving cost of
long-lived logs, where any entries have long expired. Section 10.3
discusses policies on when pruning may be permitted. This section
discusses how it is done and the impact on log structure.
An issuance log is pruned by updating its _minimum index_ parameter
(Section 5.2). The minimum index is the index of the first log entry
that the log publishes. (See Section 5.2.2.) It MUST be less than
or equal to the tree size of the log's current checkpoint, and also
satisfy any availability policies set by relying parties who trust
the CA.
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An entry is said to be _available_ if its index is greater than or
equal to the minimum index. A checkpoint is said to be available if
its tree size is greater than the minimum index. A subtree [start,
end) is said to be available if end is greater than the minimum
index.
Log protocols MUST serve enough information to allow a log client to
efficiently obtain the following:
* Signatures over the latest checkpoint by the CA's cosigners
(Section 5.4)
* Any individual available log entry (Section 5.2.1)
* The hash value of any available checkpoint
* An inclusion proof (Section 2.1.3 of [RFC9162]) for any available
entry to any containing checkpoint
* A consistency proof (Section 2.1.4 of [RFC9162]) between any two
available checkpoints
* The hash value of any available subtree (Section 4)
* A subtree inclusion proof (Section 4.3) for any available entry in
any containing subtree
* A subtree consistency proof (Section 4.4) between any available
subtree to any containing checkpoint
Meeting these requirements requires a log to retain some information
about pruned entries. Given a node [start, end) in the Merkle Tree,
if end is less than or equal to the minimum index, the node's
children MAY be discarded in favor of the node's hash.
Figure 11 shows an example pruned tree with 13 elements, where the
minimum index is 7. It shows the original tree, followed by the
pruned tree. The pruned tree depicts the nodes that MUST be
available or computable. Note that entry 6 MAY be discarded, only
the hash of entry 6 must be available.
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+-----------------------------+
| [0, 13) |
+-----------------------------+
/ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
| [0, 8) | | [8, 13) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
/ \ / |
+--------+ +--------+ +---------+ |
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | | [8, 12) | |
+--------+ +--------+ +---------+ |
/ \ / \ / \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ |
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |[6,8)| |[8,10)| |[10,12)| |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ |
/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ |
+=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +==+ +==+ +==+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| |7| |8| |9| |10| |11| |12|
+=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +==+ +==+ +==+
+-----------------------------+
| [0, 13) |
+-----------------------------+
/ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
| [0, 8) | | [8, 13) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
/ \ / |
+--------+ +--------+ +---------+ |
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | | [8, 12) | |
+--------+ +--------+ +---------+ |
/ \ / \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ |
|[4,6)| |[6,8)| |[8,10)| |[10,12)| |
+-----+ +-----+ +------+ +-------+ |
/ \ / \ / \ |
+-+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +==+ +==+ +==+
|6| |7| |8| |9| |10| |11| |12|
+-+ +=+ +=+ +=+ +==+ +==+ +==+
Figure 11: An example showing the minimum nodes that must be
available after pruning
Logs MAY retain additional nodes, or expect log clients to compute
required nodes from other nodes. For example, in Figure 11, the
log's serving protocol MAY instead serve [0, 2) and [2, 4), with the
log client computing [0, 4) from those values.
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5.3. Cosigners
This section defines a log _cosigner_. A cosigner follows some
append-only view of the log and signs subtrees (Section 4) consistent
with that view. The signatures generated by a cosigner are known as
_cosignatures_. All subtrees signed by a cosigner MUST be consistent
with each other. The cosigner may be external to the log, in which
case it might ensure consistency by checking consistency proofs. The
cosigner may be operated together with the log, in which case it can
trust its log state.
A cosignature MAY implicitly make additional statements about a
subtree, determined by the cosigner's role. This document defines
one concrete cosigner role, a CA cosigner (Section 5.4), to
authenticate the log and certify entries. Other documents and
specific deployments may define other cosigner roles, to perform
different functions in a PKI. For example, [TLOG-WITNESS] defines a
cosigner that only checks the log is append-only, and [TLOG-MIRROR]
defines a cosigner that mirrors a log.
Each cosigner has a public key and a _cosigner ID_, which uniquely
identifies the cosigner. The cosigner ID is a trust anchor ID
[I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]. By identifying the cosigner, the
cosigner ID specifies the public key, signature algorithm, and any
additional statements made by the cosigner's signatures. If a single
operator performs multiple cosigner roles in an ecosystem, each role
MUST use a distinct cosigner ID and SHOULD use a distinct key.
Following the principle of key separation [KeyReuse], cosigner keys
SHOULD NOT be used for purposes outside this document. Additional
uses MAY be defined but MUST NOT overlap with the signature format
defined in Section 5.3.1. See Section 12.8 for additional
discussion.
A single cosigner, with a single cosigner ID and public key, MAY
generate cosignatures for multiple logs. In this case, signed
subtrees only need to be consistent with others for the same log.
5.3.1. Signature Format
A cosigner computes a _subtree signature_ for a subtree in a log by
signing a CosignedMessage, defined below using the TLS presentation
language (Section 3 of [RFC8446]):
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opaque HashValue[HASH_SIZE];
struct {
uint8 label[12] = "subtree/v1\n\0";
opaque cosigner_name<1..2^8-1>;
uint64 timestamp;
opaque log_origin<1..2^8-1>;
uint64 start;
uint64 end;
HashValue subtree_hash;
} CosignedMessage;
This signature format is designed to be compatible with the ML-DSA-44
signature construction in [TLOG-COSIGNATURE], but it supports
signature algorithms other than ML-DSA-44 and tree hashes other than
SHA-256.
label is a fixed prefix for domain separation. Its value MUST be the
string subtree/v1, followed by a newline (U+000A), followed by a zero
byte (U+0000).
cosigner_name and log_origin are computed from the cosigner ID and
the issuance log's ID (Section 5.1), respectively. They contain the
concatenation of:
* The 16-byte ASCII string oid/1.3.6.1.4.1.
* The trust anchor ID's ASCII representation (Section 3 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids])
This is equivalent to the concatenation of:
* The four-byte ASCII string oid/
* The trust anchor ID as a full OID, in dotted decimal notation
For example, the trust anchor ID 32473.1 would be encoded as the
ASCII string oid/1.3.6.1.4.1.32473.1.
start and end MUST define a valid subtree of the log, and
subtree_hash MUST be the subtree's hash value in the cosigner's view
of the log.
If timestamp is non-zero, it MUST be the time that the signature was
produced. This time is represented as seconds since the Epoch, as
defined in Section 4.19 of Volume 1 of [POSIX]. Additionally, if
timestamp is non-zero, the following MUST be true:
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* start MUST be zero.
* end MUST be the size of the largest consistent tree that the
cosigner has observed for the log.
timestamp MAY be zero, in which case no additional constraints are
placed on start or end, and no statement is made about the signing
time or largest observed tree.
5.3.2. Signature Semantics
Before signing a subtree of some log, the cosigner MUST ensure that
subtree_hash is consistent with its view of the log. Different
cosigner roles may obtain this assurance differently. For example:
* A cosigner may maintain a full copy of the log, e.g. if it's the
log operator. The cosigner can then compute subtree_hash from
this copy.
* A cosigner may maintain the hash of the largest consistent tree
observed by the log. The cosigner can then check subtree_hash
with a subtree consistency proof (Section 4.4).
In both cases, the cosigner MUST ensure that, as it updates its view
of the log, the old and new views are consistent. For example,
[TLOG-WITNESS] defines a cosigner that checks consistency proofs
(Section 2.1.4 of [RFC9162]) between the two views.
When a cosigner signs a subtree, it is held separately responsible
_both_ for the subtree being consistent with its other signatures,
_and_ for the cosigner-specific additional statements. That is, if a
cosigner signs an inconsistent subtree, it is held responsible for
its additional statements on all entries in the inconsistent subtree,
even if some other signed subtree exists that asserts different
entries.
Subtree signatures can be used to sign timestamped log checkpoints
with a non-zero timestamp. A signature with a non-zero timestamp
asserts the complete state of the cosigner's view of the log at a
given time. These signatures are not directly used in Merkle Tree
Certificates (Section 6.1), but cosigners MAY generate them, subject
to the rules above, as part of other functions in a PKI. This may
include log serving or integrating an issuance log into a
transparency ecosystem. For example, [TLOG-TILES] and [TLOG-WITNESS]
use such signatures.
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5.3.3. Signature Algorithms
The cosigner's public key specifies both the key material and the
signature algorithm to use with the key material. In order to change
key or signature parameters, a cosigner operator MUST deploy a new
cosigner, with a new cosigner ID. Signature algorithms MUST fully
specify the algorithm parameters, such as hash functions used.
In this document, any PKIX signature algorithm MAY be used, such as
the ML-DSA algorithms defined in [RFC9881]. The signature is
generated as in PKIX, except that the input is the structure defined
in Section 5.3.1. In particular, in ML-DSA algorithms, the context
string MUST be an empty string, as in Section 3 of [RFC9881].
Other documents or deployments MAY define other signature schemes and
formats. Log clients that accept cosignatures from some cosigner are
assumed to be configured with all parameters necessary to verify that
cosigner's signatures, including the signature algorithm and version
of the signature format.
5.4. Certification Authority Cosigners
A _CA cosigner_ is a cosigner (Section 5.3) that certifies the
contents of a log. Each CA MUST operate a CA cosigner whose cosigner
ID is the same as its CA ID (Section 5.1). A CA cosigner MUST NOT
sign checkpoints or subtrees for logs not part of this CA instance.
When a CA cosigner signs a subtree, it makes the additional statement
that it has certified each entry in the subtree. For example, a
domain-validating CA states that it has performed domain validation
for each entry, at some time consistent with the entry's validity
dates. CAs are held responsible for every entry in every subtree
they sign. Proving an entry is included (Section 4.3) in a CA-signed
subtree is sufficient to prove the CA certified it.
What it means to certify an entry depends on the entry type:
* To certify an entry of type null_entry is a no-op. A CA MAY
freely certify null_entry without being held responsible for any
validation.
* To certify an entry of type tbs_cert_entry is to certify the
TBSCertificateLogEntry, as defined in Section 5.2.1.
Entries are extensible. Future documents MAY define type and
extension_type values and what it means to certify them. A CA MUST
NOT sign a subtree if it contains an entry with type or
extension_type that it does not recognize. Doing so would certify
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that the CA has validated the information in some not-yet-defined
format. Section 12.5 further discusses security implications of such
extensions.
If the CA issues certificate revocation lists (CRLs) [RFC5280] or
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses [RFC6960], the
CA's cosigner key MAY be used to directly sign TBSCertList or OCSP
ResponseData structures, respectively, but only for this CA instance.
Such uses remain subject to other X.509 constraints, such as the key
usage extension, which are out of scope for this document. See
Section 12.8 for a discussion of domain separation.
If the CA operator additionally operates a directly-signing X.509 CA,
that CA key MUST be distinct from any Merkle Tree CA cosigner keys.
In particular, a CA cosigner key MUST NOT be used to directly sign
TBSCertificate structures. A CA cosigner key issues certificates by
signing subtrees.
5.5. Representing Certification Authorities
This section defines the X.509 Certificate [RFC5280] representation
of a Merkle Tree Certificate CA. It identifies the CA cosigner
(Section 5.4) and associated issuance logs. This information is
encoded as follows:
* The subject field MUST be the CA ID as a PKIX distinguished name,
as described in Section 5.1.
* The subjectPublicKeyInfo field MUST be the public key of the CA
cosigner Section 5.4.
* The extensions field MUST contain a critical extension of type id-
pe-mtcCertificationAuthority, defined below.
* The subject key identifier extension (Section 4.2.1.2 of
[RFC5280]), if present, SHOULD be set to the CA ID Section 5.1.
The CA ID is encoded in its binary representation, as defined in
Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids].
Other fields and extensions in [RFC5280] apply unmodified. In
particular:
* The key usage extension (Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280]) MUST be
present and assert at least the keyCertSign bit.
* The basic constraints extension (Section 4.2.1.9 of [RFC5280])
MUST be present and set the cA field to TRUE.
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The id-pe-mtcCertificationAuthority extension is defined below. This
extension indicates that the subject of the certificate is a CA that
issues Merkle Tree Certificates. If present, it MUST be marked as
critical.
id-pe-mtcCertificationAuthority OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pe(1) TBD }
ext-mtcCertificationAuthority EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX MTCCertificationAuthority
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mtcCertificationAuthority
CRITICALITY TRUE
}
-- From draft-ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids
TrustAnchorID ::= RELATIVE-OID
MTCCertificationAuthority ::= SEQUENCE {
logHash AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
sigAlg AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
minSerial INTEGER
}
For initial experimentation, early implementations of this design
will use the OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.44363.47.2 instead of id-pe-
mtcCertificationAuthority.
The fields of a MTCCertificationAuthority structure are defined as
follows:
* logHash describes the hash algorithm used by all logs operated by
this CA. For example, if the hash is SHA-256, it would be mda-
sha256 as defined in Section 8 of [RFC5912].
* sigAlg is the CA cosigner's signature algorithm (Section 5.3.3).
* minSerial is an integer describing the minimum allowed serial
number from this CA. Since the serial number encodes both the log
number (Section 5.2) and the entry index into a specific log, it
can be used to set a minimum allowed log number or a minimum
allowed index in a particular log (Section 5.2.3).
If this extension is present, the key described in
subjectPublicKeyInfo is a CA cosigner key and subject to the usage
restrictions described in Section 5.4. In particular, it MUST NOT be
used to directly sign TBSCertificate structures.
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This extension indicates the subtree signature format defined in
Section 5.3.1. If a later version of the protocol defines a new
format, this SHOULD be represented in CA certificates with a new
extension type.
A CA certificate using this format SHOULD NOT be self-signed by the
Merkle Tree Certificate CA. Doing so would require writing the
information in the issuance log. Instead, if used to represent a
trust anchor, the certificate should be an unsigned certificate
[RFC9925].
6. Certificates
This section defines how to construct Merkle Tree Certificates, which
are X.509 Certificates [RFC5280] that assert the information in an
issuance log entry. A Merkle Tree Certificate is constructed from
the following:
* A TBSCertificateLogEntry (Section 5.2.1) contained in the issuance
log (Section 5.2)
* A subject public key whose hash matches the TBSCertificateLogEntry
* A subtree (Section 4) that contains the log entry
* Zero or more signatures (Section 5.3) over the subtree, which
together satisfy relying party requirements (Section 7.3)
For any given TBSCertificateLogEntry, there are multiple possible
certificates that may prove the entry is certified by the CA and
publicly logged, varying by choice of subtree and signatures.
Section 6.1 defines how the certificate is constructed based on those
choices. Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 define two profiles of Merkle
Tree Certificates, standalone certificates and landmark-relative
certificates, and how to select the subtree and signatures for them.
6.1. Certificate Format
The information is encoded in an X.509 Certificate [RFC5280] as
follows:
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The TBSCertificate's version, issuer, validity, subject,
issuerUniqueID, subjectUniqueID, and extensions MUST be equal to the
corresponding fields of the TBSCertificateLogEntry. If any of
issuerUniqueID, subjectUniqueID, or extensions is absent in the
TBSCertificateLogEntry, the corresponding field MUST be absent in the
TBSCertificate. Per Section 5.2.1, this means issuer MUST be the
issuance log's CA ID as a PKIX distinguished name, as described in
Section 5.1.
The TBSCertificate's serialNumber is constructed from the zero-based
index of the TBSCertificateLogEntry in the log and the log's number
(Section 5.2). The serialNumber MUST be equal to (log_number <<
48) | index. All serial numbers constructed in this way will be
positive and at most 2^64-1.
The TBSCertificate's subjectPublicKeyInfo contains the specified
public key. Its algorithm field MUST match the
TBSCertificateLogEntry's subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm. Its hash MUST
match the TBSCertificateLogEntry's subjectPublicKeyInfoHash.
The TBSCertificate's signature and the Certificate's
signatureAlgorithm MUST contain an AlgorithmIdentifier whose
algorithm is id-alg-mtcProof, defined below, and whose parameters is
omitted.
id-alg-mtcProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD }
For initial experimentation, early implementations of this design
will use the OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.44363.47.0 instead of id-alg-mtcProof.
The signatureValue contains an MTCProof structure, defined below
using the TLS presentation language (Section 3 of [RFC8446]):
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/* From Section 4.1 of draft-ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids */
opaque TrustAnchorID<1..2^8-1>;
opaque HashValue[HASH_SIZE];
struct {
TrustAnchorID cosigner_id;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} MTCSignature;
struct {
MerkleTreeCertEntryExtension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
uint48 start;
uint48 end;
HashValue inclusion_proof<0..2^16-1>;
MTCSignature signatures<0..2^16-1>;
} MTCProof;
extensions MUST contain the log entry's extensions value
(Section 5.2.1).
start and end MUST contain the corresponding parameters of the chosen
subtree. inclusion_proof MUST contain a subtree inclusion proof
(Section 4.3) for the log entry and the subtree. signatures contains
the chosen subtree signatures. In each signature, cosigner_id
contains the cosigner ID (Section 5.3) in its binary representation
(Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]), and signature
contains the signature value as described in Section 5.3.1. The
timestamp field used when computing the signature MUST be zero.
Each element of the signatures field MUST have a unique cosigner_id.
Elements MUST be ordered by cosigner_id as follows:
* Shorter byte strings are ordered before longer byte strings
* Byte strings of the same length are ordered lexicographically
An MTCProof parser MUST reject the input if there are duplicate
cosigner_id values, or if they are not ordered correctly. This can
be done by checking each cosigner_id value comes strictly after the
previous one in the above order.
The MTCProof is encoded into the signatureValue with no additional
ASN.1 wrapping. The most significant bit of the first octet of the
signature value SHALL become the first bit of the bit string, and so
on through the least significant bit of the last octet of the
signature value, which SHALL become the last bit of the bit string.
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6.2. Standalone Certificates
A _standalone certificate_ is a Merkle Tree certificate which
contains sufficient signatures to allow a relying party to trust the
choice of subtree, without any predistributed information beyond the
cosigner(s) parameters. Standalone certificates can be issued
without significant processing delay.
When issuing a certificate, the CA first adds the
TBSCertificateLogEntry to its issuance log. It then schedules a job
to construct a checkpoint and collect cosignatures. The job proceeds
as follows:
1. The CA signs the checkpoint with its key(s) (Section 5.4).
2. Using the procedure in Section 4.5, the CA determines the two
subtrees that cover the entries added between this checkpoint and
the most recent checkpoint.
3. The CA signs each subtree with its key(s) (Section 5.3).
4. The CA requests sufficient checkpoint cosignatures (Section 5.3)
from external cosigners to meet relying party requirements
(Section 7.3).
5. The CA requests subtree cosignatures from the cosigners above.
6. For each certificate in the interval, the CA constructs
certificates (Section 6.1) using the covering subtree.
Steps 4 and 5 are analogous to requesting SCTs from CT logs in
Certificate Transparency, except that a single run of this job
collects signatures for many certificates at once. The CA MAY
request signatures from a redundant set of cosigners and select the
ones that complete first.
This document does not place any requirements on how frequently this
job runs. More frequent runs results in lower issuance delay, but
higher signing overhead. It is RECOMMENDED that CAs run at most one
instance of this job at a time, starting the next instance after the
previous one completes. A single run collects signatures for all
entries since the most recent checkpoint, so there is little benefit
to overlapping them. Less frequent runs may also aid relying parties
that wish to directly audit signatures, as described in Section 5.2
of [AuditingRevisited], though this document does not define such a
system.
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This document does not prescribe the specific cosigner roles, or a
particular protocol for requesting cosignatures. Protocols for
cosigners can vary depending on the needs of that cosigner. Some
example protocols are described in [TLOG-WITNESS] and [TLOG-MIRROR].
It is RECOMMENDED that the CA collect cosignatures for the
authenticating party, but the authenticating party MAY collect
additional cosignatures and add them to the certificate.
6.3. Landmark-Relative Certificates
A _landmark-relative certificate_ is a Merkle Tree certificate which
contains no signatures and instead assumes the relying party had
predistributed information about which subtrees were trusted.
Landmark-relative certificates are an optional size optimization.
They require a processing delay to construct, and only work in a
sufficiently up-to-date relying party. Authenticating parties thus
SHOULD deploy a corresponding standalone certificate alongside any
landmark-relative certificate, and use some application-protocol-
specific mechanism to select between the two. Section 8 discusses
such a mechanism for TLS [RFC8446].
6.3.1. Landmark Tree Sizes
To issue landmark-relative certificates, a CA must additionally
maintain a _landmark sequence_, which is a sequence of _landmarks_.
Each landmark specifies an agreed tree size, as a common point of
reference across the ecosystem for optimizing certificates.
Landmarks are numbered consecutively from zero. The first landmark,
numbered zero, MUST have a tree size of zero. The sequence of tree
sizes MUST be append-only and strictly monotonically increasing.
Landmarks determine _landmark subtrees_: for each landmark, other
than number zero, let tree_size be the landmark's tree size and
prev_tree_size be that of the previous landmark. As described in
Section 4.5, select the one or two subtrees that cover
[prev_tree_size, tree_size). Each of those subtrees is a landmark
subtree. Landmark zero has no landmark subtrees.
As the issuance log grows, CAs continuously allocate new landmarks.
This allocation balances minimizing landmark-relative certificate
delay with minimizing the size of the relying party's predistributed
state. To bound the latter, each CA sets a positive integer
max_active_landmarks parameter, which is the maximum number of
landmarks that may contain unexpired certificates at any time.
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The most recent max_active_landmarks landmarks are said to be
_active_. Landmarks MUST be allocated such that, at any given time,
only active landmarks contain unexpired certificates. The active
landmark subtrees are those determined by the active landmarks.
There are at most 2 * max_active_landmarks active landmark subtrees
at any time. Every unexpired entry will be contained in one or more
landmark subtree, or between the last landmark subtree and the latest
checkpoint. Active landmark subtrees are predistributed to the
relying party as trusted subtrees, as described in Section 7.4.
It is RECOMMENDED that landmarks be allocated following the procedure
described in Section 6.3.2. If landmarks are allocated incorrectly
(e.g. past landmarks change, or max_active_landmarks is inaccurate),
there are no security consequences, but some older certificates may
fail to validate.
Relying parties will locally retain up to 2 * max_active_landmarks
hashes (Section 7.4) per CA, so max_active_landmarks should be set to
balance the delay between landmarks and the amount of state the
relying party must maintain. Using the recommended procedure below,
a CA with a maximum certificate lifetime of 7 days, allocating a
landmark every hour, will have a max_active_landmarks of 169. The
client state is then 338 hashes, or 10,816 bytes with SHA-256.
6.3.2. Allocating Landmarks
It is RECOMMENDED that landmarks be allocated using the following
procedure:
1. Select some time_between_landmarks duration. Define a series of
consecutive, non-overlapping time intervals, each of duration
time_between_landmarks.
2. At most once per time interval, append the latest checkpoint tree
size to the landmark sequence if it is greater than the last
landmark's tree size.
To ensure that only active landmarks contain unexpired certificates,
set max_active_landmarks to ceil(max_cert_lifetime /
time_between_landmarks) + 1, where max_cert_lifetime is the CA's
maximum certificate lifetime. The + 1 accounts for landmarks not
allocated at the exact start of their time interval, which can push
certificate expiry one interval further than ceil(max_cert_lifetime /
time_between_landmarks) alone would bound.
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6.3.3. Publishing Landmarks
CAs SHOULD publish their active landmarks, so that relying parties
can configure trusted subtrees (Section 7.4). The following format
can be used to describe this information. The format is the
following sequence of lines. Each line MUST be terminated by a
newline character (U+000A):
* Two space-separated non-negative decimal integers: <last_landmark>
<num_active_landmarks>. This line MUST satisfy the following,
otherwise it is invalid:
- num_active_landmarks <= max_active_landmarks
- num_active_landmarks <= last_landmark
* num_active_landmarks + 1 lines each containing a single non-
negative decimal integer, containing a tree size. Numbered from
zero to num_active_landmarks, line i contains the tree size for
landmark last_landmark - i. The integers MUST be strictly
monotonically decreasing and lower or equal to the log's latest
tree size.
It is RECOMMENDED that this format be published as an HTTP resource
[RFC9110] with content type text/plain; charset=utf-8.
6.3.4. Constructing Landmark-Relative Certificates
Given a TBSCertificateLogEntry in the issuance log and a landmark
sequence, a landmark-relative certificate is constructed as follows:
1. Wait for the first landmark to be allocated that contains the
entry.
2. Determine the landmark's subtrees and select the one that
contains the entry.
3. Construct a certificate (Section 6.1) using the selected subtree
and no signatures.
Before sending this certificate, the authenticating party SHOULD
obtain an application-protocol-specific signal that implies the
relying party has been configured with the corresponding landmark.
(Section 7.4 defines how relying parties are configured.) The trust
anchor ID of the landmark may be used as an efficient identifier in
the application protocol. Section 8 discusses how to do this in TLS
[RFC8446].
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6.4. Size Estimates
The inclusion proofs in standalone and landmark-relative certificates
scale logarithmically with the size of the subtree. These sizes can
be estimated with the CA's issuance rate. The byte counts below
assume the issuance log's hash function is SHA-256.
Some organizations have published statistics which can be used to
estimate this rate for the Web PKI. As of June 9th, 2025:
* [LetsEncrypt] reported around 558,000,000 active certificates for
a single CA
* [MerkleTown] reported around 2,100,000,000 unexpired certificates
in CT logs, across all CAs
* [MerkleTown] reported an issuance rate of around 444,000
certificates per hour, across all CAs
The current issuance rate across the Web PKI may not necessarily be
representative of the Web PKI after a transition to short-lived
certificates. Assuming a certificate lifetime of 7 days, and that
subscribers will update their certificates 75% of the way through
their lifetime (see Section 10.4), every certificate will be reissued
every 126 hours. This gives issuance rate estimates of around
4,400,000 certificates per hour and 17,000,000 certificates per hour,
for the first two values above. Note the larger estimate is across
all CAs, while subtrees would only span one CA.
Using the per-CA short lifetime estimate, if the CA mints a
checkpoint every 2 seconds, standalone certificate subtrees will span
around 2,500 certificates, leading to 12 hashes in the inclusion
proof, or 384 bytes. Standalone certificates additionally must carry
a sufficient set of signatures to meet relying party requirements.
If a new landmark is allocated every hour, landmark-relative
certificate subtrees will span around 4,400,000 certificates, leading
to 23 hashes in the inclusion proof, giving an inclusion proof size
of 736 bytes, with no signatures. This is significantly smaller than
a single ML-DSA-44 signature, 2,420 bytes, and almost ten times
smaller than the three ML-DSA-44 signatures necessary to include
post-quantum SCTs.
Proof sizes grow logarithmically, so 32 hashes, or 1024 bytes, is
sufficient for subtrees of up to 2^32 (4,294,967,296) certificates.
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7. Relying Parties
This section discusses how relying parties verify Merkle Tree
Certificates.
7.1. Relying Party Configuration
In order to accept certificates from a Merkle Tree CA, a relying
party MUST be configured with:
* The CA's ID (Section 5.1)
* The CA's log hash algorithm, e.g. SHA-256
* The CA cosigner, and any other supported cosigners, as pairs of
cosigner ID and public key
* A policy on which combinations of cosigners to accept in a
certificate (Section 7.3)
* An optional list of trusted subtrees that are known to be
consistent with the relying party's cosigner requirements
(Section 7.4)
* A list of revoked ranges of serial numbers (Section 7.5)
This information may be obtained from a CA certificate structure,
defined in Section 5.5:
* The CA ID is determined from the certificate's subject.
* The log hash algorithm is determined from the id-pe-
mtcCertificationAuthority extension.
* The CA cosigner is determined from the certificate's subject
public key and id-pe-mtcCertificationAuthority extension. The
CA's cosigner ID is the same as its CA ID. The relying party
incorporates this cosigner into its cosigner policy based on the
guidance in Section 7.3.
* No trusted subtrees are directly represented by the CA certificate
structure, but the relying party MAY incorporate trusted subtrees
from out-of-band information.
* The revoked serial number ranges include the half-open range [0,
minSerial), but the relying party MAY incorporate additional
ranges from out-of-band information.
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7.2. Verifying Certificate Signatures
When verifying the signature of an X.509 certificate (Step (a)(1) of
Section 6.1.3 of [RFC5280]) whose issuer is a Merkle Tree CA, the
relying party performs the following procedure:
1. Check that the TBSCertificate's signature field is id-alg-
mtcProof with omitted parameters. If this check fails, abort
this process and fail verification.
2. Decode the signatureValue as an MTCProof, as described in
Section 6.1.
3. Let serial be the certificate's serial number. If serial is
negative or greater than 2^64-1, abort this process and fail
verification.
4. If serial is contained in one of the relying party's revoked
ranges (Section 7.5), abort this process and fail verification.
5. Let index be the least significant 48 bits of serial and let
log_number be serial >> 48. If log_number is zero, abort this
process and fail verification.
6. Let log_id be the log ID constructed from the CA ID in issuer
and the log_number (Section 5.2).
7. Construct a TBSCertificateLogEntry as follows:
1. Copy the version, issuer, validity, subject, issuerUniqueID,
subjectUniqueID, and extensions fields from the
TBSCertificate.
2. Set subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm to the algorithm field of the
subjectPublicKeyInfo.
3. Set subjectPublicKeyInfoHash to the hash of the DER encoding
of subjectPublicKeyInfo.
8. Construct a MerkleTreeCertEntry as follows:
1. Set type to tbs_cert_entry.
2. Set extensions to the MTCProof's extensions value.
3. Set tbs_cert_entry_data to the TBSCertificateLogEntry,
encoded as described in Section 5.2.1.
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9. Let entry_hash be the hash of the entry, MTH({entry}) =
HASH(0x00 || entry), as defined in Section 2.1.1 of [RFC9162].
10. Let expected_subtree_hash be the result of evaluating the
MTCProof's inclusion_proof for entry index, with hash
entry_hash, of the subtree described by the MTCProof's start and
end, following the procedure in Section 4.3.2. If evaluation
fails, abort this process and fail verification.
11. If log_number, start, and end matches a trusted subtree
(Section 7.4) for the CA, check that expected_subtree_hash is
equal to the trusted subtree's hash. Return success if it
matches and failure if it does not.
12. Otherwise, check that the MTCProof's signatures contain a
sufficient set of valid signatures from cosigners to satisfy the
relying party's cosigner requirements (Section 7.3).
Unrecognized cosigners MUST be ignored.
Signatures are verified as described in Section 5.3.1. For each
signature verification, the CosignedMessage structure is
constructed as follows:
1. Set the CosignedMessage's cosigner_name based on the
cosigner ID as described in Section 5.3.1.
2. Set the CosignedMessage's timestamp to zero.
3. Set the CosignedMessage's log_origin based on log_id as
described in Section 5.3.1.
4. Set the CosignedMessage's start and end to the MTCProof's
start and end, respectively.
5. Set the CosignedMessage's subtree_hash to
expected_subtree_hash.
This procedure only replaces the signature verification portion of
X.509 path validation. The relying party MUST continue to perform
other checks, such as checking expiry.
In this procedure, entry_hash can equivalently be computed in a
single pass from the DER-encoded TBSCertificate, without storing the
full TBSCertificateLogEntry or MerkleTreeCertEntry in memory:
1. Initialize a hash instance.
2. Write the extensions field from the MTCProof to the hash.
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3. Write the big-endian, two-byte tbs_cert_entry value to the hash.
4. Write the TBSCertificate contents octets to the hash, up to the
subjectPublicKeyInfo field.
5. Write the subjectPublicKeyInfo's algorithm field to the hash.
6. Write the octet 0x04 to the hash. This is an OCTET STRING
identifer.
7. Write the octet L to the hash, where L is the hash length.
(This assumes L is at most 127.)
8. Write H to the hash, where H is the hash of the entire
subjectPublicKeyInfo field.
9. Write the remainder of the TBSCertificate contents octets to the
hash, starting just after the subjectPublicKeyInfo field.
10. Finalize the hash and set entry_hash to the result.
This is possible because the structure in Section 5.2.1 omits the
TBSCertificateLogEntry's identifier and length octets.
7.3. Trusted Cosigners
A relying party's cosigner policy determines the sets of cosigners
that must sign a view of the issuance log before it is trusted.
This document does not prescribe a particular policy, but gives
general guidance. Relying parties MAY implement policies other than
those described below, and MAY incorporate cosigners acting in roles
not described in this document.
In picking trusted cosigners, the relying party SHOULD ensure the
following security properties:
Authenticity: The relying party only accepts entries certified by
the CA
Transparency: The relying party only accepts entries that are
publicly accessible, so that monitors, particularly the subject of
the certificate, can notice any unauthorized certificates
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Relying parties SHOULD ensure authenticity by requiring a signature
from the CA cosigner key. This is analogous to the signature in a
directly-signed X.509 certificate. If the relying party obtains CA
information from a CA certificate, the CA cosigner key is determined
as in Section 7.1.
While a CA signature is sufficient to prove a subtree came from the
CA, this is not enough to ensure the certificate is visible to
monitors. A misbehaving CA might not operate the log correctly,
either presenting inconsistent versions of the log to relying parties
and monitors, or refusing to publish some entries.
To mitigate this, relying parties SHOULD ensure transparency by
requiring a quorum of signatures from additional cosigners. At
minimum, these cosigners SHOULD enforce a consistent view of the log.
For example, [TLOG-WITNESS] describes a lightweight "witness"
cosigner role that checks this with consistency proofs. This is not
sufficient to ensure durable logging. Section 7.5 discusses
mitigations for this. Alternatively, a relying party MAY require
that cosigners serve a copy of the log, in addition to enforcing a
consistent view. For example, [TLOG-MIRROR] describes a "mirror"
cosigner role.
Relying parties MAY accept the same set of additional cosigners
across CAs.
In applications that do not enforce transparency requirements, a
relying party MAY implement a policy that only checks for a signature
from the CA cosigner. This fits the pattern of many existing X.509
applications, where CA information is determined directly from a CA
certificate, with no additional out-of-band information.
Unrecognized cosignatures are ignored, so such applications can
interoperate with certificates issued for transparency-enforcing
applications that require additional cosigners.
Cosigner roles are extensible without changes to certificate
verification itself. Future specifications and individual
deployments MAY define other cosigner roles to incorporate in relying
party policies.
Section 10.2 discusses additional deployment considerations in
cosigner selection.
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7.4. Trusted Subtrees
As an optional optimization, a relying party MAY incorporate a
periodically updated, predistributed list of trusted subtrees from
one or more of the CA's issuance logs. This allows the relying party
to accept landmark-relative certificates (Section 6.3) constructed
against those subtrees.
Each trusted subtree contains:
* The log number of the containing log
* The start and end values that define the subtree
* The hash of the subtree
Trusted subtrees for a given log are determined by its active
landmark subtrees, as described in Section 6.3.1. Before configuring
the subtrees as trusted, the relying party MUST obtain assurance that
each subtree is consistent with checkpoints observed by a sufficient
set of cosigners (see Section 5.3) to meet its cosigner requirements.
It is not necessary that the cosigners have generated signatures over
the specific subtrees, only that they are consistent.
This criteria can be checked given:
* Some _reference checkpoint_ that contains the latest landmark
* For each cosigner, either:
- A cosignature on the reference checkpoint
- A cosigned checkpoint containing the referenced checkpoint and
a valid Merkle consistency proof (Section 2.1.4 of [RFC9162])
between the two
* For each subtree, a valid subtree consistency proof (Section 4.4)
between the subtree and the reference checkpoint
[[TODO: The subtree consistency proofs have many nodes in common. It
is possible to define a single "bulk consistency proof" that verifies
all the hashes at once, but it's a lot more complex.]]
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This document does not prescribe how relying parties obtain this
information. A relying party MAY, for example, use an application-
specific update service, such as the services described in [CHROMIUM]
and [FIREFOX]. If the relying party considers the service
sufficiently trusted (e.g. if the service provides the trust anchor
list or certificate validation software), it MAY trust the update
service to perform these checks.
The relying party SHOULD incorporate its trusted subtree
configuration in application-protocol-specific certificate selection
mechanisms, to allow an authenticating party to select a landmark-
relative certificate. The trust anchor IDs of the landmarks may be
used as efficient identifiers in the application protocol. Section 8
discusses how to do this in TLS [RFC8446].
7.5. Revoked Ranges
For each supported Merkle Tree CA, the relying party maintains a list
of revoked ranges of serial numbers. A serial number combines a log
number and a log index. A relying party can thus efficiently revoke
both ranges of entries of an issuance log, and ranges of issuance
logs, even if the contents are not necessarily known. This may be
used to mitigate the security consequences of misbehavior by a CA, or
other parties in the ecosystem.
When a relying party is first configured to trust an issuance log, it
SHOULD be configured to revoke all entries from zero up to but not
including the first available unexpired certificate at the time.
This revocation SHOULD be periodically updated as entries expire and
logs are pruned (Section 5.2.3). In particular, when CAs prune
entries, relying parties SHOULD be updated to revoke all newly
unavailable entries. This gives assurance that, even if some
unavailable entry had not yet expired, the relying party will not
trust it. It also allows monitors to start monitoring a log without
processing expired entries.
A misbehaving CA might correctly construct a globally consistent log,
but refuse to make some entries or intermediate nodes available.
Consistency proofs between checkpoints and subtrees would pass, but
monitors cannot observe the entries themselves. Relying parties
whose cosigner policies (Section 7.3) do not require durable logging
(e.g. via [TLOG-MIRROR]) are particularly vulnerable to this. In
this case, the indices of the missing entries will still be known, so
relying parties can use this mechanism to revoke the unknown entries,
possibly as an initial, targeted mitigation before complete CA
removal.
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When a CA is found to be untrustworthy, relying parties SHOULD remove
trust in that CA. To minimize the compatibility impact of this
mitigation, index-based revocation can be used to only distrust
entries after some index, while leaving existing entries accepted.
This is analogous to the [SCTNotAfter] mechanism used in some PKIs.
The revocation mechanism in this section is complementary to
certificate-level revocation mechanisms. log entries are uniquely
identified by their serial number and issuer, existing revocation
mechanisms like CRLs [RFC5280] and OCSP [RFC6960] apply unchanged.
8. Use in TLS
Most X.509 fields such as subjectPublicKeyInfo and X.509 extensions
such as subjectAltName are unmodified in Merkle Tree certificates.
They apply to TLS-based applications as in any X.509 certificate.
The primary new considerations for use in TLS are:
* Whether the authenticating party should send a certificate from
one Merkle Tree CA, another Merkle Tree CA, or a directly-signing
X.509 CA
* Whether the authenticating party should send a standalone or
landmark-relative certificate
* What the relying party should communicate to the authenticating
party to help it make this decision
Certificate selection in TLS, described in Section 4.4.2.2 and
Section 4.4.2.3 of [RFC8446], incorporates both explicit relying-
party-provided information in the ClientHello and CertificateRequest
messages and implicit deployment-specific assumptions. This section
describes a RECOMMENDED integration of Merkle Tree certificates into
TLS trust anchor IDs ([I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]), but
applications MAY use application-specific criteria in addition to, or
instead of, this recommendation.
8.1. Standalone Certificates
Authenticating and relying parties SHOULD use the trust_anchors
extension to determine whether a standalone certificate would be
acceptable. A standalone certificate has a trust anchor ID of the
corresponding CA ID (Section 5.1). This trust anchor ID is
additionally contained in the trust anchor groups defined in
Section 8.2.1.
CA IDs MAY be incorporated into other trust anchor groups, following
the guidance in Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids].
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[[TODO: Ideally we would negotiate cosigners.
https://github.com/tlswg/tls-trust-anchor-ids/issues/54 has a sketch
of how one might do this, though other designs are possible.
Negotiating cosigners allows the ecosystem to manage cosigners
efficiently, without needing to collect every possible cosignature
and send them all at once. This is wasteful, particularly with post-
quantum algorithms.]]
A standalone certificate MAY also be sent without explicit relying
party trust signals, however doing so means the authenticating party
implicitly assumes the relying party trusts the issuing CA. This may
be viable if, for example, the CA is relatively ubiquitous among
supported relying parties.
8.2. Landmark-Relative Certificates
An authenticating party SHOULD NOT send a landmark-relative
certificate without a signal that the relying party trusts the
corresponding landmark subtree. Even if the relying party is assumed
to trust the issuing CA, the relying party may not have sufficiently
up-to-date trusted subtrees.
TLS implementations SHOULD use the trust_anchors extension to
determine this. A landmark-relative certificate's trust anchor ID is
the concatenation of the following OID components:
* The CA ID Section 5.1 of the CA that issued the certificate
* The constant 1
* The log number of the log used to construct the certificate
* The landmark number of the landmark used to construct the
certificate
For example, the trust anchor ID for landmark 42 of CA 32473.1 and
log number 8 is 32473.1.1.8.42.
These trust anchor IDs are used when it is necessary to identify an
individual landmark, e.g. as in the retry mechanism described
Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]. To more efficiently
express a relying party's complete landmark state, these IDs are
contained in trust anchor groups defined in Section 8.2.1, which
allow relying paries to express their landmark state with a single
ID.
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If both a landmark-relative and a standalone certificate are usable,
an authenticating party SHOULD preferentially use the landmark-
relative certificate. A landmark-relative certificate asserts the
same information as its standalone counterpart, but is expected to be
smaller.
8.2.1. Single-Log Landmark Groups
Relying parties support many landmarks per log at a time. To
compactly represent this, each log ID implicitly defines series of
trust anchor groups (Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids])
called _landmark groups_.
For each Merkle Tree Certificates CA, each log number N, and each
landmark number L, a landmark group is defined. The group's ID is
the concatenation of the following OID components:
* The CA ID Section 5.1 of the CA
* The constant 2
* The log number N
* The landmark number L
This group contains the following trust anchors:
* The CA ID itself (see Section 8.1)
* Each landmark of log N from L - max_active_landmarks + 1 to L,
inclusive
Landmark-relative certificates SHOULD be configured with this
information, as in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]. A
relying party whose latest trusted subtree (Section 7.4) in log N is
landmark L SHOULD configure the trust_anchors extension to advertise
the above landmark group. This signals support for both standalone
certificates and supported landmarks.
For example, a relying party which is up-to-date as of landmark 42 of
log 8 of CA 32473.1 would send an ID of 32473.1.2.8.42.
8.2.2. Timestamped Landmark Groups
Landmark groups for an single CA, described above, allow relying
parties to advertise one ID per supported CA. Depending on the
number of trust anchors, this can be sufficient to efficiently
represent relying party state.
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When needed, Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids] describes
how PKIs requiring further size savings can use trust anchor groups
that span multiple CA instances. For example, a single ID may signal
support for a group of CAs across one or more CA operators. This
section describes how such groups can be applied to landmarks, using
a variation of the versioning construction described in Section 5.1
of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids].
Trust anchor groups containing landmarks SHOULD define versions
predictably based on the time. For example, if the contained CAs
allocate landmarks roughly hourly, the trust anchor group might
increment the version component every hour. Each given version of
the group SHOULD contain the active landmarks as of the corresponding
timestamp.
This predictable cadence allows the CA to construct trust anchor
group inclusions (Section 7.2 of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]) for
issued certificates without additional coordination. Conversely, a
relying party MAY send a version if its trusted subtrees
(Section 7.4) are up-to-date for all contained CAs, as of the
versions timestamp.
In some cases, the relying party's trusted subtrees may only be
partially up-to-date. The relying party, or its update service, may
be unable to reach one CA in the group, e.g. due to a transient
outage. This complicates timestamp-based strategies:
* If the relying party sends the group with an older timestamp, it
will not signal its up-to-date state for the reachable CAs. This
means a single unreachable CA can disrupt service for certificates
issued by unrelated CAs.
* If the relying party sends the group with a newer timestamp, the
relying party may signal support for landmarks it does not have.
This risks connection failures. If the unreachable CA issued
recent landmark-relative certificates, those certificates will
fail validation.
The relying party can mitigate this in a number of ways:
* If the trust anchor group consists of CAs from the same operator,
waiting until all CAs are reachable will be minimally disruptive.
* The relying party can opt to send the group with an older
timestamp, combined with other, smaller groups at newer timestamps
to better describe its state.
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* A client relying party can send the newer timestamp and, in the
event the unreachable CA did issue recent landmark-relative
certificates, rely on the retry mechanism described in Section 4.3
of [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids] to recover from any signaling
failures.
9. ACME Extensions
This section describes how to issue Merkle Tree certificates using
ACME [RFC8555].
When downloading the certificate (Section 7.4.2 of [RFC8555]), ACME
clients supporting Merkle Tree certificates SHOULD send "application/
pem-certificate-chain-with-properties" in their Accept header
(Section 12.5.1 of [RFC9110]). ACME servers issuing Merkle Tree
certificates SHOULD then respond with that content type and include
trust anchor ID information as described in Section 7 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]. Section 8 decribes the trust anchor
ID assignments for standalone and landmark-relative certificates.
When processing an order for a Merkle Tree certificate, the ACME
server moves the order to the "valid" state once the corresponding
entry is sequenced in the issuance log. The order's certificate URL
then serves the standalone certificate, constructed as described in
Section 6.2.
The standalone certificate response SHOULD additionally carry an
alternate URL for the landmark-relative certificate, as described
Section 7.4.2 of [RFC8555]. Before the landmark-relative certificate
is available, the alternate URL SHOULD return a HTTP 503 (Service
Unavailable) response, with a Retry-After header (Section 10.2.3 of
[RFC9110]) estimating when the certificate will become available.
Once the next landmark is allocated, the ACME server constructs a
landmark-relative certificate, as described in Section 6.3 and serves
it from the alternate URL.
ACME clients supporting Merkle Tree certificates SHOULD support
fetching alternate chains. If an alternate chain returns an HTTP 503
with a Retry-After header, as described above, the client SHOULD
retry the request at the specified time.
10. Deployment Considerations
10.1. Operational Costs
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10.1.1. Certification Authority Costs
While Merkle Tree certificates expect CAs to operate logs, the costs
of these logs are expected to be much lower than a CT log from
[RFC6962] or [RFC9162]:
Section 5.2.2 does not constrain the API to the one defined in
[RFC6962] or [RFC9162]. If the PKI uses a tile-based protocol, such
as [TLOG-TILES], the issuance log benefits from the improved caching
properties of such designs.
Unlike a CT log, an issuance log does not have public submission
APIs. Log entries are only added by the CA directly. Costs are thus
expected to scale with the CA's own issuance.
A CA only needs to produce a digital signature for every checkpoint,
rather than for every certificate. The lower signature rate
requirements could allow more secure and/or economical key storage
choices.
Individual entries are kept small and do not scale with public key or
signature sizes. This mitigates growth from post-quantum algorithms.
Public keys in entries are replaced with fixed-sized hashes. There
are no signatures in entries themselves, and only signatures on the
very latest checkpoint are retained. Every new checkpoint completely
subsumes the old checkpoint, so there is no need to retain older
signatures. Likewise, a subtree is only signed if contained in
another signed checkpoint.
Log pruning (Section 5.2.3) allows a long-lived log to serve only the
more recent entries, scaling with the size of the retention window,
rather than the log's total lifetime.
Mirrors of the log can also reduce CA bandwidth costs, because
monitors can fetch data from mirrors instead of CAs directly. In
PKIs that deploy mirrors as part of cosigner policies, relying
parties could set few availability requirements on CAs, as described
in Section 10.3.
10.1.2. Cosigner Costs
The costs of cosigners vary by cosigner role. A consistency-checking
cosigner, such as [TLOG-WITNESS], requires very little state and can
be run with low cost.
A mirroring cosigner, such as [TLOG-MIRROR], performs a role
comparable to CT logs, but several of the cost-saving properties in
Section 10.1.1 also apply: improved protocols, smaller entries, less
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frequent signatures, and log pruning. While a mirror does need to
accommodate another party's (the CA's) growth rate, it grows only
from new issuances from that one CA. If one CA's issuance rate
exceeds the mirror's capacity, that does not impact the mirror's
copies of other CAs. Mirrors also do not need to defend against a
client uploading a large number of existing certificates all at once.
Submissions are naturally batched and serialized.
10.1.3. Monitor Costs
In a CT-based PKI, every log carries a potentially distinct subset of
active certificates. Monitors must check the contents of every CT
log. At the same time, certificates are commonly synchronized
between CT logs. As a result, a monitor will typically download each
certificate multiple times, once for every log. In Merkle Tree
Certificates, each entry appears in exactly one log. A relying party
might require a log to be covered by a quorum of mirrors, but each
mirror is cryptographically verified to serve the same contents.
Once a monitor has obtained some entry from one mirror, it does not
need to download it from the others.
In addition to downloading each entry only once, the entries
themselves are smaller, as discussed in Section 10.1.1.
10.2. Choosing Cosigners
In selecting trusted cosigners and cosigner requirements
(Section 7.3), relying parties navigate a number of trade-offs:
A consistency-checking cosigner, such as [TLOG-WITNESS], is
inexpensive to run, but does not guarantee durable logging. A
mirroring cosigner is more expensive and may take longer to cosign
structures. Requiring a mirror signature provides stronger
guarantees to the relying party, which in turn can reduce the
requirements on CAs (see Section 10.3), however it may cause
certificate issuance to take longer. That said, mirrors are
comparable to CT logs, if not cheaper (see Section 10.1), so they may
be appropriate in PKIs where running CT logs is already viable.
Relying parties that require larger quorums of trusted cosigners can
reduce the trust placed in any individual cosigner. However, larger
quorums result in larger, more expensive standalone certificates.
The cost of standalone certificates will depend on how frequently the
landmark optimization occurs in a given PKI. Conversely, relying
parties that require smaller quorums have smaller standalone
certificates, but place more trust in their cosigners.
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Relying party policies also impact monitor operation. If a relying
party accepts any one of three cosigners, monitors SHOULD check the
checkpoints of all three. Otherwise, a malicious CA may send
different split views to different cosigners. More generally,
monitors SHOULD check the checkpoints in the union of all cosigners
trusted by all supported relying parties. This is an efficient check
because, if the CA is operating correctly, all cosigners will observe
the same tree. Thus the monitor only needs to check consistency
proofs between the checkpoints, and check the log contents themselves
once. Monitors MAY also rely on other parties in the transparency
ecosystem to perform this check.
10.3. Log Availability
CAs and mirrors are expected to serve their log contents over HTTP.
It is possible for the contents to be unavailable, either due to
temporary service outage or because the log has been pruned
(Section 5.2.3). If some resources are unavailable, they may not be
visible to monitors.
As in CT, PKIs that deploy Merkle Tree certificates SHOULD establish
availability policies. These policies SHOULD be adhered to by
trusted CAs and mirrors, and enforced by relying party vendors as a
condition of trust. Exact availability policies for these services
are out of scope for this document, but this section provides some
general guidance.
Availability policies SHOULD specify how long an entry must be made
available, before a CA or mirror is permitted to prune the entry. It
is RECOMMENDED to define this using a _retention period_, which is
some time after the entry has expired. In such a policy, an entry
could only be pruned if it, and all preceding entries, have already
expired for the retention period. Policies MAY opt to set different
retention periods between CAs and mirrors. Permitting limited log
retention is analogous to the CT practice of temporal sharding
[CHROME-CT], except that a pruned issuance log remains compatible
with older, unupdated relying parties.
Such policies impact monitors. If the retention period is, e.g. 6
months, this means that monitors are expected to check entries of
interest within 6 months. It also means that a new monitor may only
be aware of a 6 month history of entries issued for a particular
domain.
If historical data is not available to verify the retention period,
such as information in another mirror or a trusted summary of
expiration dates of entries, it may not be possible to confirm
correct behavior. This is mitigated by the revocation process
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described in Section 7.5: if a CA were to prune a forward-dated entry
and, in the 6 months when the entry was available, no monitor noticed
the unusual expiry, an updated relying party would not accept it
anyway.
The log pruning process simply makes some resources unavailable.
Availability policies SHOULD constrain log pruning in the same way as
general resource availability. That is, if it would be a policy
violation for the log to fail to serve a resource, it should also be
a policy violation for the log to prune such that the resource is
removed, and vice versa.
PKIs that require mirror cosignatures (Section 7.3) can impose
minimal to no availability requirements on CAs without compromising
transparency goals. If a CA never makes an entry available, mirrors
will be unable to update. This will prevent relying parties from
accepting the undisclosed entries. However, a CA that is
persistently unavailable may not offer sufficient benefit to be used
by authenticating parties or trusted by relying parties.
However, if a mirror's interface becomes unavailable, monitors may be
unable to check for unauthorized issuance, if the entries are not
available in another mirror. This does compromise transparency
goals. As such, availability policies SHOULD set availability
expectations on mirrors. This can also be mitigated by using
multiple mirrors, either directly enforced in cosigner requirements,
or by keeping mirrors up-to-date with each other.
In PKIs that do not require mirroring cosigners, the CA's serving
endpoint is more crucial for monitors. Such PKIs SHOULD set
availability requirements on CAs.
In each of these cases, the serial numbers of unavailable entries are
known. Availability failures can thus be mitigated by revocation, as
described in Section 7.5, likely as a first step in a broader
distrust.
10.4. Certificate Renewal
When an authenticating party requests a certificate, the landmark-
relative certificate will not be available until the next landmark is
ready. From there, the landmark-relative certificate will not be
available until relying parties receive new trusted subtrees.
To maximize coverage of landmark-relative certificates,
authenticating parties performing routine renewal SHOULD request a
new Merkle Tree certificate before the previous Merkle Tree
certificate expires. Renewing around 75% of the way through the
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previous certificate's lifetime is RECOMMENDED. Authenticating
parties additionally SHOULD retain both the new and old certificates
in the certificate set until the old certificate expires. As the new
subtrees are delivered to relying parties, certificate negotiation
will transition relying parties to the new certificate, while
retaining the old certificate for relying parties that are not yet
updated.
The above also applies if the authenticating party is performing a
routine key rotation alongside the routine renewal. In this case,
certificate negotiation would pick the key as part of the certificate
selection. This slightly increases the lifetime of the old key but
maintains the size optimization continuously.
If the service is rotating keys in response to a key compromise, this
option is not appropriate. Instead, the service SHOULD immediately
discard the old key and request a standalone certificate and the
revocation of the previous certificate. This will interrupt the size
optimization until the new landmark-relative certificate is available
and relying parties are updated.
11. Privacy Considerations
The Privacy Considerations described in Section 9 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids] apply to their use with Merkle Tree
Certificates.
In particular, relying parties that share an update process for
trusted subtrees (Section 7.4) will fetch the same stream of updates.
However, updates may reach different users at different times,
resulting in some variation across users. This variation may
contribute to a fingerprinting attack [RFC6973]. If the Merkle Tree
CA trust anchors are sent unconditionally in trust_anchors, this
variation will be passively observable. If they are sent
conditionally, e.g. with the DNS mechanism, the trust anchor list
will require active probing.
12. Security Considerations
12.1. Authenticity
A key security requirement of any PKI scheme is that relying parties
only accept assertions that were certified by a trusted certification
authority. Merkle Tree certificates achieve this by ensuring the
relying party only accepts authentic subtree hashes:
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* In standalone certificates, the relying party's cosigner
requirements (Section 7.3) are expected to include some signature
by the CA's cosigner. The CA's cosigner (Section 5.4) is defined
to certify the contents of every checkpoint and subtree that it
signs.
* In landmark-relative certificates, the cosigner requirements are
checked ahead of time, when the trusted subtrees are
predistributed (Section 7.4).
Given a subtree hash computed over entries that the CA certified, it
must be computationally infeasible to construct an entry not on this
list, and an inclusion proof, such that inclusion proof verification
succeeds. This requires using a collision-resistant hash in the
Merkle Tree construction.
Log entries contain public key hashes. It must additionally be
computationally infeasible to compute a public key whose hash matches
the entry, other than the intended public key. This also requires a
collision-resistant hash.
12.2. Transparency
The transparency mechanisms in this document do not prevent a CA from
issuing an unauthorized certificate. Rather, they provide comparable
security properties as Certificate Transparency [RFC9162] in ensuring
that all certificates are either rejected by relying parties, or
visible to monitors and, in particular, the subject of the
certificate.
Compared to Certificate Transparency, some of the responsibilities of
a log have moved to the CA. All signatures generated by the CA in
this system are assertions about some view of the CA's issuance log.
However, a CA does not need to function correctly to ensure
transparency properties. Relying parties are expected to require a
quorum of additional cosigners, which together enforce properties of
the log (Section 7.3) and prevent or detect CA misbehavior:
A CA might violate the append-only property of its log and present
different views to different parties. However, each individual
cosigner will only follow a single append-only view of the log
history. Provided the cosigners are correctly operated, relying
parties and monitors will observe consistent views. Views that were
not cosigned at all may not be detected, but they also will not be
accepted by relying parties.
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If the CA sends one view to some cosigners and another view to other
cosigners, it is possible that multiple views will be accepted by
relying parties. However, in that case monitors will observe that
cosigners do not match each other. Relying parties can then react by
revoking the range of inconsistent serials (Section 7.5), and likely
removing the CA. If the cosigners are mirrors, the underlying
entries in both views will also be visible.
A CA might correctly construct its log, but refuse to serve some
unauthorized entry, e.g. by feigning an outage or pruning the log
outside the retention policy (Section 10.3). The impact depends on
the relying party's cosigner policy:
* If the relying party requires cosignatures from trusted mirrors,
the entry will either be visible to monitors in the mirrors, or
have never reached a mirror. In the latter case, the entry will
not have been cosigned, so the relying party would not accept it.
* If the relying party accepts log views without a trusted mirror,
the unauthorized entry may not be available. However, the
existence of _some_ entry at that index will be visible, so
monitors will know the CA is failing to present an entry. This is
sufficient to determine the serial number, so relying parties can
then react by revoking the undisclosed entries (Section 7.5), and
likely removing the CA.
12.3. Public Key Hashes
Unlike Certificate Transparency, the mechanisms in this document do
not provide the subject public keys, only the hashed values. This is
intended to reduce log serving costs, particularly with large post-
quantum keys. As a result, monitors look for unrecognized hashes
instead of unrecognized keys. Any unrecognized hash, even if the
preimage is unknown, indicates an unauthorized certificate.
This optimization complicates studies of weak public keys, e.g.
[SharedFactors]. Such studies will have to retrieve the public keys
separately, such as by connecting to the TLS servers, or fetching
from the CA if it retains the unhashed key. This document does not
define a mechanism for doing this, or require that CAs or mirrors
retain unhashed keys. The transparency mechanisms in this protocol
are primarily intended to allow monitors to observe certificate
issuance.
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12.4. Non-Repudiation
When a monitor finds an unauthorized certificate issuance in a log or
mirror, it must be possible to prove the CA indeed certified the
information in the entry. However, only the latest signed checkpoint
may be retained by the transparency ecosystem, so it may not be
possible to reconstruct the exact certificate seen by relying
parties.
However, per Section 5.4, any subtree signature is a binding
assertion by the CA that it has certified every entry in the subtree.
Thus, given _any_ signed checkpoint that contains the unauthorized
entry, a Merkle inclusion proof (Section 2.1.3 of [RFC9162]) is
sufficient to prove the CA issued the entry. This is analogous to
how, in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC9162], CAs are held accountable for
signed CT precertificates.
The transparency ecosystem does not retain unhashed public keys, so
it also may not be possible to construct a complete certificate from
the signed checkpoint and inclusion proof. However, if the log
entry's subjectPublicKeyInfoHash does not correspond to an authorized
key for the subject of the certificate, the entry is still
unauthorized. A Merkle Tree CA is held responsible for all log
entries it certifies, whether or not the preimage of the hash is
known.
12.5. Extensibility
MerkleTreeCertEntry (Section 5.2.1) contain several extension points:
* New X.509 extensions can be added to TBSCertificateLogEntry.
* New MerkleTreeCertEntryType values define new formats for the
entry contents.
* New MerkleTreeCertEntryExtensionType values define new entry
extension fields.
X.509 extensions apply to Merkle Tree Certificates without any
modifications. The two entry-level extension points are new to this
protocol. Older CAs, cosigners, relying parties, and monitors may
encounter unrecognized entries:
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Different cosigner roles interact with extensions differently. Some
roles, e.g. [TLOG-MIRROR] and [TLOG-WITNESS], do not interpret entry
contents. Unrecognized extensions do not impact these roles. Other
roles, such as CA cosigners, have semantics that depend on the entry
contents. If a cosigner role interprets log entry contents, it MUST
define how it interacts with unrecognized types and extensions.
Section 5.4 forbids a CA from logging or signing entries that it does
not recognize. A CA cannot faithfully claim to certify information
if it does not understand it. This is analogous to how a correctly-
operated X.509 CA can never sign an unrecognized X.509 extension.
Unrecognized entry types do not impact older relying parties. In
Section 7.2, the relying party constructs the MerkleTreeCertEntry
that it expects. The unrecognized entry will have a different type
value, so the proof will never succeed, assuming the underlying hash
function remains collision-resistant.
However, unrecognized entry extensions will be ignored by relying
parties, analogously to a non-critical X.509 extension. Entry
extensions thus SHOULD be defined so that this is safe.
If a monitor observes an entry with unknown type or entry extension,
it may not be able to determine if it is of interest. For example,
it may be unable to tell whether it covers some relevant DNS name.
Until the monitor is updated to reflect the current state of the PKI,
the monitor may be unable to detect all misissued certificates.
This situation is analogous to the addition of a new X.509 extension.
When relying parties add support for log entry types or new X.509
extensions, they SHOULD coordinate with monitors to ensure the
transparency ecosystem is able to monitor the new formats.
12.6. Certificate Malleability
An ASN.1 structure like X.509’s Certificate is an abstract data type
that is independent of its serialization. There are multiple
encoding rules for ASN.1. Commonly, protocols use DER [X.690], such
as Section 4.4.2 of [RFC8446]. This aligns with Section 4.1.1.3 of
[RFC5280], which says X.509 signatures are computed over the DER-
encoded TBSCertificate. After signature verification, applications
can assume the DER-encoded TBSCertificate is not malleable.
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When the signature verification process in Section 7.2 first
transforms the TBSCertificate into a TBSCertificateLogEntry, it
preserves this non-malleability. There is a unique valid DER
encoding for every abstract TBSCertificate structure, so malleability
of the DER-encoded TBSCertificate reduces to malleability of the
TBSCertificate value:
* The version, issuer, validity, subject, issuerUniqueID,
subjectUniqueID, and extensions fields are copied from the
TBSCertificate to the TBSCertificateLogEntry unmodified, so they
are directly authenticated by the inclusion proof.
* serialNumber is omitted from TBSCertificateLogEntry, but its value
determines the inclusion proof index, which authenticates it.
* The redundant signature field in TBSCertificate is omitted from
TBSCertificateLogEntry, but Section 7.2 checks for an exact value,
so no other values are possible.
* subjectPublicKeyInfo is hashed as subjectPublicKeyInfoHash in
TBSCertificateLogEntry. Provided the underlying hash function is
collision-resistant, no other values are possible for a given log
entry.
X.509 implementations often implement Section 4.1.1.3 of [RFC5280] by
equivalently retaining the original received DER encoding, rather
than recomputing the canonical DER encoding TBSCertificate. This
optimization is compatible with the assumptions above.
Some non-conforming X.509 implementations use a BER [X.690] parser
instead of DER, and then apply this optimization to the received BER
encoding. BER encoding is not unique, so this does not produce the
same result. In such implementations, the BER-encoded TBSCertificate
becomes also non-malleable, and applications may rely on this. To
preserve this property in Merkle Tree Certificates, such non-
conforming implementations MUST do the following when implementing
Section 7.2:
* Reparse the initial identifier (the SEQUENCE tag) and length
octets of the TBSCertificate structure with a conforming DER
parser and fail verification if invalid.
* When copying the version, issuer, validity, subject,
issuerUniqueID, subjectUniqueID, and extensions fields, either
copy over the observed BER encodings, or reparse each field with a
conforming DER parser and fail verification if invalid.
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* Reparse the serialNumber field with a conforming DER parser and
fail verification if invalid.
* Reparse the signature field with a conforming DER parser and fail
verification if invalid. Equivalently, check for an exact
equality with for the expected, DER-encoded value.
* When hashing subjectPublicKeyInfo, either hash the observed BER
encoding, or reparse the structure with a conforming DER parser
and fail verification if invalid.
These additional checks are redundant in X.509 implementations that
use a conforming DER parser.
Section 5.2.1 requires that the TBSCertificateLogEntry in a
MerkleTreeCertEntry be DER-encoded, so applying a stricter parser
will be compatible with conforming CAs. While these existing non-
conforming implementations may be unable to switch to a DER parser
due to compatibility concerns, Merkle Tree Certificates are new, so
there is no existing deployment of malformed BER-encoded
TBSCertificateLogEntry structures.
The above only ensures the TBSCertificate portion is non-malleable.
In Merkle Tree Certificates, similar to an ECDSA X.509 signature, the
signature value is malleable. Multiple MTCProof structures may prove
a single TBSCertificate structure. Additionally, in all X.509-based
protocols, a BER-based parser for the outer, unsigned Certificate
structure will admit malleability in those portions of the encoding.
Applications that derive a unique identifier from the Certificate
MUST instead use the TBSCertificate, or some portion of it, for
Merkle Tree Certificates.
12.7. Revocation
This document does not define a new certificate-level revocation
mechanism. Existing mechanisms like CRLs and OCSP apply unchanged to
Merkle Tree certificates. The sequential serial numbers assigned by
issuance logs may enable future improvements to revocation, but such
work is out of scope for this document.
12.8. Signature Domain Separation
The signature format defined in Section 5.3.1 includes a fixed label
prefix to ensure domain separation. Provided other uses of the same
key use a non-overlapping prefix, signatures in one context cannot be
substituted for those in another.
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Section 5.4 permits a CA cosigner key to be used to sign CRLs and
OCSP resposes. These signatures do not include a domain separation
prefix. Instead, X.509 relies on an undocumented assumption that the
TBSCertificate, TBSCertList, and OCSP ResponseData structures do not
overlap at the level of individual ASN.1 fields.
These ASN.1 structures all begin with a SEQUENCE tag, which is
encoded in DER as 0x30 or the ASCII digit "0". The domain separation
label used in Section 5.3.1, subtree/v1\n\0, does not begin with "0",
so their inputs do not overlap. More generally, this label is not a
prefix of any DER or BER encoding.
Domain separation analysis based on the structures themselves is
fragile, particularly when individual ASN.1 fields must be analyzed.
This document depends on a structure-level analysis for CRLs and OCSP
responses due to how these legacy protocols were defined. Future
uses of the key SHOULD use a more robust mechanism, namely a fixed
label prefix or a context string parameter if the signature scheme
supports it.
13. IANA Considerations
13.1. Module Identifier
IANA is requested to add the following entry in the "SMI Security for
PKIX Module Identifier" registry [RFC7299]:
+=========+=================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=================+============+
| TBD | id-mod-mtc-2025 | [this-RFC] |
+---------+-----------------+------------+
Table 1
13.2. Algorithm
IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "SMI Security for
PKIX Algorithms" registry [RFC7299]:
+=========+=================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=================+============+
| TBD | id-alg-mtcProof | [this-RFC] |
+---------+-----------------+------------+
Table 2
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13.3. Certificate Extension
IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "SMI Security for
PKIX Certificate Extension" registry [RFC7299]:
+=========+=================================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=================================+============+
| TBD | id-pe-mtcCertificationAuthority | [this-RFC] |
+---------+---------------------------------+------------+
Table 3
13.4. Relative Distinguished Name Attribute
IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "SMI Security for
PKIX Relative Distinguished Name Attribute" registry
[I-D.ietf-lamps-x509-alg-none]:
+=========+=======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=======================+============+
| TBD | id-rdna-trustAnchorID | [this-RFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
Table 4
14. References
14.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]
Beck, B., Benjamin, D., O'Brien, D., and K. Nekritz, "TLS
Trust Anchor Identifiers", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids-04, 30 April 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
trust-anchor-ids-04>.
[POSIX] "IEEE/Open Group Standard for Information Technology--
Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX™) Base
Specifications, Issue 8", IEEE,
DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2024.10555529, ISBN ["9798855707939"],
June 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/ieeestd.2024.10555529>.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3629>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5912>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8555>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>.
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[RFC9881] Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B. E.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure --
Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital
Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", RFC 9881,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9881, October 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9881>.
[RFC9925] Benjamin, D., "Unsigned X.509 Certificates", RFC 9925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9925, February 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9925>.
[SHS] "Secure hash standard", National Institute of Standards
and Technology (U.S.), DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.180-4, 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.180-4>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021 , February 2021.
14.2. Informative References
[APPLE-CT] Apple, "Apple's Certificate Transparency policy", 5 March
2021, <https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205280>.
[AuditingRevisited]
Heimberger, L., Patton, C., and B. Westerbaan, "Private
SCT Auditing, Revisited", 25 April 2025,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/556.pdf>.
[CABF-153] CA/Browser Forum, "Ballot 153 – Short-Lived Certificates",
11 November 2015, <https://cabforum.org/2015/11/11/ballot-
153-short-lived-certificates/>.
[CABF-SC081]
CA/Browser Forum, "Ballot SC081v3: Introduce Schedule of
Reducing Validity and Data Reuse Periods", 11 April 2025,
<https://cabforum.org/2025/04/11/ballot-sc081v3-introduce-
schedule-of-reducing-validity-and-data-reuse-periods/>.
[CHROME-CT]
Google Chrome, "Chrome Certificate Transparency Policy",
17 March 2022,
<https://googlechrome.github.io/CertificateTransparency/
ct_policy.html>.
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[CHROMIUM] Chromium, "Component Updater", 3 March 2022,
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/
components/component_updater/README.md>.
[FIPS204] "Module-lattice-based digital signature standard",
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.),
DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.204, August 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.204>.
[FIREFOX] Mozilla, "Firefox Remote Settings", 20 August 2022,
<https://wiki.mozilla.org/Firefox/RemoteSettings>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-x509-alg-none]
Benjamin, D., "Unsigned X.509 Certificates", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-x509-alg-none-
10, 5 September 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
x509-alg-none-10>.
[KeyReuse] Patton, C. and T. Shrimpton, "Security in the Presence of
Key Reuse: Context-Separable Interfaces and their
Applications", 2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/519>.
[LetsEncrypt]
Let's Encrypt, "Let's Encrypt Stats", 7 March 2023,
<https://letsencrypt.org/stats/>.
[MerkleTown]
Cloudflare, Inc., "Merkle Town", 7 March 2023,
<https://ct.cloudflare.com/>.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4514>.
[RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973>.
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[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7299>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.
[SCTNotAfter]
Adrian, D., "How to distrust a CA without any certificate
errors", March 2025,
<https://dadrian.io/blog/posts/sct-not-after/>.
[SharedFactors]
Våge, H. F. and University of Bergen, "Finding shared RSA
factors in the Certificate Transparency logs", 13 May
2022, <https://bora.uib.no/bora-
xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/3001128/
Masters_thesis__for_University_of_Bergen.pdf>.
[STH-Discipline]
Barnes, R., "STH Discipline & Security Considerations", 3
March 2017, <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/
Zm4NqyRc7LDsOtV56EchBIT9r4c/>.
[TLOG-COSIGNATURE]
C2SP, "Transparency Log Cosignatures", April 2026,
<https://c2sp.org/tlog-cosignature>.
[TLOG-MIRROR]
C2SP, "Transparency Log Mirrors", July 2025,
<https://c2sp.org/tlog-mirror>.
[TLOG-TILES]
C2SP, "Tiled Transparency Logs", June 2025,
<https://c2sp.org/tlog-tiles>.
[TLOG-WITNESS]
C2SP, "Transparency Log Witness Protocol", June 2025,
<https://c2sp.org/tlog-witness>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
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MerkleTreeCertificates
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-mtc-2025(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, AlgorithmIdentifier{},
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
Extensions{}, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
CertExtensions
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) }
Version, Name, Validity, UniqueIdentifier, PublicKeyAlgorithms
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
TrustAnchorID
FROM TrustAnchorIDs-2025 -- in [I-D.ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-trustAnchorIDs-2025(TBD) } ;
TBSCertificateLogEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
issuer Name,
validity Validity,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY,
{PublicKeyAlgorithms}},
subjectPublicKeyInfoHash OCTET STRING,
issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions{{CertExtensions}}
OPTIONAL
}
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id-alg-mtcProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD }
sa-mtcProof SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-mtcProof
PARAMS ARE absent
}
id-rdna-trustAnchorID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) rdna(25) TBD }
at-trustAnchorID ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE TrustAnchorID
IDENTIFIED BY id-rdna-trustAnchorID
}
id-pe-mtcCertificationAuthority OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pe(1) TBD }
ext-mtcCertificationAuthority EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX MTCCertificationAuthority
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mtcCertificationAuthority
CRITICALITY TRUE
}
MTCCertificationAuthority ::= SEQUENCE {
logHash AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
sigAlg AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
minSerial INTEGER
}
END
Appendix B. Merkle Tree Structure
This non-normative section describes how the Merkle Tree structure
relates to the binary representations of indices. It is included to
help implementors understand the procedures described in Section 4.
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B.1. Binary Representations
Within a Merkle Tree whose size is a power of two, the binary
representation of a leaf's index gives the path to that leaf. The
leaf is a left child if the least-significant bit is unset and a
right child if it is set. The next bit indicates the direction of
the parent node, and so on. Figure 12 demonstrates this in a Merkle
Tree of size 8:
+----------------+
| [0, 8) | level 3
+----------------+
/ \
+--------+ +--------+
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | level 2
+--------+ +--------+
/ \ / \
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |[6,8)| level 1
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
/ \ / \ / \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| |7| level 0
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
Figure 12: An example Merkle Tree of size 8
The binary representation of 4 is 0b100. It is the left (0) child of
[4, 6), which is the left (0) child of [4, 8), which is the right (1)
child of [0, 8).
Each level in the tree corresponds to a bit position and can be
correspondingly numbered, with 0 indicating the least-significant bit
and the leaf level, and so on. In this numbering, a node's level can
be determined as follows: if the node is a root of subtree [start,
end), the node's level is BIT_WIDTH(end - start - 1).
Comparing two indices determines the relationship between two paths.
The highest differing bit gives the level at which paths from root to
leaf diverge. For example, the bit representations of 4 and 6 are
0b100 and 0b110, respectively. The highest differing bit is bit 1.
Bits 2 and up are the same between the two indices. This indicates
that the paths from the root to leaves 4 and 6 diverge when going
from level 2 to level 1.
This can be generalized to arbitrary-sized Merkle Trees. Figure 13
depicts a Merkle Tree of size 6:
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+--------------+
| [0, 6) | level 3
+--------------+
/ |
+--------+ |
| [0, 4) | * level 2
+--------+ |
/ \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| level 1
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+
/ \ / \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| level 0
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
Figure 13: An example Merkle Tree of size 6
When the size of a Merkle Tree is not a power of two, some levels on
the rightmost edge of the tree are skipped. The rightmost edge is
the path to the last element. The skipped levels can be seen in its
binary representation. Here, the last element is 5, which has binary
representation 0b101. When a bit is set, the corresponding node is a
right child. When it is unset, the corresponding node is skipped.
In a tree of the next power of two size, the skipped nodes in this
path are where there _would_ have been a right child, had there been
enough elements to construct one. Without a right child, the hash
operation is skipped and a skipped node has the same value as its
singular child. Figure 14 depicts this for a tree of size 6.
+----------------+
| [0, 6) | level 3
+----------------+
/ \
+--------+ +--------+
| [0, 4) | | [4, 6) | level 2
+--------+ +--------+
/ \ / \
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| | | level 1
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
/ \ / \ / \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| | | | | level 0
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
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Figure 14: An example Merkle Tree of size 6, viewed as a subset
of a tree of size 8
Zero bits also indicate skipped nodes in paths that have not yet
diverged from the rightmost edge (i.e. the path to the last element),
when viewed from root to leaf. In the example, the binary
representation of 4 is 0b100. While bit 0 and bit 1 are both unset,
they manifest in the tree differently. Bit 0 indicates that 4 is a
left child. However, at bit 1, 0b100 has not yet diverged from the
last element, 0b101. That instead indicates a skipped node, not a
left child.
B.2. Inclusion Proof Evaluation
The procedure in Section 4.3.2 builds up a subtree hash in r by
starting from entry_hash and iteratively hashing elements of
inclusion_proof on the left or right. That means this procedure,
when successful, must return _some_ hash that contains entry_hash.
Treating [start, end) as a Merkle Tree of size end - start, the
procedure hashes based on the path to index. Within this smaller
Merkle Tree, it has index fn = index - start (first number), and the
last element has index sn = end - start - 1 (second number).
Step 4 iterates through inclusion_proof and the paths to fn and sn in
parallel. As the procedure right-shifts fn and sn and looks at the
least-significant bit, it moves up the two paths, towards the root.
When sn is zero, the procedure has reached the top of the tree. The
procedure checks that the two iterations complete together.
Iterating from level 0 up, fn and sn will initially be different.
While they are different, step 4.2 hashes on the left or right based
on the binary representation, as discussed in Appendix B.1.
Once fn = sn, the remainder of the path is on the right edge. At
that point, the condition in step 4.2 is always true. It only
incorporates proof entries on the left, once per set bit. Unset bits
are skipped.
Inclusion proofs can also be evaluated by considering these two
stages separately. The first stage consumes l1 = BIT_WIDTH(fn XOR
sn) proof entries. The second stage consumes l2 = POPCOUNT(fn >> l1)
proof entries. A valid inclusion proof must then have l1 + l2
entries. The first l1 entries are hashed based on fn's least
significant bits, and the remaining l2 entries are hashed on the
left.
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B.3. Consistency Proof Structure
A subtree consistency proof for [start, end) and the tree of n
elements is similar to an inclusion proof for element end - 1. If
one starts from end - 1's hash, incorporating the whole inclusion
proof should reconstruct root_hash and incorporating a subset of the
inclusion proof should reconstruct node_hash. Thus end - 1's hash
and this inclusion proof can prove consistency. A subtree
consistency proof in this document applies two optimizations over
this construction:
1. Instead of starting at level 0 with end - 1, the proof can start
at a higher level. Any ancestor of end - 1 shared by both the
subtree and the overall tree is a valid starting node to
reconstruct node_hash and root_hash. Use the highest level with
a commmon ancestor. This truncates the inclusion proof portion
of the consistency proof.
2. If this starting node is the entire subtree, omit its hash from
the consistency proof. The verifier is assumed to already know
node_hash.
A Merkle consistency proof, defined in Section 2.1.4 of [RFC9162],
applies these same optimizations.
Figure 15 depicts a subtree consistency proof between the subtree [0,
6) and the Merkle Tree of size 8. The consistency proof begins at
level 1, or node [4, 6). The inclusion proof portion is similarly
truncated to start at level 1: [6, 8) and [0, 4). If the consistency
proof began at level 0, the starting node would be leaf 5, and the
consistency proof would additionally include leaf 4.
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+----------------+
| [0, 6) | level 3
+----------------+
/ |
+========+ +--------+
| [0, 4) | | [4, 6) | level 2
+========+ +--------+
/ \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| level 1
+-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~+
/ \ / \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| level 0
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
+----------------+
| [0, 8) | level 3
+----------------+
/ \
+========+ +--------+
| [0, 4) | | [4, 8) | level 2
+========+ +--------+
/ \ / \
+-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~+ +=====+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |[6,8)| level 1
+-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~+ +=====+
/ \ / \ / \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| |7| level 0
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
Figure 15: A subtree consistency proof that starts at level 1
instead of level 0
Note that the truncated inclusion proof may include nodes from lower
levels, if the corresponding level was skipped on the right edge.
Figure 16 depicts a subtree consistency proof between the subtree [0,
6) and the Merkle Tree of size 7. As above, the starting node is [4,
6) at level 1. The inclusion proof portion includes leaf 6 at level
0. This is because leaf 6 is taking the place of its skipped parent
at level 1. (A skipped node can be thought of as a duplicate of its
singular child.)
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+----------------+
| [0, 6) | level 3
+----------------+
/ |
+========+ +--------+
| [0, 4) | | [4, 6) | level 2
+========+ +--------+
/ \ |
+-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| level 1
+-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~+
/ \ / \ / \
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| level 0
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
+----------------+
| [0, 7) | level 3
+----------------+
/ \
+========+ +--------+
| [0, 4) | | [4, 7) | level 2
+========+ +--------+
/ \ / |
+-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~+ +=+
|[0,2)| |[2,4)| |[4,6)| |6| level 1
+-----+ +-----+ +~~~~~+ +=+
/ \ / \ / \ |
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
|0| |1| |2| |3| |4| |5| |6| level 0
+-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+
Figure 16: The interaction between inclusion proof truncation and
skipped levels
B.4. Consistency Proof Verification
The procedure in Section 4.4.3 is structured similarly to inclusion
proof evaluation (Appendix B.2). It iteratively builds two hashes,
fr and sr, which are expected to equal node_hash and root_hash,
respectively. Everything hashed into fr is also hashed into sr, so
success demonstrates that root_hash contains node_hash.
Step 2 initializes fn (first number), sn (second number), and tn
(third number) to follow, respectively, the paths to start, end - 1
(the last element of the subtree), and n - 1 (the last element of the
tree).
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Steps 3 and 4 then skip to the starting node, described in
Appendix B.3. The starting node may be:
* The entire subtree [start, end) if [start, end) is directly
contained in the tree. This will occur if end is n (step 3), or
if [start, end) is full (exiting step 4 because fn is sn).
* Otherwise, the highest full subtree along the right edge of
[start, end). This corresponds to the process exiting step 4
because LSB(sn) is not set.
Steps 5 and 6 initialize the hashes fr and sr:
* In the first case above, fn will equal sn after truncation. Step
5 will then initialize the hashes to node_hash because the
consistency proof does not need to include the starting node.
* In the second case above, fn is less than sn. Step 6 will then
initialize the hashes to the first value in the consistency proof.
Step 7 incorporates the remainder of the consistency proof into fr
and sr:
* All hashes are incorporated into sr, with hashing on the left or
right determined the same as in inclusion proof evaluation.
* A subset of the hashes are incorporated into fr. It skips any
hash on the right because those contain elements greater than end
- 1. It also stops incorporating when fn and sn have converged.
This reconstructs the hashes of the subtree and full tree, which are
then compared to expected values in step 8.
In the case when fn is sn in step 5, the condition in step 7.2.1 is
always false, and fr is always equal to node_hash in step 8. In this
case, steps 6 through 8 are equivalent to verifying an inclusion
proof for the truncated subtree [fn, sn + 1) and truncated tree tn +
1.
Acknowledgements
This document stands on the shoulders of giants and builds upon
decades of work in TLS authentication, X.509, and Certificate
Transparency. The authors would like to thank all those who have
contributed over the history of these protocols.
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The authors additionally thank Bob Beck, Corey Bonnell, Ryan Dickson,
Aaron Gable, Nick Harper, Russ Housley, Dennis Jackson, Ilari
Liusvaara, Sanketh Menda, Matt Mueller, Chris Patton, Michael
Richardson, Ryan Sleevi, and Emily Stark for many valuable
discussions and insights which led to this document, as well as
feedback and contributions to the document itself. We wish to thank
Mia Celeste in particular, whose implementation of an earlier draft
revealed several pitfalls.
The idea to mint tree heads infrequently was originally described by
Richard Barnes in [STH-Discipline]. The size optimization in Merkle
Tree Certificates is an application of this idea to the certificate
itself.
Change log
*RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
publication of a final version of this document.
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-00
* Simplify hashing by removing the internal padding to align with
block size. #72
* Avoid the temptation of floating points. #66
* Require lifetime to be a multiple of batch_duration. #65
* Rename window to validity window. #21
* Split Assertion into Assertion and AbridgedAssertion. The latter
is used in the Merkle Tree and HTTP interface. It replaces
subject_info by a hash, to save space by not serving large post-
quantum public keys. The original Assertion is used everywhere
else, including BikeshedCertificate. #6
* Add proper context to every node in the Merkle Tree. #32
* Clarify we use a single CertificateEntry. #11
* Clarify we use POSIX time. #1
* Elaborate on CA public key and signature format. #27
* Miscellaneous changes.
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Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-01
* Minor editorial changes
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-02
* Replace the negotiation mechanism with TLS Trust Anchor
Identifiers.
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-03
* Switch terminology from "subscriber" to "authenticating party".
* Use <1..2^24-1> encoding for all certificate types in the
CertificateEntry TLS message
* Clarify discussion and roles in transparency ecosystem
* Update references
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-04
Substantially reworked the design. The old design was essentially
the landmark checkpoint and CA-built logs ideas, but targeting only
the optimized and slow issuance path, and with a more bespoke tree
structure:
In both draft-04 and draft-05, a CA looks like today’s CAs except
that they run some software to publish what they issue and sign tree
heads to certify certificates in bulk.
In draft-04, the CA software publishes certificates in a bunch of
independent Merkle Trees. This is very easy to do as a collection of
highly cacheable, immutable static files because each tree is
constructed independently, and never appended to after being built.
In draft-05, the certificates are published in a single Merkle Tree.
The [TLOG-TILES] interface allows such trees to also use highly
cacheable, immutable static files.
In draft-04, there only are hourly tree heads. Clients are
provisioned with tree heads ahead of time so we can make small,
inclusion-proof-only certificates. In draft-05, the ecosystem must
coordinate on defining "landmark" checkpoints. Clients are
provisioned with subtrees describing landmark checkpoints ahead of
time so we can make small, inclusion-proof-only certificates.
In draft-04, each tree head is independent. In draft-05, each
landmark checkpoint contains all the previous checkpoints.
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In draft-04, the independent tree heads were easily prunable. In
draft-05, we define how to prune a Merkle Tree.
In draft-04, there is no fast issuance mode. In draft-05, frequent,
non-landmark checkpoints can be combined with inclusion proofs and
witness signatures for fast issuance. This is essentially an STH and
inclusion proof in CT.
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-05
* Add some discussion on malleability
* Discuss the monitoring impacts of the responsibility shift from CA
with log quorum to CA+log with mirror quorum
* Sketch out a more concrete initial ACME extension
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-06
* Fix mistyped reference
* Removed now unnecessary placeholder text
* First draft at IANA registration and ASN.1 module
* Added a prose version of the procedure to select subtrees
* Rename 'landmarks checkpoint' to 'landmarks'
* Clarify and fix an off-by-one error in recommended landmark
allocation scheme
* Add some diagrams to the Overview section
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-07
* Clarify landmark zero
* Clarify signature verification process
* Improve subtree consistency proof verification algorithm
* Add an appendix that explains the Merkle Tree proof procedures
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-08
* Improvements to malleability discussion
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* Improvements to subtree definition
* Improvements to trust_anchors integration
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-09
* Editorial fixes
* Set a more accurate intended status
* Fixes to ASN.1 module
* Make log entry more friendly to single-pass verification
Since draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-10
* Adopted by working group
Since draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-00
* Address editorial comments from WG adoption call
Since draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-01
* Renamed full certificate to standalone certificate, signatureless
certificate to landmark certificate.
* Included subject public key algorithm in log entries
Since draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-02
* Renamed landmark certificate to landmark-relative certificate
* Relaxed restrictions on null_entry
* Clarify that CRLs and OCSPs apply to MTCs unmodified
Since draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-03
* Use a tlog-compatible signature scheme for ease of deployment
* Define a CA certificate representation
* Remove the one-to-many relationship between MTC CAs and CA
cosigners
* Discuss domain separation for signatures
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* Recommend a maximum log entry size for tlog compatibility
* Prescribe landmark OID allocation
* Update TLS integration now that trust anchor IDs extension has
been moved to the base draft
* A single CA now operates a series of issuance logs, instead of a
one-to-one correspondence
* Group components of a CA into a CA-specific section that
enumerates the parts of a CA
* Canonicalize the order of cosignatures in MTCProofs
* Remove sketch of tlog subtree signer API in favor of
https://github.com/C2SP/C2SP/pull/245 in [TLOG-WITNESS]
* Add an extensions block to log entries
Authors' Addresses
David Benjamin
Google LLC
Email: davidben@google.com
Devon O'Brien
Apple Inc.
Email: asymmetric@apple.com
Bas Westerbaan
Cloudflare
Email: bas@cloudflare.com
Luke Valenta
Cloudflare
Email: lvalenta@cloudflare.com
Filippo Valsorda
Geomys
Email: ietf@filippo.io
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