%% You should probably cite draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers-09 instead of this revision. @techreport{ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers-04, number = {draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers-04}, type = {Internet-Draft}, institution = {Internet Engineering Task Force}, publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force}, note = {Work in Progress}, url = {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers/04/}, author = {Aritra Banerjee and Tirumaleswar Reddy.K and Dimitrios Schoinianakis and Tim Hollebeek}, title = {{Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers}}, pagetotal = 42, year = , month = , day = , abstract = {The presence of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) would render state-of-the-art, traditional public-key algorithms deployed today obsolete, since the assumptions about the intractability of the mathematical problems for these algorithms that offer confident levels of security today no longer apply in the presence of a CRQC. This means there is a requirement to update protocols and infrastructure to use post-quantum algorithms, which are public-key algorithms designed to be secure against CRQCs as well as classical computers. These new public-key algorithms behave similarly to previous public key algorithms, however the intractable mathematical problems have been carefully chosen so they are hard for CRQCs as well as classical computers. This document explains why engineers need to be aware of and understand post-quantum cryptography. It emphasizes the potential impact of CRQCs on current cryptographic systems and the need to transition to post-quantum algorithms to ensure long-term security. The most important thing to understand is that this transition is not like previous transitions from DES to AES or from SHA-1 to SHA-2. While drop-in replacement may be possible in some cases, others will require protocol re-design to accommodate significant differences in behavior between the new post-quantum algorithms and the classical algorithms that they are replacing.}, }