LDP 'Typed Wildcard' Forwarding Equivalence Class (FEC) for PWid and Generalized PWid FEC Elements
draft-ietf-pwe3-pw-typed-wc-fec-03

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 03 and is now closed.

(Adrian Farrel; former steering group member) Yes

Thanks for a well-written document.

(Stewart Bryant; former steering group member) Yes

(Barry Leiba; former steering group member) No Objection

(Benoît Claise; former steering group member) No Objection

(Brian Haberman; former steering group member) No Objection

(Gonzalo Camarillo; former steering group member) No Objection

(Pete Resnick; former steering group member) No Objection

(Ralph Droms; former steering group member) No Objection

(Robert Sparks; former steering group member) No Objection

(Ron Bonica; former steering group member) No Objection

(Russ Housley; former steering group member) No Objection

(Sean Turner; former steering group member) No Objection

ONly a nit:

S2: R bit: r/Must/MUST

(Stephen Farrell; former steering group member) No Objection

I'm not sure if there are really no new security
considerations here, but the difference may be relatively
minor, (given how I understand these protocols are used, i.e.
without any cryptographic authentication;-).  

Anyway, my questions:

Which of the RFCs referred to in section 5 calls out that
sending a spoofed wildcard message will have a bigger
impact for lower cost for an attacker?  

Could it also be the case that an attacker able to inject one
of these needs less information about the network to cause
the same amount of damage compared to an attacker who could
not send a wildcard message?

(Wesley Eddy; former steering group member) No Objection